Former FBI Agent: NYPD's Muslim-Spying Demographics Unit Was Almost Completely Useless

from the holds-several-'most-rights-violated'-trophies,-however dept

Certain demographics are desirable. 18-34? Taste-makers and early adopters. 35-49? Money. Muslim and New York City resident? Being a member of this group meant (until recently) having First Amendment-protected activities being closely scrutinized by the NYPD's now-defunct "Demographics Unit."

This special unit was recently disbanded, roughly a decade after it should have been, thanks to a new mayor and a new police commissioner. The unit was put together by a former CIA officer who used the post-9/11 attack climate to push for expansive surveillance of the city's Muslim population, including designating entire mosques as terrorist-related entities. Despite all the extra attention being paid to Muslims, not a single useful investigation resulted from this unit's work.

The surveillance being done by this unit so pervasively subverted civil liberties protections that not even the CIA could access the NYPD's files without breaking its internal rules. The same goes for the FBI, which has long partnered with the NYPD in its counter-terrorism efforts. Don Borelli, a former FBI agent, has written a piece for the New York Daily News, detailing why police commissioner Bill Bratton was right to disband the Demographics Unit.

Together, we were able to stop many threats — and save many lives — including a serious plot against the subways from Najibullah Zazi, an ethnic Afghan who grew up in Queens and went on to become an Al Qaeda operative.

Interestingly enough, the NYPD demographics unit had detailed files on Zazi's neighborhood in Flushing during the period in which he was becoming radicalized. It kept files on businesses and visited coffee shops believed to be hangouts for potential terrorists. The unit even visited the travel agency where Zazi bought his ticket to travel to Afghanistan for terrorism training.

So why wasn't Zazi identified until he was driving to New York from Denver to blow up the subway? Because the program was ineffective. The mission of the demographics unit was to spot the terrorists in the haystack, but again and again it failed to do so.

All haystack, no needle, like so many other surveillance programs. The unit overwhelmed itself in useless data, keeping it from finding what it needed when it mattered most. These data swamps built by investigative agencies have proven to be more dangerous than old-fashioned police work.

During my time with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, I read many reports derived from investigations conducted by the NYPD Intelligence Division, which may well have relied on the demographics unit's work. I was presented with many interesting facts about where people were attending Friday prayers and who belonged to various Muslim student associations.

But rarely did I learn anything I didn't already know through traditional investigations, much less anything that would have led me to open a terrorism investigation.

Adding to the mess here is the NYPD's twisted relationship with the FBI. While it clearly enjoys access to G-men and their tools, former police chief Ray Kelly often made it clear that his officers did superior work and that the FBI's production of information was too slow to be useful. Of course, FBI agents have said the same thing about the NYPD, particularly in the information department, where the sharing was usually a one-way street that flowed out of the FBI and into the NYPD's hands.

Beyond the antagonistic relationship is the Demographic Unit itself -- its own worst enemy. The former CIA officer who had a local judge rewrite guidelines to give the NYPD unprecedented permission for pervasive surveillance also managed to ensure that most info flowing back upstream to the FBI ended up being routed directly into the trash can.

Moreover, I wound up shredding some of these reports because they had no investigative value and, in my opinion, did not belong in any FBI file because they solely reported on what was First Amendment-protected activity.

Much like other failures to stop terrorist activity, the problems here were communication (too little) and information (too much). As Borelli notes, in his experience, it's been more useful to build trust than to endlessly spy, something the NYPD really hasn't made much effort to foster over the years. But its failure to do so means it has buried itself in data and alienated those who could bring an inside perspective. A decade's worth of spying resulted in nothing but violated rights.

Filed Under: demographics unit, fbi, muslims, new york city, nyc, nypd

Over 120 Rights And Religious Groups Join ACLU In Call For DOJ To Investigate NYPD's Surveillance Of Muslims

from the pushing-back dept

Over the last few years, the NYPD's intrusive surveillance of the city's Muslim population has raised many concerns about civil liberty violations while simultaneously failing to turn up much in the way of terrorist plots.

The ACLU has gathered the support of 125 civil rights, religious, racial justice and other community organizations, all of which have signed its letter requesting that the DOJ investigate the NYPD's surveillance of Muslims.

Dear Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuels and Section Chief Smith:

The undersigned civil rights, faith, community, and advocacy groups request that the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice commence a prompt investigation under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 into the New York City Police Department’s (“NYPD”) discriminatory surveillance of American Muslim communities.

As shown by the NYPD’s own documents, for over a decade, the Department has engaged in unlawful religious profiling and suspicionless surveillance of Muslims in New York City (and beyond). This surveillance is based on the false and unconstitutional premise, reflected in the NYPD’s published “radicalization” theory, that Muslim religious belief, practices, and community engagement are grounds for law enforcement scrutiny. That is a premise rooted in ignorance and bias: it is wrong and unfairly stigmatizes Muslims, who are a law-abiding, diverse, and integral part of our nation and New York City. Unsurprisingly, the NYPD’s surveillance program has had far-reaching, deeply negative effects on Muslims’ constitutional rights by chilling speech and religious practice and harming religious goals and missions. It has frayed the social fabric of Muslim communities by breeding anxiety, distrust, and fear. The NYPD’s biased policing practices hurt not only Muslims, but all communities who rightfully expect that law enforcement will serve and protect America’s diverse population equally, without discrimination.

Under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 210401, the United States Attorney General is authorized to conduct investigations concerning “a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a)...

As we've seen previously, the NYPD has placed blanket surveillance on entire mosques, justifying it with guidelines weakened by a former CIA officer who exploited post-9/11 paranoia to broadly expand the department's surveillance powers and eliminate built-in protection of civil liberties. This surveillance continues to this day despite an NYPD official admitting these programs have yet to generate a single useful lead or investigation.

The ACLU has drawn support across a variety of religious groups, many of which recognize that while the NYPD may be focused on Muslims now, any other religious (or political, activist, etc.) group could be subject to the same intrusive surveillance if a future attack brings with it guilt by association.

If the DOJ follows through, this will be the second time in recent months that it has weighed in on the NYPD's questionable tactics. Back in June, Attorney General Eric Holder filed a brief recommending that if Judge Scheindlin found the department's stop-and-frisk program to be unconstitutional, independent oversight should be appointed to keep the department in line. Sheindlin did find elements of the program unconstitutional and one of the remedies was, indeed, independent oversight.

As was pointed out then, the DOJ's reputation may be terrible, but one of the few areas in which it has been "aggressive and commendable" is its handling of civil rights violations by police departments. Hopefully, this will result in more of the same.

Filed Under: doj, investigation, muslims, nyc, nypd

Recent Revelations Prompt Motion To Block NYPD's Surveillance Of Muslims

from the this-will-all-seem-eerily-familiar-to-the-presiding-judge dept

A recent investigative report on the NYPD's surveillance of mosques has led to a possible revisiting of the Handschu Agreement by the federal judge presiding over a lawsuit filed against the city seeking to bar further surveillance of Muslims in New York City.

According to the 1985 ruling, the Handschu Agreement limited indiscriminate surveillance of purely political activity. If such surveillance was to take place, it first had to be approved by the three-member Handschu Authority and performed only by the specially-designated Public Security Section, a division of NYPD Intelligence. It also prohibited the videotaping or photographing of large public gatherings when there was no indication of criminal activity and forbade the sharing of information with outside agencies unless they agreed to be bound by the limitations of the Agreement.

This is what was assumed to be in place. When the plaintiffs filed in February, their attorney pointed out that the police activity that had been observed clearly violated those limitations.

The police measures directed at Muslims violate the Handschu decree "because they're not rooted in the fact that there's a criminal predicate," said plaintiff attorney Paul Chevigny. "They're rooted in the fact that the subjects are Muslims."

It was exactly as it looked: Muslims being placed under surveillance simply because they attended certain mosques -- mosques the NYPD had declared to be "terrorist organizations."

The city has countered by claiming that it closely observes the Handschu guidelines when making decisions about how to fight terror. A city lawyer, Peter Farrell, told the judge on Tuesday that the department launches investigations based on evidence of legitimate threats, not on religion.

"It's undeniable that New York City remains at the center of the threat by Islamists who have been radicalized to violence," he said.

What the city lawyer's conveniently left out was that the Handschu guidelines had been deliberately weakened by the NYPD, thanks to the efforts of a former CIA officer and his CIA liaison, who formed a so-called "Demographics Group" that was charged with monitoring activity by the city's Muslims.

[T]he activities that [CIA liaison Larry] Sanchez and [former senior CIA officer David] Cohen were proposing would not have been permitted under the Handschu guidelines. So, on September 12, 2002, Cohen filed a 23-page document in federal court asking a judge to throw out the guidelines and give his officers more leeway.

Cohen insisted that the world had changed since Al Qaeda attacked America, and the NYPD needed to change with it. “These changes were not envisioned when the Handschu guidelines were agreed upon,” he wrote, “and their continuation dangerously limits the ability of the NYPD to protect the people it is sworn to serve.”

The severely watered-down Handschu guidelines were approved by Judge Charles Haight. The name remained unchanged and most New Yorkers were unaware that hardly any limitations remained tied to the Agreement.

After securing this expanded definition (which also thoroughly abused the word "related"), the Demographics Group proceeded to declare entire mosques as "terrorist organizations" and began constant surveillance of their members. And, contrary to what the city's lawyer declared, it has yet to be proven by the NYPD or anyone else that New York is the "center of the threat by Islamists." The NYPD has spent millions of dollars and thousands of manhours surveilling and investigating Muslims and has turned up exactly zero useful leads.

When the plaintiffs filed this case, they had no idea the Handschu guidelines had been so thoroughly eviscerated. Armed with this new knowledge, the plaintiffs have asked the city to turn over so-called "investigative statements" related to these surveillance operations. The city won't even meet them halfway, offering only to turn over a "handful" for the plaintiffs' lawyers to view without making them part of the public record.

Technically, the city is correct: the NYPD is following the guidelines, as they have been altered, not as they were originally written.

The presiding judge says he will rule at a later date. However, one key factor is problematic. The presiding judge is Charles Haight, the same judge who agreed to relax those rules for the NYPD back in 2002. When he says something like this, it's hard to know how to take it.

"I've come to think of this case as a volcano that's asleep most of the time ... but every now and then blows up," U.S. District Judge Charles Haight said at the start of a hearing in federal court in Manhattan.

This "volcano" is at least partially of his own making. Haight knows how few restrictions remain under those guidelines. The NYPD can "closely observe" the relaxed Handschu guidelines and still place entire mosques under surveillance. The protections remaining are so weak and the scope of what is deemed "terrorist-related" so broad that even the CIA itself is unable to use the information collected by the Demographics Unit because doing so means violating CIA policies regarding domestic surveillance.

But it appears (although details are incredibly light) that Haight may revisit his own decision relaxing those guidelines. His upcoming ruling will determine whether the near-useless offer the city's lawyer made will be sufficient or if the city will need to cough up what's been requested: investigative statements related to "any operation targeting Muslims." Haight will also make the call as to whether the documents will remain "off the record."

The NYPD has never been very responsive when asked to turn over information, but considering this order may come from a federal judge, rather than a member of the public, the response time might be a little quicker. As for the plaintiffs, it would seem they drew possibly the least sympathetic judge to hear this case. But who knows, maybe Haight's had a change of heart over the years. Many rash legislative and legal decisions were made shortly after the 9/11 attacks and there have been more than a few who have expressed regret for their decisions or dismay at the continual expansion of already-broad policies. Haight might be one of the ones who regrets his decision. Fortunately, he's still in a position to make some changes.

Filed Under: handschu authority, mosques, muslims, nypd, surveillance

NYPD Spent Years Spying On Muslims, Generated Exactly Zero Leads

from the security-theater dept

We just wrote about yet another (in a long line) of manufactured terrorist plots, in which the FBI creates its own terrorist plot to arrest anyone who can be coaxed into going along for the ride, even if they had no interest or ability to push the plot forward on their own. In that case, it was even more ridiculous, because they couldn't even find anyone willing to go along with the plot -- and the main "suspect" actually alerted the FBI to the informant who was trying to coax him into taking part in a plot (which didn't stop him from being arrested, even if the case was eventually dropped).

Of course, the FBI is not alone in its incredibly ham-fisted anti-terrorism efforts in which the focus seems to be much more about someone's religious leanings, rather than any actual interest in creating terror. The NY Police Department got plenty of attention for deciding to build their own local versions of the FBI and CIA to try to catch terrorists. That link describes the NYPD as a sort of new "elite" intelligence agency, hiring people out of other intelligence agencies and then placing agents around the globe to try to beat the FBI and CIA at their own game.

Back at home, apparently this included following on the FBI's tactic of assuming that "brown skin = terrorist." As such, they've spent the past few years spying on "Muslim neighbrhoods" throughout New York (with help from the CIA), sending undercover agents and informants into Muslim groups and organizations:

The Demographics Unit is at the heart of a police spying program, built with help from the CIA, which assembled databases on where Muslims lived, shopped, worked and prayed. Police infiltrated Muslim student groups, put informants in mosques, monitored sermons and catalogued every Muslim in New York who adopted new, Americanized surnames.

Police hoped the Demographics Unit would serve as an early warning system for terrorism. And if police ever got a tip about, say, an Afghan terrorist in the city, they'd know where he was likely to rent a room, buy groceries and watch sports.

How useful has it been? Apparently not at all. Not a single lead has come out of the program. Not one.

I know this is a crazy thought, but perhaps violating the privacy of tons of people just because of the color of their skin or their religion, isn't the best (or even "a") way to stop terrorists.

Filed Under: civil liberties, muslims, new york city, nyc, privacy, profiling, spying, terrorism

FBI-Created 'Terrorist Plot' Fails To Produce A Single Terrorist -- But Does Plenty Of Damage To Individual Liberties

from the sacrificing-your-1st-and-4th-amendment-rights-on-the-altar-of-security dept

As the FBI continues its perfect streak of successfully thwarting every terrorist plan it has conceived and put in motion itself (a few of which have been covered here), details of an unintentionally hilarious (and particularly horrendous) "terrorist plot" conjured up back in 2006 have emerged, thanks to an NPR expose and a lawsuit filed against the FBI by some of the unwilling participants.

Dubbed "Operation Flex" in deference to its main participant, this 2006 FBI project attempted to uncover a terrorist cell in a group of Orange County Muslims, even if it had to invent that cell itself. The FBI's man on the inside was Craig Montielh, who likely cut an incongruous figure at the mosque at 6'2", 260 lbs... and white. A bodybuilder with a sketchy past, Montielh was instructed to make contact with the supposed jihadists during his frequent visits to an Irvine gym where many of the Muslim men worked out.

To Montielh's credit, he sunk himself into the role. His FBI contacts suspected his new friends might be a terrorist cell because, well, they were four, unmarried Egyptian men living under one roof. But his enthusiasm for the job was constantly thwarted by his "targets," who preferred playing FIFA Soccer on the Xbox to discussing terrorist plots.

At first, they treated Montielh (who was going by the name "Farouk") as one of them, a new acolyte in need of guidance. But as time went on and Montielh became desperate to show results, his desire to turn idle revolutionary chat into action began to worry his companions. Montielh's first move was to amp up his personal relationship with Allah.

Months passed. People noticed that Craig was acting more devout. He began reciting prayers aloud, dressing in traditional robes, and showing up so early for 5:00 AM prayers that he'd get there before the person who unlocked the mosque every morning. They also noticed something else.

Yassir Abdel Rahim - Slowly and surely enough, during some times when we were having coffee, came the question of jihad.

Craig talked to his Arabic teacher, Mohammad Elsisy, about his new obsession too.

Mohammad Elsisy - He invited me once to lunch, yes. And he focused the topic in the lunch about jihad. And I keep turning his attention into the essence of Islam. And he keeps, again, bringing it back to jihad. And he kept asking about jihad over and over and over. And I told him, Farouk, get over it, get over it, get over it.

With Montielh trying and failing repeatedly to get these California Muslims to warm up to his own personal jihad, the FBI decided it was time for phase two. Montielh was told to start talking up an actual terrorist plot to blow up buildings in Southern California. After Montielh aggressively broached the subject to his friends during a car ride, they decided to do what anyone would have done in that situation:

After they parted ways with Craig, Mohammad and Niazi talked about what had just happened. They decided they had to do something, so they did what all Americans are supposed to do in this situation, what law enforcement officials tell us we should do when someone says he has access to weapons and wants to use them. They reported Craig to the FBI as a potential terrorist.

Mohammed and Niazi had Hussam Ayloush, the director of the Council on American Islamic Relations, make the call for them. He spoke to Steve Tidwell, the head of the FBI's California branch. Tidwell didn't even ask for a name or last known address of this white Muslim terrorist and assured Hussam that the FBI would take it from here. And the FBI did, launching what, for all intents and purposes, looked like an actual terrorist investigation.

But instead of wholeheartedly pursuing its own man, the FBI agents were more interested in repeatedly questioning everyone Montielh had talked to. They honed in on Niazi, whose sister was married to Amin al-Haq, designated as a terrorist by the US government. The FBI agents used this as leverage in an attempt to get Niazi to become a paid informant and go to work for them in Afghanistan. When he refused, the FBI had him arrested for "immigration fraud and making false statements."

But what's interesting about Niazi's arrest is what he wasn't charged with. He wasn't charged with associating with terrorists himself. He wasn't charged with plotting an attack. And he wasn't charged for anything he'd ever said to Craig over the course of months of recorded conversations.

At Niazi's trial, Agent Thomas Ropel repeatedly told the prosecutor that Niazi had instigated the conversations related to the so-called "terrorist plot." This isn't the way Montielh (or his tapes) remembers it:

Sam Black - Did Niazi ever instigate this kind of conversation with you?

Craig Montielh - No. No, I did. Every time.

Despite not being charged with anything more serious than immigration fraud and "making false statements," Niazi was placed under house arrest for more than a year. He represents all of the arrests or indictments made as a result of Operation Flex. And even this didn't stick. The US government filed a motion to dismiss all charges against Niazi.

Another home-built terrorist operation and not even a single conviction to show for it. In fact, the FBI is arguably worse off now than if it had never begun the investigation. The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) has brought a lawsuit against FBI over Operation Flex, claiming the investigation violated their First Amendment rights by targeting them for their religious beliefs, as well as subjecting them to searches and monitoring without a warrant. The botched operation has also done damage to the Muslim community in California:

Operation Flex didn't just make people suspicious of law enforcement. It made them suspicious of each other. So many people I talked to say they stay away from new converts now. They have a hard time believing people are who they say they are. Here's Ayman, the Egyptian guy who first befriended Craig.

Ayman - Really, what they did is they made everybody in the mosque not trust everybody. Nobody would talk about it, but nobody-- you would see some weird looks, you know what I mean? People are looking at each other weird. I don't know. Maybe I was sensitive, but I can tell that the way they looked at me was just different.

In addition to making themselves look like a bunch of government agents creating their own busywork to stay employed, the FBI has taken yet another serious hit to its credibility. Early on in the transcript, it's noted that Stephen Tidwell (head of the FBI in Los Angeles) made an earlier approach via a town meeting at the Islamic Center of Irvine. He assured everyone attending that the FBI was not monitoring the mosque and that they would be informed if anyone from the FBI was planning to visit. That was June 5, 2006. Operation Flex began roughly two months later.

Then there's this troubling statistic, courtesy of investigative journalist Trevor Aaronson, who's studied hundreds of terrorism convictions:

Of about 500 terrorism cases since 9/11, about 50 defendants have been involved in cases where the informant came up with the idea and provided all of the means.

Finally, the worst, but least surprising, news of all: in an update to the story, NPR points out that US District Judge Cormac Carney has dismissed the lawsuit brought by CAIR, stating that allowing the the suit to proceed would "significantly compromise national security."

Carney's self-serving statement casts him (and a large part of the government's various secretive services) as an ancient Greek hero:

In struggling with this conflict, the Court is reminded of the classic dilemma of Odysseus, who faced the challenge of navigating his ship through a dangerous passage, flanked by a voracious six-headed monster, on the one side, and a deadly whirlpool, on the other. Odysseus opted to pass by the monster and risk a few of his individual sailors, rather than hazard the loss of his entire ship to the sucking whirlpool. Similarly, the proper application of the state secrets privilege may unfortunately mean the sacrifice of individual liberties for the sake of national security.

I know the Greeks laid the foundation for modern democracy, but perhaps we shouldn't base our decisions on their epic tragedies.

Filed Under: fbi, informants, muslims, privacy, profiling, terrorism