TSA Declares Themselves Fashion & Funny Police

from the bombs-zomg dept

While we were just discussing an accusation against the TSA for racial profiling (GASP!), did you know that they were also the official state-sponsored fashion and humor police? I mean, who couldn't see these guys adjudicating your local fashion show?

TSA uniforms: like Michael Jackson, but creepier
Image Source. CC BY-SA 2.0

Reader pixelpusher220 writes in about the tale of how one man's shirt got him booted off of a Delta airplane after passing through TSA security, as recounted by Cory Doctrow.

Back in 2007, I designed a shirt for Woot! that featured a screaming eagle clutching an unlaced shoe and a crushed water bottle, surrounded by the motto MOISTURE BOMBS ZOMG TERRORISTS ZOMG GONNA KILL US ALL ZOMG ZOMG ALERT LEVEL BLOODRED RUN RUN TAKE OFF YOUR SHOES. Among the lucky owners of this garment is Arijit "Poop Strong" Guha, who proudly wore it this week as he headed for a Delta flight from Buffalo-Niagara International Airport to his home in Phoenix.

But it was not to be. First, the TSA Delta agents questioned him closely about the shirt, and made him agree to change it, submit to a secondary screening and board last. He complied with these rules, but then he was pulled aside by multiple Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority cops, more TSA, and a Delta official and searched again.

Apparently the new terror plot is to make you laugh so hard your face explodes

It's worth noting that these shirts were designed by Cory Doctrow and sold as part of a charitable program.

Now, I'll restate it again, Arijit had already gone through the TSA screening when he and his wife were then approached by Delta employees at the gate who informed him that he had committed the crime of making other passengers "uncomfortable". When Arijit informed the Delta employees that he was wearing the shirt specifically to mock the security theater we call an airport these days, he was put through another round of screening at the gate by several TSA and local agents and then told that he would be allowed to board. The Delta pilot, catching wind of this, requested Arijit not be allowed to board, because laughter would not be tolerated on his enormous hunk of flying metal. Oh, and they also refused to allow his wife to board the plane too. No reason was apparently given for this, but I'm guessing there may have been some plaid mixing with pin-stripes in her outfit, and the pilot found it to be lacking in fabulousness.

Or maybe there was another reason. According to Arijit, the officer wanted to interrogate him further, saying that Arijit had given a "stupid answer" and "looked foreign":

“Certainly he wasn’t implying that dark-skinned people are not real Americans and that white people are the only true Americans,” Arijit writes in part of his snark-filled synopsis. “Fortunately, Mark’s request was denied. Apparently, someone at NFTA recognized this bigoted meathead for the bigoted meathead he was and that nationality is simply a concept that exists solely on paper and cannot be discerned from just looking at someone.”

And yet he still wasn't allowed on the plane. Was it because of his t-shirt? Was it because the motherfucking eagle on it caused concern amongst passengers? Or, as has been previously accused, was it because too many TSA agents find brown-skinned people suspicious and alarming?

Filed Under: jokes, privacy, security, t-shirts, tsa
Companies: delta

TSA Racial Profiling May Hide Larger Constitutional Problem

from the oops dept

The NY Times had an article recently about accusations of racial profiling by the TSA at Boston's Logan airport. There's apparently a pilot program going on at the airport to do more "behavior detection" with the TSA. This is the security model that is often associated with Israel's airport security, and which some have argued should be adopted in a more widespread fashion. Others have pointed out problems with such a system, including the fact that without significant training, "behavior detection" reverts quite quickly to "racial profiling." That appears to be the case in Boston.

Furthermore, two years ago, Bruce Schneier reasonably pointed out that behavioral profiling did not seem very good at finding terrorists, but did uncover criminal behavior unrelated to airplane security:

It seems pretty clear that the program only catches criminals, and no terrorists. You'd think there would be more important things to spend $200 million a year on.

Again, that seems to be what's happening in Boston, as the efforts have turned up some criminal behavior. And, apparently, that's by design. Because buried deep within the NY Times article was this tidbit:

Officers said managers’ demands for high numbers of stops, searches and criminal referrals had led co-workers to target minorities in the belief that those stops were more likely to yield drugs, outstanding arrest warrants or immigration problems.

[....] The officers identified nearly two dozen co-workers who they said consistently focused on stopping minority members in response to pressure from managers to meet certain threshold numbers for referrals to the State Police, federal immigration officials or other agencies.

The stops were seen as a way of padding the program’s numbers and demonstrating to Washington policy makers that the behavior program was producing results, several officers said.

In other words, TSA managers -- apparently in an effort to make the program look good to superiors -- are putting pressure on TSA line agents to turn up exactly what Schneier suggested: some form of criminal behavior just to make the program look good. That's leading lazy TSA agents to just focus on doing searches of minorities, as they believe that they're more likely to find some sort of criminal activity completely unrelated to airplane security.

Beyond the blatant problems of racial profiling, some of the news here highlights a potentially larger problem with airport searches. As Julian Sanchez points out, the comments above suggest not just that the focus is on criminal behavior rather than security, but also that there's a quota system in place.

That could present a serious legal problem for the basis of TSA searches. After all, a series of lawsuits that established the legality of TSA airport searches focused on the fact that they were specifically designed to keep airplanes (and those on board them) safe rather than to uncover criminal activity. An excellent summary article on BoardingArea.com explains the cases that made such searches legal. Here's a snippet that covers some of the key points:

In 1973 the 9th Circuit Court rules on U.S. vs Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908, there are key pieces of wording that give the TSA its power to search essentially any way they choose to. The key wording in this ruling includes “noting that airport screenings are considered to be administrative searches because they are conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme, where the essential administrative purpose is to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft.”

U.S. vs Davis goes onto to state “[an administrative search is allowed if] no more intrusive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives, confined in good faith to that purpose, and passengers may avoid the search by electing not to fly.”

U.S. vs Davis was upheld by the 9th Circuit Court in 1986 in U.S. vs Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 901 with this ruling “To judge reasonableness, it is necessary to balance the right to be free of intrusion with society’s interest in safe air travel.”

Except... as the case in Boston shows, the searches are going well beyond that "essential administrative purpose," and are now being used for general law enforcement. It's at that point that they clearly violate the 4th Amendment, as they're creating general law enforcement searches without proper cause or warrants. It seems that someone who was searched in Boston under these conditions could now make a pretty reasonable constitutional case that the search didn't just violate their private rights, but that the entire TSA setup -- when designed to search for criminal behavior -- has gone beyond the limits established by the courts, and now violates the 4th Amendment.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, behavioral detection, racial profiling, tsa, tsa searches

Appeals Court Wants To Know Why TSA Is Ignoring Court Order Over Public Hearings On Naked Scanners

from the we're-the-gov't,-we-can-ignore-stuff dept

About a year ago, we wrote about a court ruling that the TSA's naked scanners were legal (they didn't violate the 4th Amendment's restriction on "unreasonable" searches), but that the TSA failed to hold the proper public hearings before buying and deploying them. The TSA appears to have only paid attention to the first part. After a bunch of folks asked why the TSA was ignoring the order for public hearings, now an appeals court has officially weighed in and demanded to know why the TSA has failed to hold public hearings more than a year after that court ruling. The order is pretty straightforward:

ORDERED that the Department of Homeland Security, et al., respond to the petition on or before August 30, 2012.

The TSA has said that it would hold hearings "next year" (or two years after it was ordered to do so). You would think that it wouldn't take the TSA two years to set up basic hearings -- especially while it has continued to roll out a variety of new scanning machines...

Filed Under: court order, privacy, public hearings, scanners, tsa

Apparently Stripping Nude To Protest TSA Search Is Protected By The First Amendment

from the in-oregon-at-least dept

A few months ago, you may have heard about John Brennan, who was going through Portland International Airport, and felt that the TSA screening procedures were the equivalent of harassing him. In response, to protest, he stripped naked... and was promptly arrested for disorderly conduct and indecent exposure. However, a court has now acquitted Brennan by saying that the stripping was an act of public protest, and thus protected by the First Amendment. The judge pointed out that there's already state precedent in Oregon that anti-nudity laws "do not apply in cases of protest."

"It is the speech itself that the state is seeking to punish, and that it cannot do," Circuit Judge David Rees said.

The DA who prosecuted the case is complaining that now anyone arrested for indecent exposure can just claim that it's a protest.

Deputy District Attorney Joel Petersen argued that Brennan only spoke of a protest minutes later. Petersen urged the judge to recognize that distinction, "otherwise any other person who is ever naked will be able to state after the fact" that it was done in protest.

Of course, this now raises the troubling (or appealing, depending on your nature) idea that stripping at the front of the TSA line may become more popular. That said, if you're now... er... itching to disrobe in front of the TSA, it's worth noting that this ruling is specific to Oregon, and who knows how other states might deal with the same issue.

Filed Under: free speech, nudity, protest, search, tsa

Rep. Jackie Speier Puts Forth Bill To Extend TSA To Mass Transit

from the because-that's-exactly-what-we-need dept

Well this is very disappointing. My own Congressional Representative, has put forth a bill, HR 3140 to expand TSA info sharing capabilities to mass transit. Because that's just what we need. Even worse, in speaking about it, Speier doesn't seem to even recognize that there's a problem with the TSA at airports, and seems to assume that it's just obvious that everything's great with airport security:

"We have put in place through TSA a very elaborate system [in airports]. We all go through those metal detectors and those secondary searches. And we've put a lot of focus on the airlines for good reason. But we have neglected the mass transit components, generally speaking," she said.

Speier said 2 million people fly each day, compared with more than 5 million who ride the subway each day in New York City alone. She pointed out that the most recent terrorist attacks have been on mass transit. Also, when U.S. Special Forces raided Osama Bin Laden's compound last year, intelligence gathered revealed the next attack was intended for mass transit.

"The writing is on the wall. We need to be better prepared than we are right now," Speier said.

I'm all for keeping trains safe from terrorists. I ride on trains all the time -- including a Caltrain that has been named after Jackie Speier (I'm not joking). But any approach that suggests the current TSA efforts are somehow reasonable and should be expanded -- without even offering any evidence that this is true -- is a serious mistake.

Filed Under: caltrain, jackie speier, mass transit, security, tsa

Congress: The TSA Is Wasting Hundreds Of Millions In Taxpayer Dollars

from the oversight-indeed dept

The House Oversight Committee has come out with a report slamming the TSA for tremendous amounts of waste, specifically in the "deployment and storage" of its scanning equipment. Basically, it sounds like the TSA likes to go on giant spending sprees, buying up security equipment and then never, ever using it. A few data points

• As of February 15, 2012, the total value of TSA’s equipment in storage was, according to TSA officials, estimated at $184 million. However, when questioned by Committee staff, TSA’s warehouse staff and procurement officials were unable to provide the total value of equipment in storage.
• Committee staff discovered that 85% of the approximately 5,700 major transportation security equipment currently warehoused at the TLC had been stored for longer than six months; 35% of the equipment had been stored for more than one year. One piece of equipment had been in storage more than six years – 60% of its useful life.
• As of February 2012, Committee staff discovered that TSA had 472 Advanced Technology 2 (AT2) carry-on baggage screening machines at the TLC and that more than 99% have remained in storage for more than nine months; 34% of AT2s have been stored for longer than one year.
• TSA knowingly purchased more Explosive Trace Detectors (ETDs) than were necessary in order to receive a bulk discount under an incorrect and baseless assumption that demand would increase. TSA management stated: “[w]e purchased more than we needed in order to get a discount.”

Oh yeah, and it appears that the TSA isn't very good at tracking this stuff. When asked about the total cost of managing this equipment, the TSA was unable to provide an answer. And then it appeared to willfully mislead Congress about this:

• TSA intentionally delayed Congressional oversight of the Transportation Logistics Center and provided inaccurate, incomplete, and potentially misleading information to Congress in order to conceal the agency’s continued mismanagement of warehouse operations.
• TSA willfully delayed Congressional oversight of the agency’s Transportation Logistics Center twice in a failed attempt to hide the disposal of approximately 1,300 pieces of screening equipment from its warehouses in Dallas, Texas, prior to the arrival of Congressional staff.
• TSA potentially violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, by knowingly providing an inaccurate warehouse inventory report to Congressional staff that accounted for the disposal of equipment that was still in storage at the TLC during a site visit by Congressional staff.
• TSA provided Congressional staff with a list of disposed equipment that falsely identified disposal dates and directly contradicted the inventory of equipment in the Quarterly Warehouse Inventory Report provided to Committee staff on February 13, 2012.

One of the theories that was floated a few years ago when there was that big rush to rollout the nudie scanners, was that much of it was being driven by fear mongering from former government officials, like Michael Chertoff, who had economic relationships with the makers of the equipment. This report doesn't confirm any of that, but it sure seems to fit that narrative pretty perfectly. Fear monger away, have the TSA buy a ton of questionable equipment it doesn't actually need, and then have much of that equipment just sit in a warehouse. All on the taxpayers' dime.

Filed Under: congress, house oversight committee, michael chertoff, scanners, tsa, waste

Homeland Security Admits That TSA Scanners Have 'Vulnerabilities'

from the shockingly-unshocking dept

A leaked internal report by Homeland Security has revealed what most people already knew: that its new (expensive) nudie scanners have vulnerabilities that could let things through. This is hardly a surprise. We've written about previous claims including a pretty detailed research report highlighting the vulnerabilities. In fact, it seems pretty crazy that the TSA is finally starting to take notice now. What's really the most galling, of course, is that plenty of people have been pointing out these kinds of vulnerabilities for a while and the TSA did nothing. It's just that now, as the vulnerabilities are finally getting press attention, that the TSA starts to pretend to take these things seriously, rather than admitting the truth: they're there for show more than anything else.

Filed Under: homeland security, scanners, tsa

Former TSA Boss Admits Airport Screening Is Broken

from the who-replaced-kip-hawley-with-bruce-schneier dept

Just a few weeks ago, we wrote about noted TSA-critic and security expert (among other things) Bruce Schneier debating former TSA boss Kip Hawley over at the Economist. While that debate was interesting, you might be forgiven for reading a WSJ piece written by Hawley and wondering if Hawley wasn't secretly replaced by Schneier. In the article, Hawley admits that the TSA screening process is ridiculously broken, and even makes a few statements that are almost word for word repeats of criticism Schneier has directed in the TSA's direction for years. Here's a snippet:

More than a decade after 9/11, it is a national embarrassment that our airport security system remains so hopelessly bureaucratic and disconnected from the people whom it is meant to protect. Preventing terrorist attacks on air travel demands flexibility and the constant reassessment of threats. It also demands strong public support, which the current system has plainly failed to achieve.

The crux of the problem, as I learned in my years at the helm, is our wrongheaded approach to risk. In attempting to eliminate all risk from flying, we have made air travel an unending nightmare for U.S. passengers and visitors from overseas, while at the same time creating a security system that is brittle where it needs to be supple.

Any effort to rebuild TSA and get airport security right in the U.S. has to start with two basic principles:

First, the TSA's mission is to prevent a catastrophic attack on the transportation system, not to ensure that every single passenger can avoid harm while traveling. Much of the friction in the system today results from rules that are direct responses to how we were attacked on 9/11. But it's simply no longer the case that killing a few people on board a plane could lead to a hijacking. Never again will a terrorist be able to breach the cockpit simply with a box cutter or a knife. The cockpit doors have been reinforced, and passengers, flight crews and air marshals would intervene.

Second, the TSA's job is to manage risk, not to enforce regulations. Terrorists are adaptive, and we need to be adaptive, too. Regulations are always playing catch-up, because terrorists design their plots around the loopholes.

All of that sounds good... but why wasn't that the way the TSA acted under Hawley's 3.5 year tenure at the helm? As he explains it, some of it was merely giant bureaucratic institutional momentum. Some of it was political. Some of it was his own fault. Basically, there were a number of reasons -- not all of which are particular convincing for the public that's sick of the TSA, something that Hawley admits. While he does say that there are some things that make more sense than people realize (for example, he says that there are more reasons for requiring people to take off their shoes than people realize), there are other things that he admits are pretty stupid, such as the liquid restrictions. He notes that there are plans on someone's desk (which existed while he was at the TSA) that would allow people to bring the liquids they wanted -- basically by setting up separate lines for those bringing larger volumes of liquids, which can be scanned with relative ease with a software upgrade.

In the end, he suggests a few key changes to the TSA process to improve not just the airport experience, but also the safety of flying. And he notes all of these could be implemented in a matter of months if the TSA wanted to do it:

1. No more banned items: Aside from obvious weapons capable of fast, multiple killings—such as guns, toxins and explosive devices—it is time to end the TSA's use of well-trained security officers as kindergarten teachers to millions of passengers a day. The list of banned items has created an "Easter-egg hunt" mentality at the TSA. Worse, banning certain items gives terrorists a complete list of what not to use in their next attack. Lighters are banned? The next attack will use an electric trigger.

2. Allow all liquids: Simple checkpoint signage, a small software update and some traffic management are all that stand between you and bringing all your liquids on every U.S. flight. Really.

3. Give TSA officers more flexibility and rewards for initiative, and hold them accountable: No security agency on earth has the experience and pattern-recognition skills of TSA officers. We need to leverage that ability. TSA officers should have more discretion to interact with passengers and to work in looser teams throughout airports. And TSA's leaders must be prepared to support initiative even when officers make mistakes. Currently, independence on the ground is more likely to lead to discipline than reward.

4. Eliminate baggage fees: Much of the pain at TSA checkpoints these days can be attributed to passengers overstuffing their carry-on luggage to avoid baggage fees. The airlines had their reasons for implementing these fees, but the result has been a checkpoint nightmare. Airlines might increase ticket prices slightly to compensate for the lost revenue, but the main impact would be that checkpoint screening for everybody will be faster and safer.

5. Randomize security: Predictability is deadly. Banned-item lists, rigid protocols—if terrorists know what to expect at the airport, they have a greater chance of evading our system.

I think it's reasonable to criticize him for not doing more to get these changes in place while he was still in charge, but at least he's speaking out now. One key point in all of this, which often goes unnoted in the discussions of security theater, is that it often makes us less safe by the incentives it creates for TSA scanners. Above, one of his suggestions is to get rid of banned items, because of the "easter-egg hunt." As he notes elsewhere in the article, one of the problems with today's system is that agents become so focused on finding the specific "banned items" that they miss real threats. He relates the story of a test where agents were so focused on finding cigarette lighters that they missed bomb parts packed in the same bag around the lighter.

Of course, the problem in actually getting Hawley's ideas implemented remains the biggest hurdle. As much as the public hates the TSA screening process, no one is willing to make a change like this, because when an attack inevitably gets through (as it would with or without today's procedures), then the "new" security screening process will inevitably be blamed. As such, whoever agreed to put in place such a security regime would inevitably be sacrificed for "failing" in his or her job. So, you shouldn't necessarily expect any significant changes any time soon. Instead, it'll be yet another showing of traditional security theater... for old time's sake.

Filed Under: bruce schneier, security theatre, tsa

TSA Security Theater Described In One Simple Infographic

from the theater-of-the-absurd dept

Didier J. MARY points us to an infographic highlighting why the TSA's security theater has been such a huge waste of taxpayer money:

Filed Under: infographic, security theater, tsa

Size Matters: Why The TSA Fears Thirteen-Inch Laptops, But Not Eleven-Inch Ones

from the makes-no-sense dept

I used to travel with both a laptop and a netbook. More recently, I've usually traveled with a laptop and a tablet. I always took both the laptop and netbook out when I went through airport security, assuming that was required. Also, remembering reports that were written when the iPad first came out, I also take my tablet out and dutifully place it in a separate bin. The last time I went through the airport, a TSA agent told me (for the first time) that I don't actually need to take out the tablet, but she still thanked me for doing so. I may continue to do so, just to avoid any further hassle, but it turns out that the rules for what devices you need to take out, and what you don't, are ridiculously opaque. And, in fact, I probably never had to take out that netbook in the first place, though I wouldn't have put it past the TSA agents to force me to do so anyway if I hadn't.

Matt Richtel, at the NY Times, tries to get to the bottom of the weird rules for what devices come out and which don't and mostly comes up empty. He got curious after a similar experience, in which he was told his iPad could stay in his bag. The TSA insisted it had its reasons, but wouldn't tell him. Other security experts had some guesses, but no solid reasons. Then, there's the TSA's famous Blogger Bob. Oddly, Richtel and the NY Times apparently don't know how to do this amazingly cool HTML trick of "linking" (guys, it's 2012, get with the program), but Richtel quotes two TSA Blogger Bob posts, which I will link to here, finding them myself using another modern digital tool: the search engine. The first one says that smaller devices can stay in your bag:

Electronic items smaller than the standard sized laptop should not need to be removed from your bag or their cases. It’s that simple.

It’s important to remember, however, that our officers are trained to look for anomalies to help keep air travel safe, and if something needs a closer look, it will receive secondary screening. The key to avoiding bag searches is keeping the clutter down. The less clutter you have in your bag, the less likely it will be searched.

Only electronics the size of a standard laptop or larger (for example Playstation®, Xbox®, or Nintendo®), full-size DVD players, and video cameras that use video cassettes must be removed from their carrying cases and submitted separately for x-ray screening. Removing larger electronics helps us get a better look at them and also allows us to get a better look at the contents of your bag

That explains the what, but not the why. It also, once again, makes me think that it's often a safer bet to just remove, rather than give the TSA any reason to delay you. The second post is slightly more bizarre, in that it seems to suggest that there's a screen-size cutoff:

So with those rules in mind, the 11” model of the MacBook Air is fine to leave in your bag, and the 13” model must be removed prior to X-ray screening. Unless of course you own one of the "Checkpoint friendly" laptop bags... Keep in mind that even though you’ve done everything right, our officers are trained to look for anomalies and the need may arise to take a closer look at your gadget.

I hope this clears things up.

Got it? 11" screens? Leave 'em in your bag. 13"? Take 'em out. 12"? Well, are you feeling lucky?

I am curious, however, how many people actually have tried to go through TSA security with an 11" or smaller screen on a computer... and made it through without having to pull the device out of your bag. I can't imagine that most average TSA agents know this amazing 12" rule.

Either way, Richtel tries to parse the language to figure out why there's a screen size cutoff, and still comes up empty. Finally, he talks to an anonymous "security expert," who actually worked on "related issues with the Department of Homeland Security." That guy admitted what we all pretty much suspected all along:

He said that the laptop rule is about appearances, giving people a sense that something is being done to protect them. “Security theater,” he called it.

Richtel makes it sound like "security theater" is a new term, which it's not. But, either way, it's nice to get confirmation, yet again, that the whole thing is a joke. But, in the end, it doesn't matter, because rather than deal with security delaying you from catching your flight, it's still probably going to be easier to take everything out and put them all in individual bins.

Filed Under: blogger bob, laptop, security, tsa