Hertz Ordered To Tell Court How Many Thousands Of Renters It Falsely Accuses Of Theft Every Year

from the oh-well-it's-just-customers-whose-money-we-already-have dept

It all started with Hertz being less than helpful when a man was falsely accused of murder. Michigan resident Herbert Alford was arrested and convicted for a murder he didn't commit. He maintained his innocence, claiming he was at the airport in Lansing, Michigan during the time the murder occurred. And he could have proven it, too, if he had just been able to produce the receipt showing he had been renting a car at Hertz twenty minutes away from the crime scene.

It wasn't until Alford had spent five years in prison that Hertz got around to producing the receipt. Three of those years can be laid directly at Hertz's feet. The receipt was requested in 2015. Hertz handed it over in 2018. Alford sued.

That's not the only lawsuit Hertz is facing. It apparently also has a bad habit of accusing paying customers of theft, something that has resulted in drivers being accosted by armed officers and/or arrested and charged.

Nine months later, another lawsuit rolled in. A proposed class action suit -- covering more than 100 Hertz customers -- claimed the company acts carelessly and engages in supremely poor recordkeeping. The lawsuit, (then) representing 165 customers, contains details of several customers who have been pulled over, arrested, and/or jailed because Hertz's rental tracking system is buggier than its competitors'. Hertz takes pain to point out these incidents only represent a very small percentage of its renters. But that's essentially meaningless when this small error rate doesn't appear to occur at other car rental agencies.

This lawsuit is forcing Hertz to disclose exactly what this error rate is and how many renters it affects. It's a much larger number than the 165 customers the lawsuit started with last November.

In a ruling Wednesday, a federal judge in Delaware sided with the request from attorneys for 230 customers who say they were wrongly arrested.

The total still depends on whom you ask. Hertz said it reports to police 0.014% of its 25 million annual rental transactions - or 3,500 customers. Attorneys for the renters said they believe the number is closer to 8,000.

It may look like only a rounding error to Hertz, but each of these 3,500-8,000 incorrect reports represents a possible loss of liberty, if not a possible loss of life. Law enforcement officers treat auto thieves as dangerous criminals. Being falsely accused by a rental company's software doesn't alter the threat matrix until long after the guns have been drawn.

Sometimes the problem has a human component. If a rental agent does not see a vehicle they thought was returned, they may file a report. And when humans aren't involved, it's Hertz's computer system doing the dirty work.

Other times, [the attorney representing Hertz customers, France Malofiy] said, the confusion is caused by a customer swapping cars during their rental period or extending the time frame. If the credit or debit card charge fails to process correctly, he said Hertz's system generates a theft report.

Malofiy said the company does not update its police reports if a payment ultimately processes - leaving customers to flounder in the criminal justice system. In 2020, a spokesperson for Hertz told the Philadelphia Inquirer that a stolen-vehicle report "was valid when it was made" and that it was "up to law enforcement to decide what to do with the case."

And there's another data point to add to Hertz's perhaps inadvertent but very fucking real infliction of misery on thousands of renters every year. A man who has spent over $15,000 with Hertz since 2020 is currently sitting in jail thanks to yet another bogus Hertz theft alert.

All of this is at odds with Hertz's repeated claim it only issues stolen vehicle notices to law enforcement following "extensive investigations." If it did actually engage in thorough investigations of every generated theft report, it would not be currently facing a lawsuit from hundreds of drivers who've been arrested and jailed over bogus theft allegations. And the problem it claims isn't really a problem wouldn't still be getting people locked up for crimes they didn't commit.

Filed Under: false accusations, rental cars, theft
Companies: hertz

Even As Trump Relies On Section 230 For Truth Social, He's Claiming In Lawsuits That It's Unconstitutional

from the say-what-now? dept

With the launch of Donald Trump's ridiculous Truth Social offering, we've already noted that he's so heavily relying on Section 230's protections to moderate that he's written Section 230 directly into his terms of service. However, at the same time, Trump is still fighting his monstrously stupid lawsuits against Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube for banning him in the wake of January 6th.

Not surprisingly (after getting the cases transferred to California), the internet companies are pointing the courts to Section 230 as to why the cases should be dismissed. And, also not surprisingly (but somewhat hilariously), Trump is making galaxy brain stupid claims in response. That's the filing in the case against YouTube which somehow has eight different lawyers signed onto a brief so bad that all eight of those lawyers should be laughed out of court.

The argument as to why Section 230 doesn't apply is broken down into three sections, each dumber than the others. First up, it claims that "Section 230 Does Not Immunize Unfair Discrimination," which claims (falsely) that YouTube is a "common carrier" (it is not, has never been, and does not resemble one in any manner). The argument is not even particularly well argued here. It's three ridiculous paragraphs, starting with Packingham (which is not relevant to a private company choosing to moderate), then claiming (without any support, since there is none) that YouTube is a common carrier, and then saying that YouTube's terms of service mean that it "must carry content, irrespective of any desire or external compulsion to discriminate against Plaintiff."

Literally all of that is wrong. It took EIGHT lawyers to be this wrong.

The second section claims -- incorrectly -- that Section 230 "does not apply to political speech." They do this by totally misrepresenting the "findings" part of Section 230 and then ignoring basically all the case law that says, of course Section 230 applies to political speech. As for the findings, while they do say that Congress wants "interactive computers services" to create "a true diversity of political discourse" as the authors of the bill themselves have explained, this has always been about allowing every individual website to moderate as they see fit. It was never designed so that every website must carry all speech, but rather by allowing websites to curate the community and content they want, there will be many different places for different kinds of speech.

Again. Eight lawyers to be totally and completely wrong.

Finally, they argue that "Section 230(c) Violates the First Amendment as Applied to This Matter." It does not. Indeed, should Trump win this lawsuit (he won't) that would violate the 1st Amendment in compelling speech on someone else's private property who does not wish to be associated with it. And this section goes off the rails completely:

The U.S. contends that Section 230(c) does not implicate the First Amendment because “it “does not regulate Plaintiff’s speech,” but only “establishes a content- and viewpoint-neutral rule prohibiting liability” for certain companies that ban others’ speech. (U.S. Mot. at 2). Defendants’ egregious conduct in restraining Plaintiff’s political speech belies its claims of a neutral standard.

I mean, the mental gymnastics necessary to make this claim are pretty impressive, so I'll give them that. But this is mixing apples and orangutans in making an argument that, even if it did make sense, still doesn't make any sense. Section 230 does not regulate speech. That's why it's content neutral. The fact that the defendant, YouTube, does moderate its content -- egregiously or not -- is totally unrelated to the question of whether or not Section 230 is content neutral. Indeed, YouTube's ability to kick Trump off its platform is itself protected by the 1st Amendment.

The lawyers seem to be shifting back and forth between the government "The U.S." and the private entity, YouTube, here, to make an argument that might make sense if it were only talking about one entity, but doesn't make any sense at all when you switch back and forth between the two.

Honestly, this filing should become a case study in law schools about how not to law.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, content moderation, donald trump, section 230
Companies: facebook, truth social, twitter, youtube

Video Game History Foundation: Nintendo Actions 'Actively Destructive To Video Game History'

from the ding-ding-ding! dept

I've been banging on a bit lately about the importance of video game preservation as a matter of art preservation. It's not entirely clear to me how much buy in there is out there in general on this concept, but it's a challenge in this specific industry because much of the control over what can be preserved or not sits in the hands of game publishers and platforms compared with other forms of art. Books have libraries, films have the academies and museums, and music is decently preserved all over the place. But for gaming, even organizations like the Video Game History Foundation have to rely on publishers and platforms to let them do their work, or risk art being lost entirely to the digital ether or lawsuits over copyright. We've talked in the past about how copyright law is far too often used in a way that results in a loss of our own cultural history, and digital-only video games are particularly vulnerable to that.

We just discussed Nintendo's forthcoming shutdown of the 3DS and Wii U stores, and what that meant for digital games that Nintendo indicates it is not planning on selling anywhere else. Well, the Video Game History Foundation released a statement on that action and, well, hoo-boy...

While it is unfortunate that people won’t be able to purchase digital 3DS or Wii U games anymore, we understand the business reality that went into this decision. What we don’t understand is what path Nintendo expects its fans to take, should they wish to play these games in the future. As a paying member of the Entertainment Software Association, Nintendo actively funds lobbying that prevents even libraries from being able to provide legal access to these games. Not providing commercial access is understandable, but preventing institutional work to preserve these titles on top of that is actively destructive to video game history. We encourage ESA members like Nintendo to rethink their position on this issue and work with existing institutions to find a solution.

Accusing Nintendo of being "actively destructive to video game history" is a hell of a charge, but point out where it's wrong. I'll wait.

The problem here is that video games are still seen, both by the public and producers, as something less than the kind of artistic output of literature, paintings, sculptures, or movies. Imagine a world where someone took the collective works of Monet or Bach, shutdown the venue in which you could pay to see them, and then also indicated that nobody else was allowed to display them for commercial benefit or not. Nobody would accept such a situation. That is culture and it belongs, in at least some small ways, to all of us.

Either because the history of video games is much more recent, or due to stodgy hand-waiving about how these games are not "real art", far less fur is raised over Nintendo taking these actions without any guarantee, or in some cases hostility, to preservation efforts. Yes, Nintendo has directly produced many of these games and it has rights for them due to that. But those games are also part of our shared cultural history, and no individual or company is, or should be, afforded the right to determine how we document that cultural history.

If nothing else, that certainly isn't the purpose of copyright law.

Filed Under: culture, history, video games
Companies: nintendo, video game history foundation

Massachusetts Court Says No Expectation Of Privacy In Social Media Posts Unwittingly Shared With An Undercover Cop

from the going-to-need-to-have-a-deeper-discussion-about-expectations dept

Can cops pretend to be real people on social media to catfish people into criminal charges? Social media services say no. Facebook in particular has stressed -- on more than one occasion -- that it's "real name" policy applies just as much to cops as it does to regular people.

Law enforcement believes terms of service don't apply to investigators and actively encourages officers to create fake accounts to go sniffing around for crime. That's where the Fourth Amendment comes into play. It's one thing to passively access public posts from public accounts. It's quite another when investigators decide the only way to obtain evidence to support search or arrest warrants involves "friending" someone whose posts aren't visible to the general public.

What's public is public and the third party doctrine definitely applies: users are aware their public posts are visible to anyone using the service. But those who use some privacy settings are asking courts whether it's ok for cops to engage in warrantless surveillance of their posts just because they made the mistake of allowing a fake account into their inner circle.

Accepting a friend request is an affirmative act. And that plays a big part in court decisions finding in favor of law enforcement agencies. Getting duped isn't necessarily a constitutional violation. And it's difficult to claim you've been unlawfully surveilled by fake accounts run by cops. You know, due diligence and all that. It apparently makes no difference to courts that cops violated platforms' terms of service or engaged in subterfuge to engage in fishing expeditions for culpatory evidence.

Massachusetts' top court has been asked to settle this. And the state justices seem somewhat skeptical that current law (including the state's constitution) allows for extended surveillance via fake social media accounts. No decision has been reached yet, but lower courts in the state are adding to case law, providing additional precedent that may influence the final decision from the state's Supreme Court.

This recent decision [PDF] by a Massachusetts Superior Court indicates the courts are willing to give cops leeway considering the ostensibly-public nature of social media use. But it doesn't give the Commonwealth quite as much leeway as it would like.

Here's how it started:

After accepting a "friend" request from the officer, the defendant published a video recording to his social media account that featured an individual seen from the chest down holding what appeared to be a firearm. The undercover officer made his own recording of the posting, which later was used in criminal proceedings against the defendant. A Superior Court judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress the recording as the fruit of an unconstitutional search, and the defendant appealed. We transferred the matter to this court on our own motion.

Here's how it's going:

Among other arguments, the defendant suggests that because his account on this particular social media platform was designated as "private," he had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. The Commonwealth contends that the act of posting any content to a social media account de facto eliminates any reasonable expectation of privacy in that content.

The competing arguments about expectation are (from the defendant) "some" and (from the Commonwealth) "none." It's not that simple, says the court.

Given the rapidly evolving role of social media in society, and the relative novelty of the technology at issue, we decline both the defendant's and the Commonwealth's requests that we adopt their proffered brightline rules.

In this case, Boston police officer Joseph Connolly created a fake Snapchat account and sent a friend request to a private account run by "Frio Fresh." Fresh accepted the friend request, allowing the officer access to all content posted. In May 2017, Officer Connolly saw a "story" posted by "Frio Fresh" that showed him carrying a silver revolver. Connolly recorded this and passed the information on to a BPD strike force after having observed (but not recorded) a second "story" showing "Frio Fresh" in a gym. The strike force began surveilling the gym and soon saw "Frio Fresh" wearing the same clothes observed in the first story (the one the officer was able to record with a second device). Strike force members pursued "Frio Fresh" and searched him, recovering the revolver seen in the Snapchat story.

The court recognizes the damage free-roaming surveillance of social media can do to constitutional rights, as well as people's generally accepted right to converse freely among friends.

Government surveillance of social media, for instance, implicates conversational and associational privacy because of the increasingly important role that social media plays in human connection and interaction in the Commonwealth and around the world. For many, social media is an indispensable feature of social life through which they develop and nourish deeply personal and meaningful relationships. For better or worse, the momentous joys, profound sorrows, and minutiae of everyday life that previously would have been discussed with friends in the privacy of each others' homes now generally are shared electronically using social media connections. Government surveillance of this activity therefore risks chilling the conversational and associational privacy rights that the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 seek to protect.

Despite this acknowledgment, the court rules against the defendant, in essence saying it was his own fault for not vetting his "friends" more thoroughly. The defendant seemed unclear as to Snapchat privacy settings and, in this case, willingly accepted a friend request from someone he didn't know who used a Snapchat-supplied image in his profile. In essence, the court is saying either you care about your privacy or you don't. And, in this case, the objective expectation of privacy is undercut by the subjective expectation of privacy this user created by being less than thorough in his vetting of friend requests.

Nonetheless, the defendant's privacy interest in this case was substantially diminished because, despite his asserted policy of restricting such access, he did not adequately "control[] access" to his Snapchat account. Rather, he appears to have permitted unknown individuals to gain access to his content. See id. For instance, Connolly was granted access to the defendant's content using a nondescript username that the defendant did not recognize and a default image that evidently was not Connolly's photograph. By accepting Connolly's friend request in those circumstances, the defendant demonstrated that he did not make "reasonable efforts to corroborate the claims of" those seeking access to his account.

[...]

Indeed, Connolly was able to view the defendant's stories precisely because the defendant gave him the necessary permissions to do so. That the defendant not only did not exercise control to exclude a user whose name he did not recognize, but also affirmatively gave Connolly the required permissions to view posted content, weighs against a conclusion that the defendant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his Snapchat stories.

The final conclusion is that this form of surveillance -- apparently without a warrant -- is acceptable because the surveilled user didn't take more steps to protect his posts from government surveillance. There's no discussion about the "reasonableness" of officers creating fake accounts to gain access to private posts without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Instead, the court merely states that "undercover police work" is "legitimate," and therefore not subjected to the same judicial rigor as the claims of someone who was duped into revealing the details of their life to an undercover cop.

The defendant may get another chance to appeal this decision if the state's Supreme Court decides creating fake accounts to trawl for criminal activity falls outside the boundaries of the Constitution. Until then, the only bright line is don't accept friend requests from people you don't know. But that's still problematic, considering there's no corresponding restriction on government activities, which may lead to officers impersonating people from targets' social circles to gain access to private posts. And when that happens, what recourse will defendants have? The court says it's on defendants to protect their privacy no matter how many lies law enforcement officers tell. That shifts too much power to the government and places the evidentiary burden solely on people who expect their online conversations to be free of government surveillance.

Filed Under: law enforcement, massachusetts, police, privacy, sharing information, social media, third party doctrine, undercover
Companies: snapchat

US Copyright Office Gets It Right (Again): AI-Generated Works Do Not Get A Copyright Monopoly

from the this-is-correct dept

For years, throughout the entire monkey selfie lawsuit saga, we kept noting that the real reason a prestigious law firm like Irell & Manella filed such a patently bogus lawsuit was to position itself to be the go-to law firm to argue for AI-generated works deserving copyright. However, we've always argued that AI-generated works are (somewhat obviously) in the public domain, and get no copyright. Again, this goes back to the entire nature of copyright law -- which is to create a (limited time) incentive for creators, in order to get them to create a work that they might not have otherwise created. When you're talking about an AI, it doesn't need a monetary incentive (or a restrictive one). The AI just generates when it's told to generate.

This idea shouldn't even be controversial. It goes way, way back. In 1966 the Copyright Office's annual report noted that it needed to determine if a computer-created work was authored by the computer and how copyright should work around such works:

In 1985, prescient copyright law expert, Pam Samuelson, wrote a whole paper exploring the role of copyright in works created by artificial intelligence. In that paper, she noted that, while declaring such works to be in the public domain, it seemed like an unlikely result as "the legislature, the executive branch, and the courts seem to strongly favor maximalizing intellectual property rewards" and:

For some, the very notion of output being in the public domain may seem to be an anathema, a temporary inefficient situation that will be much improved when individual property rights are recognized. Rights must be given to someone, argue those who hold this view; the question is to whom to give rights, not whether to give them at all.

Indeed, we've seen exactly that. Back in 2018, we wrote about examples of lawyers having trouble even conceptualizing a public domain for such works, as they argued that someone must hold the copyright. But that's not the way it needs to be. The public domain is a thing, and it shouldn't just be for century-old works.

Thankfully (and perhaps not surprisingly, since they started thinking about it all the way back in the 1960s), when the Copyright Office released its third edition of the giant Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, it noted that it would not grant a copyright on "works that lack human authorship" using "a photograph taken by a monkey" as one example, but also noting "the Office will not register works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from a human author."

Of course, that leaves open some kinds of mischief, and the Office even admits that whether the creative work is done by a human or a computer is "the crucial question." And, that's left open attempts to copyright AI-generated works. Jumping in to push for copyrights for the machines was... Stephen Thaler. We've written about Thaler going all the way back to 2004 when he was creating a computer program to generate music and inventions. But, he's become a copyright and patent pest around the globe. We've had multiple stories about attempts to patent AI-generated inventions in different countries -- including the US, Australia, the EU and even China. The case in China didn't involve Thaler (as far as we know), but the US, EU, and Australia cases all did (so far, only Australia has been open to allowing a patent for AI).

But Thaler is not content to just mess up patent law, he's pushing for AI copyrights as well. And for years, he's been trying to get the Copyright Office go give his AI the right to claim copyright. As laid out in a comprehensive post over at IPKat, the Copyright Office has refused him many times over, with yet another rejection coming on Valentine's Day.

The Review Board was, once again, unimpressed. It held that “human authorship is a prerequisite to copyright protection in the United States and that the Work therefore cannot be registered.”

The phrase ‘original works of authorship’ under §102(a) of the Act sets limits to what can be protected by copyright. As early as in Sarony (a seminal case concerning copyright protection of photographs), the US Supreme Court referred to authors as human.

This approach was reiterated in other Supreme Court’s precedents like Mazer and Goldstein, and has been also consistently adopted by lower courts.

While no case has been yet decided on the specific issue of AI-creativity, guidance from the line of cases above indicates that works entirely created by machines do not access copyright protection. Such a conclusion is also consistent with the majority of responses that the USPTO received in its consultation on Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property Policy.

The Review also rejected Thaler’s argument that AI can be an author under copyright law because the work made for hire doctrine allows for “non-human, artificial persons such as companies” to be authors. First, held the Board, a machine cannot enter into any binding legal contract. Secondly, the doctrine is about ownership, not existence of a valid copyright.

Somehow, I doubt that Thaler is going to stop trying, but one hopes that he gets the message. Also, it would be nice for everyone to recognize that having more public domain is a good thing and not a problem...

Filed Under: ai, copyright, dabus, stephen thaler, us copyright office

LA Sheriff Threatens To 'Subject' City Council To 'Defamation Law' If They Won't Stop Calling His Deputies 'Gang Members'

from the pretty-much-the-legal-competence-you-would-expect-from-a-gang-leader dept

The man presiding over a law enforcement agency filled with gangs and cliques would prefer city officials stop referring to his employees as gang members.

Los Angeles County Sheriff Alex Villanueva has stated that there are no gangs within the Sheriff's Department, a claim he is obviously unable to back up with facts, because the facts make it clear that the LASD has been (and apparently still is) home to multiple gangs composed of deputies. There's even a Wikipedia page dedicated to the gangs infesting the Sheriff's Department.

If you distrust the info on the anyone-can-edit Wikipedia page, there's also this comprehensive database compiled by journalist Cerise Castle for Knock LA -- one that pulls info from public records and court documents to list suspected and verified members of LASD gangs.

Sheriff Villanueva continues to claim there are no gangs within his department. He has also instituted a policy to address the problem he says doesn't exist, forbidding deputies from "joining any group that commits misconduct." You'd think this policy would forbid any deputy from being employed by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, but I guess that's not how Villanueva reads his edict.

As for Villanueva's claim gangs and cliques don't exist within his department? Well, let's take a look at what his employees say:

Hundreds of Los Angeles County sheriff’s deputies said they have been recruited to join secretive, sometimes gang-like cliques that operate within department stations, according to the findings of a survey by independent researchers.

The anticipated study into the problematic fraternities — which L.A. County officials commissioned the Rand Corp. to conduct in 2019 — found 16% of the 1,608 deputies and supervisors who anonymously answered survey questions had been invited to join a clique, with some invitations having come in the last five years.

Well, all evidence to the contrary aside, Sheriff Villanueva is no longer going to stand idly by while city officials continue to make accurate statements about his problematic agency. He's issued a… well, not really a "cease and desist" letter [PDF] to the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors demanding (but not really) they stop saying his department has a gang problem. (h/t Adam Steinbaugh)

The letter is a fun read, even more so because Sheriff Villanueva definitely did not want his vaguely threatening fluff to be considered enjoyable for all the wrong reasons. Behold the semi-coherent wrath of a pissed off public servant.

As the elected Sheriff of Los Angeles County, I demand you and other elected leaders, as well as your appointees, immediately cease and desist from using the derogatory term “deputy gangs” when referring to members of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (Department). This willful defamation of character has injured both individuals and the organization. It also serves no purpose other than to fuel hatred and increase the probability of assault and negative confrontations against our people.

So, it looks like a cease-and-desist (it even uses the words!), but the Sheriff has no power to make this demand. And Villanueva is hopefully using the phrase "defamation of character" in the colloquial, no-relation-to-the-legal-meaning sense of the words, because there's plenty of evidence out there that would make any accusations about LASD gangs "substantially true" and, therefore, not defamation at all. I know we (and by "we," I mostly mean courts) don't expect law enforcement officers to be legal experts, which is good, I guess, because they clearly fucking aren't.

The letter continues in the same vein: Villanueva bitching, mostly ineffectively, that it's unfair to his department when city officials say bad things about him and his employees. The next paragraph of the letter basically says the Sheriff's Department has all the heroes and the Board of Supervisors has all the hypocritical assholes.

My personnel routinely place themselves in harm's way while serving our community and ask nothing in return, other than a paycheck and maybe a little respect for the tough job they perform. Elected officials have no problem attending the funeral of a peace officer killed in the line of duty and often fight for the opportunity to speak at the podium, but the manner in which some have enthusiastically branded my personnel as "gang members” every opportunity they get is disgusting.

It is completely possible for officials to show their respect for an officer killed in the line of duty while still suspecting the law enforcement agency they work for is home to groups of officers who commit serious misconduct while engaging in gang-like behavior: violent acts, tattoos/clothing/insignias/etc., codes of silence, et al. You know, just like it's possible for officers of the law to recognize the War on Drugs harms more than it helps.

According to the sheriff's letter, the only reason board members might refer to deputies as gang members stems from a dismissed lawsuit brought by a former LASD deputy. The letter claims this is the only "evidence" anyone has ever had and that other research arriving at the same conclusions is completely undermined because a single source of information was declared to be untrustworthy by a court decision. That willfully ignores the years of data that shows deputies have formed cliques/gangs within the department. And while that may not be the sole contributing factor to large amounts of misconduct, it certainly hasn't helped neutralize the "us vs. them" mentality that is the root of so many casual abuses of rights.

From there it gets truly laughable, with Sheriff Villanueva again demonstrating his inability to understand speech-related laws before claiming that referring to LASD gangs is actually a form of bigotry.

Those who want to further undermine the perception of law enforcement use it as hate speech to promote their own agendas, such as defunding law enforcement and redirecting those funds to their own non-profit organizations, many of which are nothing more than sham corporations who operate with virtually zero accountability. Further use of the term will be evidence of your actual underlying intent, which appears to be a campaign to inflict harm upon the reputation of the Department and myself.

First off, calling someone a gang member or implying there are gangs in the LASD isn't hate speech. It's not even hate speech in the most ignorant sense of the word. Speech someone doesn't like is not hate speech, and that's all that's really happening here. The Sheriff and his deputies aren't a protected class, nor is being employed by the LASD an immutable characteristic that can trigger hate crime laws when derogatory language is used. The rest of this is no less stupid. "Further use… will be evidence of your actual underlying intent" to harm the Department. Whatever. This isn't legally binding and further use will be evidence of nothing.

So very stupid.

As the first fluently Spanish speaking Latino Sheriff in over a hundred years, who supervises a majority Latino workforce, I hope you can see the blatant racial inferences your conscious bias displays every time you choose to attack our Department with this derogatory term.

Um, people were saying the LASD was gang-infested long before you took office, Sheriff. That they're still saying it doesn't reflect on you or your multilingual skills. All it says is that the problem persists and it's now your problem, Sheriff.

Finally, the Sheriff appears to believe this somehow is a valid legal threat, despite the fact he's unlikely to prevail in a defamation lawsuit against city council members. Here's how the letter wraps up:

I openly challenge every elected leader, or their appointees, to provide facts to me and name individuals who they can prove are "gang members," as defined by California Penal Code Section 13670, and subject yourself to defamation laws if wrong.

LOL. Well, this shouldn't be too hard. Here's the relevant part of the California Code:

"Law enforcement gang" means a group of peace officers within a law enforcement agency who may identify themselves by a name and may be associated with an identifying symbol, including, but not limited to, matching tattoos, and who engage in a pattern of on-duty behavior that intentionally violates the law or fundamental principles of professional policing, including, but not limited to, excluding, harassing, or discriminating against any individual based on a protected category under federal or state antidiscrimination laws, engaging in or promoting conduct that violates the rights of other employees or members of the public, violating agency policy, the persistent practice of unlawful detention or use of excessive force in circumstances where it is known to be unjustified, falsifying police reports, fabricating or destroying evidence, targeting persons for enforcement based solely on protected characteristics of those persons, theft, unauthorized use of alcohol or drugs on duty, unlawful or unauthorized protection of other members from disciplinary actions, and retaliation against other officers who threaten or interfere with the activities of the group.

To sum up: the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department is a gang associated with an identifying symbol that engages in all of the listed behavior. Therefore, it should be declared illegal under state law and disbanded.

There are few things more enjoyable than sternly-worded letters that are 50% bluster, 50% unintentionally hilarious. Recipients of this letter should take the Sheriff up on his dare and let him know just how many bad apples he's overseeing. If nothing else, council members should send Villanueva a "Thanks for the laugh. I really needed that." in response to his declaration of keyboard war.

Filed Under: alex villanueva, cease and desist, defamation, deputy gangs, gangs, hate speech, la, lasd

Daily Deal: codeSpark Academy Sibling Bundle

from the good-deals-on-cool-stuff dept

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Filed Under: daily deal

Trump's Truth Social Bakes Section 230 Directly Into Its Terms, So Apparently Trump Now Likes Section 230

from the well-how-about-that dept

When Donald Trump first announced his plans to launch his own Twitter competitor, Truth Social, we noted that the terms of service on the site indicated that the company -- contrary to all the nonsense claims of being more "free speech" supportive than existing social media sites -- was likely going to be quite aggressive in banning users who said anything that Trump disliked. Last month, Devin Nunes, who quit Congress to become CEO of the fledgling site, made it clear that the site would be heavily, heavily moderated, including using Hive, a popular tool for social media companies that want to moderate.

So with the early iOS version of the app "launching" this past weekend, most people were focused on the long list of things that went wrong with the launch, mainly security flaws and broken sign-ups. There's also been some talk about how the logo may be a copy... and the fact that Trump's own wife declared that she'll be using Parler for her social media efforts.

But, for me, I went straight to checking out the terms of service for the site. They've been updated since the last time, but the basics remain crystal clear: despite all the silly yammering from Nunes and Trump about how they're the "free speech" supporting social network, Truth Social's terms are way more restrictive regarding content than just about any I've ever seen before.

Still, the most incredible part is not only that Truth Social is embracing Section 230, but it has literally embedded parts of 230 into its terms of service. The terms require people who sign up to "represent and warrant" that their content doesn't do certain things. And the site warns that if you violate any of these terms it "may result in, among other things, termination or suspension of your rights to use the Service and removal or deletion of your Contributions." I don't know, but I recall a former President and a former cow farming Representative from California previously referring to that kind of termination as "censorship." But, one of the things that users must "represent and warrant" is the following:

your Contributions are not obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, violent, harassing, libelous, slanderous, or otherwise objectionable.

That might sound familiar to those of you who are knowledgeable about Section 230 -- because it's literally cribbed directly from Section 230(c)(2), which says:

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable...

That's almost word for word the same as 230. The only changes are that it removes "excessively" from "violent" and adds in "libelous" and "slanderous," -- subjects in which Devin Nunes considers himself something of an expert, though courts don't seem to agree.

Hell, they even leave in the catch-all "otherwise objectionable," even as some of their Republican friends in Congress have tried to remove that phrase in a few of their dozens of "Section 230 reform" bills.

So it's not at all surprising, but potentially a bit ironic that the man who demanded the outright repeal of Section 230 (even to the point of trying to stop funding the US military if Congress didn't repeal the law) has now not only embraced Section 230, but has literally baked a component of it (the part that he and his ignorant fans have never actually understood) directly into his own service's terms.

It's so blatant I almost wonder if it was done just for the trolling. That said, I still look forward to Truth Social using Section 230 to defend itself against inevitable lawsuits.

There are some other fun tidbits in the terms of service that suggest the site will be one of the most aggressive in moderating content. It literally claims that it may take down content that is "false, inaccurate, or misleading" (based on Truth Social's own subjective interpretation, of course). You can't advertise anything on the site without having it "authorized." You need to "have the written consent, release, and/or permission of each and every identifiable individual person in your Contributions." Does Truth Social think you actually need written permission to talk about someone?

There's also a long, long list of "prohibited" activities, including compiling a database of Truth Social data without permission, any advertising (wait, what?), bots, impersonation, "sexual content or language," or "any content that portrays or suggest explicit sexual acts." I'm not sure how Former President "Grab 'em by the p***y" will survive on his own site. Oh right, also "sugar babies" and "sexual fetishes" are banned.

Lots of fun stuff that indicates that like 4chan, then 8chan, then Gab, then Parler, then Gettr that have at times declared themselves to be "free speech zones," every website knows that it needs to moderate to some level, and also that it's Section 230 that helps keep them out of court when they moderate in ways that piss off some of their users.

Filed Under: content moderation, devin nunes, donald trump, section 230, terms of service
Companies: tmtg, truth social