Indian Court Orders Global Takedown Of 'Defamatory' Video From YouTube, Twitter, Facebook

from the jurisdiction-fight dept

I've mentioned in the past that, from Techdirt's earliest posts, one key topic is how you handle "jurisdiction" on the internet, since the internet is global, and laws don't always work that way. Indeed, allowing for global jurisdiction for any particular government's laws would inevitably mean that the most draconian and the most limiting laws rule around the globe -- and that should worry everyone. This is why we've been so concerned about rulings concerning "global" blocking of content in places like Canada and the EU. Thankfully, just recently, the Court of Justice in the EU stopped one global application of the EU's right to be forgotten, and Canada's attempt got effectively stopped by a US court.

And now we get to see how all this plays out in India, as a court has issued a global blocking order directed at Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. The content in question appears to be a video about a book, Godman to Tycoon that the courts have deemed to be defamatory towards Swami Ramdev, a somewhat controversial "yoga superstar."

The companies pushed back arguing a variety of points including that the whole case made no sense since the person who uploaded the videos themselves wasn't even targeted with any lawsuit -- and if that person removed the videos, they would be gone worldwide. But, mostly they focused on just how wrong it is to think that an Indian court should be able to control content well outside its jurisdiction (and they point to the rulings in the Canadian and EU cases above, among others, to suggest that it will only lead to embarrassment for the Indian court to try to reach its power too far).

He further submits that a global ban on content ought to be the last resort of the Court. Such an order results in muzzling dissent. Reliance is placed on the Equustek litigation, wherein an order to remove content was passed by the Courts in Canada and when Google brought an action before a US District Court to prevent enforcement of the Canadian Court‟s order, the U.S. Court restricted the application of the Canadian court‟s order only to Canadian territory. Such judgments could severely undermine the dignity of Indian courts if global injunction orders are passed.

The companies also pointed out other problems with the case -- including that since no one has determined if the videos themselves are defamatory (just the book the videos may be based on), they shouldn't be responsible for the content of the videos -- and that all of the supposedly defamatory content is public domain as it's part of the records in the (separate) court case over the book. Another good point raised: the book in question is available globally, and no Indian court could ban the sale of the book outside of India so why is it able to do so regarding a video.

The court... doesn't seem to care much about any of that. It says it doesn't matter that the videos haven't been carefully reviewed for defamation since they're about the book that has already been deemed defamatory:

The said video clearly claims to be a summary of the book – 'Godman to Tycoon – The Untold Story of Baba Ramdev'. The publishers of the book are mentioned. The video is also conscious of the fact that the book has been banned w.e.f. 11th August, 2017, which appears to be the date of one of the orders passed in the litigation between Plaintiff No.1 and the publisher. Interestingly, the video claims that the views in the video are of those of the author of the book and that the video channel itself has no relationship with the views expressed therein. Thereafter, the video proceeds to give a summary of the book

As for the issue of geoblocking... the court's reasoning is... odd. It relies heavily on the fact that the content was uploaded from India. There's a very legalistic attempt to interpret the current intermediary liability laws in India (around pages 66 to 68) in which it more or less concludes that because the law says that platforms are required to "expeditiously remove or disable access" to the content in question, that applies globally -- because the issue is "the material" and not the location of the viewer of the material.

Thus, if any information or data has been uploaded or is residing in a computer resource i.e. a computer network, the information or data which has to be removed or disabled from that very computer resource or network. The computer resource in the initial part of the Section is the same computer resource as used in the later part of the Section. The latter resource cannot be a sub-set or a species of the former. It has to be the entire computer resource which was initially connected when the uploading of the information or data took place. Thus, if an information or data has been uploaded on a computer network, the platforms would be bound to remove it and disable it from that computer network completely. Any other interpretation of Section 79(3)(b) would not give proper meaning to the use of the words “that material” and “that resource”.

From there, it highlights the fact that the content was uploaded from India as giving the court jurisdiction beyond India.

The act of uploading vests jurisdiction in the Courts where the uploading takes place. If any information or data has been uploaded from India on to a computer resource which has resulted in residing of the data on the network and global dissemination of the said information or data, then the platforms are liable to remove or disable access to the said information and data from that very computer resource. The removal or disabling cannot be restricted to a part of that resource, serving a geographical location.

Thus, if uploading of data which the Court considers defamatory or offensive has taken place from IP addresses located in India, then Indian Courts would have jurisdiction to direct the platforms to remove and disable access to the said information or material, from the computer network of these platforms on to which the said information and data has been replicated. The material/information having originated from India, courts in India would have jurisdiction to direct removal of the same. After uploading of the data or information if the same has been replicated or disseminated or stored in different servers/computers in different geographical locations, the same would not mean that Courts would lose jurisdiction on the same, as the data/material/information was uploaded from India, in the first place. So long as the uploading from India led to the data or information 'residing in' the network or being 'connected to' the network, the same ought to be disabled or blocked globally. Any other interpretation of Section 79 would result in reducing the efficacy of the provision which equates the computer resource which initially created the information and the resource from where it is to be disabled or removed.

If you squint, you can kinda maybe see the logic there if you ignore basically all of the problems it would then create. But, alas, the court says if the videos are uploaded from India and made available globally, they can be taken down globally from India as well:

Removal or disabling of access under Section 79(3)(b) of information or data uploaded from India is not restricted as meaning removal or disabling or access only to users located in India. The removal or disabling is linked with “that resource” and not with the location of the user or viewer. Thus, geo-blocking as is being suggested by the platforms would not be in consonance with Section 79 or with the purport and intent of the Supreme Court....

There's also a weird bit in which the court says that because all of these platforms have terms of service that let them takedown content, there's no real problem with requiring them to take it down globally. How would that play out if platforms didn't put that in their terms of service? Or if someone uploaded the same content from outside of India? It's not at all clear.

Thus, the policies of these platforms permit them to block and disable access in terms thereof. It is not disputed that blocking and disabling access when the platforms do it voluntarily is on a global basis.

As Stanford intermediary liability expert Daphne Keller notes on Twitter, don't be surprised when more countries start demanding global blockages of content. She also points a finger at everyone (*cough* Hollywood lobbyists *cough*) who insisted that the EU and Canada should be able to block globally because those places "have the rule of law," so such processes wouldn't be abused (don't laugh -- this was argued). But, of course, China, Iran, Russia, Turkey and lots of other countries who sure would like to censor critics would insist that they, too, "have the rule of law."

As Keller notes, this is almost certainly just the beginning of US companies having to deal with these kinds of blockade demands around the world. And, don't be at all surprised when China, Iran, Russia, Turkey and the like all point to the courts in Canada, the EU and now India as evidence for why the US companies need to obey.

Filed Under: blocking order, defamation, global blocking, global takedown, india, jurisdiction, swami ramdev, uploads
Companies: facebook, google, twitter

Aussie Censorship In Action: National Enquirer Editor Threats Get Bookstores To Block Sale Of Ronan Farrow Book

from the intermediary-liability dept

We've covered a few times in the past some of the oddities of both Australia's defamation laws and its views on intermediary liability. Our big complaint regarding both of those things is how they end up enabling censorship by the powerful of critical reporting and commentary. Perhaps a perfect example of this is former National Enquirer editor Dylan Howard having some pricey lawyers threaten Australian booksellers if they decided to offer Ronan Farrow's new book Catch and Kill: Lies, Spies and a Conspiracy to Protect Predators. If you haven't guessed, a part of Farrow's book covers efforts by the Enquirer to "get dirt" on certain people in what appears to be an attempt to suppress their credibility or ability to go public, and also to engage in the practice of "catch and kill" (from whence the book gets its title) a story by "buying" the exclusive rights to it, only to kill it.

It appears that some of those threats have worked, as a number of booksellers have chosen not to sell the book (though some others, admittedly, are still offering it for sale). Of course, the threat letter to the various book retailers has some weasel wording, allowing Howard and his lawyers to pretend that they're not trying to seek the blocking of the book:

“We have been consulted by Dylan Howard in relation to false and defamatory allegations, which he has been advised and has reason to believe will be included in the above-named book,” the Tweed firm wrote in a Sept. 27 letter to Hive Store Limited, one of the targeted booksellers (which sources say also include Britain’s W.H. Smith and Wordery chains).

“We have put the publisher, Little, Brown Book Group Limited on notice that, if the offending content is included in the book, we are instructed to take such legal action as may be appropriate,” the letter continued.

The letter concluded: “You are now on notice under UK and Irish defamation laws of the potential defamatory content within the said book. We would therefore urge you to satisfy yourselves that the offending references to our client have been removed prior to distribution by your company.”

See if you can spot the weasel words. There are a lot of conditional statements, basically saying that "if" there's defamatory content in the book, then the booksellers will be "on notice," and (so the letter claims) potentially liable. As the Daily Beast article linked above notes, Howard has previously sued other media properties to stop them from covering news about himself:

Howard and American Media sought court orders restraining the broadcaster from airing footage obtained in the lobby of the publisher's New York headquarters on March 7 this year and requiring Channel Nine to hand over the allegedly "improperly obtained material" for destruction.

It's quite incredible for a journalist (especially one working for a publication with as dubious a history as the National Enquirer) to be attacking freedom of speech when it regards reporting about himself.

Filed Under: australia, books, catch and kill, censorship, defamation, dylan howard, intermediary liability, ronan farrow

Cop's Bogus Defamation Lawsuit Nearly Puts A Small Iowa Newspaper Out Of Business

from the all-the-anti-SLAPP-legislation-motivation-anyone-needs dept

Sometimes the goal of a libel lawsuit isn't to win. Sometimes the goal is to simply inflict as much financial pain as possible. Sometimes all the plaintiff really wants is to destroy the entity they're suing. It's more about being vindictive than being vindicated.

Baseless defamation lawsuits are easily headed off in states with good anti-SLAPP laws. Unfortunately, there are only a small number of states with a law worth invoking. And there's no federal anti-SLAPP law, so vexatious litigants (like, say… Devin Nunes) are free to inflict financial pain on their opponents without worrying about paying the other side's legal fees when their cases are tossed.

Even if you win in court, you can still lose in life. Without a solid fee-shifting provision that makes the losing party responsible for the winner's expenses, plaintiffs don't need to win their lawsuits to emerge victorious.

That's the case here. A small Iowa newspaper is facing the possibility of going out of business, thanks to a bogus defamation lawsuit. The suit was filed by a local police officer who didn't like having the public being informed about his multiple underage dalliances.

The Carroll Times Herald article (former) Officer Jacob Smith sued over was published in 2017. It detailed an investigation of Smith's off-duty hobbies, the ensuing investigation, and Smith's resignation. Here's the Times Herald's recounting of Smith's not-so-illustrious law enforcement career.

The Times Herald’s investigation found that Smith was fired from his first police job in eastern Iowa in 2015, in part, because he sent inappropriate private messages on Facebook to a 16-year-old girl while he was on duty. Following his hire in Carroll, a 17-year-old girl moved into his house while she still attended high school, and she was later accused of defacing the car of a 19-year-old woman with whom Smith had a brief relationship.

One day after this article was published, Officer Smith sued the paper. He alleged his reputation had been damaged by the alleged libel and swore that his career as a law enforcement officer was over. (Smith was either unfamiliar with the cop shop revolving door, or was conveniently ignoring this [awful] truism to increase potential damages.)

The court dismissed Officer Smith's case, finding the paper's article was based on plenty of facts. These included recordings of city council meetings where Smith's messages to the 16-year-old girl were discussed, as well as Smith's own deposition in which he admitted that dating a 17-year-old "wasn't right" and "looked like shit."

Here's what the judge had to say about that:

“The article at issue is accurate and true, and the underlying facts undisputed,” [Judge Thomas] Bice wrote in his 10-page ruling.

The officer also claimed the newspaper's publication of a quote from his ex-wife -- one in which she called the officer a "pedophile" -- was also defamatory. The judge said the ex-wife's opinion (which seems to be based on Smith's fondness for underage girls) was protected speech. Further, the court said the officer's resignation was of public interest and the paper's reporting served that interest without crossing the line into libel.

The paper won, but it's losing.

A small Iowa newspaper that exposed a police officer's sexual relationships with a teenage girl is raising money after successfully fighting a libel lawsuit filed by the police officer.

Douglas Burns, vice president of the Carroll Times Herald, said the western Iowa newspaper's investigation and resulting lawsuit cost it thousands of dollars in expenses and lost revenue.

More than $140,000 to be exact. That's what's still left to be paid after the paper's libel insurance picked up its part of the tab. The paper has been in the Burns family's hands since 1929. Without outside assistance, it could go out of business. Now, Burns is asking readers -- and those generally opposed to baseless legal bullying -- to help out. So far, it seems to be working. A GoFundMe page that has raised more than $45,000 in less than 24 hours.

Not every defendant will be so lucky. Surviving a baseless lawsuit takes money and time. If plaintiffs have a little of both, they can do more damage than defendants can ever hope to recoup. This is why strong anti-SLAPP laws matter. They deter baseless lawsuits by giving defendants a way to escape before the bleeding begins, and holds plaintiffs responsible for the damage they've caused by forcing them to pay their opponents' legal fees.

Sure, some people were fine with Gawker being run out of business by a vengeful venture capitalist. But would these same people be okay with a small paper closing shop because it made the mistake of printing facts?

Filed Under: anti-slapp, defamation, free speech, iowa, jacob smith, journalism, newspapers, police, slapp
Companies: the carroll times herald

Ridiculous: Judge Says Devin Nunes' SLAPP Suit Against An Internet Cow And Others Can Continue

from the well-that's-disappointing dept

In some surprising, and ridiculous, news the local court judge, Judge John Marshall (no, not that Judge John Marshall), has decided not to dismiss the lawsuit that Nunes filed against Twitter, two satirical Twitter accounts, and political strategist Liz Mair. As you'll recall, Mair and Twitter had both argued that the case had no reason to be in a local Virginia court, and that, if anything, the proper venue was in California. The judge had demanded that Twitter reveal to him the details of who was behind the Twitter accounts (something that was already questionable under the 1st Amendment, which protects anonymity). Twitter refused, though did say that neither account holder was based in Virginia.

Of course, now it looks like none of that even mattered anyway, as the judge has said that the venue is fine because Mair once lived in Virginia (she doesn't any more) even though it was a different county from where the lawsuit was filed. The reasoning from the judge is... weird.

The court rejects this argument and finds in this case that the posts to social media were made in Virginia and therefore publication occurred in Virginia and the cause of action for defamation arose in Virginia.

The judge also rejects Twitter's argument that Nunes signed Twitter's terms of service which require any disputes to be handled in California by saying (perhaps slightly more reasonably) that since the lawsuit isn't about things that Nunes did on Twitter, but about third parties, what Nunes agreed to has nothing to do with the venue question. The logic there makes some sense, actually, even though there are many other reasons why the court should say that California is the proper venue (including both Nunes and Twitter and the servers all being based in California).

The negligence claim of the Plaintiff against Twitter here arises from the Defendants use of twitter not the Plaintiff's use of twitter. The use of twitter by the Defendants to post allegedly defamatory statements cannot subject the Plaintiff to the terms of use agreements and the forum selection clause as it would not subject a plaintiff who did not have a twitter account to the terms of use agreement. The court finds the terms of use agreement does not apply to the Plaintiff here.

And, no, I have no idea why the judge chooses not to capitalize Twitter in that paragraph (he does elsewhere in the document). But the logic there is pretty sound if you're looking at this strictly about whether or not the terms of service are binding on Nunes for venue choice. However, the court notes that since Twitter has business activity in Virginia, the case is fine to remain there. It also notes that much can be done by video in the case, so it shouldn't "inconvenience" anyone too much if the case is in Virginia (ignoring that the whole damn lawsuit is an inconvenience...). Either way, in the end, the court has said Virginia is just fine and the case can move forward.

The court refuses to do so as litigation over the defamation claim will necessarily involve Twitter as the claim relates to the use of Twitter's social media platform and the fact that the negligence claim against Twitter is totally dependent upon the success or failure of the defamation claim. The court has ruled that the Defendants' cases are properly raised in Virginia. The Plaintiff came to from California to Virginia to pursue claims that arose in Virginia against Defendants in Virginia. The causes of action in this case are interdependent and for the other reasons in this opinion the court will not dismiss the action against Twitter based on forum non conveniens.

That's disappointing (and a bit surprising), but hardly the end of things as the case can still be tossed on other grounds. The defendants can (and likely will) ask for the case to be dismissed for failure to state a claim (i.e. even if everything in the complaint is accurate, it's still not defamation or any other violation of the law).

Meanwhile, not surprisingly, Nunes, who has historically positioned himself as a "small government" type whose own website focuses on all the ways he's cut "wasteful" government spending, is now crowing about using "every lever that we have in this government" to tell Twitter how to run its business.

His message is actually... contradictory:

"As conservatives and Republicans, we have to use every lever that we have in this government and we really have to have the courts step in and right these wrongs," Nunes said. "It's not OK for tech oligarchs to allow for their platforms to be used to slander conservatives — silence conservatives while at the same time, treating the Democrats differently."

Nunes said these are "monopolies that have full power over spaces of the internet" and "this can't be allowed to happen."

Of course, we don't need to go over (yet again) how there is no evidence to support that Twitter is actually treating Republicans differently than Democrats, but he seems to be saying that Twitter must do the reverse. It can't be allowed to silence conservatives... but it has to silence... people criticizing Devin Nunes? That's about the only interpretation of his statements that make sense. No censorship... except for my critics. Censor them. Also, Rep. Nunes, "slander" is spoken. Twitter is written. The word you want is "libel." And, criticizing you is not libel anyway. You're in Congress, man. Get a grip.

Filed Under: anti-slapp, defamation, devin nunes, devin nunes cow, free speech, jurisdiction, liz mair, slapp, virginia
Companies: twitter

What's Australian For Streisand Effect? Perhaps It's Fatty McFuckhead

from the dude,-that's-not-defamation dept

We've covered a few times just how strange Australian defamation law can be, so I wouldn't even take a guess at how the courts might come down on the question of whether or not calling billionaire Clive Palmer "Fatty McFuckhead" is defamatory. However, I will note that if Palmer didn't want people to start associating himself with the name Fatty McFuckhead, he might have thought twice about threatening to sue someone over that moniker.

As detailed in this fairly amusing video, a popular YouTuber named Jordan Shanks, but better known as Friendly Jordies, has been making a bit of fun of the billionaire, and that apparently is something that Palmer just won't stand for. Shanks goes through the legal threat letter in detail in the 26 minute video:

The video is... pretty incredible. Shanks goes through in quite a lot of detail responding to the threat letter, and laying out why he thinks Palmer deserves basically everything that Shanks said about him, and also "corrects the record" on one point, where he argues the letter alerted him that his original statements about Palmer might not have gone far enough.

We've seen this story play out so many times now. Someone super wealthy sends off a defamation threat letter to someone they know doesn't have much money, likely hoping to intimidate them into stopping being so mean to them. And, perhaps that works in some cases. But in so many cases it just leaves lots and lots of people curious as to why Clive Palmer doesn't want to be called Fatty McFuckhead.

Filed Under: australia, clive palmer, defamation, fatty mcfuckhead, free speech, friendly jordies, jordan shanks, streisand effect

Being Designated A 'Hate Group' By The SPLC Isn't Defamation, Says Federal Court

from the careful-with-that-anti-free-speech-litigation,-plaintiffs dept

The Southern Poverty Law Center has just escaped from a bogus defamation lawsuit brought against it by yet another displeased recipient of the SPLC's "hate group" designation. (h/t Adam Steinbaugh)

Back in February, Gavin McInnes -- the founder of "western chauvinist" group Proud Boys -- sued the SPLC for calling the Proud Boys a hate group. SPLC defended itself by pointing out all the hateful things the Proud Boys have said/done, as well as all the hateful things Gavin McInnes has said/done.

It seems highly unlikely McInnes will prevail in this lawsuit. Unfortunately, the SPLC will still have to defend itself against these bogus claims, and others filed by similar groups that have decided to litigiously object to the SPLC's assessment of their hate levels.

Coral Ridge Ministries (now Truth In Action Ministries) sued the SPLC in 2017 over its hate group designation, which resulted in Amazon blocking Coral Ridge from receiving charitable donations from its AmazonSmile program. The single claim against Amazon is supposedly related to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Coral Ridge feels Amazon is discriminating against it for its religious beliefs -- beliefs that include claiming homosexuality is a lawless abomination. The court points out, towards the tail end of its 141-page decision [PDF], that this claim is implausible, even if one is inclined to read the Act as covering online-only charitable donation platforms.

While Title II “is to be liberally construed and broadly read,” Miller, 394 F.2d at 349, Coral Ridge wants to stretch the statute beyond its breaking point. Perhaps Title II extends beyond physical “place[s],” § 2000a(b), to the internet. Perhaps it protects more than just potential customers seeking goods, services, etc. Perhaps it even recognizes disparate-impact claims. But it does not protect the ability to receive money donations, where such an ability is limited exclusively to § 501(c)(3) organizations and thus not open to the public. And Title II certainly does not entitle to relief a plaintiff who does not plausibly alleged any discrimination whatsoever, whether intentional or by disparate impact.

Coral Ridge cannot force the Amazon defendants to donate money to it. Its Title II claim is due to be dismissed with prejudice.

The defamation claim against SPLC isn't much more coherent. Coral Ridge decides only one definition of the word "hate group" will do -- one that includes membership that advocates for or participates in acts of violence. The court says there are multiple definitions of "hate group" used by entities all over the world and very few of them contain this requirement. More to the point, SPLC's definition of "hate group" does not contain this stipulation. Asserting facts not in evidence is no way to win a court case.

The court need not accept Coral Ridge’s alleged definition of “hate group” because it is a conclusory allegation. Critically, Coral Ridge fails to plead any facts to support its “generaliz[ed],” “blanket statement[]” about the commonly understood meaning of “hate group.” Roberts, 2013 WL 4046383, at *2. It does not, for example, plead that “hate group” is anywhere defined--whether in a dictionary, or by any other source or entity--to require engaging in or advocating violence or crime. Coral Ridge thus asserts “a factual inference”--the commonly understood meaning of “hate group”--"without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based.”

The First Amendment is at stake here. And the court isn't willing to let Coral Ridge leverage the only definition of hate group it finds acceptable into a rights-altering lawsuit win.

If courts considering motions to dismiss were obligated to accept as true plaintiffs’ factually unsupported definitions of words, concepts, and terms, it would make a mockery of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)’s pleading standard.⁷ Requiring courts to accept as true plaintiffs’ pleaded definitions of words would be particularly inappropriate in public-figure defamation suits such as this one, where “there is a powerful interest in ensuring that free speech is not unduly burdened by the necessity of defending against expensive yet groundless litigation.”

The footnote attached to this paragraph spells it out clearly for Coral Ridge: words have meaning… not just your meaning.

For example, if a plaintiff buyer alleging that a defendant seller fraudulently misrepresented the number of apples in a delivery could successfully plead any definition he wanted of “apples”--such as requiring that they have seeds made of 24-karat gold--then even the most frivolous claim could survive a motion to dismiss.

Coral Ridge doesn't survive this motion to dismiss. As the court points out, if you're going to provide citations in support of your single, ultra-thin argument, at least try to include some citations that actually back your claim.

In its amended complaint and briefing, Coral Ridge cites three sources--other than itself and SPLC--of definitions of a “hate group”: (1) judicial opinions, (2) the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and (3) the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). The definitions--or, in the case of the judicial opinions, lack of a definition--of the term “hate group” provided by all of these sources directly contradict Coral Ridge’s allegation that a “hate group is legally and commonly understood as one that engages [in] or advocates crime or violence against others.”

The term Coral Ridge wants to argue about isn't easily or narrowly defined. The court says there is "no single, commonly understood meaning of the term 'hate group.'" Since there's no precise definition, Coral Ridge cannot hope to prove the SPLC's designation is false, and certainly not that the SPLC knew it was false when it declared Coral Ridge an "anti-LGBTQ hate group."

Coral Ridge cannot prove the falsity of the “hate group” designation, given that, as the court has found, the designation is not provable as false. Logically speaking, a plaintiff cannot prove what is not provable.

[...]

To find actual malice just because SPLC publicized a meaning of “hate group” that conflicted with the common understanding of the term would severely undermine debate and free speech about a matter of public concern. This is because, even if the term had achieved a commonly understood meaning, that meaning would not be fixed forever, but rather could evolve through public debate. To sanction a speaker for promoting a genuinely held dissenting view of the meaning of “hate group” would be akin to punishing a speaker for advocating new conceptions of terms like “terrorist,” “extremist,” “sexist,” “racist,” “radical left wing,” “radical right wing,” “liberal,” or “conservative.” Punishing speakers to preserve status quo ideas would be anathema to the First Amendment.

The First Amendment protects a lot of speech people wish it wouldn't. It protects Coral Ridge's anti-LGBTQ statements -- ones that include calling homosexuality "vile," "lawless," and "an abomination." Many people would probably like to see speech like this suppressed with "hate speech" laws. It shouldn't be. But, hypocritically, Coral Ridge wants to call SPLC's "hate group" designation defamation, removing it from the shelter of First Amendment protections. But it does this while presenting itself as a fierce free speech advocate being unfairly targeted by hate speech law proposals.

The SPLC's "hate group" work is, at best, questionable. But it's still protected speech, even if it results in adverse outcomes for those it designates as hateful. The best response is more speech, not lawsuits that threaten the protections the plaintiffs benefit from each and every day.

Filed Under: defamation, free speech, hate group, opinion
Companies: coral ridge ministries, splc, truth in action ministries

Louisiana's Terrible Criminal Defamation Law Again Being Used To Unconstitutionally Target A Critic Of Law Enforcement

from the they-never-learn dept

Louisiana's stupid, unconstitutional criminal defamation law remains on the books despite the state's highest court reaching this conclusion nearly forty years ago:

We hold R.S. 14:47, 48, and 49 to be unconstitutional insofar as they attempt to punish public expression and publication concerning public officials, public figures, and private individuals who are engaged in public affairs.

Despite that, law enforcement officers and agencies continue to use the state's criminal defamation law to punish people for saying bad things about public officials. In every case we've seen, the law is deployed unconstitutionally to protect law enforcement officers/officials and their friends -- a direct contradiction of the state supreme court's holding.

Sheriff Jerry Larpenter of Terre Bonne Parish used the law to subject some bloggers critical of him and his business partnerships to searches of their residences and seizures of their electronic devices. Over in Livingston Parish, parish council members filed criminal defamation complaints against commenters on Facebook who criticized the council's misuse of public funds.

If you're sensing a pattern here, it's because there is one. The law seems to be exclusively used in the way the state's supreme court has said it can't be used. And, thanks to the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office, we have yet another data point to add to this shitty law's saga.

The St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office arrested a federal law enforcement agent and former STPSO employee Monday (Sept. 16) for defamation.

Jerry Rogers Jr. (DOB 11/3/1972) was arrested after it was discovered he sent numerous emails which included false information in relation to an open investigation.

Rogers used a fake name to create an email account and then sent messages to the family members of a victim.

The emails contained false information regarding the ongoing investigation as well as derogatory statements regarding the lead investigator and others closely involved in the investigation. The false information deprived the lead investigator of the family’s trust and confidence.

Here it is again: law enforcement making with the criminal defamation charges when, at best, it should be considered a civil case. There are more details in this in-depth report by Nola.com, which suggests the statements -- and the resulting criminal defamation charges -- stem from the Sheriff's Office's investigation of a homicide the Sheriff was initially unwilling to investigate as a homicide, despite the victim being found with a bullet through her head inside of her burned home.

The sheriff claims the former employee/current federal agent used a fake name to create accounts to send emails to the victim's family in order to undermine their confidence in the Sheriff's investigation. Yet again, the use of a pseudonym isn't a factor that should turn this from a civil case to a criminal case.

No, the problem here was someone was badmouthing the sheriff and his investigators. It may be some of what was said was substantially true. The sheriff's reluctance to investigate this death as a homicide -- at least not until he decided to run for re-election -- may have resulted in this case being back-burnered… and ultimately to the emails at the center of this attempted prosecution.

This internal investigation that has now manifested itself as an unconstitutional enforcement of a horrible law has also resulted in the firing of one of the office's investigators.

The arrest comes on the heels of the firing of Sgt. Stefan Montgomery, one of a team of Sheriff's Office investigators assigned to the Krentel case.

Documents from the Sheriff's Office said that Montgomery shared privileged information with someone outside the agency on multiple occasions. "This person then in turn used that information to defame the investigation, (Sheriff's Office) personnel and the ... agency," according to a document concerning Montgomery's termination.

This only makes this prosecution more disingenuous. If the emails the Sheriff is basing his criminal defamation case are based on credible information leaked to the suspect by another law enforcement officer, chances are there's a lot of truth in this so-called "defamation."

Even if everything the Sheriff is angry about is pure bullshit, the law cannot be used to prosecute someone who criticized public officials, even if the accused is a public official himself. Hopefully, the prosecutor will recognize this for what is -- a violation of the Constitution -- and refuse to move forward with charges. But this is Louisiana, and the state's prosecutors have shown repeatedly they're willing to compound unforced errors by local law enforcement.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, criminal defamation, critics, defamation, free speech, jerry larpenter, jerry rogers, law enforcement, livingston parish, louisiana, st. tammany parish, terre bonne parish