Take Two Interactive Wins Two Publicity Rights Lawsuits Against Lindsay Lohan And Karen Gravano

from the mean-girls dept

Hopefully you will recall that Take Two Interactive had been facing down two lawsuits brought by Lindsay Lohan and Karen Gravano over character depictions in the company's opus, Grand Theft Auto V. Both filed suit over publicity rights and likeness concerns in New York. Lohan claimed that a character in the game that evaded paparazzi after having sex in public and made some oblique references to similar-sounding movies that Lohan had acted in, along with a female character on the game's cover art, were both ripping off her personage. Gravano, meanwhile, claimed that a different character, one which made references to starring in a reality show about mobster wives and evading mob retribution, was ripping off her personage. While both suits failed to address the fictional differences in the characters, which were both composite characters parodying their celebrity archetypes, Take Two attempted to defend itself with those facts and tried to get the case dismissed. Strangely, the court at the time allowed the case to move forward...

...and now the appellate division has reversed course and tossed both cases out.

On Thursday, New York's appellate division first department took a look at both this case as well as one involving ex-Mob Wives star Karen Gravano, who brought a similar lawsuit against Take-Two over Grand Theft Auto V. Gravano had filed a $40 million complaint over the character of "Andrea Bottino," who allegedly used the same phrases the plaintiff did, had a father who was a government informant and had a mutual connection with reality television. Gravano's suit was given a green light by the same trial judge in the Lohan lawsuit.

The court's decision makes it clear that both lawsuits, brought for publicity rights reasons, don't stand up to New York's law. First and foremost, this is because the characters in the game aren't a direct composite of either plaintiff.

Both Gravano's and Lohan's respective causes of action under Civil Rights Law § 51 "must fail because defendants did not use [plaintiffs'] name, portrait, or picture'" (see Costanza v Seinfeld , 279 AD2d 255, 255 [1st Dept 2001], citing Wojtowicz v Delacorte Press , 43 NY2d 858, 860 [1978]). Despite Gravano's contention that the video game depicts her, defendants never referred to Gravano by name or used her actual name in the video game, never used Gravano herself as an actor for the video game, and never used a photograph of her (see Costanza at 255; see generally Wojtowicz at 860). As to Lohan's claim that an avatar in the video game is she and that her image is used in various images, defendants also never referred to Lohan by name or used her actual name in the video game, never used Lohan herself as an actor for the video game, and never used a photograph of Lohan (see Costanza at 255).

And, second, because the kind of depiction being discussed in these cases is protected First Amendment speech, as should have been obvious from the outset.

Even if we accept plaintiffs' contentions that the video game depictions are close enough to be considered representations of the respective plaintiffs, plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed because this video game does not fall under the statutory definitions of "advertising" or "trade" (see Costanza at 255, citing Hampton v Guare , 195 AD2d 366, 366 [1st Dept 1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 659 [1993] [stating that "works of fiction and satire do not fall within the narrow scope of the statutory phrases advertising' and trade'"]; see generally Brown v Entertainment Merchants Assn. , 564 US 786, 790 [2011] ["(l)ike the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas . . ." and deserve First Amendment protection]). This video game's unique story, characters, dialogue, and environment, combined with the player's ability to choose how to proceed in the game, render it a work of fiction and satire.

Meanwhile, one imagines that the legal teams for both women have been handsomely paid for not informing their respective clients of the futility of these lawsuits from the outset. I mentioned early on in these posts that the legal team for Take Two ought to have been able to stroll into court in their underwear, scream "Parody! First Amendment!" and immediately walk out of the courtroom victorious. That it had to go to much more trouble than that is unfortunate, but it's still good to see the court get this right.

Filed Under: grand theft auto, gta v, karen gravano, lindsay lohan, publicity rights
Companies: take two interactive

Appeals Court Tosses Lawsuit Against Broadcasters For Violating Publicity Rights During Football Game Broadcasts

from the legal-fantasies-are-the-worst-fantasies dept

Javon Marshall -- a former college athlete spearheading a putative class action against several broadcasters for uncompensated use of his likeness -- has just seen the Sixth Circuit Appeals Court send him (and everyone "similarly situated") back home without a parting gift.

Marshall -- like many others who believe the mere existence of intellectual property protections entitles them to a paycheck -- sued a long list of broadcasters for allegedly violating the Lanham Act and the Tennessee "right of publicity" law by not paying him and other athletes for using his name and "image" in game broadcasts and advertising. Marshall also claimed the NCAA's waiver student-athletes sign is "vague and unenforceable." That may very well be, but that claim was never addressed by the plaintiff and the NCAA was never a defendant. It only served as an introduction to a long list of alleged violations [PDF] that the lower court determined to be baseless accusations.

The Appeals Court makes short work [PDF] of Marshall's attempt to have the lawsuit revived, pointing out in a wonderful opening paragraph just how unrealisitic his claims are. The first sentence alone indicates how far from legal reality Marshall's class action lawsuit strayed.

To state the plaintiffs’ theory in this case is nearly to refute it.

Going on, the court punches a dramatic hole in Marshall's flawed logic.

The theory begins with the assertion that college football and basketball players have a property interest in their names and images as they appear in television broadcasts of games in which the players are participants. Thus, the plaintiffs conclude, those broadcasts are illegal unless licensed by every player on each team. Whether referees, assistant coaches, and perhaps even spectators have the same rights as putative licensors is unclear from the plaintiffs’ briefs (and, by all appearances, to the plaintiffs themselves).

Very briefly addressing the plaintiff's arguments, the court waves them away in two sentences, offering its wholehearted support of the lower court's decision.

In any event, the plaintiffs seek to assert claims under Tennessee law, the Sherman Act, and the Lanham Act on behalf of a putative class of collegiate players nationwide. The defendants—various college athletic conferences and television networks, among others—responded in the district court with a motion to dismiss, which the court granted in a notably sound and thorough opinion.

The court goes on to call the plantiffs' claims under Tennessee law "legal fantasy," pointing out that the state's "right of publicity" specifically exempts sports broadcasts. The plaintiffs' common-law claim asserts a right never granted by the state. The Sherman Act antitrust claim fails because if a right doesn't exist, it can't be licensed in a noncompetitive fashion. The court saves its best comment for Marshall's trademark claim.

That leaves the plaintiffs’ claim under the Lanham Act, whose relevant provision bars the unauthorized use of a person’s name or likeness in commerce when doing so “is likely to cause confusion” as to whether the person endorses a product. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). The theory here is that if, say, ESPN shows a banner for “Tostitos” at the bottom of the screen during a football game, then consumers might become confused as to whether all the players on the screen endorse Tostitos. Suffice it to say that ordinary consumers have more sense than the theory itself does.

This futile lawsuit was perhaps encouraged by the relative success of a similar lawsuit against Electronic Arts for using the "likenesses" of players in its sports videogames. However, there's a crucial difference that factored into the Ninth Circuit Appeals Court's decision on behalf of the players: California's oft-abused "right of publicity" law which doesn't contain the same exemptions as Tennessee's. And in that case, there's still hope of a rehearing which might tilt the court towards finding California's law must defer to the First Amendment, rather than the other way around.

Filed Under: broadcasters, broadcasts, football, javon marshall, publicity rights, sports

How California's Identity Fraud Law Has Been Interpreted To Criminalize Defamation, Publicity Rights Violations And More

from the yikes dept

Eugene Volokh has a somewhat terrifying look at how very broad interpretations of California's identity fraud law, California Penal Code § 530.5(a) has been so broadly interpreted by the courts that it, in effect, creates a crime out of things that were normally considered, at best, civil offenses. This includes defamation, publicity rights infringements and disclosure of private facts. He discusses a few cases, but focuses on a key one that we've mentioned: the state of California's recent legal win over Kevin Bollaert, a revenge porn creep. In our writeup, we were mainly concerned with how the ruling seemed to run against Section 230's protections, but as Volokh makes clear, it's much, much worse than that.

As Volokh notes, among the charges that Bollaert was found guilty over, there was the § 502.5(a) claim of identity theft. And, he points out, nothing in the ruling limited it to revenge porn or extortion. It was just "identifying information" for the purpose of committing a tort, which suddenly becomes a criminal offense:

But nothing in Bollaert’s § 530.5 discussion was limited to revenge porn, or to extortion.

Say, for instance, that Kendra Schmollaert, Kevin Bollaert’s second cousin, has a blog with a couple of thousand readers. She publishes a blog post that mentioned an acquaintance’s formerly private sex scandal (or medical problem) and gives the acquaintance’s name. That may well constitute the tort of disclosure of private facts, and maybe Schmollaert should be liable for that. (I think the tort is too broad and vague to be constitutional, but most courts disagree with me on that.) But, to her surprise — and, I suspect, to the surprise of most media lawyers — a prosecutor decides to charge Schmollaert criminally. Guilty!

1. Schmollaert willfully published the aquaintance’s “identifying information” — the full name, and possibly some indication of location (e.g., if Schmollaert says the acquaintance is Schmollaert’s neighbor).
2. Schmollaert did so with the purpose of committing a tort, namely the disclosure of private facts. (True, Schmollaert wasn’t doing this just for the sake of committing a tort, but neither was Bollaert — Schmollaert wanted to tell an interesting story, or maybe expose an acquaintance whom Schmollaert disliked, while Bollaert wanted to make money, and both purposefully used people’s identifying information as a means of accomplishing that goal.)
3. Schmollaert didn’t reveal any nude photographs — but nothing in § 530.5(a) says anything whatever about nudity, or about photographs; as the courts have interpreted the statute, tortious disclosure of private facts is enough.
4. Schmollaert also wasn’t impersonating anyone — but neither was Bollaert.

Or say that Schmollaert instead starts selling T-shirts that depict photographs of celebrities, with captions that give the celebrities’ names. Under California law, that’s a tort, both statutory and common-law, and might lead to liability. But again Schmollaert also turns out to be guilty of a crime:

1. She willfully published the celebrities’ “personal identifying information” (“full names, … as well as the … photographs themselves.”
2. She did so with the purpose of infringing the celebrities’ right of publicity.

That's... crazy. Criminalizing defamation and publicity rights infringement by broadly interpreting an identity fraud law seems very, very problematic. As Volokh notes again, it seems extra troubling that this seems to have happened without any real legislative discussion or deliberation. Again, these things may be civil offenses, but to turn them into criminal offenses is a situation that can and will be abused. Not many people will cry for Kevin Bollaert, but the precedent this sets is potentially terrifying:

I don’t think the California Legislature was trying, with § 530.5, to so broadly criminalize tortious speech. But that’s how California courts have interpreted the statute.

And this also helps show why many commentators — myself included — criticize proposed statutes based on the possible scope of their broad and vague language, rather than just focusing on the particular problem that led to the proposal. Once a statute is enacted, prosecutors will often push them to the limits of the language, especially when the defendants are bad people doing bad things (e.g., Bollaert’s revenge porn blackmail racket). And courts will often (not always, but often) read the language broadly. The story of § 530.5 is a classic example.

It remains to be seen how widely this gets abused, but it is certainly a big concern.

Filed Under: cda 230, criminal defamation, defamation, extortion, identity fraud, identity theft, kevin bollaert, publicity rights, section 230

Pablo Escobar's Brother Demands One Billion Dollars From Netflix Over Narcos

from the seems-reasonable dept

What is it with South American historical figures suddenly thinking they can control everything to do with their family names? You'll hopefully recall the brief existence of a case of publicity rights violation brought against Activision by Manuel Noriega over the depiction of him in the gamemaker's Call of Duty series. That case was quickly tossed out by the court because the First Amendment has just an tiny bit more weight when it comes to artistic expression than does any publicity rights for public historical figures from other countries that might, maybe, kinda-sorta exist, possibly. We might have struggled at the time to find a complainant less likely than Noriega to win this sort of long-shot in the American court system, but we need struggle no longer.

Roberto Escobar, brother and former accountant to drug kingpin Pablo Escobar, has sent a letter to Netflix demanding a billion dollars (not a joke) and the right to review all future episodes of the streaming company's hit show Narcos, to make sure that he and his family are portrayed accurately. The letter, first published by TMZ (which explains the massive TMZ watermark on it) is quite a read.

“In the first season of Narcos, there were mistakes, lies and discrepancies from the real story,” the letter says. “To this date, I am one of the few survivors of the Medellin cartel, and I was Pablo’s closest ally, managing his accounting and he is my brother for life. I think nobody else in the world is alive to determine the validity of the materials, but me.”

Escobar adds that he is seeking $1 billion in compensation, and “if they decline my offer we have attorneys ready to proceed with necessary actions” over misappropriation of the Escobar name. “I don’t think there will be any more Narcos if they do not talk to me,” he says. “They are playing me without paying. I am not a monkey in a circus, I don’t work for pennies.”

Okay, so let's unpack this a little. For starters, Roberto Escobar isn't even in the television series. Like, at all. He's not even mentioned. Using a handy thing called creative license, the show portrays Pablo's accountant as someone completely different, not related to the family. Which means this is all about Roberto Escobar claiming exclusive rights over the portrayal of other Escobars, which is an interesting legal concept in that it has almost no grounding in any kind of reality.

First, Escobar makes no claim to any actual official intellectual property rights over his name. None. Instead, he touts his knowledge of the inner workings of the drug operation as the reason why he exerts this control. This novel legal theory is wholly unlikely to find any purchase within the American legal system. And, even if it were, as was the case with Noriega's lawsuit, the First Amendment trumps any kind of publicity rights that might exist, in particular when we're talking about historical figures such as pretty much every named real person in the Narcos series. Certainly Pablo Escobar qualifies, as would most of his notorious gang.

Instead, this is likely an attempt by Roberto to make enough noise to have Netflix hire him on to have some involvement in the show. He's apparently sent them letters in the past requesting this, prior to his request for the paltry sum typically reserved for Dr. Evil. Though I admit it would be comical to see him actually try this tactic in court.

Filed Under: narcos, pablo escobar, publicity rights, roberto escobar
Companies: netflix

Another Bad Ruling In California Threatens To Massively Undermine Section 230 By Exempting Publicity Rights

from the this-is-bad dept

What a week. Just a few days after we wrote about a dangerous ruling in a federal appeals court in California concerning a way to get around Section 230 of the CDA, now we have another problematic CDA 230 ruling from California in the form of a ruling from San Mateo Superior Court judge, Donald Ayoob, that has the potential to do a lot of damage to Section 230 as well as anti-SLAPP efforts in California. Paul Levy has a very detailed post about the case, but we'll try and do a summary here.

The case involves Jason Cross, a "country rap" musician who performs under the name Mikel Knight, who has apparently made a name for himself through a highly aggressive "street team" operation that basically travels around in vans pushing people to buy Knight's CDs -- and there are plenty of accusations of sketchy behavior around how those street teams operate, and how Cross treats the people who work for him. Apparently, Cross was not happy with a Facebook group entitled "Families Against Mike Knight and the MDRST" (MDRST standing for Maverick Dirt Road Street Team, which is what Cross calls the street team). He then used a court in Tennessee to try to get Facebook to identify who was behind the group, and then demanded that the page be taken down. That effort is still ongoing, but has been temporarily postponed, while he then filed a separate lawsuit in California against Facebook and whoever is behind that group, a variety of things, including breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, negligent interference with prospective economic relations, unfair business practices and various publicity rights violations. Oddly, as Levy points out in his post, despite listing John Does as defendants, the complaint doesn't describe anything anyone did other than Facebook. However, as part of the discovery process, Cross did (of course!) ask Facebook to identify the people behind the group criticizing him.

Facebook, quite reasonably, asked the court to dismiss the case under California's anti-SLAPP law and pointed to Section 230 for an explanation of why it's immune. The ruling, unfortunately, is very, very confused. It grants some of Facebook's request, saying that Facebook didn't breach any agreement in failing to remove the group, but refuses to dismiss the publicity rights claims, stating that publicity rights are "intellectual property" and intellectual property is not covered by Section 230. The first half of the ruling does note that Facebook is not liable for the regular content on those pages and thus it was under no obligation to take them down, but then goes off the rails on the publicity rights claim.

You might wonder where there's a publicity rights claim in any of this, but it appears that Cross is arguing that because the group (a) uses images of himself (as Mikel Knight) and (b) Facebook puts ads on those pages, that this is an abuse of his publicity rights for commercial advantage. Really.

Here, it is alleged that Facebook had knowledge since October 2014 that pages using Knight's likeness and identity were being created on its site.... Knight states that he did not consent to these pages or the advertising Facebook placed on them.... Facebook's financial performance is based on its user base; accordingly, Facebook' s alleged use of Knight's image on the unauthorized pages generates advertising revenue for the company.... Knight states that Facebook's unauthorized use of his image has resulted in substantial harm.... Accordingly, Plaintiffs have shown a probability of prevailing on their rights of publicity claims. Because the Sixth Cause of Action is a derivative claim that may arise from either or both the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action, here to Plaintiffs have shown a probability of prevailing.

This seems wrong on a number of different accounts. First, and most importantly, how the hell is this a legitimate publicity rights claim? Publicity rights are supposed to be about stopping companies from using an image of a famous person in a manner that suggests endorsement when the person did no such thing. It's a very, very twisted (and incorrect) notion to argue that because Facebook has some ads on the same page as a group that complains about Cross/Knight that it's violating his publicity rights. As Levy notes in his post:

If this ruling is upheld, it will blow a gaping hole in the immunity provided by section 230. Plaintiffs who are unhappy about being criticized on any platform provided by an online service provider will be able to force the removal of those materials, and without even showing that there is anything false or otherwise tortious about the criticism – all they will have to argue is that they did not give permission for the use of their names or images in the criticism and that will be enough to make out a viable legal claim against the hosting company.

That's frightening. But, as Levy also notes, this seems to clearly be a misreading of the law:

...it simply cannot be the case that a violation of the right of publicity can be found whenever someone talks about a celebrity and thereby makes a profit. People Magazine and the National Enquirer, for example, and a variety of other publications make their money writing about individuals about whom the public has an insatiable appetite for information, but they do not require the celebrities’ permission to write about them. Indeed, to the extent that the right of publicity is analogous to trademark rights, it applies when a use of the celebrity’s name and likeness creates a likelihood that consumers will believe that the celebrity has endorsed the company that used the name and likeness (analogous to the “likelihood of confusion” requirement).

The judge here is just confused.

Second, there's the question of whether or not CDA 230 should or should not apply to publicity rights claims. It is true that CDA 230 explicitly carves out "intellectual property," but as Levy notes, there's some debate as to whether or not that applies just to federal IP laws or if it also covers state ones. Publicity rights are a purely state law concept. Of course, I think the argument could go even further, and it could be claimed that publicity rights shouldn't even be considered intellectual property in the first place. I already have issues with lumping copyright and patents together with trademarks as "intellectual property." But adding amorphous and ever changing publicity rights into the same bucket is problematic as well. There is no official definition of what counts as "intellectual property." This is, perhaps, more of a problem in that CDA 230 should have never created such a broad carveout (or should have at least specified "copyright" or whatever), but stretching the exemption to cover publicity rights is dangerous -- especially when courts like this one seem so confused about what's actually covered by publicity rights.

Levy also notes that there's a First Amendment issue behind all of this, in that it's pretty clear that Cross is seeking to suppress people saying things about him that he doesn't like. Levy -- who has been investigating this case to see if his organization, Public Citizen, should get involved (and his post details talking to a number of people who used to be a part of Cross's "street team") -- notes that he's intending to file an amicus brief in Facebook's inevitable appeal.

Either way, it's unfortunate that a judge would get such issues so incredibly wrong in a manner that could have a serious impact on free expression. Hopefully, the ruling is quickly reversed on appeal.

Filed Under: anti-slapp, breach of contract, california, cda 230, defamation, jason cross, mikel knight, publicity rights, tennessee
Companies: facebook, maverick dirt road street team

Public Outcry Leads Minnesota Politician To Drop Terrible Idea For The PRINCE Act

from the good-news dept

Last week, we wrote about a terrible idea from Minnesota politician Joe Hoppe, for the PRINCE Act (Personal Rights in Names Can Endure Act), which was a massively broad publicity rights law, clearly designed to capitalize on Prince's recent death. In fact, as we noted, the bill could be read to violate itself, since the whole point was to block people from exploiting the likeness or name of a famous person like Prince for various purposes, including commercial purposes and fundraising. Hoppe, apparently missing the irony entirely, had no problem saying that he was pushing the bill to exploit Prince's death.

“I’ve had people say, `Is it just prompted by the death of Prince?’ Yeah, essentially it is. Really, what it’s doing is it’s attempting to recognize the right of publicity postmortem,” Hoppe said.

Thankfully, lots of people spoke out against the bill -- including many in Minnesota itself, pointing out how the law would stifle free speech for no good reason.

Apparently surprised by the unexpected backlash to his attempt to exploit Prince's death by stopping others from exploiting Prince's death, Hoppe has now announced that the bill is being set aside for the rest of this legislative session -- but may come back in the future. Hopefully, if it does, Hoppe will have taken some time to understand just how problematic broad publicity rights laws can be.

Filed Under: joe hoppe, minnesota, prince act, publicity rights

Minnesota's Broad Publicity Rights Law, The PRINCE Act, So Broad That It May Violate Itself

from the subtle,-guys,-subtle dept

We've written many posts on the area of so-called "publicity rights" laws. These are state laws that try to create a newish form of intellectual property around someone's "likeness" or other identifying features. A few years ago, Eriq Gardner wrote the definitive piece detailing the rise of publicity rights as a new way to try to lock down "protections" for things that don't really need to be protected. The initial intent behind many of these laws was to avoid a situation where there was a false endorsement -- basically to stop someone from putting an image or likeness of a famous person in an ad to imply support. But the law has (not surprisingly) expanded over time, and there have been many, many crazy battles over publicity rights -- including ones concerning Marilyn Monroe, Manuel Noriega, Katherine Heigl, Lindsay Lohan, Lindsay Lohan and Lindsay Lohan.

Since there's no federal law over this, it's all based on a bunch of state laws, which vary quite a bit from state to state. For example, a big part of the publicity rights case concerning Marilyn Monroe was over whether NY or California publicity rights laws applied to her estate. In California, the publicity rights continue after death. In NY, they do not. For tax reasons, after Monroe died, her estate convinced California tax authorities that Monroe was a NY resident at the time of her death. That saved them on some taxes, but it created a problem for them when they realized it meant that they couldn't use publicity rights laws in NY. So they suddenly started claiming publicity rights in California anyway, until a court rejected that plan.

That brings us to Prince. The artist who both embraced and struggled with the internet throughout his lifetime, was always focused on one thing in particular: control. While some of his actions seemed contradictory (embracing the internet at one moment and slamming it the next), when viewed through the lens of "he wanted ultimate control," the actions fit a pretty clear reasoning. But, it turns out that Minnesota, where Prince famously lived, there is no post-mortem publicity rights.

No worries, thought some Minnesota legislators, apparently, let's just rush through as quickly as possible a brand new law to create massive and widespread publicity rights for the deceased. Hell, they thought, why not call it the PRINCE Act (Personal Rights in Names Can Endure Act -- because, nothing matters any more).

Of course, like basically any law that is rushed through in response to an event, like someone's death, it appears that the people rushing it through haven't spent any time thinking about the actual impact of what they're proposing. Instead, it appears that Rep. Joe Hoppe wanted to get his name in the headlines as "helping" the Prince estate to stop the "exploitation" of Prince. Except this law is insanely broad and will be abused to stifle expression. The bill first declares:

An individual has a property right in the use of that individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, and likeness in any medium in any manner.

That's pretty damn broad. To be fair, there are a few limitations included in the bill. It does allow for fair use, but that's limited to use that's "news, public affairs or sports broadcast." No idea why a sports broadcast is exempted here, but okay. The law also can be read to only apply to commercial use, since it applies to use "on or in products, merchandise or goods" or "for purposes of advertising or selling..." or for fund raising. And there is a limitation that just using the "name, voice, signature or photograph" "in a commercial medium does not constitute a use for purposes of advertising or soliciting solely because the material containing the use is commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising." So you could argue that you won't get hit for just posting a photo on social media or something, even if there are ads on the page.

But seeing how widely we've seen publicity rights claims abused, you could easily see this being abused. Any Prince cover artist would basically be required to get a license. Someone writing a book about Prince or that discusses Prince might violate the law -- and, at the very least, might face a lawsuit to determine if it's fair use. And, somewhat ironically, as our own Tim Cushing points out, one could read the bill itself as violating itself. After all, it's using Prince's name, and it's clearly being used to "advertise." You could also make a strong argument that it's being used for fund raising of the politicians pushing it.

In fact, Hoppe even admits that he's deliberately exploiting Prince's name:

“I’ve had people say, `Is it just prompted by the death of Prince?’ Yeah, essentially it is. Really, what it’s doing is it’s attempting to recognize the right of publicity postmortem,” Hoppe said.

So it's okay for Hoppe to exploit Prince's name and death... for the purpose of making sure no one else exploit's Prince's name and death? How does that work.

I know that Prince really liked to have control over everything, but it really feels a lot like this move is about figuring out how Prince's relatives will be allowed to cash in on his estate. It's not clear why politicians should be aiding such a maneuver.

Filed Under: intellectual property, joe hoppe, minnesota, prince, prince act, publicity rights

Nothing About The Story Of An Artist Being Threatened With A Lawsuit Over A Painting Of A Small-Dicked Donald Trump Makes Sense

from the huh? dept

The Guardian had a weird story over the weekend claiming that artist Illma Gore is being threatened with a lawsuit if she sells a painting she created of a naked Donald Trump with, well, a less than average sized schlong (and I use that term, only because Trump apparently likes that word). I won't post an image of the painting. The Guardian has the whole thing if you really feel like seeing it. But almost nothing in the story makes any sense at all.

The piece by Illma Gore, titled Make America Great Again, depicts Trump with a small penis. It went viral in February after the artist published it on her Facebook page and has since been censored on social media sites and delisted from eBay after the anonymous filing of a Digital Millennium Copyright Act notice threatening to sue Gore.

Except, you can't file an anonymous DMCA notice. A key part of the DMCA notice process is that you need to identify the copyrighted work that was infringed, and the notice itself needs to be signed by someone acting on behalf of the copyright owner. In other words, there's no such thing as an anonymous DMCA notice -- not a valid one anyway.

Second, there's no copyright issue here at all, most likely. Lots of people jumped to the conclusion that it was Trump or his lawyers who sent the notice. That may well be, as he has a history of being ridiculously litigious over the slightest of insults, but he has no copyright interest in what he looks like. The only way there's a copyright claim here is if another artist painted the same thing first or, perhaps, if the painting was based on a photograph of Trump and the photographer was suing. But if it was just a regular clothed picture of Trump, I'd think that this would pretty obviously be transformative fair use from that photograph.

If it was Trump, he'd have no copyright interest at all. Potentially, his lawyers could, I guess, argue a publicity rights claims, which vary based on different state laws, but that would almost certainly fail as well. And the DMCA has nothing to do with publicity rights.

It's possible that it was just a Trump supporter sending a bogus DMCA to get eBay to take down the image. After all, the article also notes:

... galleries in the US refused to host the piece due to security concerns following threats of violence from Trump’s supporters....

[....]

The LA-based artist has received thousands of death threats and travelled to the UK to escape the frenzy....

But if that's the case, eBay (which has lawyers who should know this stuff) should have easily rejected the DMCA notice as invalid.

Perhaps eBay pulled the image for other reasons, and it's just being reported as an "anonymous DMCA notice" because people (and reporters) don't even recognize that the DMCA refers to a specific thing with specific rules. But, in the end, very little about the story makes any sense at all.

Filed Under: copyright, dmca, donald trump, illma gore, painting, publicity rights, takedown
Companies: ebay

Surprise: Court Allows Lindsay Lohan's Suit Against Take-Two Interactive To Go Forward

from the bwah? dept

Somehow and for some reason, the head-scratching lawsuit between actress Lindsay Lohan and Take-Two Interactive continues to move forward. If you'll recall, in 2013 Lohan began asking her lawyers about suing Take-Two over what she claimed wrongly was a direct depiction of herself in the game Grand Theft Auto 5. The character in question is clearly a composite parody of all kinds of Hollywood starlets, in part composed of references to Lohan's antics, and in part composed of references to other starlets' antics. Which is ultimately entirely besides the point, because the depiction is parody in nature and that really should have been the end of all of this. Except Lohan's legal team moved forward with the suit, and even amended it to include as much paperwork as possible, all while asserting that her legal claims could get around the statute of limitations on bringing the suit because Take-Two had manipulated the cover image for the game, which featured a bikini-clad girl Lohan also claims is a depiction of herself, in order to fit it on the DVD the game was shipped with.

It seemed for all the world like a case destined to be tossed at the court's earliest convenience, which of course is why the judge instead has proudly proclaimed that the suit can move forward.

On Friday, New York Supreme Court judge Joan Kennedy wrote she must make all inferences in Lohan's favor at this stage, can't rely upon defendants' documents aiming to show the images in question don't show Lohan and ruled that the actress' statements in her pleading had sufficiently alleged causes of action to merit a denial of the dismissal motion. The judge also rejected Take-Two's argument that Lohan had brought her lawsuit too late.

From the ruling itself:

Defendants have not been able to prove, at this juncture of the litigation, that the republication exception to the one year statute of limitations is not applicable to this case because the intended audiences were the same as those of the original publication and the images remained the same. Plaintiff specifically alleges facts which contend otherwise.

Now, earlier in the ruling, Judge Kennedy notes that the court is required, for requests by defendants for dismissals such as these, that pretty much everything about the case must be interpreted in the most generous manner towards the plaintiff. That said, it seems crazy that the court doesn't bother to understand at this point of the case that the "re-publishing" that Lohan's team is alleging consists only of resizing an image to fit on a DVD. Take-Two went so far as to ask for sanctions on Lohan for so meritless a legal claim, yet the court takes only a surface look at all of this and sides with Lohan on procedural grounds.

And so now discovery will begin, assuming Take-Two doesn't bow out and settle. Which it shouldn't, because this lawsuit shouldn't survive.

Filed Under: grand theft auto, gta 5, lindsay lohan, publicity rights
Companies: take two interactive

The Donald Sends Cease And Desist Threat To Band Over The Use Of His Name In Music And Video

from the drumpf dept

So, the political season is really starting to ramp up now, which means the insanity ramps up along with it. This particular go around in presidential politics has been particularly absurd, causing even those of us that try to view it all through the prism of entertainment to be more than a little frightened. Still, there can be no doubt that there has been an uptick in the engagement level of the American people, including from musical artists looking to provide commentary on American politics. Take this song and video released by music duo Fight Clvb, for instance. It's called Donald Trump and it is massively NSFW.

Not exactly William F. Buckley levels of political analysis or commentary there, but there's no provision for quality when it comes to expression. Still, Fight Clvb doesn't exactly have a massive following and that particular song of course will not be making it onto national airwaves anywhere. It's the kind of thing that has a niche audience that never really finds the masses.

Until, of course, Donald (f@#$ing) Trump decides to be his normally litigious self and sends out a cease and desist letter to the band over the use of his name and image in the video.

When you get that cease and desist from Donald Trump's attorney :/ Posted by Fight Clvb on Wednesday, February 24, 2016

If you'll all climb aboard, the Streisand Express is now leaving the station. Yes, rather than simply ignoring what would have been a narrowly viewed music video, His Donald-ness instead has decided to give those of us that cover intellectual property a reason to more widely disperse said music video as we cover his bullying ways. Trump is famously thin-skinned when it comes to anyone using his name or likeness in any way, of course, but the letter that was sent has me scratching my head. Trademark violation? I was unaware that Trump had entered into the music industry. If he hasn't, I'm unclear on where the common marketplace is between Fight Clvb and Donald Trump, nor am I clear on exactly how or where customers are going to be confused as to any of this. That the letter also claims infringement on Donald's other simply-named "rights" only adds to the confusion.

The music group, apparently, isn't going to play along.

Fight Clvb posted again yesterday, saying that they just got off the phone with legal counsel. Stating that the Cease & Desist is generally used as a scare tactic, Fight Clvb isn’t planning on following any of the orders of action at this time, opting instead to be rabble-rousers.

I for one am of the opinion that opting to be a rabble-rouser is always the proper course to take. Still, I imagine the group is pleased to see a bit of the spotlight, all because Trump decided to send a threat letter rather than ignore a barely-legible bit of political commentary. Not exactly the kind of measured and informed thinking one would want in a president, I think.

Filed Under: cease and desist, copyright, donald trump, fight clvb, publicity rights, streisand effect, trademark