More Details On Copyright Office's Suggestions On Copyright Reform; Some Good, Some Bad

from the going-to-be-a-mess dept

Earlier today, we broke the story that the head of the US Copyright Office, Maria Pallante is proposing major copyright reforms, including reducing the term to life plus 50 with the ability to proactively renew for another 20 years. While this was a move in the right direction (though not far enough), there were plenty of other proposals that were worrisome. Some more details are starting to come out.

First, I'm at a Santa Clara University conference all about the DMCA (fun stuff!) today, and Rob Kasunic from the Copyright Office mentioned that Pallante's talk at Columbia a couple weeks ago, where most of this information comes from, was merely a "shorter" version of her larger proposal. And that's impressive since her talk covered a lot of different areas concerning copyright. Now, the Association of Research Libraries has posted the notes of an attendees at that lecture, Greg Cram, from the NY Public Library. He points out that these are just his own notes, and may not be totally accurate. However, there are some details. First, the reduction in copyright term is basically what we discussed:

Term of 50 years, renewable for an additional 20

—The Supreme Court decision in Golan v. Holder is last word on whether life plus 70 years is constitutional

—However, the term of copyright protection could be modified to 50 years after the death of the author, renewable for another 20 years

—This would put the burden on the copyright owner to renew copyright term at the end of 50 years after death

—Modeled after § 108(h), something the Copyright Office is very fond of

—This proposal would be acceptable under various international treaties, including the Berne Convention

This is a small step in the right direction, which is surprising, since pretty much all steps have gone in the other direction, in favor of maximalism. However, there is plenty to be worried about. Here are a few such points:

Stronger Enforcement —The new law must respect the integrity of the internet, including free speech —There needs to be, however, a mix of legislative and voluntary efforts to combat infringement online —On solution may be to increase criminal penalties for streaming, or at least bring them in line with the penalties for distribution through downloads

In other words... perhaps we trade off shorter terms for more criminal prosecutions for "streaming," even as there are serious questions about why basic streaming should be illegal and with so much evidence that greater enforcement does little to help copyright holders' bottom line. That's a problem.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act —The Internet has evolved since DMCA passage in 1998 —Congress should review the § 512 safe harbors —Congress also needs to review § 1201 rulemaking, especially in light of the White House response to a petition on unlocking mobile phones

This is the part that worries me. The entertainment industry has been really itching to ditch the DMCA's safe harbor provisions that protect service providers from liability for the actions of their users. If that's the trade-off for shorter copyright terms, it's not worth it. The safe harbor provisions of the DMCA are a huge part of why the internet has been able to develop so many wonderful services.

The § 1201 rulemaking, however, is the issue concerning anti-circumvention, which should absolutely be re-examined, as it's created a huge mess for all sorts of legitimate uses. But, again, re-opening the safe harbors provision should be a non-starter. Nothing good can come from that.

Incidental Copies —Not all copies are the same —Perhaps there could be discrete exceptions for certain incidental copies —For more information on this issue, see the Copyright Offices 2001 study on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act

Depending on where this falls out, this could be pretty important. Hollywood has often tried to argue that "incidental" copies should be seen as infringing, and cases like the Cablevision case have raised some issues around that.

Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings —Copyright Office is a “strong supporter” of a public performance right for sound recordings —Disparities between terrestrial radio and internet radio royalty rates are hampering new business models

This is an old battle that's been fought for years and years, and is basically a tax on broadcasters for the benefit of the RIAA. It's silly since it's obvious that the record labels directly value radio airplay, because they pay for it via payola. Arguing that radio stations should have to pay back for the "right" to promote a musician seems kind of silly.

Statutory Damages —Review registration requirements —Look at statutory damages from all angles —Statutory damages are important part of copyright act and should be retained —Need to provide guidance to courts about how statutory damages should be applied

This one could be good, since the statutory damages are so out of whack with reality. However, again, just watch as Hollywood -- with its ridiculous belief that "more punishment" will suddenly get people to buy again -- argues that these rates need to go up not down.

Other Exceptions/Limitations —The libraries and archives exception in § 108 should be updated —Update exceptions for the blind and print disabled in § 121 for the digital world —Explore new exception for higher education institutions —Personal space-shifting

These are important, but are really reflections of problems of a system that has automatic copyright applied to nearly everything and not nearly enough recognition of individual rights. The solutions here are useful, but are basically just patching up evidence of why overreaching copyright law is fundamentally broken. On that issue, however, she apparently believes that more compulsory licensing can be a solution:

Opt-Out v. Opt-In —Extended collective licensing could potentially solve many problems

Of course, this ignores just how screwed up the collective licensing process often becomes, with the focus just being on constantly raising rates, often squeezing out other business models. On top of that, the distribution challenge means a lot of wasted overhead and an all too frequent situation in which big name artists end up getting the money that should go to smaller artists, since they're harder to find and to track.

Small Claims —The Copyright Office is studying this issue —Small claims may be a way for rights holders to enforce rights when federal litigation may be too expensive —The Copyright Office could, potentially, take a lead role in administering small claims

We discussed this recently, and how it could actually have widespread impact, leading to more infringement lawsuits being filed. This needs to be watched carefully.

There's also the issue of giving herself a lot more power:

Finally, Congress should expand the role of the Copyright Office. The Office could help to resolve questions of law or fact through advisory opinions. The Office could also help to establish best practices on a number of topics, including searching for copyright owners. If an extended collective licensing scheme is devised by Congress, then the Office could provide transparency to that system.

Basically, they want to make the Copyright Office a bigger deal, like the FCC or something. This has a whole host of risks, especially when the Copyright Office has a big revolving door with the entertainment industry.

Once again, this is going to be a very big deal when the full details of these suggestions are put forth -- and we should be quite worried about a number of the ideas above that could make things significantly worse, rather than better.

Filed Under: anti-circumvention, authority, collective licensing, copyright, copyright reform, copyright term, maria pallante, safe harbors, statutory damages

Obama Administration, Once Again, Says $222,000 For Sharing 24 Songs Is Perfectly Reasonable

from the oh-really? dept

This shouldn't be seen as much of a surprise at all, given that the Obama administration previously supported the $1.5 million verdict against Jammie Thomas-Rasset for sharing a mere 24 songs. However, now that an appeals court has reverted back to the original $220,000 ruling (procedural reasons...), and Thomas-Rasset has filed to ask the Supreme Court to hear the case, the Obama administration is back again, saying that there is nothing wrong with $220,000 for 24 songs. The argument is basically what you'd expect. In short: Congress set the statutory rates, the record labels asked for statutory damages, and thus nothing in that range should be considered too high.

The administration does have a point that there is not a real controversy between different circuit courts on the issue at play here, and thus there may not be a need for the Supreme Court to get involved. After the appeals court ruling, we predicted that the Supreme Court would refuse to hear this case, and that still seems likely. That doesn't mean that there aren't problems with the government's analysis. Its focus on using a Supreme Court ruling from a century ago ("Williams") which covered an obscure issue not directly relevant, still seems problematic to me -- but not so problematic that the Supreme Court is likely to weigh in.

Statutory damages are a massive problem with copyright law today. They are way out of proportion with any actual harm, and thus do raise considerable questions, that might amount to interesting Constitutional challenges. That doesn't mean that this case was the right case (in fact, it has many problems). Even so, it's a bit disappointing to see the Obama administration weigh in at all on the issue, giving a de facto thumbs up to massive and ridiculous statutory damages. The basic conclusion of "Congress decides, and that's good enough" is a real problem:

That public interest cannot be realized if the inherent difficulty of proving actual damages leaves the copyright holder without an effective remedy for infringement or precludes an effective means of deterring further copyright violations. The statute reflects a legislative determination of the range of assessments necessary to vindicate those public interests, see 17 U.S.C. 504(c), and Congress’s judgment as to the appropriate amounts is entitled to deference.

If the administration was interested in true leadership in fixing the problems of the copyright system, it would not condone such clearly ridiculous awards. Doing so merely confirms that it remains focused on helping out its friends in legacy industries, rather than reflecting what is actually best for the public.

Filed Under: copyright, jammie thomas-rasset, obama administration, punitive, statutory damages, supreme court

Jammie Thomas Asks Supreme Court: How Much Is Too Much For Copyright Infringement?

from the here-we-go dept

Back in September, we wrote about the latest in the Jammie Thomas-Rasset saga, in which an appeals court had ruled that the original (of three) district court rulings in her case, in which she was told to pay $9,250 per song was perfectly reasonable. As we noted, this was more or less a procedural thing, in an effort to get to the main event: a challenge on the Constitutionality of ridiculously high statutory damages for copyright. And... that's where we are now. Thomas-Rasset has petitioned the Supreme Court to hear her appeal on exactly that question:

Is there any constitutional limit to the statutory damages that can be imposed for downloading music online?

The argument, as when it has been brought up earlier, is that such huge fines represent a 5th Amendment due process problem, as the awards simply are so far out of line with any reason. The filing runs through a brief history of the recording industry's fight against file sharing (amusingly quoting from the movie The Social Network to make the point that the recording industry has seen better days).

Thomas-Rasset makes the case that the three different verdicts, with three different crazy amounts from three different juries highlights the problems with today's statutory damages, and how disconnected they are from reality:

Statutory damages imposed in this way are unpredictable, unconstrained, and equally as punitive as punitive damages; the jury’s role in imposing them is even more divorced from finding facts, from deciding what happened, than it is in imposing punitive damages. The order-of-magnitude difference between the verdicts in this case, $222,000 in the first trial, $1,920,000 in the second trial, and $1,500,000 in the third trial, demonstrates this. The verdicts are unpredictable and, in a deeper sense, arbitrary; they are not tied to any fact or rationale that justifies them, that explains why the law imposes this particular penalty on this particular defendant.

And it's that arbitrary nature that becomes a Constitutional problem under the 5th Amendment:

Thomas–Rasset contends that the award of statutory damages against her violates the Due Process Clause because it is tied not to the actual injury that she caused or other features of her conduct, but to the injury caused by file sharing in general. Like punitive damages, statutory damages are imposed not only to compensate the plaintiff, but also to deter the defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. While this general approach, punishing one offender to deter others, is constitutional within limits, even gross limits of fair retribution for an individual’s conduct, due process limits the extent of the punishment. This Court recognized as much in reviewing awards of statutory damages as early as a century ago.

In Williams, decided in 1919, a railroad challenged statutory damages of “not less than fifty dollars nor more than three hundred dollars” imposed for overcharging two passengers by 66 cents in violation of Arkansas’s regulation of railroad rates. 251 U.S. at 63–64. The railroad argued that such statutory damages “contravene due process of law” because “the penalty is arbitrary and unreasonable, and not proportionate to the actual damages sustained.” ... This Court held that the Due Process Clause “places a limitation upon the power of the states to describe penalties for violations of their laws” and that due process is denied “where the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”

And, of course, they claim that this case clearly shows that statutory damages are completely disproportionate:

Under Williams and the other early cases, the award of statutory damages in this case is unconstitutional because it is “grossly excessive” and “wholly disproportioned to the offense.”.... $222,000 for 24 songs that would have cost $24 on iTunes is absurd. Nor can $222,000 be justified by the kinds of other features of the offense identified in Williams.

There's a lot more in the full filing, but it also takes on things, like the claims that the record labels should be able to get more from Thomas-Rasset, because they have to cover for other files sharers. That doesn't fly:

a defendant may be punished for his own similar acts only, Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422–23 (“A defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business.”), and only for the injury that he inflicted on the particular plaintiff in the case, not for any injuries that he inflicted on nonparties, Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (“the Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation”). These cases preserve the civil nature of a case notwithstanding the imposition of a punishment: the case remains between two parties, and the civil punishment must be justified with reference to the acts between those parties, not acts in the world in general.

There are a number of legal arguments... and one appeal to emotion, which comes off as a bit weak, though you never know how well some of those might play out:

But lawyers should care about these cases for an entirely different reason: This is not just. It is unfair, it is not due process, for an industry to sue 12,500 people and threaten to sue 5,000 more, wielding a statute for which they lobbied, under which they can threaten hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars in statutory damages, where the only way to resist is through modern, complex, expensive federal process, so that the only reasonable choice is to pay the settlement and be done. That’s extortion, not law. We cannot govern that way.

I am skeptical that this will result in a ruling in favor of Thomas-Rasset (even if the Supreme Court grants cert -- which I'd say is possible, but unlikely). However, perhaps I'll be pleasantly surprised. This is an absolute long shot, especially given a Supreme Court that, while skeptical of patent expansion, has shown a bizarre willingness to let Congress continue to stretch and change and expand copyright law at every turn.

Filed Under: copyright, due process, jammie thomas rasset, statutory damages, supreme court

Canadian Copyright Law Caps Statutory Damages At $5,000 Just As File Sharing Lawsuits Make Their Unwelcome Return

from the sounds-like-these-suits-should-be-filed-in-small-claims-court dept

There's some bad news on the copyright front in Canada, but at least it's tempered with some, if not actually good news, reasonable news. The bad news is that file sharing lawsuits are returning to Canada, assisted by forensic software companies like Canipre, which has been collecting information on infringing users for the past several months.

A forensic software company has collected files on a million Canadians who it says have downloaded pirated content.

And the company, which works for the motion picture and recording industries, says a recent court decision forcing Internet providers to release subscriber names and details is only the first step in a bid to crack down on illegal downloads.

“The door is closing. People should think twice about downloading content they know isn’t proper,” said Barry Logan, managing director of Canipre, the Montreal-based forensic software company.

Logan said while last week’s court case involved only 50 IP addresses, his company is involved in another case that will see thousands of Canadians targeted in a sweep aimed at deterring Internet users from illegally downloading movies and other digital content.

Logan said his company has files on one million Canadians who are involved in peer-to-peer file sharing and have downloaded movies from BitTorrent sites, identifying them through Internet Protocol addresses collected over the past five months.

Moving beyond the obvious problem with identifying infringers through an IP address, it looks as if Canadian citizens are going to be on the receiving end of lawsuits brought by members of the content industry. Whether this results in a corresponding sales boost to the industries involved remains to be seen, but the tactics involved (mass lawsuits, IP addresses) seem to have been taken from the copyright trolls' handbook. In short, there's nothing remotely "good" about this news.

Even though the tactics are familiar and the companies involved state that they're modeling their actions on their American counterparts, there's one aspect that trails far "behind" the US system: statutory damages. Michael Geist reminds us of the reasonable news, which is as close to "good" as this situation gets:

While it is possible that many will receive demand letters, it is important to note that recent changes to Canadian copyright law limit liability in non-commercial cases to a maximum of $5,000 for all infringement claims. In fact, it is likely that a court would award far less - perhaps as little as $100 - if the case went to court as even the government's FAQ on the recent copyright reform bill provided assurances that Canadians "will not face disproportionate penalties for minor infringements of copyright by distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial infringement."

Compared to the US statutory damage laws, which allow for up to $150,000 per infringement, Canada's limits bring personal liability down to something more in line with the "damages" of non-commercial infringement. Even commercial infringement is treated more realistically, capping out at $20,000 per infringement.

This would be the small bit of "good" news contained within the unwelcome return of file sharing lawsuits. Geist theorizes on the mass lawsuit process, lending more credence to the idea that the represented industries are heading out for a bit of trolling. Fortunately for Canadian citizens, a low cap on damages means very few of those swept up in mass filings will end up in court.

The lawsuits will likely follow a three-step process. First, rights holders will seek a court order requiring Internet providers to disclose customer name and address information. Second, should the court order the disclosure, rights holders will use the information to send settlement demand letters to subscribers. The letters will allege infringement and likely offer to settle the case for several thousand dollars. If subscribers refuse to settle - perhaps they believe the allegation is inaccurate or the settlement demands unfair - it will fall to rights holders to follow through with a lawsuit. Given recent changes to the law, there is reason to doubt those cases will be filed as the individual liability is very limited.

If you can't keep rights holders from casting a wide net in hopes of swift settlements, the next best thing is to keep them from seeking outrageous statutory damages. With the very real possibility of showing up in court only to walk out with a $100 bill, one would suspect that settlement requests will stay at more realistic levels.

Filed Under: canada, copyright, file sharing, lawsuits, statutory damages

BitTorrent Uploader Ordered To Pay $1.5 Million After Not Showing Up In Court

from the default-judgment dept

Torrentfreak has the story of a default judgment against someone for infringement of some porn videos, in which Kywan Fisher has been ordered to pay $1.5 million for uploading 10 movies. Default judgments are basically what happens when the other party doesn't show up in court. Many judges will then enter a judgment against them, more or less accepting everything that the plaintiff says and asks for. Courts don't have to accept the plaintiff's claims in default judgment cases, but too many judges just rubberstamp such requests, and that seems to be the case here.

Unfortunately, copyright trolls will now use this ruling to threaten more people into paying up. They'll ignore that the facts here are a bit different than ordinary cases. Here, beyond it being a default judgment, the copyright holder, Flava Works (whose name you might recognize from another case where they haven't fared well) has additional evidence against Fisher. Apparently Flava Works watermarks files that paying customers access. In this case, Fisher was a paying customer who then took the works -- with watermarks intact -- and posted them online for others to download. So, there's significantly more evidence against Fisher, beyond just an IP address.

Even so, it's a bit disappointing that the judge simply accepted what Flava Works asked for in terms of the award. Flava Works justification for the $1.5 million figure is tremendously disingenuous:

Plaintiff seeks statutory damages for willful infringement of $1,500,000 for the willful infringements of 10 videos that were downloaded 3,449 times. Exhibit “E”. Defendant caused 3,449 infringements of the Plaintiff’s videos. Plaintiff is seeking the maximum statutory damages of $150,000 per infringement. $150,000 times 3,449 infringements is over $517,000,000. Thus, Plaintiff, Flava Works, Inc.’s request for an award of $1,500,000 is very reasonable.

Except... Flava Works is being misleading. The statute on statutory damages (17 USC 504) makes it clear that statutory damages are to be awarded per work, not per infringement. So the whole point about 3,449 infringements and a possible award of $517 million is way outside of what the law actually says is allowed. Yes, others have tried this "per infringement" argument rather than "per work" before, most memorably in the Limewire case, where the judge outright rejected that request, noting that statutory damages are to be awarded per work infringed, not per infringement. In the end, the court in this case goes with $1.5 million, which is the upper bound for what it can really provide as statutory damages, so it doesn't appear that the court went beyond what was allowed, but hopefully it wasn't influenced by that ridiculous $517 million claim into thinking that $1.5 million "is very reasonable."

In all likelihood, as often happens, the fact that it was a default judgment situation led the judge to just go with $1.5 million -- the maximum possible amount under the law. The problem, of course, is that this number isn't "very reasonable" at all. It's way way out of line with the action. Even if we grant that 3,449 people downloaded the work, and each would have paid, say, $20 otherwise (to choose an arbitrarily high number) we're still talking less than $70,000. And that's even assuming that everyone who downloaded would have bought at such a ridiculously high price -- an obviously laughable assertion. In other words, while statutory damages don't need to relate to actual damages, it's not difficult to look at this and think that the award is still ridiculous, even if you feel that there's sufficient evidence to suggest Fisher did break the law.

And, once again, we're left with a situation that creates even less respect for copyright law. From the (one-sided) evidence presented by Flava Works, it certainly seems much more likely that Fisher broke the law, and as such I don't think there's any issue with him losing the lawsuit (though, as a default judgment we have no idea if he has a legitimate defense). But a $1.5 million award just seems so out of proportion to reality that the court really ought to have gone with something slightly more reasonable. Not that Flava Works will ever collect from Fisher, but it's doubtful anyone really cares about that. The whole point of this is to get the judgment on the books so that Flava Works and others can now use it on tons of others.

Filed Under: bittorrent, copyright trolls, default judgment, statutory damages, uploads
Companies: flava works

UK Kicks Off Small Claims Court For 'Small Scale' Copyright Claims

from the would-that-help? dept

It's no secret that one of the significant problems with copyright law today are the ridiculous statutory damages, set by Congress, which have absolutely no reasonable connection to the "harm" being done. The idea that you could owe $150,000 for sharing a single song should be horrific to just about everyone (though, of course, the maximalists always have crazy ways to justify such insane and punitive damages). However, over in the UK, one thing they're trying to tackle is changing the equation for "small scale" copyright disputes. Specifically, they've set up the equivalent of a small claims court for copyright issues, which makes the process much cheaper and faster.

"Small firms, whose intellectual property has been infringed, will have today a simpler and easier way to take their cases forward, by writing direct to the judge and setting out the issues," Business Minister Michael Fallon said in a statement. "Lower legal costs will make it easier for entrepreneurs to protect their creative ideas where they had previously struggled to access justice in what could often be an expensive progress. A smarter and cheaper process is good for business and helping businesses make the most of their intellectual property is good for the economy."

I question how effective this will be, but at least it is a different approach. If nothing else, it will be worthwhile for the sake of seeing how well (if at all) it works. I don't see how this really solves any of the big problems with massive damages. All it really does is make it easier for there to be more copyright lawsuits, though with limited benefits for those who file. It seems like the kind of system that's going to see a lot of attempted abuse. We already see so much abuse of the existing copyright system, so are we sure it's a good idea to make it even easier for some to file lawsuits -- even with the limited punishment?

Filed Under: copyright, damages, small claims, statutory damages, uk

Court: Fining Jammie Thomas $9,250 Per Song Infringed Motivates Creative Activity

from the really-now? dept

This is hardly a surprise, but similar to the Joel Tenenbaum case, Jammie Thomas-Rasset (the other person sued for copyright infringement for using a file sharing system), has lost again. The appeals court (8th Circuit) has ruled that $9,250 per song infringed is perfectly reasonable and that the judge in the case, Michael Davis, erred in calling for a new trial after the initial jury verdict (the first of three). There were a number of procedural issues here, and it's worth pointing out that Thomas-Rasset herself more or less asked the court to bring back this first verdict and focus on the Constitutionality of the damages amount. So, the whole mess with the three separate district court trials sort of gets swept under the rug. However, the court simply isn't buying Thomas-Rasset's claim that the statutory damages are unconstitutionally punitive and a violation of due process. Basically, it says that the fact that statutory damages are completely out of whack with actual damages doesn't matter, because the point of statutory damages is that they're disconnected from actual damages on purpose (because, in theory, they're put in place because actual damages are difficult to assess).

Given that, the court then takes the statutory range (basically $750 to $150,000 -- upper limit is $30,000 if not willful) and basically says, "well, $9,250 is at the low end of the range, so it's fine."

We conclude that an award of $9,250 per each of twenty-four works is not “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.” .... Congress, exercising its “wide latitude of discretion,”... set a statutory damages range for willful copyright infringement of $750 to $150,000 per infringed work.... The award here is toward the lower end of this broad range. As in Williams, “the interests of the public, the numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for securing uniform adherence to [federal law]” support the constitutionality of the award.

Because of this, it argues that crazy copyright statutory damages somehow automatically "motivate the creative activity."

Congress’s protection of copyrights is not a “special private benefit,” but is meant to achieve an important public interest: “to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.” ... With the rapid advancement of technology, copyright infringement through online file-sharing has become a serious problem in the recording industry. Evidence at trial showed that revenues across the industry decreased by fifty percent between 1999 and 2006, a decline that the record companies attributed to piracy. This decline in revenue caused a corresponding drop in industry jobs and a reduction in the number of artists represented and albums released

The court then accepts as fact (a) these highly dubious claims that the record labels are in trouble and it's all due to copyright infringement online and (b) that such awards actually act as a deterrent. The truth is both of these statements are factually incorrect. The record labels are in trouble because they failed to adapt to a changing market. And awards of many thousands of dollars for infringing on a single song don't act as a deterrent at all. They just seem so far away from any sense of reality that they actually make people respect copyright even less.

I've long been a believer that the RIAA and the labels sued Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset for just a couple dozen songs, but then kept making the point that they were really sharing over a thousand to defend the ridiculously large awards. If that's the case, then they should have sued over all of the songs -- because you can't defend against that which you weren't sued over. In this appeal, Thomas-Rasset more or less tried to use a variation on that argument to prove the insanity of the $9,250 number, pointing out that if she had been sued over 1,000 songs, then she would have owed $9.25 million, which just seems obviously ridiculous. Unfortunately, the court makes a weird statement to avoid that logic:

The absolute amount of the award, not just the amount per violation, is relevant to whether the award is “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”

Is that really true, though? The court seems to be saying that it's only the total amount that matters, and not the amount per violation. But that makes no sense. Since the question is whether it's "disproportioned to the offense" then, um, the offense itself is important. Yet, here the court is arguing "24 songs or 1,000 songs, doesn't matter -- just the total amount matters."

The court also said that Judge Davis shouldn't have ordered a mistrial, as he did over faulty jury instructions in that original jury trial. The issue was over mistaken jury instructions, concerning whether or not "making available" is infringement. The RIAA was hoping that the court would also confirm their highly questionable theory that merely "making available" (i.e., putting something in a shared folder) is infringement itself, rather than the view of many that you have to show something that actually violates one of the rights under the Copyright Act (distribution, reproduction, etc.). Making available is not one of those rights, but the RIAA and copyright maximalists like to pretend it is, and they were hoping the court here would say it was. Instead, the court punts on the issue, saying that because it can handle the main issues at hand without having to deal with the making available question, they'll skip it, thank you very much:

But because the verdicts returned by the second and third juries are sufficient to justify these remedies, it is unnecessary for this court to consider the merits of the district court’s order granting a new trial after the first verdict. Important though the “making available” legal issue may be to the recording companies, they are not entitled to an opinion on an issue of law that is unnecessary for the remedies sought or to a freestanding decision on whether Thomas-Rasset violated the law by making recordings available.

Thomas-Rasset's attorneys have made it clear they plan to appeal, though there's no guarantee that the case will go anywhere. It appears unlikely that there will be any sort of circuit split between this case and the Tenenbaum case, as both seem to be heading in similar directions (though somewhat different paths). And, as I've said before, both of these cases were the wrong ones to fight for a precedent on. In both cases, you have clear examples of "bad actors" -- who not only infringed, but knew they were infringing -- and who then took steps that make it easy to portray them as bad actors in court, whether it was trying to blame others or outright lying to the court. Both Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum should have settled their cases long ago. There are important Constitutional questions about statutory damages for copyright, but these two make bad cases and they're making it easy for the courts to put in place dangerous precedents that guarantee that copyright law gets no respect from the public, and that damages are wholly outside the realm of reasonable.

Filed Under: actual damages, copyright, file sharing, jammie thomas-rasset, statutory damages

Two Copywrongs Don't Make A Right, But We Still Need A Way To Combat False Takedown Notices

from the because-they-wrote-the-laws dept

We've noted plenty of examples of completely bogus takedowns due to copyright claims -- including some pretty serious ones. Over at TorrentFreak, they're asking if such bogus takedowns should be punished in some manner, and they suggest a three strikes system, in which after the third strike, parties are not allowed to file any more takedowns for a month. I'm not sure such a system would really be that productive, but it does seem that something should be done. I know that whenever we talk about bogus takedowns, people point to the "penalty of perjury" language found in DMCA takedown notices. But that's usually a misreading of what the perjury notices actually say. The "penalty of perjury" part only needs to apply to the claim that the party writing the letter is authorized to act on behalf of the rightsholder. That's it. It does not need to apply to the claim that the content is actually infringing, even though most people interpret the notice to read that way. Separately, when the takedowns happen via automated systems like YouTube's ContentID, or via government action, like ICE's domain seizures, the perjury claims have no bearing at all, since they happen outside of the DMCA entirely.

So what can or should be done in those situations? At one point, some Brazilian officials had suggested effectively putting the public domain and fair use on par with copyright -- and thus equalizing the punishments for violating either. There is some poetic justice in such a setup. Given the insanity of today's statutory damages rates (which can lead to up to $150,000 for infringement of a single item), would it be reasonable to then say if you take down something incorrectly, you are opening yourselves up to similar damages?

Defenders of copyright would argue that's way too harsh, though they'd do so without any hint of realization that those penalties are way too harsh for today's infringement as well. Besides, they wouldn't have to worry if they only issue proper takedowns.

Of course, the problem with that is that you're effectively creating a "two wrongs" situation, rather than fixing the bad situation. You could argue that if you set it up so that the two sides had to be in lockstep, then that might actually encourage copyright holders to be more willing to come to the table to reduce statutory damages to more reasonable levels, though this also explains why they'd fight as hard as they could against any such proposal.

In the end, I really don't know what the proper response is -- but it does seem clear that the ability to falsely censor content online, thanks to the DMCA and bogus notices and automated systems, is a real problem that needs to be fixed.

Filed Under: bogus takedowns, dmca, free speech, perjury, punishment, statutory damages, takedowns

District Court: $675,000 For Non-commercially Sharing 30 Songs Is Perfectly Reasonable

from the pay-up dept

Let's be clear on one thing: Joel Tenenbaum should never have allowed the record label lawsuit against him to go forward. As with Jammie Thomas before him, he was not a good defendant, and had too many factors that clouded the key questions concerning the statutory damages rates in copyright law. Even worse, he lied to the court and his lawyers seemed more focused on making a point than mounting a defense. As we said all along, he needed to find better lawyers (and he probably shouldn't have fought this in the first place). Even the judge, who clearly was sympathetic to Tenenbaum's side of the story, rejected his basic argument, on which his legal team seemed to bet their whole strategy -- and then berated his legal team for their dreadful handling of the case.

Given all of that, it's easy to conflate all of those other issues with the important one: are the statutory rates for copyright infringement, especially in cases of non-commercial, personal use, Constitutional? The original judge, Nancy Gertner, argued that they were unconstitutionally excessive, which became the focus of the appeals process. The appeals court rejected the process Gertner used to come to that conclusion, saying that she should have used "remittitur" to reduce the award and offer the RIAA a chance for a new trial (as happened in the Jammie Thomas case). Instead, Gertner effectively tried to jump the line, by going straight to a Constitutional argument. The appeals court noted that it was too early in the process for that, and she should have used remittitur first. As such, it reinstated the original jury award of $675,000 for sharing 30 songs. The Supreme Court then refused to hear the case, which wasn't a huge surprise either.

So... back down at the district court, with a different judge, who doesn't seem nearly as sympathetic. Given that the judge is 80-years-old, it's perhaps not a surprise that she seemed to spend more time talking about what a naughty kid Tenenbaum was, rather than the actual reasonableness of the rates. The court has now said, not only does it not find $675,000 constitutionally excessive for sharing 30 songs, but that it doesn't even qualify for remittitur, because $675,000 is not "grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience of the court." In other words, a $675,000 judgment is perfectly reasonable for sharing 30 songs. The judge, not surprisingly, focuses on many of the elements that we discuss above in arguing why it's not excessive, with Tenenbaum's continued use of file sharing and his lies, to support the supposed reasonableness of the ruling. She never actually looks at whether the numbers make sense, but merely suggests that because he didn't revere copyright law, that such an award is perfectly reasonable.

Unfortunately, it seems that Tenenbaum's behavior -- which we agree was not good at all -- clouds the larger issue of just how insane the statutory damages are. Some, of course, will point out that he's been accused of sharing a lot more than 30 songs, but that doesn't matter. The trial was about 30 songs. We don't punish people in a court for stuff they're not charged with and which they can't defend against. If you want to say that $675k is reasonable for thousands of songs, then he should have been charged with infringing on that many songs.

The judge argues that one of the factors that makes this "reasonable" is that if Tenenbaum had wanted to license the songs for distribution himself, the cost would have been "enormous," according to the labels. But that's a silly comparison, because this wasn't a commercial venture and he wasn't looking to set up a service -- he was just doing what millions of people around the world do -- whether you think it's right or wrong. As such, any thinking person should recognize that a $675k fine for the personal sharing of 30 songs seems offensive to the senses, even if you agree that Tenenbaum is not particularly apologetic for what he did. It really is a situation where tons of people were doing it, and right or wrong, it had become the norm. Something is wrong with a legal system that burdens people with such out of proportion awards for doing what everyone's doing.

And despite the RIAA cheering on this decision, claiming that it's "pleased" with the decision, it actually hurts them too. When ordinary people see $675,000 judgments for sharing 30 songs, they respect copyright less, because it seems so out of proportion with reality.

This case probably isn't over yet, and there will likely still be an appeal to get at the Constitutional questions. But, I'm worried that Tenenbaum's own bad actions, separate from what he's accused of, are clouding the water here, and actually make this a bad and potentially dangerous case. That the court has upheld the $675,000 isn't a surprise, but it should still be worrisome to people in terms of the precedent it will set for the next group of people accused in this manner, who didn't act the same way Tenenbaum did.

Filed Under: $675, 000, constitutional, copyright, joel tenenbaum, non-commercial sharing, statutory damages
Companies: riaa

Authors Guild Asks For $750 For Every Book Google Scans; While Google Points Out That There's No Evidence Of Any Harm

from the fair-use-fight dept

As the Authors Guild and Google fight for summary judgment in the case over the legality of its book scanning, the authors have asked for $750 per book. As I write this, their actual filing is not available yet, though I imagine it will be soon and I'll add it here. On the face of it, $750 per book is insanity. I doubt anyone at all thinks that $750 per book scanned is a "reasonable" number. However, in some ways, the Authors Guild is probably thinking that it's being generous in suggesting such a deal. After all, $750 is the minimum statutory damage amount for infringement. Thus, it can rationalize this as saying it's actually asking for the minimum under the law, when it could seek as much as $150,000 per work.

But, really, all this is doing is highlighting the insanity of statutory damages in copyright law, which have no connection to reality. Even at this "low end" of the scale, the amounts would clearly make it cost prohibitive for Google to scan any more books, and that would be a shame.

In fact, on its side of the legal fight, Google is arguing that the authors have completely failed to prove any harm, while making the argument that the scanning project is fair use. Basically, Google points out that it's creating an index of everything in the books, not acting as a substitute for the books. Thus, the purpose serves to make useful information more widely available (which likely can increase the demand for the books, by helping users find new books). Not surprisingly, I find the arguments in favor of fair use compelling (and have been saying so for many years -- so much so that I was disappointed when Google first tried to settle this case, rather than standing behind its fair use claims).

While, in the end, it's likely that the case will depend on the fair use ruling, it should also be seen as a case that highlights the insanity of statutory licenses in copyright law. There is no doubt that Google's book search is a useful tool that helps expand access to knowledge. The idea that such a thing could only be created with an additional $750 per book scanned being sent back to the copyright holder, seems ridiculous -- but it's a factor of a broken copyright system that has such out of touch and out of proportion statutory damages.

Filed Under: book scanning, copyright, harm, statutory damages
Companies: authors guild, google