Senator Wyden Responds To CIA Defenders Distorting The Truth About CIA Torture

from the setting-the-record-straight dept

Last week, Senator Ron Wyden picked apart a Wall Street Journal "op ed" by former CIA directors, attacking the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the CIA's torture program. However, with more CIA defenders coming out of the woodwork, he's done so again. He's written the following for Techdirt in response to a misleading op-ed published by former CIA acting director and deputy director John McLaughlin that was published in the Washington Post. As you can see, the Senator finds that if there are distortions being made, it is from these former CIA officials.

With the release of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee's report on the CIA's use of torture, many former CIA officials have rushed to defend themselves and their actions. Unfortunately, many of these responses mischaracterize the report's contents and continue to repeat inaccurate information about the results of torture and the CIA’s years of misrepresentations. Hopefully these responses, including specific citations, to former CIA official John McLaughlin will help set the record straight.

The most incredible and false claim in the Senate intelligence committee’s report on the CIA interrogation program is that the program was neither necessary nor effective in the agency’s post-9/11 pursuit of al-Qaeda.

Actually, the Committee's report does not include conclusions about the effectiveness of "the CIA interrogation program" -- its conclusions address the CIA's use of torture. The Committee's report identifies numerous instances in which detainees who had not been tortured (or not yet been tortured) provided useful information.

The report, written by the committee's Democratic majority and disputed by the Republican minority and the CIA, uses information selectively and distorts facts to “prove” its point.

The Committee's report was approved on a bipartisan vote of 9-6, and the Committee elected to release it on a bipartisan vote of 11-3, along with additional and minority views. When the report was publicly released on December 9, 2014, Senators from both parties, including Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) spoke in favor of it on the Senate floor.

Furthermore, the Committee’s report is comprehensive, not selective. The public version of the Committee’s report is 499 pages and includes 2,725 footnotes. The full, classified version is over 6,700 pages, with approximately 38,000 footnotes, which appears to make it the largest Senate report in history.

Finally, the facts laid out in the Committee's report come almost entirely from the CIA's own internal records. And they show that the CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the White House, the Justice Department, Congress and the public. Chairman Feinstein also noted in her March 2014 Senate floor statement that the CIA's own internal "Panetta Review" came to many of the same conclusions as the Committee's investigation. The Panetta Review currently remains classified.

I won’t try to convince you that the program was the right thing to do — reasonable people will differ. Nor will I discuss the management of the program, other than to say that the record clearly shows the agency went to extraordinary lengths to assure it was both legal and approved — and the CIA halted the program when uncertain.

The CIA received legal and policy approvals for coercive interrogations after it provided extensive inaccurate information to the Justice Department, the White House and Congress about their use and effectiveness.

The Committee's report documents this inaccurate information in detail. For example, on pp. 217-225, the report describes the CIA's inaccurate claim that coercive interrogations led to the discovery of particular terrorist plots, and on pp. 49-50, 59, and 69, the report describes the CIA's inaccurate claims about the training and qualifications of CIA interrogators.

The Democratic staffers who drafted the report assert the program contributed nothing important, apparently to bolster a bogus claim that the CIA lied.

The Committee’s report does not assert that CIA interrogations contributed "nothing important." The report evaluates the CIA's repeated claims that its coercive interrogations provided critical "otherwise unavailable" information, and finds that the CIA's own internal records do not support this claim. In all twenty cases that the Committee examined, the CIA had access to the information from more traditional intelligence sources, and later attributed it to the use of coercive interrogations.

The man who led the United States to bin Laden, a courier known as Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, was mentioned by earlier sources but only as one of many associates bin Laden had years before

This is not accurate. As detailed on pp. 378-400 of the Committee's report, the CIA had substantial intelligence on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti prior to any CIA detainee reporting about him. In particular, CIA records show that in August 2002 a detainee in foreign custody with known links to al-Kuwaiti reported that al-Kuwaiti was "one of a few close associates of Usama bin Laden."

The most specific information about the courier came from a detainee, Hassan Ghul, who, after interrogation, strengthened the case by telling of a specific message the courier had delivered for bin Laden to operations chief Abu Faraj al-Libi

As detailed on pp. 395-396 of the Committee's report, Hassan Ghul provided the most accurate CIA detainee reporting on bin Laden BEFORE being subjected to the CIA's coercive interrogations. During this period Ghul told CIA debriefers that al-Kuwaiti was bin Laden's "closest assistant" and listed al-Kuwaiti as one of three individuals likely to be living with bin Laden. Ghul also discussed bin Laden's likely living arrangements, and made statements about al-Kuwaiti moving messages to Abu Faraj al-Libi. Some of this information was corroborative of intelligence collected by the CIA in 2002, which was also unrelated to the CIA’s coercive interrogations.

Finally, interrogated senior operatives such as Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who by that time was enormously cooperative, lied when confronted with what we had learned about the courier

As detailed in the Committee's report, CIA records describe in detail how the CIA assessed KSM was continually uncooperative before, during, and after the use of torture. See pp. 81-96 and 210-216.

The staffers who prepared the Senate draft do not appear to understand the role in analysis of accumulating detail, corroboration and levels of confidence in making momentous decisions like the May 2011 Abbottabad operation that killed bin Laden.

As detailed throughout the Committee's report, the CIA repeatedly told the Justice Department, Congress and the White House that coercive interrogations were necessary to obtain "otherwise unavailable" information. These statements were not supported by CIA records. In all cases cited by the CIA, the CIA had either obtained the information previously from other intelligence sources, or never obtained it from the detainee in question.

If the CIA had said only that tortured detainees provided information that corroborated other sources, or that they repeated information that they had provided before being tortured, this claim would have been accurate.

Capturing 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed. This led to disrupting numerous plots. But the committee says interrogation of detainees did not play a role in getting him because a CIA asset (not a terrorist detainee) helped us. This is astounding to those of us involved in capture operations. In fact, interrogated detainees were essential to connecting the source to Mohammed. The CIA will not permit me to reveal the operational details — a classic problem for intelligence officers seeking to defend against outlandish charges.

The capture of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) is detailed on pp. 326-333 of the Committee's report. This section clearly explains how a sensitive CIA asset led the CIA directly to KSM, and how the asset's access to KSM was described in CIA records from 2001.

This section of the report is based on both contemporaneous CIA internal communications as well as after-action interviews conducted by the CIA's Oral History Project. The CIA officer who 'handled' the sensitive asset and who was directly involved in the capture of KSM described it as "a HUMINT op pretty much from start to finish." (The CIA's claims regarding the role of detainee reporting are discussed in the footnotes to this section.)

After interrogation, Khalid Sheik Mohammed told us he transferred money to Hambali via a certain individual to finance attacks in Asia. This triggered a string of captures across two continents that led us to Hambali in Southeast Asia.

The capture of Hambali is described on pp. 301-311 of the Committee's report. CIA officials repeatedly told policymakers and the Justice Department that the information about this money transfer was first provided by KSM as a result of the use of the CIA's coercive interrogation techniques. However, CIA records show that the information about the money transfer was first obtained from a detainee in foreign government custody, who was questioned using non-coercive interrogation methods. (See footnote 1721 on pp. 307-308 for the CIA's description of these methods.)

The committee says a source run by another country mentioned a plot to use airplanes to strike West Coast targets. But that's all we knew — none of the details needed to stop it.

That information came from detainees, starting with Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who told us after interrogation that Hambali would replace him in this plot.

The Committee's report discusses this plotting on pp. 246-258. CIA records actually show that this plotting was disrupted in early 2002, and that a CIA detainee in foreign government custody (who was questioned using non-coercive interrogation methods) provided detailed information about the plotting, operatives and proposed method of attack.

Of note, the President's Homeland Security Advisor stated in a February 2006 White House briefing that this plot had been disrupted in February 2002, which was over a year prior to the capture of KSM.

This drove our effort to find Hambali.

As noted on p. 302 of the Committee's report, internal CIA communications described Hambali as the CIA's "number one target" in Southeast Asia a year before the capture of KSM.

We located him and found he had recruited 17 Southeast Asians and was apparently trying to arrange flight training for them to attack the West Coast

As detailed on p. 255 of the Committee's report, the information that led to the capture of Hambali's brother came from Hambali himself, who provided his brother’s true name and location while still in foreign government custody. Furthermore, the report describes how Hambali's brother provided information about this group of Southeast Asians while in foreign government custody. A wide body of CIA records indicates that this group was not witting of or involved in the "second wave plotting." See p. 247-248 and pp. 483-484.

The committee says interrogation played no role in heading off attacks on the Pakistani hotels, where U.S. and other Western visitors stayed. But it leaves out the fact that detainee Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Hussein, better known as Abu Zubaida, provided information on how to locate al-Qaeda “safe houses” in Karachi. One of these provided us a letter that tipped us to the plots. That is how those famous “dots” really get connected.

As detailed on pp. 239-246 of the Committee's report, the CIA's own records state that the Karachi plotting was disrupted when key captures were made by Pakistani authorities based on "unrelated criminal leads."

To drive home their points, the committee frequently cherry-picks documents. It describes officers expressing concern via e-mail that they will be “ostracized” for saying that certain detainees “did not tell us everything.” But the staff leaves out the critical context: The CIA officers were actually discussing their dismay over the agency’s decision to cease the interrogation program, causing the loss of important intelligence information.

The Committee's report provides additional context about these communications on p. 213. The interrogator who wrote "I'm ostracized whenever I suggest those two [KSM and Abu Zubaydah] did not tell us everything" also wrote in the same exchange "I think it's a dangerous message to say we could do almost the same without measures. Begs the question -- then why did you use them before?" This interrogator also told the CIA inspector general that KSM had "beat the system" and that KSM responded better to "creature comforts and a sense of importance" than to "confrontational approaches."

Many administration and congressional officials ritualistically say we will never know whether we could have gotten important information another way. This is a dodge wrapped in political correctness

The Committee's report does not conclude that the answer to this question is unknowable. The report systematically examines the top twenty examples that the CIA used to justify its use of torture. In each of these twenty cases the CIA's claims were verifiably inaccurate – in every case the information that CIA officials later attributed to coercive interrogations was actually obtained from other sources. (See pp. 172-401 of the Committee’s report.)

The point is we did succeed in getting vital information — during a national emergency when time was limited by the great urgency of a clock ticking on the next plot.

Terrorists had just killed thousands of Americans, and we felt a deep responsibility for ensuring they could not do it again.

We succeeded.

The Committee's report includes substantial information about the counterterrorism threats faced by the United States, and the successes that the CIA and other US government agencies had in uncovering and disrupting those plots. The report also details how CIA officials often inaccurately claimed that coercive interrogations had produced "otherwise unavailable" information that was key to disrupting these plots. As detailed on pp. 172-401 of the Committee's report, these statements are not supported by CIA records.

The release of this report finally makes the facts about torture available to the American public, and is an important step toward making sure that the US never repeats these mistakes. Another important step is calling out the defenders of torture any time they distort or deny the facts. Correcting years of misrepresentations from these officials is the only way to ensure the informed public debate that is necessary to keep America safe.

Filed Under: cia, cia torture report, john mclaughlin, ron wyden, senate, senate intelligence committee, torture, torture report

Washington Post Shrugs Off Torture Because, You Know, It Polls Well

from the wait,-what?!? dept

We've written before about Jay Rosen's excellent explanation of "the church of the savvy," in which political reporters seem more focused on describing the "horse race" aspect of politics rather than the truth. It's the old story in which the press ignores, say, a really good concept because "politicians won't support it." A key giveaway for a "savvy" post is to focus on "what the polls say" rather than what reality says. That doesn't mean that polls are never useful or shouldn't be reported on -- but when they get in the way of the actual story, it can make for ridiculous results.

Take, as a quintessential example, the Washington Post's Aaron Blake giving us the latest on torture's polling numbers. Apparently, the polls tell us that Americans are okay with torture (even when they believe it's torture):

A Pew poll shows Americans say, by a two-to-one margin (56-28), say the CIA's interrogation methods after 9/11 "provided intelligence that helped prevent terrorist attacks."

Similarly, a CBS News poll shows that 57 percent of Americans think waterboarding and other interrogation techniques practiced by the CIA "provide reliable information that helps prevent terrorist attacks" either "often" or "sometimes." Just 8 percent say it "never" provides quality information, while 24 percent say it "rarely" does.

And finally, a Washington Post-ABC News poll released Tuesday morning shows people say 53-31 that the CIA's program did "produce important information that could not have been obtained any other way."

Now, an actual reporter might point out that (1) these Americans are wrong and (2) that it doesn't fucking matter whether or not torture works -- it's still reprehensible. But, instead, Blake concludes that, boy, this sure is a loss for the Democrats:

And as long as people believe torturing terrorism detainees leads to valuable information, the CIA's interrogation program — and torture in general — are unlikely to face a major public backlash.

This is the unhappy reality being confronted by Democrats who had hoped to make a splash with the CIA report.

So the only "reality" in the article is the fact that the public's depraved position is bad for one particular party. Apparently, it's not bad for "humanity" or common sense or human rights or America. It's just bad for one party? Rather than actually educating the public -- which reporters are supposed to be doing -- the focus is just on what these polling numbers mean for torture -- presented in the same way one might discuss the polling numbers for a regular election.

This isn't a political horse race we're talking about here. This is about a fundamental issue of human rights, and the press is acting like all that matters is torture's polling numbers?

Filed Under: aaron blake, church of the savvy, cia, journalism, polling, polls, torture, torture report, washington post
Companies: washington post

CIA's Brennan: I Think We've Had Enough Transparency For The Time Being

from the oh-really? dept

The CIA's Director John Brennan spoke out about this week's release of the Senate Intelligence Committee's CIA Torture Report -- and to say he wasn't pleased about the report would be an understatement. Rather amazingly, in real-time as Brennan spoke, Senator Dianne Feinstein's staffers did a real time rebuttal/fact-check to his speech via Twitter, with each statement punctuated with the hashtag #ReadTheReport. Brennan's tap dancing concerning the report included a number of jaw dropping statements, but I wanted to focus on two specific ones. First, Brennan claimed that he's had enough transparency and he thinks this goes too far:

When asked if he supported the release of the Senate report, Brennan said he would keep his views to himself. But could he share them with the public, “in the interest of transparency?” a Wall Street Journal reporter asked. “I think there is more than enough transparency that has happened over the last couple days,” said the man who was chosen for the job by President Obama. “I think it’s over the top.”

Over the top? It's "over the top" to have the Senate Intelligence Committee -- the body designed to do oversight over the intelligence community to prevent abuse of power -- to spend years researching these issues, and then agree to only release a heavily redacted executive summary that basically details widespread and systematic practices that clearly amount to torture without naming any names or placing any direct blame? And that's "over the top"?

Second, is that after all of this, Brennan won't admit that the CIA won't go back into the torture game. Rather, he notes that if ordered to do the same thing again, he'd go right along with it:

"We are not contemplating at all getting back into the interrogation program," Brennan said.

As for the future, he said, “I defer to future policymakers.”

We've been told for a while -- including by the President himself -- that one of the reasons why they wanted this report out was to make sure that such things never happened again. It does not appear to be working.

Filed Under: cia, cia torture report, john brennan, torture, torture report, transparency

Dick Cheney Says CIA Torture Report Is 'Full Of Crap' -- Then Admits He Hasn't Read It

from the judging-a-book-by-its-cover dept

It's no secret that those most closely responsible for the CIA's torture program are pulling out all the stops to attack the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the program, trying out a variety of defenses from "it actually saved lives" to "it's just a partisan hack job." So it should come as no surprise that former Vice President Dick Cheney has been making the cable TV news appearances to help attack the report. After all, many have argued that the real person behind the torture program was Cheney and his staff -- and to date, Cheney has insisted that everything that was done was perfectly reasonable and he'd do it again. Thus there's no surprise when Cheney appears on Fox News (because, of course), to claim that the report is "a bunch of hooey" and "full of crap" and "deeply flawed" only to then admit " I haven't read the report."

Wait, what?

Even the Fox News interviewer was taken aback -- and Cheney must have realized how stupid he looked, because he then tried to backtrack, arguing that he hadn't read "all 6,000 pages," but then saying he'd read "parts of it" and "summaries." Yes, we've all read "summaries." But some of us have sat down to read the whole 500 pages (minus the redacted bits, of course). You would hope that if Cheney was going on TV to respond to questions about the report that he might have done so as well, rather than just repeating the talking points handed out to folks associated with the program. Apparently not.

From there, Cheney shifted over to his other key talking point -- one that is entirely debunked by the report itself:

“How nice do you want to be to the murderers of 3,000 Americans?”

Yeah, great. Except the report makes it fairly clear that many of the people tortured had absolutely nothing to do with the attacks on 9/11. In fact, the only real "revelations" from the torture program was that the CIA torturers concluded that the people being tortured really didn't have any relevant information. Furthermore, the "how nice do you want to be" line is incredibly revealing and disturbing, because it sets up an unending war. What's to stop millions of people angry at America from justifying new terrorist attacks on us based on "how nice do you want to be to torturers from America?"

No one was saying that we should buddy up with the people responsible for 9/11, but to pretend the only other option is to torture many innocent people is psychopathic.

It won't surprise anyone, really, that Cheney will defend the torture program that he oversaw. But his comments here are sickening and should be quite eye-opening about the level of cognitive dissonance from the powerful people who were responsible for this incredibly shameful period in US history.

Filed Under: cia, dick cheney, torture, torture report

Profiting Massively From Torture: Designers Of CIA Torture Program Raked In $81 Million (And Are Still Getting Money)

from the how-do-they-sleep-at-night? dept

There are so many incredible things in the CIA Torture Report that will be discussed and analyzed over the next few weeks and months. But one that stands out to me is that the architects of the torture program were not only wholly unqualified to design it, but they profited massively from the program, to the tune of at least $81 million. And that number may go up, as they also are getting paid by the government for any legal issues related to the program, including over $1 million for legal fees associated with responding to the Senate Intelligence Committee investigation that resulted in this report.

The report uses pseudonyms for the two psychologists: Grayson Swigert and Hammond Dunbar. However, their names were actually revealed back in 2007: James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen. To say they were unqualified for the work of designing the torture program would be an understatement. While they were psychologists with the US Air Force's "Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape" (SERE) program (which is supposed to help train US military personnel in case they're captured), you'd think they'd actually have some relevant background with terrorism and/or interrogation. But, nope:

Neither psychologist had experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al- Qa'ida, a background in terrorism, or any relevant regional, cultural, or linguistic expertise. SWIGERT had reviewed research on "learned helplessness," in which individuals might become passive and depressed in response to adverse or uncontrollable events. He theorized that inducing such a state could encourage a detainee to cooperate and provide information.

Instead, their only real experience with interrogation was in reading reports on how to resist the kind of torture programs used by those who failed to follow the Geneva Conventions. Their limited experience with interrogation revolved almost entirely on pure torture programs that did not follow the Geneva Conventions:

SERE training is intended to be used to teach our soldiers how to resist interrogation by enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions and international law. In SERE school, our troops who are at risk of capture are exposed in a controlled environment with great protections and caution -- to techniques adapted from abusive tactics used against American soldiers by enemies such as the Communist Chinese during the Korean War. SERE training techniques include stress positions, forced nudity, use of fear, sleep deprivation and, until recently, the Navy SERE school used the waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste of what they might be subjected to if captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be better prepared to resist. The techniques were never intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody.

In other words, their knowledge of interrogation came solely from knowing a little about torture programs used by countries who didn't follow the Geneva Conventions, and their role had been to try to help US soldiers resist such techniques should they come up. Instead, they turned it around and told the CIA to do almost everything that they flat out knew were torture programs in violation of the Geneva Conventions.

The psychologists -- initially led by the pseudonymous "Swigert" -- were the key to initially torturing Abu Zubadayah. According to the report, the CIA initially planned to see if Zubadayah would provide information through more standard interrogation techniques, leaving a "hard approach... only as a last resort." In discussing this, someone suggested bringing in Swigert for help -- and almost immediately the plans changed.

Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters formally proposed that Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24 hours a day, that Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, that loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number of people interact with him. CIA records indicate that these proposals were based on the idea that such conditions would lead Abu Zubaydah to develop a sense of "learned helplessness. CIA Headquarters then sent an interrogation team to Country [X], including SWIGERT, whose initial role was to consult on the psychological aspects of the interrogation.

Remember, Swigert had apparently recently reviewed some "research" on "learned helplessness," and suddenly the CIA's interrogation plan changed. An FBI message at the time shows exasperation over this, noting that the FBI's more traditional interrogation techniques had been working in getting relevant information, but as soon as the CIA's chosen psychologists showed up, they went straight to torture, and blocked the FBI out of the process. Here's part of an FBI agent's message back to FBI headquarters:

"AZ's health has improved over the last two days and Agency[CIA]is ready to move [Abu Zubaydah] out of the hospital and back toUH^^Ion in an elaborate plan to change AZ's environment. Agency [CIA] advised this day that they will be immediately changing tactics in all future AZ interviews by having only there [sic] [CIA officer] interact with AZ (there will be no FBI presence in interview room). This change contradicts all conversations had to date.... They believe AZ is offering, 'throw away information' and holding back from providing threat information (It should be note [sic] that we have obtained critical information regarding AZ thus far and have now got him speaking about threat information, albeit from his hospital bed and not [an] appropriate interview environment for full follow-up (due to his health). Suddenly the psychiatric team here wants AZ to only interact with their [CIA officer, and the CIA sees this] as being the best way to get the threat information.... We offered several compromise solutions... all suggestions were immediately declined without further discussion. .. .This again is quite odd as all information obtained from AZ has come from FBI lead interviewers and questioning.... I have spent an un-calculable amount of hours at [Abu Zubaydah's] bedside assisting with medical help, holding his hand and comforting hum through various medical procedures, even assisting him in going [to] the batliroom.... We have built tremendous report [sic] with AZ and now that we are on the eve of 'regular'' interviews to get threat information, we have been 'written out' of future interviews.

That was just the beginning. "Swigert" became a key cog in pushing for ever greater torture techniques:

In early July 2002, CIA officers held several meetings at CIA Headquarters to discuss the possible use of "novel interrogation methods" on Abu Zubaydah.'" During the course of those meetings SWIGERT proposed using techniques derived from the U.S. military's SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) school. SWIGERT provided a list of 12 SERE techniques for possible use by the CIA: (1) the attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap, (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) waterboard, (10) use of diapers, (11) use of insects, and (12) mock burial. SWIGERT also recommended that the CIA enter into a contract with Hammond DUNBAR, his co-author of the CIA report on potential al-Qa'ida interrogation resistance training, to aid in the CIA interrogation process. Like SWIGERT, DUNBAR had never participated in a real-world interrogation. His interrogation experience was limited to the paper he authored with SWIGERT and his work with U.S. Air Force personnel at the SERE school.

You'd think that this sort of lack of experience would be a concern. But, to the CIA, apparently, it was seen as an advantage. A footnote quoting the CIA's response discusses this:

Drs. [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] had the closest proximate expertise CIA sought at the beginning of the program, specifically in the area of non-standard means of interrogation. Experts on traditional interrogation methods did not meet this requirement. Non-standard interrogation methodologies were not an area of expertise of CIA officers or of the US Government generally. We believe their expertise was so unique that we would have been derelict had we not sought them out when it became clear that CIA would be heading into the uncharted territory of the program.

The Senate report points follows this up by pointing out that these psychologists were the key to convincing the CIA to adopt the ruthless torture plans:

As noted above, the CIA did not seek out SWIGERT and DUNBAR after a decision was made to use coercive interrogation techniques; rather,SWIGERT and DUNBAR played a role in convincing the CIA to adopt such a policy.

In fact, it soon reached the point at which the only people allowed to have contact with Abu Zubadayah were... Swigert and Dunbar, the two psychologists who (remember) had no experience with interrogations and little to no background on Al'Qaeda.

On August 3, 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the interrogation team at DETENTION SITE GREEN that it had formal approval to apply the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard, against Abu Zubaydah. According to CIA records, only the two CIA contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, were to have contact with Abu Zubaydah. Other CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN - including CIA medical personnel and other CIA "interrogators with whom he is familiar" - were only to observe.

The report notes, not surprisingly, that this plan to torture Abu Zubadayah produced no useful intelligence (not that it would be okay if it had... but just pointing it out). However, the CIA then let the two psychologists review the success of the program themselves. Guess what they found?

As noted, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and approved.... Nonetheless, CIA Headquarters informed the National Security Council that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used against Abu Zubaydah were effective and were "producing meaningful results." A cable from DETENTION SITE GREEN, which CIA records indicate was authored by SWIGERT and DUNBAR, also viewed the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah as a success. The cable recommended that "the aggressive phase at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] should be used as a template for future interrogation of high value captives," not because the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced useful information, but rather because their use confirmed that Abu Zubaydah did not possess the intelligence that CIA Headquarters had assessed Abu Zubaydah to have.

Got that? They said it was a success because the torture turned up nothing of value, and thus it proved he had no valuable information to provide. Thus, it should become the model for "future interrogations." And it did. The same cable, again, authored by those two psychologists, set themselves up to continue being torturers-for-hire:

The cable further recommended that psychologists—a likely reference to contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR— "familiar with interrogation, exploitation and resistance to interrogation should shape compliance of high value captives prior to debriefing by substantive experts."

And, indeed, they were used again. And again.

As late as June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, operating outside of the direct management of the Renditions Group, were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to both interrogate and conduct psychological reviews of detainees.

This was just the beginning, but once they were in, they were in. Despite a few attempts by some in the CIA to raise concerns about these two, they became the go to guys for both torture techniques and in evaluating those very same torture techniques. And they made a shitload of money.

CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, who played a central role in the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the summer of 2002, and then used the techniques as contract interrogators, formed a company in 2005 [Company Y]. In addition to providing interrogators for the CIA's interrogation program, Company Y was granted a sole source contract to provide operational psychologists, debriefers, and security personnel at CIA detention sites. Under the contract. Company Y was tasked with conducting ongoing conversations with CIA detainees to learn about the terrorist mind set (this project was named the "Terrorist Think Tank" or "T³"), developing [REDACTED] strategies, and writing the history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Later descriptions of their services note that—on behalf of the CIA—Company Y officers participated in the interrogations of detainees held in foreign government custody and served as intermediaries between entities of those governments and the CIA.

By 2006, the value of the base contract for their company, with all options exercised, was in excess of $180 million. As of May 2007, Company Y had hired [X] former CIA staff officers, many of whom had previously been involved with the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program....

The CIA's contract with Company Y was terminated in mid-2009. From the time of the company's creation in 2005 through the close-out of its contract in 2010, the CIA paid Company Y more than $75 million for services in conjunction with the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.... In 2008, the CIA authorized an additional payment to Company Y of approximately $570,000, after Company Y indicated that it had incurred costs for conducting countersurveillance of its officers when appeared in the press in conjunction with the program. The CIA agreed to a $5 million indemnification contract for the company that covered, among other expenses, criminal prosecution. Company Y hired a prominent [REDACTED] law firm for representation in 2007, and billed the CIA $1.1 million for legal expenses from 2007 through 2012 per its indemnification agreement. Part of these expenses included legal presentation at a Committee staff briefing by SWIGERT and DUNBAR on November [XX], 2008. Under the CIA's indemnification contract, the CIA is obligated to pay Company Y's legal expenses through 2021.

Torture sure is profitable.

Reading the details of the report, it certainly feels like James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen deserve a place in history alongside other infamous torturers. And yet, instead, they're free and have banked many millions of dollars -- and Mitchell now spends his retirement kayaking in Florida. It's downright sickening.

Filed Under: bruce jessen, cia, cia torture, grayson swigert, hammond dunbar, james mitchell, money, profits, sere, torture, torture report

An Inside View On The Purpose And Implications Of The Torture Report

from the it's-about-facts dept

While some will, no doubt, be embarrassed by the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation program, as one of the staffers who helped make the case for the Committee’s investigation when it was initiated in 2009, I can tell you that was not its intention.

(For the record, all I did was help make the initial case for the investigation and maybe put out a press release or two. I am in no way taking credit for the tremendous work that Chairman Feinstein and her committee’s staff did on this report. By the way, I know those staffers did not trek out to the CIA site in Virginia — often in their free time — in search of our thanks and recognition, but I hope you will join me in giving it to them anyway. Because reports like this do not materialize from thin air.)

The dedicated SSCI staff — who spent tens of thousands of hours over the better part of five years researching, writing and editing this report — did so in order to ensure our nation’s interrogation programs would be grounded in what has, for too long, been missing from our nation’s interrogation debate: facts.

The interrogation techniques the CIA developed during the Bush Administration were not devised by behavioral experts with experience turning detainees into "long-term strategic sources of information." Rather, as the Department of Justice’s 2008 Inspector General’s report revealed, the FBI’s interrogation experts — with that experience — repeatedly refused to sign off on proposed interrogation plans, calling them "deeply flawed" and "completely ineffective."

The CIA’s interrogation program, instead, grew from the post-9/11 mentality that the U.S. would be best kept safe by those willing to go to the greatest extremes to protect it, or as former CIA agent Glenn Carle put it in his 2011 book The Interrogator, "Interrogating terrorists was no place for goddamn candy-asses."

FBI officials have described the interrogation-strategy sessions they observed as "circus-like."  I’ve personally been told by individuals who participated in high-level discussions of U.S. interrogation policy that — as disturbing as it sounds — these conversations were more often than not informed by the participants’ recollection of episodes of the TV show 24 than by an understanding of the psychology of interrogation. Meanwhile, defenders of the CIA’s Bush-era interrogation activities continue to cite the murder of nearly 3,000 Americans on September 11, 2001 as justification for their actions.

As Senator Feinstein writes in her introduction to the report:

The major lesson of this report is that regardless of the pressures and the need to act, the Intelligence Community's actions must always reflect who we are as a nation, and adhere to our laws and standards. It is precisely at these times of national crisis that our government must be guided by the lessons of our history and subject decisions to internal and external review.

The SSCI’s report was written to provide those lessons.

While some have and will likely continue to argue that President Obama settled the issue when he, as the president said in his statement today, "unequivocally banned torture when [he] took office," one might have argued that George Washington actually settled the issue 234 years earlier when he ordered that any American soldier who brought "shame, disgrace and ruin to themselves and their country" by causing injury to a British prisoner could be put to death.  Our "new country in the New World," Washington declared, "would distinguish itself by its humanity." And yet, two centuries after Washington gave that order, agents of the U.S. government subjected "at least five CIA detainees…to 'rectal rehydration' … without documented medical necessity."

President Obama’s executive order only settles the issue insofar as he remains president. As long as the belief persists that torture is an effective means of interrogation and anyone who doesn’t support ‘enhanced interrogation’ is a "candy ass" who lacks the necessary stomach to keep Americans safe, there is no assurance that a future president won’t take a different position than our current president.

Some have and will undoubtedly continue to argue that we shouldn’t discuss the efficacy of torture as an interrogation technique — even if it’s to prove that torture doesn’t work — because it suggests that if torture worked, it would be ok to torture people. I believe these people have a point.

The United States is more than a mass of land defined by geographic boundaries, it is a nation of people united by certain, principled beliefs, many of which our forefathers laid out at our nation’s founding. It is not enough to simply protect the people of the United States, one must also protect the principles that define the United States as a people; otherwise, there is no United States to protect. When the CIA and the Bush Administration sanctioned the torture of captured terrorists — regardless of their reasons — they made the United States something George Washington said we’d never be: a nation that tortures. One might argue that made us a little less American.

Some have and may continue to argue that making the CIA’s actions known puts Americans — particularly those serving overseas — in jeopardy. It’s worth noting that these arguments were made by people who know Senator Feinstein in an effort to persuade her not to make the committee report public. I say this is worth noting, because you do not need to know Senator Feinstein very well to know that there is nothing she wants less than to jeopardize the lives of American citizens, particularly those serving in harm’s way, and if there is an argument that would have given her second thoughts about releasing this report, that most likely would have been it.

If Americans are at risk, however, they are not at risk because the Senate Intelligence Committee is publicly acknowledging that the CIA tortured people during the Bush Administration. They’re at risk because the CIA tortured people during the Bush Administration.

The CIA put Americans at risk when they undermined the international agreements that protect Americans detained by foreign powers and sacrificed the moral authority we’ve long used to advocate for the humane treatment of detainees. They put Americans at risk when they made it harder — if not impossible — to prosecute known terrorists and keep them locked up. I'd also argue that defending the CIA’s actions, while refusing to come clean about what was done during the Bush Administration, not only fueled Al Qaeda’s hatred of Americans and put them at risk, it undermines the Obama Administration’s argument that the CIA no longer engages in torture.

Some have and may continue to argue that putting out this report will undermine morale at the CIA and derail its necessary work. Again, I'd argue that any hit to the CIA’s morale began when its agents were ordered to torture detainees without clear parameters and a solid legal foundation.

Some have and will no doubt continue to argue that an act taken to "prevent a threatened terrorist attack" is not as bad as an act taken "for the purpose of humiliation or abuse." I’d argue that torture is defined not by the torturer but by the person being tortured and that the laws governing torture were put in place because most people who engage in torture think they have a good reason.

There are some who have and will no doubt continue to argue — as they do about all things pertaining to national security — that this report shouldn’t have been made public. To respond to that I will quote directly from page 8 of the unclassified report:

The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior CIA officials coordinated to share classified information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to select members of the media to counter public criticism, shape public opinion, and avoid potential congressional action to restrict the CIA's detention and interrogation authorities and budget.

If the SSCI’s report demonstrates one thing, it’s that the CIA’s unfettered ability to keep information about it’s activities secret gives it virtually limitless ability to control everyone’s understanding of its activities: from the White House and Congress to Hollywood and the American people. I have no doubt they’d argue those actions were necessary to protect national security, because in their mind — it seems — national security is harmed by anything that could potentially limit their authority to do exactly what they want. Someone should really tell them that's not how we do things in the United States.

And finally there will be some who have and will continue to argue that the CIA’s actions were necessary to protect national security. Those people, I’m guessing, need to make those arguments to help them sleep at night. To them, I’d argue the path to redemption lies not in the perpetuation of that belief, but in its eradication.

Again, please thank the Senate Intelligence Committee.

---

Jen Hoelzer is the former Communications Director and Deputy Chief of Staff for Senator Ron Wyden.

Filed Under: cia, dianne feinstein, senate intelligence committee, torture, torture report

CIA Program Tortured Dozens To Produce Nearly Nothing In The Way Of Useful Intelligence

from the did-we-win-the-War-on-Terror-yet? dept

Perhaps the most disheartening aspect of the Torture Report [pdf link] is the fact that the CIA clearly knew the methods weren't producing usable intelligence but continued to use them anyway, all the while hiding the extent of its abuses from the rest of the goverment.

The Executive Summary is 525 pages of abusive activity, carried out under the pretense that no other approach would keep the US safe from further terrorist attacks. Dianne Feinstein's preamble addresses the incredible amount of work that went into the full report (which weighs in at over 7,000 pages). While it does point out that the CIA destroyed evidence and forced Senate staffers to work in a CIA-controlled environment while performing research, it curiously omits any mention of the CIA's spying on Senate staffers -- something that seemed to be a big deal a few months ago.

The introduction to the full report runs more than 20 pages, but even this limited sampling expands greatly on Feinstein's 6-page statement released in conjunction with the report. Contained within are more details of the futility of the CIA's torture program and the efforts it made to cover up both its extraterritorial rendition sites as well as the lack of usable intelligence it produced.

The thing is, the CIA's own records (what remains of them) point out the limited return on investment.

[A]ccording to CIA records, seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA custody. CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were usually subjected to the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques.

Torture produced useful intel less frequently than other methods. Information was volunteered even without the use of torture. But some who might have volunteered useful information were never given the chance, as the CIA showed a predilection for torturing first and asking questions later. And those who were tortured did what they could to end the torment.

While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, multiple CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. Detainees provided fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the CIA identified as its highest priorities.

A lack of useful intel wasn't enough to derail the CIA's torture plans. Agents ignored warnings from medical staff and continued to "break down" detainees. Medical personnel were asked to do whatever was needed to return detainees to torture-ready condition.

Detainees were subjected to waterboarding, ice water "baths," 180-hour stints of sleep deprivation, extended physical/mental abuse and being chained naked to cell floors. The CIA also made it personal, threatening detainees with a list of horrors their family members would be subjected to if they didn't cooperate.

CIA officers also threatened at least three detainees with harm to their families — to include threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a detainee, and a threat to "cut [a detainee's] mother's throat."

Some of this behavior was exacerbated by the CIA's active disinterest in ensuring it didn't create a playground for problematic agents in its employ.

Numerous CIA officers had serious documented personal and professional problems—including histories of violence and records of abusive treatment of others—that should have called into question their suitability to participate in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their employment with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. In nearly all cases, these problems were known to the CIA prior to the assignment of these officers to detention and interrogation positions.

The agency callously turned over detainees to these agents and continued with its unproductive "intelligence gathering." The program veered from merely useless to borderline psychopathy on several occasions. Detainees who should never have been detained were subjected to torture, including one who was held simply to coerce information out of undetained relatives.

Of the 119 known detainees, at least 26 were wrongfully held and did not meet the detention standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). These included an intellectually challenged" man whose CIA detention was used solely as leverage to get a family member to provide information…

In addition, the CIA apparently tortured its own, thanks to its torture-first policy.

...two individuals who were intelligence sources for foreign liaison services and were former CIA sources...

And bad intel obtained via torture led to even more torture of individuals who never should have been detained.

...and two individuals whom the CIA assessed to be connected to al-Qa'ida based solely on information fabricated by a CIA detainee subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

The program was such a fiasco that it actually harmed US counterterrorism efforts.

The CIA, in the conduct of its Detention and Interrogation Program, complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant to these agencies' missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees, and provided inaccurate information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to these agencies.

But the agency still believed -- or at least wanted to believe -- it was fighting the good fight. The Office of Legal Counsel intervened on its behalf, redefining "torture" as acceptable "under the current circumstances."

Having reviewed information provided by the CIA, the OLC included the "necessity defense" in its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House counsel on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation. The OLC determined that "under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture.

Two consecutive CIA directors further insulated the program by pursuing actions to lock out the Office of the Inspector General. In 2005, CIA Director Goss requested that no further reviews be initiated until the faulty 2004 review was complete. In 2007, Director Michael Hayden vindictively ordered a review of the OIG itself, deterring it from pursuing further investigations of the CIA's interrogation programs. The "faulty" 2004 review was the direct result of the CIA feeding bad info to the OIG in order to cover up its rendition and interrogation programs.

Not only was the OIG eventually locked out, but the CIA's activities were so "dirty" and its gathered intel so questionable that the FBI and Dept. of Defense distanced themselves from the program, refusing to participate in any way. Anything usable was ignored along with anything useful the CIA obtained from its detainees. To further complicate things, the CIA denied requests for access from FBI director Mueller and compartmentalized its intelligence, walling itself off from other intelligence and investigative agencies.

Further details contained in the report point to the fact that the CIA program was never properly documented nor was it ever under any proper oversight.

This program, which was hidden by its participants, lied about to multiple layers of supposed oversight (including the President), and produced little to no usable intelligence, is the same program that is now being defended by former officials as something that "saved" American lives. If it has, there's no evidence of it in here. What it looks like is a post-terrorist-attack reaction being allowed to indulge in its own excesses, using justifications like "under the current circumstances" and "ticking time bombs" to excuse the abysmal depths of its ultimately futile depravity.

Filed Under: cia, dianne feinstein, senate intelligence committee, torture, torture report

Feinstein's Summary Paper On CIA's 'Interrogation Program' Report Contains Plenty Of Torture

from the using-bullshit-ends-to-justify-the-means dept

The Senate Torture Report has officially been released. Accompanying it is a 6-page statement containing "highlights" from the 525-page "Executive Summary" of the (obviously much larger) full report. (We'll have more once we've dug through the larger report.)

The statement [pdf link], put together by Sen. Feinstein's office, opens with this quote from the Senate Intelligence Committee head:

This document examines the CIA’s secret overseas detention of at least 119 individuals and the use of coercive interrogation techniques—in some cases amounting to torture.

The delineation between "torture" and "coercive interrogation techniques" will be left up to many, many dissemblers. Those who defend the CIA's actions will opt for the former, presumably in long opinion pieces hosted at CIASavedLives.com, a website created solely for countering the negative press that will follow the release of the Torture Report. The site is still mostly dead at this point, occasionally humming to half-life with a bit of pre-emptive flag waving. (LITERALLY)


But the actions contained in this short summary certainly meet any reasonable definition of the word "torture."

In November 2002 a detainee who had been held partially nude and chained to a concrete floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility.

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Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in painful stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. The CIA led several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave CIA custody alive, suggesting to one detainee that he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box.

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CIA detainees at one detention facility, described as a “dungeon,” were kept in complete darkness and constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste.

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Contrary to CIA representations to the Department of Justice, the waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. During one session, Abu Zubaydah became “completely unresponsive with bubbles rising through his open full mouth.” Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as evolving into a “series of near drownings.”

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[T]he CIA instructed personnel that the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take “precedence” over his medical care, resulting in the infection and deterioration of a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred during his capture.

---

At least five CIA detainees were subjected to “rectal feeding” or “rectal hydration” without documented medical need.

All of this (and there's much more documented in the full report) and for what? To save lives, as the URL goes? But there's no evidence this torture resulted in usable intelligence.

The committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported counterterrorism “successes” that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. Each of those examples was found to be wrong in fundamental respects. In some cases, there was no relationship between the claimed counterterrorism “success” and any information provided by a CIA detainee during or after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. In the remaining cases, the CIA inaccurately represented that unique information was acquired from a CIA detainee as a result of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, when in fact the information was either (a) acquired from the CIA detainee prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques or (b) corroborative of information already available to the intelligence community from sources other than the CIA detainee, and therefore not unique or “otherwise unavailable...”

The CIA took these lies went all the way to the top.

In an attempt to justify the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA provided examples of supposedly “thwarted” terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists that the CIA attributed to the use of its techniques. The CIA representations were inaccurate and contradicted by the CIA’s own records. The CIA’s internal Panetta Review also identified numerous inaccuracies in the CIA’s effectiveness representations—including representations to the President.

And when the CIA wasn't lying about the techniques being necessary to stay ahead of "ticking time bombs," it was lying about its methods.

Records do not support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an “an open, non-threatening approach,” or that interrogations began with the “least coercive technique possible” and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary. Instead, in many cases the most aggressive techniques were used immediately, in combination and nonstop.

It's not just the US that will have to weather this debacle -- one that gives lie to the government's view that it holds itself to higher standard than its enemies -- it's every other country that participated in the CIA's extraordinary rendition program.

These are the countries that will be worried by the CIA 'torture' report http://t.co/xx9vii1aFZ pic.twitter.com/g23OHBK3Cw

— The Independent (@Independent) December 9, 2014

The real question following the release of this report is whether anyone will be held accountable for these deplorable actions. There needs to be meaningful punishments handed down. If not, then the rest of the world will know how much we're willing to let our agencies get away with during this neverending War on Terror. Failing to do so will only open the door for further abuse.

Filed Under: cia, dianne feinstein, senate intelligence committee, torture, torture report

Rogers, Hayden Claim Release Of CIA Torture Report Will Be The Tipping Point For Enemies Of The US

from the you-know,-rather-than-everything-else-we've-done-to-piss-them-off dept

The NSA's many, many surveillance programs. The TSA's security theater. "See something, say something." The DHS and its "Fusion Centers," in which First Amendment-protected activity is viewed as inherently suspicious. The distribution of armored vehicles and high-powered weapons to law enforcement agencies. The FBI's constantly expanding investigative scope and powers. The NYPD's "Demographics Unit." These are all things we do because of terrorism.

Those who believe the threat of terrorism can justify nearly anything are now claiming the threat of terrorism justifies NOT doing something. Daniel Drezner rounds up quotes from current and former officials who believe that the safety of our nation now hinges on not releasing the long-delayed "Torture Report." Joining John Kerry in his statement that the release could have negative effects on "foreign policy" are a host of familiar names, starting with House Intelligence Committee head Mike Rogers.

"I think this is a terrible idea," Rogers said. "Our foreign partners are telling us this will cause violence and deaths. . . . Foreign leaders have approached the government and said, 'You do this, this will cause violence and deaths.' Our own intelligence community has assessed that this will cause violence and deaths."

Michael Hayden, former director of the CIA, echoes Rogers' concerns.

"...[T]his will be used by our enemies to motivate people to attack Americans and American facilities overseas."

As Drezner points out, the narrative these men are pushing makes no sense. According to Hayden, Rogers and (to a lesser extent) Kerry, the release of this report will be the tipping point for our enemies, rather than two lengthy, unending military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan… or years of drone strikes… the United States' constant support of Israel… the revelations of torture occurring at Abu Ghraib…

According to this narrative, terrorists will be more outraged by a damning Senate report than by the previous decade-plus of actions in response to the 9/11 attacks.

I'm sorry, but this is just nuts. There is no shortage of US foreign policy actions and inactions in the region to inflame enemies. The Senate report is small potatoes compared to that.

The release of the report could actually be a net win for the US. Its reputation has taken several hits over the past year, and exposing its flaws to the world -- in hopes of preventing this behavior from repeating itself -- will show our allies, and our enemies, that the nation is stronger than its weakest moments. Delaying the release of the report, or rendering it meaningless via over-redaction, won't send the same message. Instead, it will confirm our enemies' (and allies') worst suspicions: that the US government cares more about maintaining a facade than actually making an effort to rebuild its damaged reputation. Doing what Kerry, Rogers and Hayden suggest -- bury the report until whenever (and at what point will we not have enemies?) -- could actually provide more motivation to terrorists than being open, honest and contrite about the CIA's actions.

Filed Under: cia, foreign policy, john kerry, michael hayden, mike rogers, surveillance, terrorists, torture, torture report

Part Of CIA Torture Report May Finally Be Released Next Week, As More Details Leak

from the it's-a-start dept

Jason Leopold has a big article at Vice detailing some more of what's in the Senate Intelligence Committee's CIA torture report, but the bigger news is that the long fought over, somewhat redacted executive summary may be released next week:

... the Senate committee is hoping to release its report as early as next week, when the US sends a delegation to Geneva, Switzerland where it will submit a report on compliance with the International Convention Against Torture. The release of the executive summary would be an effort to show "some form of accountability," one person familiar with the declassification negotiations said.

Of course, it also notes that the fight over redacting pseudonyms still isn't settled, and that may muck things up. And, really, why wouldn't the CIA keep pushing back? Now that the GOP has won the Senate, it knows that if it can just stall until January, the whole report may get buried.

As for the other leaks about the report, many of them confirm what had previously leaked about the report, but also go deeper into each of those areas. For example, earlier leaks had already talked about how the torture techniques used by the CIA went beyond what was approved, how the CIA tortured more people than previously admitted (and then hid those details), and then lied to Congress claiming that the torture was effective when it was not. Leopold has some more details about all of those, including how the CIA is responding to and challenging some of those findings.

However, Leopold also highlights a variety of ways in which the report does appear to fall short, choosing to pull punches and avoid blaming top administration officials like former Vice President Dick Cheney (despite his previous admissions that he okayed the program), and also carefully avoiding placing any blame on a high-ranking CIA official who is described as "Feinstein's boy":

Although he is identified in the Senate report, the committee did not level any criticism against Stephen Kappes, who was deputy director of the CIA while the interrogation program was up and running. Kappes allegedly played a role in covering up the death of a detainee who froze to death in 2002 at a CIA operated prison in Afghanistan called the "Salt Pit." The death of the detainee is highlighted in the Senate report.

Kappes had been Feinstein's choice to head the CIA after Barack Obama was sworn in as president in 2009. Feinstein is on record stating she would not support Panetta's nomination unless Kappes was named as his deputy, a position he served in until 2010. One former CIA official said Kappes is "Feinstein's boy," suggesting that he was spared criticism because of his close relationship with the Intelligence Committee chairwoman.

As for Cheney:

The Senate report promotes the narrative that the CIA deceived the Bush White House into permitting the agency to use the controversial interrogation techniques against certain captives. This, despite the fact that former Vice President Dick Cheney admitted in 2008 that he personally "signed off" on the waterboarding of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and two other high-value captives because he "thought that it was absolutely the right thing to do."

"This is why the SSCI [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence] report is flawed and is not a full historical overview of the EIT program," said one person familiar with it. "Who in their right mind would believe that Dick Cheney does not bear any responsibility here?"

Perhaps even more troubling is that the report does not say that the "enhanced interrogation techniques" were actually torture. We've questioned in the past why Senator Feinstein won't call torture "torture" and apparently that linguistic game continues in this report:

However, the Senate report does not conclude that the CIA violated any domestic or international laws prohibiting the use of torture, contradicting Feinstein's public statements. People familiar with the document say the Senate didn't even use the word "torture" to describe the techniques to which detainees were subjected.

In fact, Leopold claims that the report focuses on the "efficacy" of the torture program and doesn't even touch the questions of legality (or morality).

The report also, apparently, skips over George Tenet's leadership in the CIA, but instead focuses a lot of Michael Hayden:

The committee's executive summary, however, singles out Michael Hayden, who became CIA director in 2006 and is a staunch defender of the use of EITs. He is accused of lying to the panel during a briefing nearly a decade ago when he sought to revamp the CIA's interrogation program.

People familiar with the executive summary said the committee obtained records about Hayden's briefings and carefully reviewed what he told committee members. The report concludes that the former CIA director erroneously told the committee that there were fewer than 100 detainees held captive by the CIA when in fact that number was higher. (The committee's full report says the CIA detained 119 men). Hayden is also criticized for telling the committee that the enhanced interrogation program was "humane." The committee's report concludes that Hayden misrepresented the scope of the program and was not being truthful.

This probably explains why Hayden has been the most vocal and stringent critics of this report. He claimed that Feinstein was "too emotional" to judge the CIA's torture program, and also insisted that it was just a partisan attack.

Still, Leopold's report also highlights how the CIA and its defenders are likely to hit back on the claims about the torture program not being effective. They're going to argue that the torture was the "bad cop" aspect of a "good cop/bad cop" scheme, and the useful information came out when the "good cop" was in the room, but wouldn't have happened without the "bad cop" (i.e., the torture).

Retired Air Force psychologist James Mitchell, who has been credited with being the architect of the CIA's enhanced interrogation program — he's bound by a non-disclosure agreement he signed with the government and does not confirm, deny, or discuss his role in the program — said that his understanding of "the purpose of the enhanced interrogation program was to get the detainee to be willing to engage with a debriefer or a targeter who was asking a question, and that it wasn't designed so that you would ask questions about actionable intelligence… while the detainee was experiencing the enhanced interrogation program."

In other words, Mitchell is saying the enhanced interrogation program was akin to a good cop, bad cop act. For example, a "bad cop" might use EITs on a detainee, then leave the room. A "good cop" might then enter the room and, without the use of any kind of force, get answers from the detainee, who had just been subjected to EITs. If the bad cop and good cop submit separate reports, it would appear on paper that the EITs were ineffective because the bad cop didn't get the answers — the good cop did.

And the Senate would have used that intel in compiling its report.

"If you could go in and read the individual pieces of intel that were written as a result of the debriefings and the interrogations, what would that look like in the database?" Mitchell says. "What that would look like is that all the actionable intelligence came from the good cop just like you would expect, and you wouldn't see a lot of actionable intelligence leading to things like capturing bin Laden coming from the enhanced interrogation program because it wasn't designed to do that."

Still, from previous leaks, even that explanation seems questionable -- as it appears that much of the useful information came from people who weren't being tortured or before they were tortured, suggesting that argument is bunk. And, even if it were true, that doesn't magically make torture right in any way (legally or morally).

Either way, all this speculation is getting ridiculous. The Senate should just release the damn report already.

Filed Under: cia, dianne feinstein, michael hayden, senate, senate intelligence committee, torture, torture report