Foreign Stream-Ripping Site Wins Against Music Labels Based On Jurisdiction

from the not-like-this dept

It's been quite frustrating to watch the music industry continually turn its legal gaze to whatever it insists is the "new" threat. From the traditional piratey-scapegoats like Napster, to torrent sites, and on to file-lockers, before finally moving over to stream-ripping sites -- it's been quite predictable, if a bit silly. As with so many industry-led crusades against technology tools, this attack on these types of sites carries with it the misguided notion that because a site or tool can be used to infringe on music copyrights, it therefore is an enemy and must be shut down entirely. We've seen this same tactic used against tons of technology tools that have had perfectly legal uses in the past, but in the case of stream-ripping sites, most have decided to simply fold.

Which makes it somewhat noteworthy that one foreign site is fighting back and winning against a legal challenge in the US, if only on jurisdictional grounds.

FLVTO.biz and 2conv.com, owned by Russian developer Tofig Kurbanov, remained online despite being sued by several record labels last August. Where other site owners often prefer to remain in the shadows, Kurbanov filed a motion to dismiss the case. According to the defense, the court has no jurisdiction over the matter. Only a small fraction of the visitors come from the US, and the site is managed entirely from Russia, it argued.

The RIAA labels involved in the suit disagreed, of course. As with all lawsuits of this kind, the labels merely see a tool that American users can get to, and can use to infringe, therefore it must be killed off. FLVTO pointing out that it doesn't do anything to entice American users to its site, nor does it engage in any commercial activity on the site other than displaying advertisements, did nothing to keep the RIAA from suing. It did, however, convince the judge to toss the case on jurisdictional grounds.

“Even if the Websites’ servers knew exactly where the users were located, any interaction would still be in the unilateral control of the users as they initiate the contacts,” Judge Hilton’s opinion reads.

There could be personal jurisdiction if there’s a “commercial contract” involved. However, that’s not the case here. The site generates revenue from users through advertisements, but that’s not seen as a basis for a commercial contract, the court concludes.

In other words, an American company can't sue a foreign operator in the US simply because the internet works as intended.

While this is a good ruling generally, it might be nice to get the courts to establish some clarity on the legal status of stream-ripping sites. Again, these are essentially dumb sites that don't care whether the rip is infringing or not. They are a tool, nothing more. Given that, the fact that these sites are shutting themselves down under the mere threat of lawsuits represents a pretty clear chilling effect on the dissemination of otherwise legal tools and technology to the internet writ large.

This is especially true given that we already have a pretty clear precedent for this issue. Stream ripping is little different from the VCR in effect. It is taking a "stream" of live content, and "recording" it for personal use and storage. Thirty-five years ago, the Supreme Court made it clear that this was perfectly legal in the famous Sony Betamax case. In that case, the court found that there were substantial non-infringing uses of the technology -- as is true of stream rippers -- and that "time shifting" of content that was being streamed live was a perfectly legitimate use. As the ruling in the Betamax case found:

The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that question, we need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only consider whether, on the basis of the facts as found by the District Court, a significant number of them would be noninfringing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case, we need not give precise content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so both (A) because respondents have no right to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and (B) because the District Court's factual findings reveal that even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' programs is legitimate fair use.

It is difficult to see how that same standard does not apply to stream ripping as well -- but so far, the RIAA (in particular) is acting as if the Supreme Court ruled the opposite way in the Betamax case, and because many of these sites are small, they have little desire to actually fight a huge, costly legal battle. And thus, the RIAA has mostly been able to kill off the modern VCR. This case turned on jurisdiction issues, which is a good start, but a clear ruling that stream ripping is legal, a la the Betamax, would be even better.

Filed Under: copyright, fair use, intermediary liability, jurisdiction, recording, stream ripping, substantial non-infringing uses, time shifting, tofig kurbanov
Companies: 2conv, flvto.biz

Author Ken MacLeod: Please Don't Pass The EU Copyright Directive In My Name

from the keep-the-internet-open dept

As a full-time writer I have an interest in copyright. However arguable its principles and arbitrary its scope, I benefit from it. When I trip over an online pirate version of one of my books, I shamelessly snitch the pirates to my publishers.

But would I want the platforms that enable this piracy to be liable for it? No. Because then the platforms – mostly giant corporations whose names we all know – would have every incentive to screen for any content that might conceivably breach copyright. Given the volumes involved, they would have to attempt to automate their filters. Good luck with designing an algorithm that can distinguish rip-offs from fair dealing!

Far greater than my interest in copyright is my interest in a free and open internet – or, failing that, in keeping the internet as free and open as it is now. The internet is already a long way from the wild wonderland I first stepped into in the mid-1990s. Predictably enough, that early free-for-all has shrunk to a handful of giant corporations, who -- like some fast-forward cartoon version of the last chapter of Marx's Capital: Vol 1 -- usurp and monopolise all the advantages of this process of transformation.

It's tempting to think that the EU is standing up to the corporate behemoths in the interest of creators. But Articles 11 and 13 of the proposed directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market aren't an instance of democracy against capitalism. Drafted with scary imprecision, they at best licence one group of corporate behemoths – the big publishers and creative industries – to harass another, the digital platforms. At worst, they enable the digital platforms to further censor and blinker us, their users.

The European Parliament would do well to ditch the offending articles, leave creators and publishers to deal with egregious rip-offs of their work, and leave the rest of us to meme and link and parody and remix as we please.

Kenneth Macrae MacLeod is a Scottish science fiction writer who’s published books such as The Star Fraction (1995) to The Restoration Game (2010). In 2009 he was a writer in residence at the ESRC genomics policy and research forum at Edinburgh University. He’s won numerous awards including the BSFA award and Prometheus Award, both for Best Novel.

Filed Under: article 11, article 13, copyright, eu, eu copyright directive, free speech, intermediary liability, open internet

Supreme Court Refuses To Hear Case That Threatened CDA 230

from the good-news! dept

As we noted earlier this year, the California Supreme Court wisely sided with Yelp in a legal fight over whether or not the company could be forced to remove reviews based on another legal dispute of which Yelp was not a party. The crux of the case was about Section 230 of the CDA. As we detailed back in 2016, a lower court had initially ordered Yelp to take down a review that the court found to be defamatory (though, it was on default judgment as the defendant in the case decided to not show up in court). The case was brought by a lawyer, Dawn Hassell, who sued a former client, Ava Bird, claiming that Bird had posted a negative review of Hassell's legal work. Bird then ignored the lawsuit, leading to the default judgment -- all of which is fine. But then the court issued an injunction against Yelp, ordering it to take down the review, despite Yelp not even being a party to the lawsuit.

The California Supreme Court properly ruled that the injunction should be thrown out, based on CDA 230, which (as we've discussed over and over again) says that an internet service provider (such as Yelp) cannot be held liable due to the speech of a user (such as Ava Bird). This was a pretty standard and "easy" ruling on CDA 230, and the court had many cases to cite. And thus, it's good news that the US Supreme Court has denied Hassell's cert petition to hear the case -- meaning the California ruling stands. It shouldn't be a surprise that the Supreme Court decided not to hear the case, as there is widespread agreement that this is exactly how CDA 230 is meant to work and it's how basically every circuit that has ruled on this issue has found, sot here's no circuit split to deal with. Having the Supreme Court refuse to hear a case isn't always newsworthy, but it's at least a bit of a relief that the court apparently didn't think this one was an issue worth reconsidering. The internet and the services we all use, remain protected... for now.

Filed Under: ava bird, california, cda 230, dawn hassell, free speech, hassell v bird, intermediary liability, reviews, section 230, supreme court
Companies: yelp

Herrick V. Grindr – The Section 230 Case That's Not What You've Heard

from the pleading-matters dept

On the surface Herrick v. Grindr seems the same sort of case as Daniel v. Armslist (which we wrote about last week): it's a case at an appeals court that addresses the applicability of Section 230, meaning there is a reasonable possibility of it having long-lingering effect on platforms once it gets decided. It's also a case full of ugly facts with a sympathetic plaintiff, and, at least nominally, involves the same sort of claim against a platform – in Armslist the claim was for "negligent design," whereas here the claim is for "defective design." In both cases the general theory is that because people were able to use the platform to do bad things, the platforms themselves should be legally liable for the resulting harm.

Of course, if this theory were correct, what platform could exist? People use Internet platforms in bad ways all the time, and they were doing so back in the days of CompuServe and Prodigy. It is recognition of this tendency that caused Congress to pass Section 230 in the first place, because if platforms needed to answer for the terrible things their users used them for, then they could never afford to remain available for all the good things people used them for too. Congress felt it was too high a cost to lose the beneficial potential of the Internet because of the possibility of bad actors, and so Section 230 was drafted to make sure that we wouldn't have to. Bad actors could still be pursued for their bad acts, but not the platforms that they had exploited to commit them.

In this case the bad act in question was the creation and management of a false Grindr profile for Herrick by an ex-boyfriend bitter about their breakup. It led to countless strangers, often with aggressive expectations for sex, showing up at Herrick's home and work. There is no question that the ex-boyfriend's behavior was terrible, frightening, inexcusable, and, if not already illegal under New York law, deserving to be. But only to the extent that such a law would punish just the culprit (in this case the ex-boyfriend who created the fake profile).

The main problem with this case is that Herrick is seeking to have New York law extend to also punish the platform, which had not created the problematic content. But the plain language of Section 230 – both in its immunity provision along with its pre-emption provision – prevents platforms from being held liable for content created by others. Herrick argues that Grindr should be held liable anyway "because it knowingly facilitated criminal and tortious conduct." But that's not the standard. The standard is whether the platform created the wrongful content, or, at minimum, in the wake of Roommates, had a hand in imbuing it with its wrongful quality. But here there is no evidence to suggest that Grindr had anything to do with the creation of the fake profile. It was the awful ex-boyfriend who was doing all the malfeasant content supplying.

But here's where the two cases part company, and where the Grindr one gets especially messy. The good news for Section 230 is that this messiness may make it easy for the Second Circuit to resolve in favor of Grindr and leave Section 230 unscathed. The bad news is that if the Second Circuit decides the other way, it will be very messy indeed.

One of the core questions in most lawsuits involving Section 230 is whether the platform itself is an interactive computer service provider, and thus protected by Section 230 for lawsuits seeking to hold them liable for content created by others, or whether it is instead a non-immune "information content provider." Part of the problem with this case is that when Herrick filed the lawsuit originally, the pleading acknowledged that it was an interactive computer service provider. Later when he was fighting the motion to dismiss he changed its mind, but that's a problem. You don't usually get to change your mind about these critical elements of your complaint without repleading it. (Which is one of the reasons Herrick is appealing; the dismissal was "with prejudice," meaning it wouldn't easily be able to re-plead at this point, and Herrick wants another chance to amend his complaint.)

But that's only one of the pleading problems. A plaintiff also has to put forth a plausible theory of liability at the outset, in large part so that the defendant can be on notice of what it is being accused of to defend itself. It's not unusual for theories of liability to evolve as litigation proceeds, but if the theory changes too much too late in the process it raises significant due process problems for the defendant. Which seems to be happening here. The story Herrick told the Second Circuit about why it thought Grindr should be liable for the harm Herrick suffered differed in significant ways from the story it had told at the outset, or to the trial court. This change is one reason why the case is particularly messy, and may be messier still if the Second Circuit allows it to continue anyway.

At issue is what Herrick told the Second Circuit about his harassment. According to him now, strange men were showing up in his life not just constantly but everywhere he went. Yet according to the record at the trial court, they only showed up in two places: his home and his work. Which is not to say, of course, that it's ok for him to have these people harass him at either place (or any place). The issue is that this "everywhere" v. "only in two places" distinction significantly affects his theory of the case and therefore the merits of his appeal.

Because the argument he pressed at oral argument was that it was Grindr's geolocation service that removed the case from Section 230's purview. According to him there must be some bug in Grindr that allows these strange men to know where he is and seek him out, and so, he thinks, Grindr should be liable for not fixing this defect.

However there are a number of problems with this theory. First, it is highly implausible. For it to be true Grindr would need to not only still be tracking him (even as an ex-user) but then, for some unknown reason, somehow unite the location data of the actual Herrick person with the fake Herrick profile. Herrick tried to argue that the first part was likely, citing for instance Google's location services continuing to track users after they'd thought it had stopped. But even if it were true that Grindr had continued to track him, it would be really random to associate that data with any other account he didn't control. From Grindr's point of view, his real account and the fake account would look like two completely separate users. Sure, Grindr could have a bug that mis-associated location data, but there's no reason for it to pick these two completely different accounts to merge the data from. It would be just as arbitrary as if it mixed up his data with any other Grindr account.

Furthermore, there is zero evidence to suggest that the fake account used the geolocation data of anyone at all, other than perhaps the ex-boyfriend, who was operating the account. There certainly is no evidence to suggest that it was somehow using Herrick's actual data, and that's why the factual distinction about where he was harassed matters. If it truly was everywhere then he might have a point about the app having a vulnerability, and if so then perhaps his defective design claim might start to be colorable. But the only information he's alleged is that he was harassed in those two places, home and work, and no one needed to use any geolocation data to find him at either of these places. The ex-boyfriend knew of these places and could easily send would-be suitors to them directly via private messages. In other words, the reason they turned up at either of these places was because of content supplied by a third party (the ex-boyfriend). This fact puts the case clearly in Section 230-land and makes the case one where someone is trying to hold a platform liable for harm caused by how another communicated through their system.

Finally, an additional problem with this theory is that even if it were correct, and even if there were some evidence that the geolocation was allowing strangers to harass him everywhere, it needed to have come up before the appeal. The purpose of the appeal is to to review whether the first court made a mistake. Belatedly supplying more information for the benefit of the appeals court will not help it decide whether the first court made a mistake because that court could only have done the best it could with the information available to it. It isn't a mistake not to have had the benefit of more, and to add more at this late date would be incredibly unfair to the defendant. As it was, by pressing this new "he was tracked everywhere" theory at oral argument it left Grindr's counsel in the unenviable and risky position of having to field extremely hypothetical questions from the judges about their client's potential liability based on facts nowhere in the underlying record. It was uncomfortable to listen to the judges push Grindr's lawyers on the question of whether some hypothetical software bug that they had never contemplated, and likely doesn't exist, might undermine their Section 230 protection. To their credit they fielded the hypo on the fly pretty well by reminding the judges that Section 230 covers how platforms are used by other people, regardless of whether they are used appropriately or exploitatively. But given the way this case was pleaded from the outset, this hypo should never have come up, especially not at this late juncture.

So one of the overarching concerns about this case is that because this theory did not coalesce until it had reached the appeals court, it left the central legal questions it raised under-litigated, thus inviting poor results if the Second Circuit now gives them any credence. But that's not the only concern. It may still be an ominous harbinger, for even if Herrick loses the appeal, it may not be the last time we see this "software vulnerability makes you lose Section 230 protection" theory put forth. It foreshadows how we may see future privacy litigation wrapped-up as defective design cases, and, worse, it may encourage plaintiffs seeking to do an end-run around Section 230 to try to package their claims up as privacy cases.

Also, what Herrick asked for in his appeal was a remand back to the trial court to explore all these under-developed evidentiary issues. Was there a software bug? Was Grindr continuing to track former subscribers in a way they didn't know about? Was there a privacy leak, where the fake profile was somehow united with the geolocation of a real person? Herrick believes the case shouldn't have been dismissed without discovery on these issues, but early dismissal is a big reason why Section 230 provides valuable protection to a platform. It is extremely expensive to go through the discovery stage – in fact, it's often the most expensive stage – and if platforms had to endure it just so plaintiffs could explore paranoid fantasies with no evidence to give them even a veneer of plausibility, it will be extremely destructive to the online ecosystem.

On the upside, however, unlike the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in the Armslist case, after listening to the oral argument I'm relatively confident that the judges will be able to respect prior precedent upholding Section 230, even in these awful cases, and resist reaching an emotional conclusion that strays from it. Also, given the issues with the pleading and such – which at oral argument the judges flagged – there may be enough procedural problems with Herrick's case to make it easy for the court to dispense with it without causing damage to Section 230 jurisprudence in the Second Circuit in the process. But if these predictions turn out to be wrong, and if it turns out that these procedural issues pose no obstacle to the court issuing the remand Herrick seeks, then we might have to contend with something really ugly on the books at a federal appellate circuit level.

Filed Under: cda 230, intermediary liability, section 230
Companies: grindr

In Which We Warn The Wisconsin Supreme Court Not To Destroy Section 230

from the not-just-fosta dept

One of the ideas that we keep trying to drive home is that the Internet works only because Section 230 has allowed it to work. Mess with Section 230, and you mess with the Internet. FOSTA messed with it statutorily, but it isn't just Congress that can undermine all the speech and services that depend on Section 230's protection for the platforms that enable them. Courts can mess with it too.

While it's bad enough when courts get questions of whether Section 230 applies wrong at the trial court level, the higher the court, the more potentially destructive the decision if the court decides to curtail its protection. On the other hand, the higher the court, the more durable Section 230's protective language becomes when the decision gets it right. This post is about one of those cases where the future utility of Section 230 hangs in the balance, and where we hope that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the highest court in the state, gets it right and finds it applies to the platform being sued -- and therefore all other platforms that depend on its protection.

We've written before about this case, Daniel v. Armslist. As with a lot of the litigation challenging Section 230 it was one of those "bad facts make bad law" sorts of cases. In this case an estranged husband, against whom there was a restraining order, bought a gun from an unlicensed seller who had advertised through the Armslist site. Notably it does not appear that the sale was necessarily illegal – in Wisconsin unlicensed dealers apparently do not have to run background checks – nor was the sale fully transacted on the site (the actual purchase was made in a McDonalds parking lot). Of course, even if the sale had been illegal, or fully brokered via the site, Section 230 should still have insulated the platform, but here the Section 230 inquiry should be much more straight forward: the lawsuit alleging that Armslist negligently designed a site that facilitated a third party's speech – in this case, the speech offering the gun for sale – should have been barred by Section 230.

The trial court actually had gotten this question right and dismissed the case. Unfortunately a state appeals court in Wisconsin opted to ignore twenty-plus years of jurisprudence, as well as the statute's pre-emption provision, which would have directed such a finding, and reversed the trial court's original decision. Armslist then sought review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and we filed an amicus brief supporting their petition. One of the main points we made in the brief was how much stood to be affected if the decision was not overturned and Section 230's applicability in Wisconsin was now narrowed in ways Congress hadn't intended. After all, it isn't just Armslist in the crosshairs; it is all platforms everywhere, and all the speech and services they enable, in Wisconsin and beyond, that are threatened if platforms can no longer depend on Section 230's critical protection applying to them as it once had.

Fortunately the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and this week we filed yet another amicus brief in support of Armslist on the merits. It is similar to the previous brief, with the added example of how much the Copia Institute itself, and Techdirt in particular, depends on Section 230 remaining robust and effective. It relies on it as a user of other services -- for instance, to have its posts shared through social media -- and as a platform itself. There could not be a comments section on Techdirt -- or all the vibrant and insightful discussion found there -- without Section 230 protecting the site from liability for what commenters say.

It would be easy for the tragedy underpinning this case to cause the court to fixate on Armslist and the type of user content it intermediates. But Internet platforms come in all sorts of shapes and sizes, offering all sorts of services, and enabling all sorts of speech on all sorts of topics. And all of them will be affected by how the court resolves this particular case before it. So we hope our brief helps remind the Wisconsin justices of just how much is at stake.

Filed Under: cda 230, free speech, gun sales, intermediary liability, section 230, wisconsin
Companies: armslist

EU Cancels 'Final' Negotiations On EU Copyright Directive As It Becomes Clear There Isn't Enough Support

from the breaking:-the-internet dept

So, this is certainly unexpected. Just hours after we pointed out that even all of the lobbyists who had written/pushed for Article 13 in the EU Copyright Directive were now abandoning their support for it (basically because the EU was considering making it just slightly less awful), it appears that Monday's negotiations have been called off entirely:

Apparently multiple countries -- including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland -- made it clear they would not support the latest text put forth by Romania, and therefore would have blocked it from moving forward. Monday's negotiations were supposed to have been the "final" negotiations (after the previous "final" negotiations that didn't accomplish much) around a "compromise" bill that then would have gone out to be voted on by the EU Council, the EU Committee and the EU Parliament in the next few months. However, with the news of all those countries (via the EU Council) deciding to vote against the proposal, it effectively blocks it for now.

MEP Julia Reda now has the full breakdown of the votes, noting that 11 countries voted against the "compromise" text: Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Slovenia, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Croatia, Luxembourg and Portugal. That's... a pretty big list. Reda points out that most of those countries were concerned about the impact on users' rights (Portugal and Croatia appear to be outliers). That's pretty big -- as it means that any new text (if there is one) should move in a better direction, not worse.

As Reda notes, this does not mean that the Copyright Directive or Article 13 are dead. They could certainly be revived with new negotiations (and that could happen soon). But, it certainly makes the path forward a lot more difficult. Throughout all of this, as we've seen in the past, the legacy copyright players plowed forward, accepting no compromise and basically going for broke as fast as they could, in the hopes that no one would stop them. They've hit something of a stumbling block here. It won't stop them from still trying, but for now this is good news. The next step is making sure Article 13 is truly dead and cannot come back. The EU has done a big thing badly in even letting things get this far. Now let's hope they fix this mess by dumping Articles 11 and 13.

Filed Under: article 13, copyright, eu, eu copyright directive, eu council, intermediary liability, safe harbors

Record Labels, Film Studios, Tech Companies And The Public Now All Agreed That Article 13 Is A Disaster

from the why-is-it-still-moving-forward? dept

Earlier this week, we noted that the film, TV and sports industry associations had come out against Article 13 in the EU Copyright Directive. It was for all the wrong reasons of course -- mainly, that (1) negotiators were exploring very minor safe harbors that would give internet platforms conditions they could follow to avoid liability and (2) they were hoping that a few court cases would break their way and they'd get an even better result in the courts -- but it was still notable. After all, much of Article 13 was pushed for by those same industry reps.

Still, some suggested that while the movie and TV folks wanted out, the record labels didn't, as they had been even more instrumental in crafting Article 13, with their entirely mythical concept of the "value gap" (a thing that does not actually exist) which they incorrectly believed Article 13 would solve. However, on Thursday, even the record labels bailed out on support for Article 13, though it appears for the same awful reasons as the film studios. They don't go quite as far as the film and TV folks (who ask for Article 13 to be put on hold indefinitely), but rather call for major changes:

With the final trilogue only days away, European creatives and rightsholders urgently inform EU policymakers that the 13 January draft text of the proposed Copyright Directive does not meet the original objective of Article 13 and urgently requires significant changes.

They don't really explain why they're so upset, but it's not difficult to see that it's the same reason as the film, TV and sports organizations. Again, Article 13 is a kind of bait and switch. All of the stuff people are complaining about -- the mandatory filters, notice-and-staydown, the insane fines -- all go away if the internet platforms agree to basically cough up all their money to the legacy copyright gatekeepers. The "secret" truth behind Article 13 is that even the folks crafting it know that all of the demands are absolutely ridiculous. It's just that they've included a "way out." And that "way out" is to agree to insane licensing rates from the legacy copyright players. Despite the nonsense you'll hear, this won't create "fair market" rates or "fair" anything. You don't negotiate a fair market rate when you're basically told that if you don't agree to whatever rates the copyright gatekeepers set, you'll get fined billions of dollars.

So any path to avoiding having to agree to a license at the end of a shotgun is seen as a non-starter for the entertainment industry. Though, their latest bit of petulance about not getting everything they want kind of gives away the gameplan. This was never about stopping infringement. It was always about a government-mandated wealth-transfer from the companies who actually innovated to the companies that failed to innovate.

Either way, if they no longer like the deal, the tech companies have never liked the deal and (most importantly) the public hates the deal... then why is the EU still pushing forward with it? Who actually still supports it, beyond the politicians in the EU? It's one thing to say that a true political compromise makes no one happy, but this is a case where everyone is fundamentally against the end result entirely.

So, please, European bureaucrats: let's just leave Article 13 in the trash pile where it belongs.

Filed Under: article 13, copyright, eu, eu copyright directive, intermediary liability, record labels, safe harbors
Companies: ifpi

Latest EU Copyright Directive Still Demands Internet Companies Wave Magic Wands

from the this-is-not-how-you-regulate dept

The EU Copyright Directive continues to be a total and complete disaster. It's so bad that neither of the two main groups lobbying around it -- the legacy entertainment industry and the big tech companies (with the vast majority of the lobbying coming from the copyright sector) are both unhappy with the bill (though for opposite reasons). And yet, despite all of this, the EU continues to soldier forward with a new proposal and a new draft that still requires that internet companies do the impossible:

The specific suggestions being pushed in the revised Copyright Directive suggests that whoever is putting this stuff together still has no idea what they're talking about. There's an attempt at fixing Article 11 (the snippet tax) not by actually fixing it, but at least making sure that it doesn't apply to "individual words or very short extracts."

The rights referred to in the first subparagraph shall not apply in respect of uses of individual words or very short extracts of a press publication.

What does "very short extracts of a press publication" mean? Well, we'll have to see what courts think of it after extensive litigation, I guess.

More importantly, Article 13 remains an utter mess where they still think that internet companies can just wave a magic wand and suddenly they will stop all infringement without also taking down non-infringing content. The text still pushes for online platforms to have to take out licenses for everything -- and on the question of takedowns of stuff that isn't actually infringing, it just says "don't do that":

The steps taken by the online content sharing service providers should be without prejudice to the application of exceptions and limitations to copyright, including in particular those which guarantee the freedom of expression of users.

Users should not be prevented from uploading and making available content that they have produced and that contains existing works or other protected subject matter for specific purposes of illustration or parody when these uses do not create significant harm to rightholders.

First of all... how is that even possible to do these things without running afoul of the other parts of the law? The bureaucrats don't say because they don't understand any of this. Second, this new text basically only says that this applies to "parody" or when the uses "do not create significant harm to rightsholders." But, who determines that? We've seen rightsholders go nuts over all sorts of uses that wouldn't create actual harm (in some cases that would lead to more revenue). All of this is just left up to the idea that internet companies will magically figure out what's okay and what's not.

As the EFF notes in a thorough post, so much of Article 13 is really the EU putting out vague statements about what should be allowed and what should not be allowed, without any notion of how that'll work and then saying you two giant industries figure this mess out. Indeed, as scholar Annemarie Bridy pointed out recently in a wonderful (if terrifying) tweet storm, the entire Article 13 appears to be based on a model of the world that isn't accurate -- one where there are just a few internet companies negotiating with just a few content companies:

The whole thing remains an utter disaster that is moving forward even as no one is left who really seems to support it. The public doesn't want this shit. The big entertainment companies are now asking for Article 13 to be set aside. The big internet companies have always been against it. And yet it rolls ever forward, with a bunch of clueless, technically illiterate bureaucrats basically saying "well, if we just say big companies should do this without allowing any negative consequences to happen, surely they can figure it out..." and tossing it over the fence.

This is not how sane policy is made. This is how you fuck up the internet.

Filed Under: article 11, article 13, censorship, copyright, eu copyright directive, filters, intermediary liability, magic wand, safe harbors

Hollywood Asks EU To Drop Article 13 Entirely, Because It Might Possibly Have A Tiny Compromise For The Internet

from the going-for-broke dept

Earlier today, we had a post detailing the completely ridiculous "defense" of Articles 11 and 13 in the EU Copyright Directive that the EU Parliament's JURI Committee released. It was so full of misleading statements, outright lies, and contradictory arguments that it would have been hilarious, if it wasn't trying to justify changing the entire internet for the worse. However, those of us who think that the EU should drop Article 13 (and Article 11) entirely now have a very unlikely ally: the legacy entertainment industries, who were the ones lobbying heavily for Article 13 in the first place.

Really.

As we had noted last month, as the negotiations moved forward on Article 13, the TV, sports and film industries -- calling themselves the "creative sectors" -- have been suddenly freaking out and asking the negotiators to hit the brakes, or at least carve them out of Article 13. They were doing this for all the wrong reasons of course. Specifically, negotiators had begun to consider a very, very limited (and ridiculously weak) safe harbor for internet platforms, that if they followed a few key steps, they'd be able to avoid having massive liability foist upon them if they let any users sneak through an upload of infringing content (they'd still have to pull it down quickly after it was uploaded, but they wouldn't be facing billions in fines).

And, now with Article 13 just about finalized and it looking absolutely terrible in almost every single way... Hollywood is going for broke and now calling for negotiations on Article 13 to be suspended entirely. Again, they're doing this for totally the wrong reasons, but considering that absolutely no one wants Article 13 at this point, shouldn't EU negotiators just drop it?

We understand the eagerness to bring the negotiations to a close within the current mandate. However, rather than rushing the highly controversial Art. 13 and seeking conclusion of this provision, no matter the jeopardy to the European copyright framework and no matter the prejudice and damage to the creative sectors before the end of this legislative period, we urge EU co-legislators to suspend negotiations with respect to this article.

We agree. Negotiators should drop Article 13 entirely (Article 11 as well, but we'll discuss that another time).

This letter is signed by a bunch of legacy copyright interests, with the main one being the MPA (the MPAA's international arm). And their reasoning, as before, is that they actually think that they're going to get a better deal (i.e., no safe harbors for internet services at all) in the EU Courts:

One of the main justifications for Article 13 articulated in the Commission’s original impact assessment back in 2016 was the absence of a CJEU referral that could bring clarity to the question of whether an uploaded content service is responsible for acts of communication to the public and/or can benefit from the hosting provider status under the E-Commerce Directive. Since that assessment the situation has now fundamentally changed. In the meantime, such a referral has been launched by a recent decision of 13 September 2018. The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) referred a case to the CJEU involving YouTube/Google and certain rightholders, for clarification of this very issue (case C-682/18 Google e.a.).

Basically, Hollywood and its friends pushed for Article 13 when they thought that courts had read the law (correctly) to mean that the safe harbors already existing in the E-Commerce Directive applied to internet platforms hosting user generated uploads of content. However, at least one German court has mucked that up, and that case is being reviewed by the EU Court of Justice... and Hollywood is hoping that the CJEU will just declare that these safe harbors don't apply for platforms hosting content. Basically, Hollywood is going for broke. It truly wants to make the internet change massively, such that there is no more "user generated content" platforms unless those platforms first agree to throw money at Hollywood not to sue them. It's pretty close to an outright extortion scam.

Either way, we're happy that Hollywood has now properly recognized that EU negotiators have no business moving forward with Article 13, and we're happy to agree that it should be dropped.

Filed Under: article 13, copyright, eu, eu copyright directive, intermediary liability, safe harbors
Companies: mpa, mpaa