Verizon Gets A Wrist Slap For Years Of Neglecting Its Broadband Networks In New Jersey And Pennsylvania

from the I-get-200-kbps-when-it-rains dept

For much of the last decade we've noted that Verizon received billions in tax breaks and subsidies for fiber optic networks that were only partially deployed. From New Jersey to Pennsylvania, from New York City to Philadelphia, newswires the last few years have been filled with complaints from consumers and governments who say the company didn't finish the job it was handsomely paid to complete, leaving a patchwork of spotty next-gen broadband availability, and entire cities filled with customers still paying an arm and a leg for circa 2002 DSL speeds.

And the problem isn't just that Verizon didn't upgrade its networks, it's that the company has been neglecting the aging DSL network equipment already in place. In 2015, for example, frustrated Verizon union employees submitted a complaint to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission highlighting just what Verizon's network hardware currently looks like in many parts of a state that was supposed to have been upgraded to fiber years ago:

The same can be said for a wide variety of instances where Verizon couldn't really be bothered to work particularly hard at utility pole repair:

Given Verizon's political stranglehold over federal and local regulators and legislators, efforts to hold the company accountable on this front have been decidedly mixed. The company has often added insult to injury by insisting these complaints are either "pure nonsense," or at times by trying to claim that people who would like their phone and DSL lines to be upgraded (or hey, to simply work) are just being archaic Luddites because they refuse to sign up for significantly more expensive wireless service that in many areas may not be available anyway:

"This is a classic example of how some people fear new technology so they reactively reject it instead of accepting it, no matter how irrational that fear may be," Gierczynski said. Verizon opponents believe it plans to offer non-FiOS neighborhoods what they said is inferior wireless or Voice Link services once the firm's aging, deteriorating copper wire lines stop working altogether.

"I think people are going to look back and laugh (at copper landline proponents) ... just like (those) who were part of the Anti-Digit Dialing League," he added, referring to people who resisted the seven-digit phone numbers that began in the late 1950s.

Yes, hilarious. The goal for both AT&T and Verizon over the last few years has been to effectively let these unwanted DSL customers rot on the vine, until company lobbyists can convince state regulators to purge regulations requiring they continue to serve these users, many of which are elderly. This has been done (as evident above) by suggesting that killing off fixed-line DSL networks and shoving these users to wireless is all part of a miraculous "IP transition" that will deliver untold, amazing technological advancements to local communities.

Complications arise from the fact that wireless (especially in rural areas) isn't yet a viable alternative to fixed lines. Many of these lines were also taxpayer subsidized, and are still very much in use. Not to mention the fact that Verizon took billions more from these communities to deliver fiber upgrades never delivered. That said, there has been some modest traction in recent weeks after Verizon was forced by Pennsylvania regulators to at least repair some of the worst parts of its neglected network:

"The telecom giant will repair the worst of its legacy copper network in areas without FiOS and replace 15,000 unsightly and dangerous “double poles” on Pennsylvania roadsides, according to the deal between the company and the company’s Pennsylvania unionized workers who are part of the Communications Workers of America."

The agreement falls well short of requiring Verizon to admit fault of any kind, or forcing Verizon to upgrade these networks to fiber as per a 1993 agreement with the state -- that critics say was supposed to result in uniform fiber coverage statewide. But Verizon has also been forced to strike a similar deal by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, who found that, again, Verizon neglected its fixed-line networks to an almost comical degree. It won't, however, be forced to upgrade the state to fiber:

"But the telecom giant won’t be wiring a wide swath of Cumberland, Burlington, Salem, and Atlantic Counties with the high-speed Fios service that has been extended to millions of residents in other parts of New Jersey, according to a settlement among state officials, Verizon, and 17 towns that complained about substandard phone service. Fios is Verizon’s branded service for internet, television, and voice services, delivered over fiber lines.

In late 2015, the 17 towns, mostly in Cumberland County, complained to the state Board of Public Utilities about downed phones and bad or no internet. Service has been particularly unreliable on rainy or damp days, which result in buzzing water-soaked copper phone lines because of their age and rundown condition, local residents and officials say."

These are important wins, but in full context they're a drop in the bucket. Time, and time, and time again communities have tried to hold the telco accountable for taking taxpayer funds, then failing to upgrade essential infrastructure. Verizon's attentions meanwhile are elsewhere. The company recently acquired AOL and Yahoo in the hope of pivoting from neglecting running fixed-line networks to becoming a major media and advertising competitor to Google and Facebook (success on that front has been decidedly mixed).

It's abundantly clear that Verizon executives are done with these communities, but these communities also have made it abundantly clear (as New York City's recent lawsuit against the telco will attest) -- they're not quite yet done with Verizon.

Filed Under: broadband, competition, fiber, new jersey, pennsylvania, promises

Court: State Not Justified In Seizing Grandmother's House After Her Son Sold $140 Of Marijuana

from the well,-obviously,-although-it-takes-73-pages-to-get-there dept

Pennsylvania has some of the worst civil asset forfeiture laws in the country. At the top of list of perverse incentives? 100% of proceeds go to the agency that seized the property. As a result, all sorts of abusive forfeitures occur. In one case, law enforcement seized a couple's house because of a single $40 drug sale by their son.

Legislators in Pennsylvania haven't made much of dent with their reform efforts. Attempts have been made but every bill presented has been gutted by law enforcement lobbyists before passage. Nothing has made its way to the governor's desk yet, which is just as well because the disemboweled bills are reform-in-name-only.

The courts could play a part in curtailing forfeiture abuse but the system is stacked against property owners. In forfeiture cases, they're not even invited to the judicial party. The state files a suit against the property, rather than the owners, and proceeds from there. Far too many courts in this nation have punted on issues like this, kicking them back to legislators to fix the problems. And far too many legislators haven't had the strength to stand up against powerful law enforcement lobbyists.

Fortunately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is raising the bar just a bit for local law enforcement. Granted, the bar was already laying on the ground when it grabbed it, but some upward movement of any form is appreciated. C.J. Ciaramella of Reason reports:

Four years after the Philadelphia District Attorney seized her house without ever charging her with a crime, a 72-year-old grandmother has prevailed at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, where justices strengthened protections for property owners against civil asset forfeiture.

In a unanimous opinion issued last Thursday, the Supreme Court tightened the rules for seizing property, ruling that, although police and prosecutors have the authority to take property used in illegal activities, there must be clear evidence that the property owner knew of and agreed to the crimes.

The opinion [PDF] does an incredibly deep dive into the background of the case, as well as the amount of evidence (hardly any) the state must provide to take property away from people who haven't been charged with crimes. The attenuation in this case was minimal: a few controlled marijuana buys ($140 total) from a 72-year-old grandmother's tenant: her 50-year-old son.

The court's decision relies partly on something only slightly related to the act of civil asset forfeiture: excessive fines. Weighing the value of the house seized against the criminal act, the court finds the punishment does not fit the crime, at least in terms of American dollars.

In Pennsylvania, the gross disproportionality test is applicable to all punitive forfeitures, including civil in rem proceedings. In this regard, the following three, non-exhaustive, factors have been considered: the penalties that the legislature has authorized compared to those to which the defendant was subjected; whether the violation was isolated or part of a pattern of misbehavior; and the nature of the harm caused by the defendant.

Citing Justice Clarence Thomas' recent comments in a forfeiture case in front of the Supreme Court, the court actually calls the idea of "guilty property" a false assertion -- at least not without significant narrowing of that definition.

Based upon the rich history of in rem forfeiture both in England and our country, and the clear demarcation between criminal in personam proceedings and those brought civilly in rem, as well as more recent pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court, it is evident to us that the “guilty property” fiction which serves as the basis for civil in rem forfeiture logically demands that the property sought to be forfeited be an instrumentality of the offense.

[...]

In sum, an analysis of whether a civil in rem forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment requires a threshold inquiry into whether the specific property sought to be forfeited is an instrumentality of the underlying offense. If the property sought to be forfeited is an instrumentality of the underlying offense, the inquiry continues to an examination of proportionality. If not, the forfeiture cannot withstand Eighth Amendment scrutiny and the inquiry ends.

Then the court gets down to dealing with the problems inherent to civil asset forfeiture, a process that allows law enforcement to enrich itself without having to secure criminal convictions.

The potential harshness of a forfeiture against a property owner with no alleged criminal conduct, or minor culpability, however, must be recognized in any excessiveness inquiry, and we find doing so comfortably fits within the United States Supreme Court’s gross disproportionality test. Therefore, we must be wary of forfeiture imposing greater punishment than appropriate for the underlying crime itself. Indeed, a civil in rem proceeding can be viewed in one way as a “super criminal” proceeding, in which a property owner is punished through the seizure of his or her property, but without all the safeguards associated with criminal proceedings. While Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections are applicable to civil forfeiture proceedings, there is no right to counsel for individuals subjected to forfeiture proceedings.

In balancing personal property rights and the deterrent effect of forfeiture, the court says law enforcement must apply the law with restraint and the judicial system must act more rigorously when handling these cases. The loss of a home is a life-changing event for those on the end of a forfeiture claim.

In Pennsylvania, as elsewhere, the home is an especially significant type of property. The loss of one’s home, regardless of its monetary value, not only impacts the owner, but may impact other family members, and one’s livelihood. Indeed, the home is where one expects the greatest freedom from governmental intrusion; it not only occupies a special place in our law, but the most exacting process is demanded before the government may seize it.

It goes on to point out the trial court failed to examine this as thoroughly as it should have, especially given the impact it would have on the elderly owner -- and it gave far too much credence to the government's arguments.

As noted by the Commonwealth [appeals court], various parts of the record were not considered, or at least addressed, by the trial court. Specifically, the court did not address Appellee’s past dealings with her son when she discovered drug usage; her contention that she did not see any drugs in her home or van; her explanation that she only allowed her son to return home due to her belief that he had stopped using illegal drugs; her assertions that, if she had found drugs in her home, she would have evicted her son; that no neighbors or the block captain reported knowledge of drug dealing from the home or problems with Appellee’s son; that she requested from police some proof that her son was selling drugs, but that no proof was ever proffered; and the failure of the police to arrest her son after executing a search warrant on the home in November 2009. All of these circumstances should have been accounted for and considered by the trial court in rendering its decision. Furthermore, the prospect of evicting Appellee’s son needed to be contemplated in the context of an elderly widow with serious health challenges who relied upon her son for living assistance. The trial court should have considered what was reasonable under these circumstances.

This isn't a reform effort or a drastic rereading of the state's forfeiture statutes. It's a warning from the state's highest courts that lower courts are no longer welcome to turn in cursory reviews of forfeiture claims. As it points out in a footnote, it's not setting new precedent: it's just letting everyone know the law will be interpreted far more precisely than it has been.

In requiring such review, we are not upsetting the statutory burdens of proof found in the Forfeiture Act as asserted by the Commonwealth. Rather, we are mandating compliance with that statute and our case law, and ensuring that innocent property owners are not dispossessed of what may be essential possessions — even though not convicted of or even charged with a crime — without rigorous scrutiny by the courts.

This is the way it always should have been. It's just taken until 2017 to hit critical mass in the Pennsylvania court system.

Filed Under: civil asset forfeiture, pennsylvania

Pennsylvania Court Says Bloggers Protected By Journalist Shield Law; Don't Have To Reveal Commenter IP Addresses

from the nice-to-see dept

Over the years, there have been plenty of debates about whether bloggers should be considered journalists and, specifically about if they should qualify to be protected by journalist shield laws. Court rulings on this have been something of a mixed bag with some courts saying that bloggers don't qualify for state shield laws, but over in Pennsylvania there's a recent ruling that went the other way.

The case, filed in Beaver County Pennsylvania, and heard in the local state court, found that the blogger who runs BeaverCountian need not respond to a subpoena demanding IP addresses or other identifying info on various commenters. The lawsuit was brought by Connie Javens and Renee Javens Zuk against a bunch of John Does who they accused of posting defamatory comments on BeaverCountian.

The court carefully reviewed Pennsylvania's journalist shield law and found that the operator of Beaver Countian is pretty clearly covered. It first notes there's no requirement that the publication be a print publication and further highlights that the operator of the site, John Paul Vranesevich, clearly does journalism with his posts to the site.

Mr. Vranesevich authors articles posted on the site. Further its publication online is available to anyone who wishes to access the website. In that sense, it constitutes a newspaper of general circulation. The fact that the content is published online rather than in a traditional format is inconsequential considering the clear intent of the statute. There is no indication in the language of the Shield Law that its provisions are limited to publications printed in a traditional "hard copy" print format. Further, it is apparent that Mr. Vranesevich operates the website for the purpose of gathering, compiling and publishing news.

The second question, then, is whether or not commenters on a blog should count as protected "sources" under the law. The court, rightfully, decides that they clearly are sources:

Here the record establishes that at this stage of the proceedings the persons posting comments as "John Q Taxpayer" and "the bigdigger" were both sources of information provided to Mr. Vranesevich concerning his investigative reporting of Ms. Javens. The Plaintiffs have argued that the comments of the posters were not news information for Mr. Vranesevich and therefore not protected. Such a conclusion would require a narrow interpretation of the Shield Law which is an approach firmly rejected by our supreme court. The statute prohibits persons such as Mr. Vranesevich from being compelled to disclose "the source of any information procured or obtained" by him so long as the information was obtained "for purposes of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publishing news".

Moreover, it is not the content per se that's protected, but rather the source.... Nor are there any restrictions on the form of the content or where the content was disseminated and how it came to the attention of the person protected by the Shield Law. It is obvious that "John Q Taxpayer" and "the bigdigger" intended that their true identities be confidential to all but those operating BeaverCountian.com. Mr. Vranesevich used information provided by these two individuals to gather news to be published on the BeaverCountian.com. The Shield Law prohibits compelling disclosure of these two identities in this litigation.

The court does allow that some of the other John Doe commenters are not protected by the shield law as there is "nothing in the record to indicate that they were sources of information" to the website.

From there, the court analyzes whether or not it's appropriate to disclose anonymous commenters sued for defamation. This is a big issue that we've written about numerous times in the past. Different states have different standards, some of which do a better job than others in protecting commenters' First Amendment rights to anonymity. In Pennsylvania, the court notes, the test requires notification, sufficient evidence, an affidavit of good faith and necessity, and finally a "balancing strength of claims against First Amendment rights."

The court notes that to show sufficient evidence of defamation to disclose the anonymous commenters, Javens -- as an elected public figure -- needs to show "actual malice" and totally fails to do so. And, even worse, Javens fails to show that any of the statements they claim are defamatory are not true. The court is generally not impressed.

Ms. Javens is a public official whose actions as treasurer have been the target of extensive press coverage. There have been a number of online articles reporting on her allegedly dishonest or improper conduct including reports of official investigations into her conduct in office. There were numerous online comments posted at the BeaverCountian.com, while only a portion of which have been identified in this action. It is not possible to gage the extent to which the posts in question would have a defamatory impact or be responsible for the alleged injuries when compared to the entirety of media reports concerning much the same assertions of misconduct. The nexus between the statements at issue and the generalized assertion of harm is not strong. This diminishes the strength of her case.

Moreover Ms. Javens' factual record in support of her Motion seeking disclosure is thin at best. As noted above there are no specific evidence from which one could conclude that the allegedly defamatory statements are not true. The only factual averment in the record in this regard is the general statement in the plaintiffs Motion that they are "innocent victims of an offensive and scandalous attack on their reputation" without any delineation with regard to the contents of the numerous comments they cite. This greatly diminishes the strength Ms. Javens' case.

The court seems more open to allowing the case to move forward on behalf of Zuk, who is Javens' daughter. The court doesn't find her to be a public figure here, and does seem to suggest that some of the comments may be defamatory. But she failed to file a good faith affidavit that says there's no other way to determine the identities in question.

The larger issue here, though is the earlier determination by the court that a blogger can qualify for source protection under the state's shield law. There have been some who have reasonably argued over the years that shield laws can be a problem, since they seem to only apply to a class of people called "journalists" -- but if the laws are broadly applied to anyone in the process of doing anything journalistic, that wouldn't be a bad thing.

Filed Under: beaver county, bloggers, commenters, connie javens, john paul vranesevich, journalism, pennsylvania, shield law
Companies: beavercountain

Pennsylvania Court Shrugs Off Microsoft Decision; Says Google Must Turn Over Emails Stored At Overseas Data Centers

from the redefining-'seizure' dept

Just south of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's district, a Pennsylvania (3rd Circuit) federal judge has come to (nearly) the opposite conclusion on law enforcement's access to emails stored overseas. This case deals with two FBI SCA (Stored Communications Act) warrants seeking emails that Google says aren't stored in the United States. Google, however, also says the sought emails could be at any of its data storage sites -- which would include those in the US. It all depends on when it's asked to retrieve the communications.

And there's where this decision parts ways with the Second Circuit, which found that emails stored in an Irish data center weren't subject to US-issued warrants. The court explains [PDF] Google's process for handling user data, which is built for efficiency, rather than what's central to the FBI's demands: efficiency of retrieval in response to law enforcement requests.

Google stores user data in various locations, some of which are in the United States and some of which are in countries outside the United States. Some user files may be broken into component parts, and different parts of a single file may be stored in different locations (and, accordingly, different countries) at the same time. Google operates a state-of-the-art intelligent network that, with respect to some types of data, including some of the data at issue in this case, automatically moves data from one location on Google's network to another as frequently as needed to optimize for performance, reliability, and other efficiencies.

As a result, the country or countries in which specific user data, or components of that data, is located may change. It is possible that the network will change the location of data between the time when the legal process is sought and when it is served. As such, Google contends that it does not currently have the capability, for all of its services, to determine the location of the data and produce that data to a human user at any particular point in time.

Because of the way Google handles data, it theoretically could refuse every US law enforcement request for communications. (It could do the same to foreign requests as well.) This makes Google's case distinguishable from Microsoft's legal battle. Microsoft knew exactly where the stored communications were located. Google says the communications might be anywhere -- in one place upon receipt of a warrant and in another when retrieval efforts begin. As the court sees it, the Second Circuit's ruling would basically make Google completely immune to law enforcement requests.

[I]f the court were to adopt Google’s interpretation of the Microsoft decision and apply such a rationale to the case at bar, it would be impossible for the Government to obtain the sought-after user data through existing MLAT channels.

The "fix," according the Pennsylvania court, is to have Google round up the sought communications in the US, putting them within reach of the FBI's warrants.

In contrast, under this court’s interpretation, Google will gather the requested undisclosed data on its computers in California, copy the data in California, and send the data to law enforcement agents in the United States, who will then conduct their searches in the United States.

Of course, this means compelling Google to do something with its data that it doesn't normally do, which would make it a seizure. And since the data sought is constantly in transit, the court is giving the government the power to step in and alter Google's data-handling. This would obviously be a seizure of data potentially stored (at least temporarily) in foreign countries. To get around the Fourth Amendment concerns this raises -- not to mention the expansion of the US government's power to compel the production of data from foreign servers -- the court decides no seizure actually takes place until the government takes control of the data Google has been ordered to compile.

In contrast to the decision in Microsoft, this court holds that the disclosure by Google of the electronic data relevant to the warrants at issue here constitutes neither a "seizure" nor a "search" of the targets' data in a foreign country. This court agrees with the Second Circuit's reliance upon Fourth Amendment principles, but respectfully disagrees with the Second Circuit's analysis regarding the location of the seizure and the invasion of privacy.

[...]

Electronically transferring data from a server in a foreign country to Google's data center in California does not amount to a "seizure" because there is no meaningful interference with the account holder's possessory interest in the user data. Indeed, according to the Stipulation entered into by Google and the Government, Google regularly transfers user data from one data center to another without the customer's knowledge. Such transfers do not interfere with the customer's access or possessory interest in the user data. Even if the transfer interferes with the account owner's control over his information, this interference is de minimis and temporary.

This is a really weird -- and wrong -- interpretation of the word "seizure." While it's true the FBI won't actually have taken possession of the emails until after Google has gathered them in a California datacenter to make them more Fourth Amendment-compliant (or whatever), the fact that Google has to interrupt its normal flow of data at the government's request would appear to make that initial interruption a "seizure" -- de minimis or not.

In essence, the court is saying the Fourth Amendment doesn't apply to data in transit. The government can compel the collection of overseas data and have the Fourth Amendment applied to it after it's already been gathered and stored locally. The decision makes a mess of the Fourth Amendment cart-horse configuration, but figures this is more acceptable than informing the FBI that its warrants might be useless.

The better conclusion to reach would be the one the Second Circuit reached: if the concern is that the 30-year-old SCA limits law enforcement's ability to demand data from overseas data centers run by US companies, the solution lies with the entity that created it (Congress), rather than the courts. This decision will be appealed and it's safe to assume the Third Circuit Court of Appeals will arrive at the same conclusion.

Even if Congress doesn't "fix" the SCA to make US companies with foreign data centers more responsive to law enforcement demands, cases going forward may start applying the Rule 41 changes that went into effect at the beginning of this year, which greatly expand the jurisdictional reach of US court-issued warrants. As for Google, its system isn't built with law enforcement's needs in mind, nor should it be. It does what works best for it, which is what we expect from private companies. This ruling gives law enforcement a workaround for dealing with the SCA's limits, so some forum shopping should be expected until this decision is (hopefully) overturned.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, ecpa, emails, pennsylvania, stored communications act, subpoena, third circuit, warrant
Companies: google, microsoft

Governor Vetoes Bill That Would Have Allowed Agencies To Withhold Names Of Officers Who Deploy Deadly Force

from the legislators-forced-to-lower-middle-fingers-previously-extended-to-public dept

Last month, Pennsylvania legislators wrapped up a little gift for the state's law enforcement agencies: a bill that would have allowed agencies to withhold the names of officers involved in deployments of deadly force for at least 30 days. This was just the mandatory withholding window. The bill never stipulated a release date past that point, meaning "never" was also an acceptable time frame.

The normal concerns for "officer safety" were given as the reason for the new opacity. Rather than see disclosure as an essential part of maintaining healthy relationships with the communities they served, law enforcement agencies saw disclosure as just another way to hurt already very well-protected officers.

The DOJ itself -- often a defender of entrenched police culture -- recommended a 72-hour window for release of this information. State legislators, pushed by local police unions, felt constituents would be better served by being kept in the dark. Given the back-and-forth nature of public sentiment, it was unclear how Governor Tom Wolf would react to the passed proposal.

Fortunately, Governor Wolf has seen the bill for what it is: something that further distances police officers from the people they serve. In a letter [PDF] announcing his veto of the bill, Wolf points out the law would have done far more harm than good. (via PINAC)

Government works best when trust and openness exist between citizens and their government. I cannot agree to sign this bill, because it will enshrine into law a policy to withhold important information from the public.

The legislation as drafted would prevent the disclosure of a police officer's name in a situation where an officer takes the life of an unarmed person. These situations in particular -- when law enforcement uses deadly force -- demand utmost transparency, otherwise a harmful mistrust will grow between police officers and the communities they protect and serve. Transparency and accountability are required of all public employees, but this bill ignores the reality that a police officer is a public employee.

Wolf also points out that law enforcement agencies aren't being served by this bill either. The bill would make it illegal to release officers' names before thirty days have elapsed, even if individual agencies feel an earlier release would defuse tensions and/or protect uninvolved officers from being subjected to unfocused criticism or abuse.

The proponents of the bill have little concern for community relationships nor the well being of uninvolved officers. All they want to do is add more opacity to law enforcement and erect a stronger shield over some of the government's most problematic employees. Fortunately, the state's governor saw the damage the bill would create and refused to become part of the problem.

Filed Under: deadly force, pennsylvania, police, tom wolf, veto

Pennsylvania Legislature Looking To Hide The Names Of Cops Who Deploy Excessive Or Deadly Force

from the while-victims'-full-names-and-criminal-records-are-dumped-immediately dept

Pennsylvania is looking to regress. Police accountability is always a struggle, but the state legislature wants to take a huge step backwards. A bill sitting on the governor's desk would allow law enforcement agencies to withhold the names of officers who deploy excessive force, possibly indefinitely.

The decision to release names of officers deploying excessive or deadly force has usually been made at the local level by each individual department. Some were better than others at doing so. Some, like Philadelphia's police department -- moved more proactively, instituting a 72-hour release policy in accordance with DOJ recommendations. This discretion would be removed and replaced with a state law that would only serve to further separate officers from accountability.

That this bill is even on the governor's desk is largely due to a local police union's power, as Reggie Shuford of the ACLU explains:

On September 11, 2015, Pennsylvania State Rep. Martina White — who represents a district in northeastern Philadelphia, and who received a political endorsement from the local Fraternal Order of Police — introduced HB 1538. A direct response to [Philadelphia Police Chief Charles] Ramsey’s 72-hour policy, the bill was designed to shield the names of officers involved in shootings. HB 1538 would have made it illegal for any public official to release the name of an officer involved in a shooting unless that officer was charged with a related crime.

This version of the bill didn't make it far, but a watered-down version has replaced it that's not much better.

On October 26 this year, Pennsylvania’s State Senate passed a form of the bill that sets a 30-day prohibition on releasing the name of police officers who use force on the job. The state House passed it the next day.

Thirty days is far longer than the DOJ-recommended 72 hours. Worse, the bill robs local PDs of control, subjecting them to state standards, even when delaying the release of officers' names may do more overall harm to the department and its relationship to its community.

Then there's the fact that the law doesn't mandate a release once 30 days have elapsed. All it does is ensure that no information can be released during this time period. If departments want to withhold names indefinitely, nothing in the law prevents them from doing so.

As Shuford points out in his article, police officials should be given the latitude to release names earlier, especially considering the collateral reputational damage done to every officer who works for the same department. While many officials claim that "safety concerns" or "ongoing investigations" prevent the release of officers' names in use of force incidents, this secrecy does no favors for other officers on the force.

The Hummelstown Police Department was transparent after officer Lisa Mearkle killed David Kassick in February 2015. That transparency protected her fellow officers from unnecessary public pressure…

When the public doesn't know who the "bad apples" are, it's pretty easy for them to hate the whole barrel. The proposed law does nothing to foster relationships with the public and forces more proactive agencies to sit on their hands as situations deteriorate.

Filed Under: pennsylvania, police, police accountability, transparency

46 California Cities Join Rush To Impose 'Netflix Tax'

from the tax-ALL-the-things dept

Last year, Chicago proudly declared that the city would be expanding its 9% amusement tax (traditionally covering book stores, music stores, ball games and other brick and mortar entertainment) to online streaming services and cloud computing. While Chicago was hungrily pursuing the $12 million in additional revenue the expanded tax would provide, it ultimately faced a lawsuit questioning the legality of Chicago's move. The ongoing lawsuit by the Liberty Justice Center claims Chicago violated city rules by not holding a full vote on the changes, and is violating the Internet Freedom Tax Act.

Legal or not, Chicago's push to impose a Netflix tax has opened the floodgates.

Earlier this year, the Pennsylvania legislature expanded the state's 6% sales tax to cover digital downloads and subscription services like Netflix and Hulu -- but also music, e-books, apps, online games, and ringtones. And now Pasadena, California, has joined the fun, applying its own 9.4% tax on streaming video providers such as Netflix, HBO Go and Hulu. In fact, Pasadena is one of 46 total California cities that are rushing to embrace the tax to help shore up city budget shortfalls. But much like Chicago, there are a number of groups ready to sue over the move, claiming these cities don't have the authority:

"Jon Coupal, president of the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, called the tax “very suspect.” The association’s legal team is currently investigating the legality of the new interpretation of the tax.

"We will be taking a very close look at this,” Coupal said. “If we determine this is an extension of an existing tax, then under the Constitution, they need voter approval. They can put as much lipstick on this pig as they want, but the pig is still a tax increase."

Pasadena, however, says that city laws have always provided it with the authority to tax cloud-based services:

"Pasadena’s Finance Director Matthew Hawkesworth made his determination Thursday that the tax applies to video games and streaming services similar to cable “regardless of the content of such video programming, or the technology used to deliver such services,” according to a memo to City Manager Steve Mermell.

"It’s our interpretation because of our code, these types of video services have always been eligible to be taxable," Hawkesworth said. "The administrative ruling is instructing the various companies that offer video service that the tax includes their services as well, and it will be incumbent upon them to collect the tax and remit it to the city."

The efforts to tax all cloud services are creating an absolute legal minefield over determining exactly where a cloud-based transaction is taking place, when to apply said tax, and who intends to collect it. Who pays sales tax when an app developer in New York relies on a cloud computing provider in New Jersey, and sells to customers in Illinois? Nobody appears to know and the answer may differ state by state. But one thing's for sure: lawyers certainly won't be going to bed hungry as cities rush to cash in on the rise of the internet video revolution.

Filed Under: california, chicago, internet taxes, netflix tax, pennsylvania
Companies: netflix

Harrisburg, PA Mayor Picks And Chooses Who The 'Real' Journalists Are

from the picking-a-fight dept

We talk a lot around here about stories with people trying to determine what "real journalism" is. Those stories tend to veer towards the incredibly dumb, with most centering on a misunderstanding of what journalism actually means in the digital age. For a long time, journalism was an alchemy performed by a select few wizards, horded by a few outlets, which vetted and locked up their product. Today, of course, the barriers of entry to doing any kind of journalism are lower and the ability to distribute that kind of work is virtually unlimited. And, despite what you might hear from some grumpy folks who prefer the good ol' days, it turns out that smaller websites and independent citizens can journalism really well!

But not everybody has gotten that memo, apparently. Take Eric Papenfuse, Mayor of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. He has recently, and apparently surprisingly, decided to ban anyone working for website PennLive to the weekly meetings and briefings the rest of the press is allowed to attend.

We allowed Papenfuse to speak on his behalf. He said the ban was put in place because he does not believe PennLive is a credible news outlet, therefore it should not be held to the same standard.

“I think PennLive is the equivalent to Gawker (a self-proclaimed gossip blog), not the equivalent of the Washington Post,” Papenfuse said, “and it needs to be understood and treated as such.”

Now, I'm quite familiar with Gawker, having both read the site and our own coverage of their escapades recently. So when I went to PennLive.com to check the site out, I was expecting snark and gossip alongside some substance, which is exactly how I would describe Gawker. Instead I was greeted by headlines over a missing 11 year old girl from the area, Harrisburg crime reporting, and stories about a motorcycle accident. I can't say I'm sure that there is zero gossip on the site, but I can attest that I have yet to find even one sex-tape involving a professional wrestler. Honestly, the whole site seems like a basic local news site.

Observers appear to be equally confused.

Dave LaTorre, founder of LaTorre Communications, could not believe that a government official of a capital city could make such a public relations blunder.

“I call this breaking into jail,” LaTorre said. “You break into jail and you create a problem that wasn’t there.”

LaTorre said in full disclosure, he voted and donated to Papenfuse’s campaign. He was disappointed by Papenfuse’s decision Monday to limit access to PennLive reporters, no matter the reason.

“To pick a fight right now clearly will drown out a lot of the positive vibe that we felt here in the city,” he said.

Pressed for details, the good Mayor actually suggested that PennLive traffics in "hate speech." When bewildered questioners asked what in the world he was talking about, he said:

When asked if even hate speech should be considered hate speech, the mayor said not when it concerns an “anonymous post.” Papenfuse added that PennLive must better police its public comment sections to be considered a legitimate news source before he will release the ban.

If this ends up being all about the site allowing its community to comment, and comment anonymously, then this is completely insane. First, as LaTorre pointed out, the Mayor ran on a campaign of transparency. To begin banning sites that allow the public to comment from press briefings is the opposite of transparency. It breeds a culture within the press where, absent the rest of the press ganging up in retaliation, foists a permission-like atmosphere, where positive coverage is rewarded with more access. There's always some of that kind of thing that goes on, sure, but making it policy through banning unfavored publications? Come on.

Oh, and of course the Mayor's attempt to drive traffic away from PennLive didn't exactly go as planned.

LaTorre said that notion backfired as PennLive’s story on Papenfuse cutting off reporters has generated nearly 500 comments and thousands of page views.

“I’m looking at other comments. Twenty-six on one story,” LaTorre said. “Fifteen, 3, 5; this is Penn State story-type numbers.”

As a communications specialist, LaTorre advises Papenfuse to rescind his ban and apologize for the sake of the Office of Mayor and Harrisburg as a whole.

“Think about this decision. Reverse it,” he said, “and get back to governing.”

Papenfuse reportedly refused this advice. Banning the press for allowing comments and proclaiming a site as not being journalism? Oh, yeah, this should go well.

Filed Under: eric papenfuse, free speech, freedom of the press, harrisburg, hate speech, pennsylvania
Companies: pennlive