A Mess In The House: Dirty Pool As Rep. Schiff Inserts Loophole To Help The FBI Spy On You

from the doesn't-the-4th-amendment-matter dept

As the debate continues over the renewal of some Patriot Act provisions for NSA surveillance techniques, the House now has a chance to correct a failure by the Senate, by one measly vote, to require a warrant for the FBI to go sifting through your internet histories that the NSA scooped up along the way. The intelligence community refuses to reveal how often this is done, but Senator Wyden is indicating that it's a lot more than you think -- and he's been right pretty much every time he's made those suggestions.

It's now up to the House, and while Rep. Lofgren had a version of the warrant requirement amendment, some petty political squabbling from Democratic leadership threatened to quash it -- mainly by Rep. Adam Schiff inserting a massive loophole to allow for more warrantless surveillance. Earlier on Tuesday it was reported that, after a long weekend of haggling, it appeared that a vote will be allowed on Lofgren's Amendment and that the language had been cleared up to the point that even Senator Wyden backed it:

“After extensive bicameral, bipartisan deliberations, there will be a vote to include a final significant reform to Section 215 [of the USA Patriot Act] that protects Americans’ civil liberties,” Lofgren, a Democrat of California, said. “Without this prohibition, intelligence officials can potentially have access to information such as our personal health, religious practices, and political views without a warrant,” she added.

[...]

The Lofgren-Davidson amendment will require the FBI to obtain a warrant even if there’s only a possibility that the data it seeks is tied to a U.S. person. If the government wishes to access the IP addresses of everyone who has visited a particular website, it could not do so without a warrant unless it can “guarantee” that no U.S. persons will be identified.

Wyden's support was seen as critical, because if he felt that Schiff had torpedoed the Amendment he wouldn't support the amendment. So the original reports saying that he was on board, was a good sign. He even put out a detailed statement in support.

Then, the full language came out, and Schiff appeared to torpedo the whole deal anyway by telling the NY Times that the amendment didn't really do anything anyway:

But in his own statement, Mr. Schiff put forward a narrower emphasis. Stressing the continued need to investigate foreign threats, he described the compromise as banning the use of such orders "to seek to obtain" an American's internet information.

Soon after Wyden pulled his support of the bill, realizing that Schiff was making a ridiculous interpretation to allow for more spying on American's internet browsing habits:

“The House Intelligence Committee chairman’s assertion that the Lofgren-Davidson amendment does not fully protect Americans from warrantless collection flatly contradicts the intent of Wyden-Daines, and my understanding of the amendment agreed to earlier today. It is now clear that there is no agreement with the House Intelligence Committee to enact true protections for Americans’ rights against dragnet collection of online activity, which is why I must oppose this amendment, along with the underlying bill, and urge the House to vote on the original Wyden-Daines amendment,” Wyden said.

Again, however, I remain perplexed about Schiff trying to water this down. Remember, Schiff was literally the House manager of the Trump impeachment campaign, and more than anyone, Schiff has a front row seat to how this President has politicized all aspects of government at his disposal. You would think that's a good enough reason to pass a bill that would protect American citizens from being spied on by the FBI without a warrant (as, I should mention, the Constitution requires). Why would that be at all controversial? I get that Schiff comes from a background where he has traditionally had a kneejerk support for greater law enforcement and intelligence powers -- but given what he knows about this administration, it's crazy that he wouldn't want to restrict those powers in the hands of someone who still regularly seems to threaten his political opponents, including Schiff.

Of course, as all of this was happening, the President himself urged his supporters in Congress to vote against the bill anyway, so who the hell knows what's going on any more anyway. What is clear is that Congress had a real chance to make sure the FBI had to live under the 4th Amendment, and it appears that it has failed to do so, so far.

Filed Under: adam schiff, backdoor searches, fbi, fisa, nsa, patriot act, ron wyden, surveillance, zoe lofgren

House Democrats Have The Power To Protect Our Web Surfing From Warrantless FBI Searching; Instead, They're Pointing Fingers

from the not-a-good-look dept

You would think that House Democrat leaders like Speaker Pelosi and Reps. Adam Schiff and Jerry Nadler, who helped lead the impeachment effort against President Trump, would leap at the chance to stop Trump and the FBI from conducting warrantless searches of Americans' internet browsing habits. Instead, they seem to be supporting it and are trying to scapegoat Rep. Zoe Lofgren -- who is trying to safeguard our internet surfing -- because she's dared to push for a fix to the law. At issue is the FISA renewal bill, in which Congress has decided to take the FBI's "backdoor searches" out of the backdoor and moved them around the front: explicitly allowing the FBI to go trawling through internet/browsing/search histories collected without a warrant by the NSA.

As we've discussed, over in the Senate, Senator Ron Wyden and Steve Daines pushed for a pretty straightforward amendment to say that these searches should require a warrant (yes, the 4th Amendment alone should require that, but... ) and their amendment fell just one vote short. So even though significantly more than half of the Senate voted to require a warrant, the bill that passed out of the Senate does not require a warrant. The ball then moved to the House side, and you'd think that leadership there should just put in a similar amendment -- and, indeed, Rep. Lofgren had one ready to go. This shouldn't be a surprise. Lofgren has fought to end backdoor searches for years.

However, a story in Politico argued that Lofgren's Amendment somehow threatened to "blow up" a well-orchestrated Congressional move to make sure the FBI could keep spying without a warrant. Dell Cameron, over at Gizmodo, breaks down just how ridiculous this whole story is, and how it appears that it's actually Speaker Pelosi and Rep. Schiff who want to let the FBI warrantless searches continue, and they've strong-armed Rep. Nadler into supporting this position (Nadler, who is terrible on copyright issues, usually is pretty good on civil liberties), while trying to pin any "blame" on Lofgren.

Much of the story covers shenanigans to box out Lofgren back in February when she sought to add her version of the Wyden/Daines Amendment:

A timeline of the negotiations shared with Gizmodo, which was compiled from notes and communication logs immediately after the story ran, shows that Lofgren and her allies had been pressing the Judiciary Committee about amendments to Nadler’s bill as early as February 10.

Requests to see the text were repeatedly denied, the sources said. The same FISA reformers reportedly reached out to the committee on February 12, saying that, if adopted in the form of amendments, parts of Lofgren’s bill would ensure that Nadler’s FISA re-authorization push was even more bipartisan. The Judiciary Committee reportedly turned over a draft copy of the bill the following day, but warned that “substantial revisions” were already in the works. About a week later, the updated text was still not available.

According to this timeline, the authors of the Lofgren-Davidson amendment would not see the final text of the bill until Friday, February 21. Minus the weekend, that gave staffers roughly 24 hours to work alongside legislative counsel to draft the amendment in a way that comported with Nadler’s bill. The Lofgren-Davidson amendment was finally handed over to the Judiciary Committee that Tuesday, a full 24 hours before the markup hearing, meeting the committee’s requirements.

And when Lofgren met that deadline... Nadler cancelled the markup, effectively blocking the amendment from a vote. And this wasn't for lack of interest:

One Republican staffer, who has direct knowledge of the negotiations, told Gizmodo that Nadler had effectively burned the Democrats by cancelling the markup hearing. The appetite for reform was certainly there, they said. Not only did the Democrat’s progressive wing and the libertarian House Freedom Caucasus support it, but many other Republicans, who’ve never shown interest in privacy reform, would have campaigned on curtailing the FBI’s authority.

It would have been useful in an election year, the staffer said, if only because President Trump has so frequently and publicly accused the FBI of breaking the law.

And so now that the bill is back on the House's plate, Nadler is the official roadblock to getting this amendment in, though it sounds like Pelosi and Schiff are putting on the pressure from behind the scenes.

Two Democratic aides said that the pressure on Nadler to kill the Lofgren-Davidson amendment was coming “from all sides,” and that cancelling the February hearing was probably not his own decision. Both staffers stopped short of fingering Pelosi and Schiff, but said that “House leaders,” including “other committee chairs,” were likely involved in that effort.

Questioning what it all means for the future of the Democratic party, which has long portrayed itself as the defender of Americans’ civil liberties, one Democratic aide said: “We need to look at ourselves and say, ‘Why on earth is the Senate the body that is producing the more progressive government privacy legislation and not the House?’ Why is that? I think the answer [requires] a long look in the mirror.”

Lofgren and others are now pushing to get their amendment back on the agenda, and it sure sounds like Schiff and Pelosi are trying to stop it, with Nadler -- whose public statements seem to indicate his support, but his actions show otherwise -- the key to actually making a decision.

I still find it bizarre that this amendment is even remotely controversial. First, it's just making it clear that the 4th Amendment applies. Second, if bad shit is happening, the FBI can still get a warrant. Third, both Democrats (stop Trump from abusing his powers) and Republicans (stop the deep state from surveilling Americans) have ready-made stories to explain their votes.

So what's the damn holdup?

Filed Under: adam schiff, backdoor searches, browser history, fbi, fisa, fisa renewal, jerry nadler, nancy pelosi, nsa, patriot act, surveillance, zoe lofgren

As Congress Looks To Give FBI Broad Powers To Sniff Through Your Browsing History Sans Warrant, Wyden Asks ODNI How Often It's Used

from the wyden-siren dept

The Wyden Siren is blaring. If you're unfamiliar, Senator Wyden has a pretty long history of what is generally known as Wyden Siren letters to the Director of National Intelligence. Wyden, one of the few Senators who has consistently shown a belief in protecting the civil liberties of Americans, has spent over a decade sending letters to the Director of National Intelligence that always ask questions about how often certain very sketchy surveillance techniques are being used. And, every time he does so, it tends to be a signal that the method in question is used to a massive degree, while the intelligence community is running around insisting that it's nothing to be concerned about. If we've learned one thing, however, in all these years, it's that when Wyden asks these types of questions, it means you'd best pay attention, and the activity in question is happening way more than anyone thought before.

The latest, as first spotted by Zack Whittaker, is Wyden's letter to Acting Director of National Intelligence, Richard Grenell asking about how often the intel community and the FBI use their powers to spy on web surfing behavior:

Current law requires the DNI to report publicly on the number of targets of Section 215 collection and the number of "unique identifiers used to communicate information" the government collects. In its annual Statistical Transparency Report, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has used email addresses as an example of a "unique identifier." While this may help put into context the scale of the government's collection of email communications, I am concerned it does not necessarily apply to web browsing and internet searches. This ambiguity creates the likelihood that Congress and the American people may not be given the information to realize the scale of warrantless government surveillance of their use of the internet. I therefore request that you respond to the following questions:

How would the government apply the public reporting requirements for Section 215 to web browsing and internet searches? In this context, would the target or "unique identifier" be an IP address?

If the target or "unique identifier" is an IP address, would the government differentiate among multiple individuals using the same IP address, such as family members and roommates using the same Wi-Fi network, or could numerous users appear as a single target or "unique identifier"?

If the government were to collect web browsing information about everyone who visited a particular website, would those visitors be considered targets or "unique identifiers" for purposes of the public reporting? Would the public reporting data capture every internet user whose access to that website was collected by the government?

If the government were to collect web browsing and internet searches associated with a single user, would the public reporting requirement capture the scope of the collection? In other words, how would hte public reporting requirement distinguish between the government collecting information about a single visit to a website or a single search by one person and a month or a year of a person's internet use?

The context of all of this, of course, is the effort going on in Congress right now to renew various surveillance authorities for the NSA (which the FBI also gets access to via "backdoor searches" that require no warrant). Wyden has been pushing back against those kinds of backdoor searches for years, and in response, those putting together the renewal package seem to have decided that they should just move the backdoor to the front door, and give the FBI more explicit power to search through your browser history and internet searches (as collected by the NSA) without a warrant.

Wyden, of course, put forth an amendment to require a warrant for such searches, and that amendment fell short by just one vote. So even though at least 59 Senators think there should be warrants required for the FBI look through your browsing history, the bill still allows it (and is currently being debated in the House).

Of course, the reality here is not much of a surprise. If Grenell responds at all, any substantive response will be given in a private, classified way that means the public will not find out the answers to most of these questions. But take it from someone who has been reading these letters for many years now: each of those questions reveals exactly what the answer is almost certainly going to be. The FBI's warrantless backdoor searches of your internet surfing habits is likely to be much broader and more widespread than most people expect. And it's likely that if your IP gets snarfed up in a search, it means that they can look through not just your web surfing, but everyone who shares the network with you. Without a warrant.

Even in a normal time this should be a huge scandal. But it never is because no matter which President is in charge, it seems like they all agree that warrantless surveillance of Americans is important and should be expanded. But it's particularly ridiculous in these times, when you have a large chunk of Congress that has no reason to believe the DOJ won't abuse its powers for partisan political purposes, and the other large chunk of Congress insisting that the evil "deep state" FBI has been illegally spying on them and their friends.

Under such conditions, it should be fairly obvious that Congress should slap a warrant condition on any slurping up browsing history. And yet, that's just not happening.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, backdoor searches, browser history, fbi, fisa, nsa, odni, patriot act, renewal, richard grenell, ron wyden, warrants, wyden siren

Even As The GOP Whines About Illegal 'Deep State' Surveillance, It's Preparing To Give More Surveillance Powers To The FBI

from the fucking-hypocrites dept

We've been pretty critical of federal surveillance powers going back, well, as long as we can remember. And while Trump's biggest supporters like to insist that FISA warrant abuses were some sort of new thing that were just used against his campaign in a politically motivated manner, the reality is that it's just been standard operating procedures for the FBI to abuse the same "backdoor warrants" that were first revealed in 2013, but go back years before that. While, yes, the problems with the Carter Page surveillance were concerning, they were no more concerning than tons of other crap the FBI has done in making use of so-called backdoor warrants to surveil tons of Americans without cause.

Indeed, just this morning we were writing about how the FBI couldn't even bother to meet the most basic procedural requirements regarding the use of these backdoor searches, and violated the Constitution over and over and over again in sniffing through this huge corpus of data.

Now, you might hope that even as we've had a new rash of misleading "deep state" complaints from Trump and his fans over the past few days, the government might actually look to pull back on the authorities granted to the DOJ/FBI to spy on Americans this way, but it appears that (of course) the opposite is happening. A draft bill to renew FISA powers would expand the FBI's ability to conduct warrantless backdoor surveillance of Americans by snarfing their way through NSA collections of data.

Indeed it appears that, rather than enabling these backdoor searches through, let's just say, creative interpretation of the words in the law, the new amendment would explicitly allow such searches.

Under cover of redressing what President Donald Trump and his allies call the FBI’s “witch hunt” over collusion with the Kremlin, McConnell, via an amendment to the PATRIOT Act, will expressly permit the FBI to warrantlessly collect records on Americans’ web browsing and search histories.

As always, Senator Ron Wyden is sounding the alarm:

“Under the McConnell amendment, Barr gets to look through the web browsing history of any American—including journalists, politicians, and political rivals—without a warrant, just by saying it is relevant to an investigation,” said Wyden, who has been trying to ban warrantless surveillance on such records.

It's no surprise that the DOJ/FBI want to retain these powers, and it's even less of a surprise that Attorney General Bill Barr, who has done more to politicize the DOJ than any Attorney General in decades, wants such easily abused surveillance powers. But it does make it quite clear that those who have been whining and complaining about the "deep state", and talking about how unfair it is that Trump officials were subject to FBI surveillance, are generally full-of-shit hypocrites.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, backdoor searches, deep state, doj, fbi, fisa, mitch mcconnell, nsa, patriot act, surveillance, warrants

National Intelligence Report Shows The FBI Never Gets Warrants For Its Backdoor Searches Of NSA Collections

from the 'shows'-is-perhaps-a-strong-word-for-something-hidden-17-pages-in... dept

The Intelligence Community's latest transparency report [PDF] contains even more evidence of the FBI's inability to follow the law when helping itself to the NSA's collections. The infamous "backdoor searches" of the NSA's Section 702 collections -- which sweep up millions of electronic communications every year -- have always been a problem for the FBI. (But it's a problem the FBI likely doesn't mind having.)

Communications and data related to US persons are supposed to be minimized before being accessed by the FBI. The FBI may have permission to access this collection, but the impossible-to-stop "incidental" collection of US persons' communications means the FBI is supposed to use warrants when searching the data using US person queries. This mandate only applies to certain cases: criminal investigations not related to national security. The built-in minimization procedures are supposed to take care of the rest of the agency's backdoor searches, supposedly ensuring the FBI can't use a foreign-facing communications collection to spy on Americans.

In practice, this almost never works. It certainly didn't work in every case listed in the ODNI's latest report. Elizabeth Goitein, writing for Just Security, says the report contains more depressing admissions from the FBI. Every time the FBI has accessed US persons communications in cases where it's required to get a warrant, it hasn't bothered to get a warrant.

As minimal as this requirement is, the 2019 statistical transparency report reveals that the FBI has failed to comply with it in literally every relevant case. According to a table in the report, there were six instances in 2018 in which the FBI reviewed the contents of Americans’ communications after conducting a backdoor search in a criminal, non-national security case.

[...]

The same table indicates that the FBI obtained a warrant to review the contents of those communications exactly zero times. Similarly, for 2019, the table lists one instance in which the FBI ran a backdoor search in a criminal, non-national security case and reviewed communications content, but zero instances in which it obtained a warrant.

There's another caveat that could have salvaged these warrantless backdoor searches, making them compliant with the law. But, nope. This one doesn't work either.

[T]he requirement to obtain a warrant applies only when the investigation has reached a particular stage (namely, when it is designated as a “predicated” investigation). A footnote in the ODNI report, however, states that the Department of Justice reported “each instance” to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as a “compliance incident.” That means the warrant requirement applied—and was violated—in each case.

The news that the FBI violated the warrant requirement in every backdoor search fitting these parameters should have been front page news for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. But the ODNI apparently doesn't want this sort of information to be easily discernible in its ironically-named "Transparency Report." As Goitein points out, this news was buried in a footnote and inferred from a table on page 17. No public statement has been made by the ODNI or the FBI about its inability to secure warrants when warrants in the few instances are required.

Some may shrug this off as being of limited importance because there were only six violations. But that number only covers a single month in 2018 and those were only discovered because the DOJ decided to engage in some oversight for a change.

It's not like it's tough to adhere to the minimal demands Congress has made of the FBI when searching 702 collections. But apparently the FBI isn't up to it.

[T]here is nothing complicated about the requirement Congress imposed; it should have been an easy matter to educate FBI agents about their new obligation. There is no imaginable excuse for a compliance rate of zero percent.

The requirement has been on the books since the beginning of 2018. The FBI still couldn't find a way to comply with the warrant mandate several months later. This isn't acceptable, not when the agency is using a foreign-facing collection that's subject to almost zero oversight to search for communications incidentally swept up by the NSA's dragnet. It has continually abused this privilege to search unminimized communications and engage in domestic surveillance while pretending to be only interested in foreign terrorists. The FBI is a serial domestic abuser. For too many years, Congress and the FISA Court have been its enabler.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, backdoor searches, constitution, fbi, nsa, surveillance, warrants

Second Circuit Says Warrantless Backdoor Searches Of NSA Collections Might Violate The Fourth Amendment

from the stay-in-your-own-lane,-g-men dept

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested -- not exactly ruled -- that backdoor searches of Section 702 collections targeting Americans (citizens and permanent residents) is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The case involves Agron Hasbajrami, a lawful permanent resident who was arrested in 2011 as he attempted to board a flight to Turkey. The government claimed Agron -- an Albanian immigrant -- was ultimately headed to Pakistan to join a terrorist organization.

Agron is somewhat of a unicorn. He's one of the few defendants that's actually been informed the evidence used against him was derived from NSA collections under Section 702. The DOJ is supposed to be proactive about this, but instead has chosen to emphasize parallel construction over transparency.

The evidence appears to have come from a backdoor search by the FBI. The FBI is allowed to access Section 702 collections, but domestic data and communications are supposed to be "minimized" to protect US persons swept up by the NSA. If the FBI performs backdoor searches to access Americans' communications that have been incidentally collected by the NSA foreign-facing surveillance programs, it should have to obtain a warrant. But that's not actually the case for a couple of reasons. First, very few defendants are ever informed of the true source of the evidence against them. Second, the secrecy shrouding the NSA's collections and the Intelligence Community's access prevents a lot of judicial examination in the few cases where evidence can actually be challenged.

The Second Circuit's ruling [PDF] kicks Hasbajrami's case back down to the lower court so it can reexamine the Fourth Amendment implications of warrantless backdoor searches. The Appeals Court has no problem with the NSA's collections, which putatively target foreigners. The court says these are lawful. Accessing collected communications from Americans via the NSA's collections, not so much.

The issue here isn't the collection itself or any inadvertent collection of US persons' communications. The problem is the querying of stored communications without a warrant when the target of the queries is a US person. The court doesn't say the FBI can't look at its own stored collections without a warrant to locate intelligence or evidence. Stuff it has already acquired is fair game, more or less. The court makes a physical analogy:

It is true the FBI does not need an additional warrant to go down to its evidence locker and look through a box of evidence it collected from a crime scene.

But that's where the analogy ends.

But lawful collection alone is not always enough to justify a future search.

Pointing to the Riley decision, the court notes that the lawful seizure of an arrestee's phone does not give law enforcement the right to perform a warrantless search of its contents.

Searching the FBI's own data stores tipped to it by the NSA isn't nearly as problematic as what the FBI appears to have done here: browsing the NSA's much larger collection without a warrant to find more communications originating from a US person. Say goodbye to any flattering "evidence locker" analogies.

If such a vast body of information [250 million emails as of 2011] is simply stored in a database, available for review by request from domestic law enforcement agencies solely on the speculative possibility that evidence of interest to agents investigating a particular individual might be found there, the program begins to look more like a dragnet, and less like an individual officer going to the evidence locker to check out a previously-acquired piece of evidence against some newfound insight.

And there's where the Fourth Amendment fits in:

To permit that information to be accessed indiscriminately, for domestic law enforcement purposes, without any reason to believe that the individual is involved in any criminal activity and or even that any information about that person is likely to be in the database, just to see if there is anything incriminating in any conversations that might happen to be there, would be at odds with the bedrock Fourth Amendment concept that law enforcement agents may not invade the privacy of individuals without some objective reason to believe that evidence of a crime will be found by a search.

The case returns to the lower court so it can consider the Fourth Amendment implications it chose to ignore when considering the defendant's motion to suppress evidence that is starting to look like it was acquired unconstitutionally.

If this results in suppression, this case is going to travel right back up the judicial ladder. There's no way the government is going to let its backdoor searches be subject to a warrant requirement. Warrants create paper trails, and the last thing the IC wants is more paperwork linking domestic surveillance to foreign-facing NSA collections. This isn't a win yet, but if the district court aligns itself with the Appeals Court's suggestions, it could be a game changer.

Filed Under: 2nd circuit, 4th amendment, agron hasbajrami, backdoor searches, evidence, fbi, nsa, parallel construction, section 702

FISA Court Finds The FBI Is Still Violating The Fourth Amendment With Its Abuse Of NSA Collections

from the no-surprises-here dept

The NSA isn't the only agency to abuse its surveillance powers. The FBI's ability to access unminimized data harvested by the NSA has resulted in abuse after abuse, as the FBI loves to use the massive data haul to perform "backdoor searches" of its domestic targets.

This concern has been raised repeatedly, most notably by Sen. Ron Wyden, who has been calling out surveillance abuses for years -- specifically calling out these backdoor searches and hinting (strongly) that they are much more prevalent than most people believed. Nothing much has been done about it, other than multiple federal agencies suggesting they too should be put on the ever-growing list of entities with access to the NSA's multiple collections.

A FISA Court opinion released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) details even more abuse of the NSA's Section 702 collections by the FBI. When you give an agency the power to dig into massive amounts of data with minimal oversight, abuses will happen. But this goes further than "inadvertent" collections or erroneous access of unminimized data. This ruling [PDF] -- first reported on by the Wall Street Journal -- shows the FBI treats sensitive collections as its personal playground.

The October 2018 court ruling identifies improper searches of raw intelligence databases by the bureau in 2017 and 2018 that were deemed problematic in part because of their breadth, which sometimes involved queries related to thousands or tens of thousands of pieces of data, such as emails or telephone numbers. In one case, the ruling suggested, the FBI was using the intelligence information to vet its personnel and cooperating sources. Federal law requires that the database only be searched by the FBI as part of seeking evidence of a crime or for foreign-intelligence information.

In other instances, the court ruled that the database had been improperly used by individuals. In one case, an FBI contractor ran a query of an intelligence database—searching information on himself, other FBI personnel and his relatives, the court revealed.

The partially-redacted, 138-page opinion makes it clear the FBI has frequently abused its access to the NSA's surveillance collections, which include emails, phone numbers, and a host of other digital detritus. Using collections authorized only to be used for national security purposes to perform security reviews of FBI personnel is obviously contrary to the intention of the program -- a purpose that is always reiterated loudly any time someone suggests surveillance should be curtailed. This opinion vindicates Wyden's incessant demands the FBI come clean about its backdoor searches. Wyden argued the FBI abused this power frequently. This opinion makes it clear the FBI abuses its "backdoor" access to domestic data constantly.

The weirdest thing is the Trump DOJ argued in court the program the FBI abused cannot be modified without harming the security of the nation. Yep, the administration that claims the "Deep State" is out to get it showed up in court to argue the Deep State should not have its power curtailed.

The court rejected this faulty premise. It also pointed out how severely any misuse of this power contains the potential to harm dozens, if not thousands, of people. Considering the breadth of the collection, running a single improper search returns hundreds, if not thousands, of records the FBI has no business retrieving. Using the database to vet employees or perform natsec vanity searches does not comply with the restrictions on the FBI's searches, which are only supposed to return data related to criminal activity (and then only certain crimes) and/or foreign intelligence information.

As usual, Sen. Ron Wyden was the first to go on record criticizing the FBI and its backdoor searches following the release of the FISA opinion.

Last year, when Congress reauthorized Section 702 of FISA, it accepted the FBI's outright refusal to account for all its warrantless backdoor searches of Americans. Today's release demonstrates how baseless the FBI's position was and highlights Congress' constitutional obligation to act independently and strengthen the checks and balances on government surveillance. The information released today also reveals serious abuses in the FB's backdoor searches, underscoring the need for the government to seek a warrant before searching through mountains of private data on Americans. Finally, I am concerned that the government has redacted information in these releases that the public deserves to know.

Wyden makes good points. And they're points he's made for years. Unfortunately, the FBI continues to do the stuff it shouldn't and the public has to read between the redactions in an (often vain) attempt to see what's being done to them in the name of "national security."

The abuses will continue until Congress or the FISA Court decide they've seen enough. While both entities have chastised agencies with access to NSA collections, neither have taken any action that will head off future misuse of surveillance databases in the future. We're a reactionary nation when it comes to surveillance abuse and that's just not going to prevent future abuses. But that's the nature of the national security beast. No one's allowed to know what's going on until after everything bad has happened.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, backdoor searches, fbi, fisa court, fisc, nsa, odni, ron wyden, vanity searches

FBI Swept Up Info About Aaron Swartz While Pursuing An Al-Qaeda Investigation

from the stocking-the-back-room-for-a-rainy-day-of-searches dept

The FBI has the power to collect massive amounts of data and communications during its investigations. This power periodically ingests NATSEC steroids, pumping the FBI's data stores full of stuff not relevant to the NSA's work, but possibly relevant to the FBI's crime-fighting duties.

You would think the FBI would toss anything not relevant to an investigation. Just in terms of storage and haystack-sorting, it would only make sense to discard data/communications not needed for ongoing investigations. But you'd be wrong. The FBI holds on to everything it gets because you never know: the irrelevancies you hoovered up yesterday might be useful today.

That's pretty much what happened to Aaron Swartz, according to documents published by Dell Cameron of Gizmodo.

Nearly two years before the U.S. government’s first known inquiry into the activities of Reddit co-founder and famed digital activist Aaron Swartz, the FBI swept up his email data in a counterterrorism investigation that also ensnared students at an American university, according to a once-secret document first published by Gizmodo.

The email data belonging to Swartz, who was likely not the target of the counterterrorism investigation, was cataloged by the FBI and accessed more than a year later as it weighed potential charges against him for something wholly unrelated.

The data collected -- most likely obtained with an NSL -- came from Pittsburgh University. It was part of a data haul associated with the FBI's terrorism investigation. Swartz was never the target of this Al-Qaeda investigation but the information obtained remained in the FBI's data stores even though the FBI had no reason to hold onto non-hit data.

When the FBI did start looking in Swartz's activities, it found his email address in the stored data it had obtained from the university in 2007. This apparently happened in 2008, around the time the FBI was trying to determine if Swartz had violated any laws by freeing millions of court documents from PACER.

The FBI targeted a foreign terrorist entity but ended up with an untold amount of email metadata originating from US persons' accounts. The only reason we're seeing any evidence of the FBI's backdoor domestic searches come to light is Aaron Swartz's inadvertent involvement. If it hadn't been for a high-profile prosecution and Swartz's tragic suicide, public interest in the FBI's investigative activities surrounding Swartz would likely have minimal public interest. But Swartz's prosecution and death have put more eyes on the case, including those of transparency group Property of the People, which obtained this document through an FOIA lawsuit against the agency.

This document is more evidence the FBI abuses its investigative privileges. The agency engages in foreign-facing terrorism investigations, hoovering up as much "relevant" data as it can. Rather than discard everything not related to the investigation, the FBI stores it indefinitely. When the FBI opens a domestic investigation, it can give itself a head start by digging through its data stores for info it has "inadvertently" gathered on American citizens. The information the FBI already has on hand -- info it really can't justify keeping -- helps build cases against Americans while depriving them of their right to challenge the evidence against them. Americans don't know about this evidence because it's laundered by NSLs, warrants, and whatever else the FBI needs to deploy to duplicate the results of data store searches the agency has already performed.

Filed Under: aaron swartz, al qaeda, backdoor searches, fbi, foia, nsa, terrorism

A Bunch Of Politicians Who Complain About Trump's Authoritarian Tendencies Just Gave Him 6 Years To Warrantlessly Spy On Americans

from the because-reasons dept

As was widely expected after Tuesday's close vote on cloture, the Senate officially voted to renew (in a somewhat expanded way) Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act by a vote of 65 to 34. That also means a few of those who voted against cloture switched over and voted for the program, including Senators Ted Cruz and Chuck Schumer. President Trump will almost certainly sign the bill shortly, despite confusing basically everyone last week by tweeting out complaints about the program, despite his White House vehemently supporting it.

Trump's confusion isn't all that surprising. What is surprising is just how many people who have been complaining and warning about Trump made this possible. In the House, vocal Trump critics including Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff and Eric Swalwell were among those who voted for this bill which, again, gives the FBI the power to spy on Americans without warrants via the collection of content (not metadata) swept up by the NSA. While defenders of the program keep insisting the program cannot be used to "target" Americans, they leave out that a ridiculous amount of American content is swept up into this collection, which can then be sifted through without a warrant, including a huge amount of communications of Americans.

Over on the Senate side, things were even more ridiculous. Senator Jeff Flake voted for cloture, helping to end (the already non-existing) debate on such surveillance, and blocking any amendments. And then, the very next morning, went on the Senate floor to slam the President, compare him to Stalin, and warn that our democracy may not survive. Again, this was mere hours after Senator Flake voted to give more surveillance powers to the President he was about to compare to Stalin.

Or how about Dianne Feinstein? It may be no surprise that Feinstein voted to continue and expand surveillance -- she has a long history of doing exactly that. But just about an hour before voting for cloture, Feinstein herself introduced an amendment that would have required a warrant to search the corpus of data collected under 702. And then she voted to block that amendment from even being voted on. Let me repeat that, because it's just that insane: Feinstein introduced an amendment to the 702 renewal, that would have required a warrant to sniff through the data... and then voted against allowing that amendment to be heard and voted on. Within an hour or so. And, since cloture needed 60 votes and just squeezed through with those 60 votes... Feinstein could have changed the debate herself. But chose not to.

Or how about Senator Claire McCaskill. She was the final vote for cloture and took over an hour after the vote was called to actually reach the floor. She was the actual deciding vote, as, if she voted against it, the cloture vote would have had only 59 yaes, and the debate would have continued, and amendments proposed. Trump has been loudly denouncing McCaskill for months as she's facing a tough reelection campaign. And her response was to deny any further debate or amendments and to vote to give Trump more surveillance powers.

These are not the only ones. Many vocal critics of the President just handed him much greater power to warrantlessly spy on Americans -- something the President (in a confused way) complained about concerning what he believed (incorrectly) was illegal spying on his own campaign.

Zack Whittaker at ZDnet has also compiled a list of elected officials who had put out earlier statements promising to reform surveillance... only to then vote for this program. It includes both Swalwell and Feinstein mentioned above, but many others as well.

Over at Lawfare, a site that has long defended basically every aspect of the surveillance state, reliable surveillance defenders Jack Goldsmith and Susan Hennessey tried to defend the paradox of not trusting Trump, but giving him the ability to warrantlessly spy on Americans. The crux of it is basically... "we don't trust Trump, but there are good people in the intelligence and law enforcement communities and they'd never abuse these powers."

More broadly, one of the underappreciated developments in the post-Snowden-revelations era is the absence of credible allegations of political or venal use of 702 authorities. In essence, the public evidence confirms that the problems that used to bedevil secret electronic surveillance through the Hoover/Nixon era—namely, senior political figures deploying intelligence agencies and tools for inappropriate, abusive political purposes—have been resolved by a robust legal regime of oversight and reporting. When Sen. Elizabeth Warren points to the surveillance abuses directed at Martin Luther King Jr. to argue against 702, she actually highlights the opposite point: the massive transparency, both voluntary and involuntary, over the past few years about how Section 702 operates shows that it has not been abused for domestic political spying and implies that the 40 years of post-Hoover legal reforms are largely a success (though not without hiccups). The fact that President Trump has not focused his abusive energies on intelligence collection is a testament to the efficacy of the legal and cultural constraints on electronic surveillance.

Not surprisingly, Marcy Wheeler rips these claims to shreds in a response on her own blog, noting that beyond factual errors in the piece, it more or less ignores the FBI's role in all of this. Even if we grant the (incorrect) claim that the NSA doesn't abuse this data, that's not at all clear on the FBI side -- especially when the FBI refuses to provide any details at all:

You can’t pass a bill that effectively blesses FBI’s use of back door searches on Americans about whom it has no evidence of any wrongdoing, while admitting you don’t know how FBI conducts those back door searches, and make any claim to conduct adequate oversight. Rather, the bill permits FBI to continue practices it has stubbornly refused to brief Congress on, rather than demanding that FBI brief Congress first, so Congress can impose any restrictions that might be necessary to adequately protect Americans.

Furthermore, Wheeler notes that Hennessey and Goldsmith completely ignore how this gives Attorney General Jeff Sessions incredible unreviewable power to make use of this warrantless data for criminal prosecutions, hiding where he got the information from.

But it’s the unreviewable authority for Jeff Sessions bit that is the real problem.

We know, for example, that painting Black Lives Matter as a national security threat is key to the Trump-Sessions effort to criminalize race. We also know that Trump has accused his opponents of treason, all for making critical comments about Trump.

This bill gives Sessions unreviewable authority to decide that a BLM protest organized using or whistleblowing relying on Tor, discovered by collection done in the name of hunting Russian spies, can be referred for prosecution. The fact that the underlying data predicating any prosecution was obtained without a warrant under 702 would — in part because this bill doesn’t add teeth to FISA notice — ensure that courts would never learn the genesis of the prosecution. Even if a court somehow managed to do so, however, it could never deem the domestic surveillance unlawful because the bill gives Jeff Sessions the unreviewable authority to treat dissent as a national security threat.

This is such an obviously bad idea, and it is being supported by people who talk incessantly about the threat that Trump and Sessions present. Yet, rather than addressing the issue head on (which I doubt Hennessey could legally do in any case), they simply remain silent about what is the biggest complaint from privacy activists, that this gives a racist, vindictive Attorney General far more authority than he should have, and does so without fixing the inadequate protections for criminal defendants along the way.

And, now, it appears that (unless Fox News somehow intervenes again) the President will sign this bill. EFF has put out an open letter about how awful this is, and how it intends to fight this in court. But, this was a major missed opportunity, and what's most incredible and disappointing is how many people who complain about Trump's authoritarian tendencies were central to making it possible.

Filed Under: adam schiff, backdoor searches, dianne feinstein, eric swalwell, fbi, fisa, jeff sessions, nancy pelosi, nsa, section 702, surveillance

Senator Wyden's 702 Reform Bill Would Limit Backdoor Searches, Permanently Kill 'About' Collection

from the incidental-permadeath dept

As promised, Ron Wyden (along with Rand Paul) has delivered an antidote to the Senate Intelligence Committee's completely terrible Section 702 "reform" bill. That bill, authored by Sen. Burr, would extend the NSA's 702 powers until 2025 while allowing US law enforcement to use collected intelligence for normal law enforcement purposes. It also would have turned the NSA's "about" collection back on, provided no one opposed it with directly-targeted legislation. This program's ability to "inadvertently" sweep up US persons' communications was so concerning the NSA voluntarily shut it off. (It asked to have it turned back on less than two months later, however.)

Charlie Savage of the New York Times has published the latest draft of the Wyden reform bill, titled the USA RIGHTS Act of 2017. (His annotated version of the bill can be found here.) Wyden's bill [PDF] makes several significant changes, including codification of the NSA's voluntary "about" collection shut down.

Beyond preventing the NSA from resuming a collection it has abused since inception, the bill also shortens the extension period to 2021, ensuring the next debate over Section 702 collections isn't put off for nearly a decade. (The Burr bill extended the sunset to 2025. The House Subcommittee's lukewarm reform bill set it at 2023.)

It also would attempt to close the "backdoor search" loophole that allows US government agencies to obtain domestic communications without a warrant. Wyden's bill adds a warrant requirement for these searches -- including those with a national security purpose. This serves two purposes. First, it brings the collection of domestic communications via NSA surveillance back in line with the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, it provides for better accountability by ensuring any database searches leave a paper trail. It also bans the acquisition of content "known to be entirely domestic."

The bill also provides for better notification of prosecutors' use of Section 702-derived evidence. It limits the use of Section 702 surveillance to national security cases, with one exception: direct approval from the Attorney General. The new notification requirements will attempt to circumvent parallel construction by preventing the government from withholding notification if there is any other conceivable way it could have obtained the same evidence (inevitable discovery, normal law enforcement surveillance methods, etc.).

It also adds further reporting requirements, including mandatory production of numbers Wyden has been seeking for years: incidentally-collected US persons' communications. It would also require the FBI to turn over the number of US persons queries it performs using NSA-collected intel.

There are other good aspects to the bill -- stuff normally not discussed during surveillance authority sunsetting. The bill would divest the power currently held by Chief Justice John Roberts. Chief justices have controlled FISA court judge selection for most of the last 30 years, resulting in a long stream of conservative picks, many of them former government prosecutors. This bill would allow all 13 circuits to nominate judges for FISC posts, which should help prevent future FISA judge picks from being so closely aligned with the Chief Justice's views.

Finally, the bill also provides for additional Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board input. The PCLOB is all but dead, but if it's revived, it would have access to Intelligence Community whistleblower complaints.

This is the best reform bill we've seen offered yet. But the clock continues to tick down to 702's renewal. Chances are, Sen. Burr's control of the Senate Intelligence Committee isn't going to do much to ensure this bill moves forward intact, if it moves forward at all. Between Burr and Sen. Feinstein, the oversight committee has been internally limited in terms of actual oversight. Wyden's presence on the committee is the wild card, but entrenched powers continue to limit his effectiveness. Hopefully, some of this bill will replace the worthless, toothless "reforms" proposed by Sen. Burr and continue to nudge the Intelligence Community towards compliance with a number of Constitutional amendments.

Filed Under: about collection, backdoor searches, nsa, rand paul, reform, ron wyden, section 702, surveillance