Now Israel Is Looking To Pass A Social Media Censorship Bill Too

from the this-will-be-abused dept

Like lots of other places around the globe, it appears that Israel is considering a dangerous social media censorship bill, that would force websites to remove content. It does have some safeguards, but, basically, if law enforcement claims a crime was committed via the publication of some content, a judge can issue a takedown order:

Under the proposed bill, a judge would be able to issue an order requiring a content publisher to remove posts from its website, if law enforcement agencies are convinced that a criminal offense has been committed through the publication of the content. It essentially allows Israeli authorities to block posts from any website featuring user-generated content, including Google, Twitter and Facebook, as well as news sites from being seen by Israeli viewers, including those with a paywall and those that require user registration.

That doesn't seem like real due process, of course. From the sound of it, you only have two parties involved -- law enforcement and the judge -- and not anyone representing the actual content creator/publisher. Thankfully, at least some are raising the alarm in Israel over this attack on free expression:

“The bill is broader than necessary and offers a substantial and procedural opening for government censorship,” the authors wrote. “Moreover, the bill also makes it possible to remove content from institutional content sites, like Israeli and foreign newspapers, at a level of intrusion that does not exist in any other country in the democratic world.”

Shwartz Altshuler told The Times of Israel on Tuesday that “the law applies to any website, with a paywall, or without, with registration or without. This means that one could go to court and ask for content removal even from news sites, which is unheard of.”

As they note in the article, this bill goes significantly further than the already wildly abused NetzDG law in Germany.

Among other things the law says it can be used for any crime that "might harm public safety" which is the kind of thing that law enforcement will claim at the drop of a hat about almost anything. Hopefully, legislators in Israel realize that this bill is half-baked.

Filed Under: censorship, content moderation, due process, israel, social media

Federal Court Says Destroying Someone's House To Apprehend A Fugitive Might Be A Constitutional Violation

from the FINALLY dept

Law enforcement has a pretty cavalier attitude towards private property. Whatever property they aren't unjustifiably seizing from drivers and passengers, they're razing to the ground. Sometimes they destroy whole houses during plain vanilla warrant service. Other times, situations are determined to be stand-offs in need of wholesale destruction, even when officers are facing down an empty house.

You'd think this sort of brazen and unjustified destruction would result in successful lawsuits to recover costs and damages incurred by these actions. But you'd be wrong. A successful lawsuit for law enforcement destruction of private property is more rare than a successful lawsuit over property seized via asset forfeiture.

Courts tend to defer to law enforcement expertise, often opining that this collateral damage is just an unfortunate side effect of good police work. Officers are free to overcome any obstacles placed in the way of their objectives, and if that means entire walls of houses need to be destroyed, that's just the way it is. Who are we (this is the judges speaking) to second-guess decisions made in the heat of the moment, even when said moment is a daylong "standoff."

Two Appeals Courts have issued precedential decisions that affect two entire circuits (the Ninth and Tenth), which make lawsuits brought in those jurisdictions even more unlikely to prevail. But a recent lawsuit -- featuring representation by the Institute for Justice (which has also had success fighting bogus forfeitures) -- has just experienced some limited success. It was brought by a woman whose residence was the victim of an overzealous Texas SWAT team that apparently felt the only way it could apprehend a suspect was by causing more than $50,000 of damage to her home.

It's not like the McKinney PD didn't have options. Vicki Baker, the plaintiff, gave them plenty, as Billy Binion reports for Reason.

In July 2020, Wesley Little—who Vicki Baker had terminated as her handyman about a year and a half prior—arrived at Baker's home in McKinney, Texas. Baker's daughter answered. Recognizing him from news reports that he was wanted for the abduction of a 15-year-old girl, she left the premises and called the police.

SWAT agents soon arrived. They set off explosives to open the garage entryway, detonated tear gas grenades inside the building, ran over Baker's fence with an armored vehicle, and ripped off her front door, despite being given a garage door opener, a code to the back gate, and a key to the home. The house was unlivable when they were through.

Baker's insurance company said it wasn't liable for damages caused by the government. The government -- in this case, the city of McKinney -- said it wasn't liable because she wasn't a victim of anything. The police had a legitimate reason to destroy her house (the apprehension of a fugitive). Sorry, but not anyone's fault, the city shrugged.

Baker sued. And a federal court has come down on her side. It very plausibly is the city's problem and it can be held liable for the unnecessary destruction of this home, says the court [PDF].

Because at this stage the Court construes all well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds Baker has plausibly alleged an official policy promulgated by the City of McKinney. As alleged in the Complaint, after the City’s destruction of her property, Baker requested compensation from the City of McKinney, but the City denied the request, stating that there was ‘no liability on the part of the City or any of its employees.’” This assertion is sufficient to plausibly allege a “a single unconstitutional action by a municipal actor”— that is, a denial of the constitutionally mandated just compensation following a taking by the government.

As the court notes, this isn't the end of the discussion. As it points out earlier, there exists no precedent in its jurisdiction or in the Fifth Circuit saying the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to incidents like these. But rather than use that lack of precedent as a means to dismiss her suit, it comes to the conclusion that destroying a home (and refusing to compensate the innocent homeowner) is a Fifth Amendment violation.

The City asks this Court to adopt what would constitute a per se rule—that destruction to private property resulting from the exercise of valid police power cannot constitute a Fifth Amendment Taking. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit have directly found a taking that requires just compensation when destruction of property results from the exercise of valid police power. The City correctly points out that other circuits have foreclosed recovery under similar circumstances.

[...]

However, both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court have suggested such action could amount to a taking… In Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, the Supreme Court opined that if “the uses of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power, the natural tendency of human nature would be to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappeared.”

This federal court decides that sort of buck-passing stops here, at least for the time being. Not every claim is a valid Takings Clause claim, but this one appears to be at this point.

While the Court acknowledges that governmental bodies are not “liable under the Just Compensation Clause to property owners every time policemen break down the doors of buildings to foil burglars thought to be inside[,]” Nat’l Bd. of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns v United States, 395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969) (emphasis added), Baker has alleged damage to her private property—and the City’s refusal to compensate for such damage—that plausibly amounts to a Fifth Amendment violation.

That's good enough to avoid dismissal. The same goes for the state law claims under the Texas constitution.

Baker pleaded that her home was intentionally destroyed in the government’s effort to apprehend Little. The affirmative actions Baker alleges include Department officers: (1) storming the house; (2) breaking windows; (3) knocking down the garage door; (4) knocking down the backyard fence; and (5) firing dozens of explosive tear gas cannisters into the home. Such actions were intentional, even if the City’s motives were to secure a threat to public safety. To be sure, the City itself indicates “the [Department] dr[ew] up plans” before busting into Baker’s home to apprehend Little. The resulting damage, therefore, can hardly be considered “incidental consequence[s] of the City’s actions.” Lastly, Baker alleges the City took her property for a public use—apprehension of a dangerous fugitive whose freedom threatened the community and public as a whole.

Baker has sufficiently pleaded a takings claim under the Texas Constitution. The actions taken by the Department officers damaged Baker’s home—that much appears undisputed. Even if the government did not intend to damage Baker’s property to apprehend Little, the City was substantially certain such damage would result. It is unreasonable for the City to suggest the Department officers stormed Baker’s house, broke the windows, knocked down the garage door, rammed down the backyard fence with a tank-like vehicle, and fired dozens of explosive tear gas cannisters into the home without a degree of certainty that such actions would cause damage to the property. As such, and after considering the pleadings and case law cited above, the Court finds Baker has sufficiently pleaded a violation of Article I, § 17 of the Texas Constitution as to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

This doesn't mean the city of McKinney can't still find a way to screw this homeowner. But this does definitely make it more difficult to escape the lawsuit. And that extra degree of difficulty may be all it takes for the city to cut a check. To push it further might mean setting precedent at a higher level that would make cities and law enforcement agencies liable for excessive damage to private property. And that's precedent no law enforcement agency in the nation is in any hurry to see set.

Filed Under: due process, law enforcement, property destruction

Court Tells Cops Who Got A Man Wrongly Imprisoned For 25 Years That Of Course Framing People For Crimes Is A Rights Violation

from the just-wrecking-up-people's-lives-and-walking-away-from-it dept

There's a constitutional right not to be framed by cops for a crime you didn't commit. This shouldn't even need to be argued in court once, much less twice. But "framed by cops" is exactly what happened to James Dennis, who spent 25 years in prison after being falsely accused of murdering a high school student back in 1991.

After having his wrongful conviction vacated in 2013 (and this decision affirmed by the Third Circuit Appeals Court in 2016), Dennis sued the cops that took 25 years of his life away by hiding exculpatory evidence and creating a narrative that put him behind bars.

Back to the Third Circuit goes Dennis again, with the Appeals Court handling an attempt by two detectives to escape Dennis' lawsuit [PDF]. The district court stripped immunity from the detectives who built the case against Dennis. The detectives appealed but they're not going to be able to walk away from this one.

The allegations are severe. According to Dennis, detectives Frank Jastrzembski and Manuel Santiago hid evidence that would have cleared Dennis and worked together to railroad him into a murder conviction. Buckle up, there's a lot to take in here.

First, Dennis alleges that the detectives concealed information about other individuals, who had confessed their involvement with the murder or who knew who was involved, and that the detectives coerced/concealed certain other witnesses. Specifically, Dennis alleges that the detectives never followed up on inconsistencies in statements made by Zahra Howard, who was with Williams on the day of her murder. Ms. Howard originally told the detectives that she never saw the assailants but later told her aunt and uncle that she recognized the assailants from Olney High School, a school that Dennis had never attended. Howard’s aunt and uncle informed the detectives about her statement; it was also corroborated by the victim’s aunt. This information, which was recorded in the detectives’ activity logs, was concealed from Dennis for ten years.

In addition, Dennis alleges that several days after the murder, Montgomery County law enforcement advised the Philadelphia Police Department that an inmate in their County Prison spoke with a man who confessed his involvement in Williams’s murder. A signed statement from the inmate included details about all three men involved in the murder and identified the source of the information. However, defense trial counsel never received any materials relating to the investigation of these three individuals; the information was only revealed 10 years later during Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) discovery.

Second, Dennis alleges that the detectives fabricated evidence to secure his conviction. Specifically, Dennis alleges that the detectives falsely claimed to have found certain clothing items that matched those of the shooter, as described by eyewitnesses to the murder. He further alleges that Detective Jastrzembski falsely testified that the clothing was found at Dennis’s residence but later “disappeared” from police headquarters prior to trial...

Third, Dennis alleges that the detectives concealed evidence that would have supported his alibi. Specifically, Dennis’s alibi that he was elsewhere at the time of the murder would have been corroborated by a witness’s time-stamped welfare receipt. When questioned by the detectives, the witness based her time estimates on the receipt’s military-style timestamp of 13:03 (1:03 PM), which she mistook to mean 3:03 PM. The detectives did not correct the witness when she misread the receipt’s military-style timestamp while they were interviewing her; instead, they took the only copy of the receipt and never shared it with Dennis or the prosecutors…

Dennis also alleges that only four of the nine eyewitnesses identified by Philadelphia Police had selected him from the lineup; three of those four testified for the Commonwealth at Dennis’s trial. After learning this information, Dennis’s counsel requested a new lineup with all nine eyewitnesses. The new lineup never occurred.

The detectives argued that even if they were in the wrong, they were not unreasonably wrong and could not have possibly known from court precedent that hiding information from accused criminals and framing them for a murder was a violation of his rights.

Wrong, says the Third Circuit. It's not even a close call. There's plenty of precedent and it dates back decades -- long before the detectives' actions in 1992.

[C]iting McDonough v. Smith, the detectives contend that a fabrication of evidence claim has been recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment only where the government officer involved in fabricating evidence was a prosecuting attorney. Not so. In Halsey v. Pfeiffer, we concluded that it was axiomatic that “those charged with upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals for crimes they did not commit.” Halsey involved an evidence fabrication claim under the Fourteenth Amendment brought against police officers. We emphasized that the Supreme Court decades ago had established that the Constitution forbids those tasked with upholding the law from knowingly using falsified evidence to secure a criminal conviction.

[...]

[A] case that is directly on point is not required so long as the precedent placed the constitutional question beyond debate. Halsey did so, recognizing prior precedent that held the fabrication of evidence by law enforcement officers violates the Fourteenth Amendment and that such a right had been established since at least 1985.

The next argument by the detectives was also off by several decades.

[T]urning to Dennis’s deliberate deception claim, the detectives contend that this claim is based on the right not to be framed by law enforcement agents, which is too broadly worded and was not established until 1995, when the Supreme Court decided Kyles v. Whitley.

The right not to be convicted on perjured testimony used by prosecutors at trial has been clearly established by the Supreme Court since at least 1935 in Mooney v. Holohan. Seven years later, in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942), the Court extended this right by recognizing as a due process violation the conviction of a defendant through perjured testimony and the deliberate suppression of evidence favorable to the accused.

Even if this precedent did not exist, the court says the due process violations are so blindingly obvious that there's no plausible excuse for the detectives' actions.

We conclude that the constitutional rule that framing criminal defendants through use of fabricated evidence, including false or perjured testimony, violates their constitutional rights applies with such obvious clarity that it is unreasonable for us to conclude anything other than that the detectives were on sufficient notice that their fabrication of evidence violated clearly established law.

That's what qualified immunity has done to the judicial system. The Supreme Court's alteration of the contours of the doctrine it created has made it more difficult for lower courts to address the rights violations, shifting focus to judicial precedent instead. Fortunately, there's plenty of it here. But more than that, it's good to see a court tell officers attempting to raise their qualified immunity shields that the stuff they did was so obviously wrong they'd still be denied immunity even if there wasn't any precedent to rely on. That needs to happen more often.

Filed Under: 3rd circuit, due process, framing people, frank jastrzembski, james dennis, lying cops, manuel santiago, police, qualified immunity, wrongful conviction

The Scale Of Content Moderation Is Unfathomable

from the it's-way-more-than-you-think dept

Sometimes it's difficult to get across to people "the scale" part when we talk about the impossibility of content moderation at scale. It's massive. And this is why whenever there's a content moderation decision that you dislike or that you disagree with, you have to realize that it's not personal. It wasn't done because someone doesn't like your politics. It wasn't done because of some crazy agenda. It was done because a combination of thousands of people around the globe and still sketchy artificial intelligence are making an insane number of decisions every day. And they just keep piling up and piling up and piling up.

Evelyn Douek recently gave a (virtual) talk at Stanford on The Administrative State of Content Moderation, which is worth watching in its entirety. However, right at the beginning of her talk, she presented some stats that highlight the scale of the decision making here. Based on publicly revealed transparency reports from these companies, in just the 30 minutes allotted for her talk, Facebook would take down 615,417 pieces of content, YouTube would take down 271,440 videos, channels, and comments, and TikTok would take down 18,870 videos. And, also, the Oversight Board would receive 48 petitions to review a Facebook takedown decision.

And, as she notes, that's only the take down decisions. It does not count the "leave up" decisions, which are also made quite frequently. Facebook is not targeting you personally. It is not Mark Zuckerberg sitting there saying "take this down." The company is taking down over a million pieces of content every freaking hour. It's going to make mistakes. And some of the decisions are ones that you're going to disagree with.

And, to put that in perspective, she notes that in its entire history, the US Supreme Court has decided a grand total of approximately 246 1st Amendment cases, or somewhere around one per year. And, of course, in those cases, it often involves years of debates, and arguments, and briefings, and multiple levels of appeals. And sometimes the Supreme Court still gets it totally wrong. Yet we expect Facebook -- making over a million decisions to take content down every hour -- to somehow magically get it all right?

Anyway, there's a lot more good stuff in the talk and I suggest you watch the whole thing to get a better understanding of the way content moderation actually works. It would be helpful for anyone who wants to opine on content moderation to not just understand what Douek is saying, but to really internalize it.

Filed Under: content moderation, due process, evelyn douek, scale, takedowns
Companies: facebook, tiktok, youtube

GOP Hollowly Threatens To 'Shut Down' Telecom Companies For Cooperating With Legal January 6 Inquiries

from the good-luck-with-that dept

If you've spent any real time digging into Trump GOP era tech policies, you've probably noticed they're a jumbled mess of contradictions and inconsistencies, cloaked in a lot of performative propaganda. The same party that thought net neutrality (the FCC holding telecom giants vaguely accountable) was a government hellscape, pivoted on a dime to try and force the FCC into regulating social media companies. The same GOP that whines incessantly about "big tech" via performative populism, routinely runs for the hills any time somebody actually tries to rein in corporate power or implement genuine antitrust reform.

Of course in the mainstream press (in this context usually The New York Times, Axios, The Washington Post, Politico, and friends), the inconsistency of the GOP's policy platforms is never really explained. It's part of the "view from nowhere" disease that has infected mainstream U.S. political coverage, where everything is portrayed in a "he said, she said" frame of perfect symmetry, leaving your readers completely uncertain where the truth actually lies. It's driven by a fear of upsetting sources and advertisers, and results in a media that simply refuses to call a duck a duck (or bullshit bullshit) when urgently required.

That bubbled up again this week as the GOP bristled at the fact the committee investigating the January 6 attack on the Capitol by a pro-Trump mob has been asking telecom and tech companies to retain relevant communications between lawmakers and organizers. Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, Signal, Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile have all received requests. As Mike has noted there are concerns that the requests are worryingly broad, including troves of internal communications at the companies' themselves.

At the same time, many of the requests (especially those looking at the text message and call logs from telecom companies) are perfectly legitimate, and if investigators can find text messages showing coordination between the violent Capitol-assaulting mob, its organizers, and the GOP, that kind of seems arguably important in terms of a functioning democracy and avoiding even worse scenarios down the road. After all, guys like Jim Jordan are nervously babbling in interviews like this one for a reason:

Several GOP members seem particularly nervous about text messages and phone logs, and are now taking to television threatening to "shut down" telecom companies if they cooperate with the probe in any way whatsoever:

This is, of course, utterly nonsensical, zero calorie, idiot theater. Congress as a whole worships the ground companies like AT&T walk on, and the GOP in particular has never stood up to AT&T on any issue of substance. Ever. Why? Because AT&T's extremely politically powerful (thanks in large part to its cozy relationship with the NSA), and a major GOP campaign contributor. There's legitimately a 0.0% chance that AT&T or Verizon see any meaningful penalties for cooperating with legal requests, especially from a party with a thirty year track record of mindlessly kissing telecom's ass.

The GOP for years has opposed privacy protections and embraced expansive government surveillance. And its entire brand has been built on the worship of purportedly "free markets" without the imposition of government intervention. And the entire Trump GOP has been to take "political norms" in the alleyway and beat the ever loving piss out of them, repeatedly. Yet this morning we saw the Rupert Murdoch editorial pages pretending to care about both telecom privacy and (gasp!) "political norms":

House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy also took to Twitter to threaten to shut down private companies for complying with legal information requests (you know, "free markets!" and all that):

Nobody's violating federal law. It's a valid inquiry into an extremely dangerous, precedent setting event. And "federal law" on privacy is weak in the first place largely courtesy of forty years of DC policy choices. There's just layers of gibberish here, particularly the pretense that the GOP gives two flying shits about rampant government surveillance or "political norms." If Congress is doing something illegal that violates privacy, anyone can sue to stop them. Instead, the GOP is having yet another toddler moment, engaging in hollow bullying to shut down private businesses they know they'll never actually follow through on.

As Ken White notes, one could argue that this kind of behavior, while likely not prosecutable, qualifies as corruption and obstruction of justice:

Granted, this most likely ends (like the mythical GOP support for "antitrust reform") with zero penalties for telecom companies, because there's nothing to penalize. Still, letting a bunch of mindlessly ambitious authoritarians try to overthrow elections with zero meaningful penalty sets a clearly dangerous precedent. As does threatening companies for complying with perfectly valid legal requests.

Shutting down AT&T is a non-starter, so what is the GOP going to do to "punish" telecom companies? Re-establish the FCC's ability to hold telecom monopolies accountable? Stop blocking efforts to impose broadband privacy rules? Finally start holding them accountable for fraud? Rein in their overly enthusiastic participation in our domestic surveillance program? Force AT&T and Verizon to close up shop and go home? Give me a break.

It's just empty-headed bullying by GOP lawmakers clearly nervous about what these requests could reveal about one of the dumbest yet most dangerous days in recent U.S. history. And yet courtesy of DC beltway press' "he said, she said" framing of the situation, a reader walks away from most terrible coverage of this dispute with the impression that the GOP's position here could be perfectly reasonable. ("Bob the authoritarian says a valid investigation into him is illegal, but his colleague Jane says that's not true. Who's right? Who knows?" ¯\_(ツ)_/¯).

U.S. press outlets need to dramatically improve their ability to call out bullshit or this stuff is all going to get significantly worse. Bad faith bullshit only works when you refuse to identify it as clearly bad faith bullshit. Corruption thrives when your press is too timid to clearly call it corruption when required. And by and large the nation's biggest media outlets continue to fail painfully at the task of highlighting the GOP's hard right authoritarian swerve, or the bullshit faux-populist propaganda they're using to make it happen.

Filed Under: due process, empty threats, evidence, gop, investigation, january 6th, jawboning, kevin mccarthy, marjorie taylor greene, obstruction of justice, subpoena, telcos
Companies: at&t, verizon

Massachusetts District Attorney Delays Forfeiture Proceedings For Years, Some Involving As Little As $10

from the bringing-down-crime-lords-at-$10-a-pop dept

We all know how lousy civil asset forfeiture is. In lieu of actual criminal charges, cops (and feds) just seize any property they can get their hands on, turning other people's money into pure profit for law enforcement agencies. Money they can often spend with little to no oversight.

It's a profitable venture. Cops steal more than actual crooks do, netting billions a year across the nation. The legal process for forfeiture asks very little from law enforcement -- rarely more than a mild hunch the seized funds are linked to criminal acts. The government has a very low bar to meet in most cases. For the people who've suddenly seen their money taken away, the bar is much higher.

In most cases, the government gets to decide when forfeiture proceedings begin. It also doesn't have to make much of an effort to notify forfeiture victims that proceedings have begun. That leads to a lot of default wins for government agencies. The amount of money it takes to hire a lawyer to challenge a forfeiture is often more costly than the funds seized, leading to even more government "wins." Every cheap win is treated like a victory in the war on crime, even when it's usually nothing more than the government making some random person poorer.

In the state of Massachusetts, one particular District Attorney is ensuring there's no due process when it comes to asset forfeiture. Thanks to severely lax laws, there's no lower limit for seizures, which means the DA's office is more than happy to help cops nickel-and-dime people to figurative death. There's also no legal obligation for the office to move forward with forfeitures in a timely fashion.

This has led to the DA's office waiting for as long as possible to initiate some proceedings. And, since the office takes home a percentage of every successful forfeiture, it does as little as possible to ensure those who've had their money seized are made aware that proceedings are imminent. Saurabah Datar and Shannon Dooling have done some digging to produce this enraging report for ProPublica. (h/t @pakanukeha)

In an investigation with ProPublica, WBUR also found that Worcester County District Attorney Joseph D. Early Jr. regularly stockpiles seized money, including that of people not charged with a crime, for years, and sometimes decades.

In more than 500 instances between 2016 and 2019, WBUR found that funds had been in the custody of the DA’s office for a decade or more before officials had attempted to notify people and give them a chance to get their money back. One case dated back to 1990.

This is an obvious mockery of due process. And it has been the standard operating procedure for the Worcester County DA for more than 20 years. Not that anyone cares. Or could even be allowed to care. Nearly nonexistent reporting requirements means state and county oversight likely have no idea this is how the DA is handling forfeitures. Since there are no better rules on the books, there's nothing compelling DA Early to change how he handles his forfeiture business.

Operating in an accountability vacuum, the DA's office engages in bullshit like this:

Take, for instance, Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Twenty Eight Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Six Dollars Fifty Cents ($28,356.50) In United States Currency. At first glance, the sum seems to reflect proceeds from a substantial drug bust. But court documents actually list 109 separate names and seizures — including one as low as $11 — spanning nearly 20 years.

Among the names in this giant batch in 2018 was Jones-Bernier, whose $95 had been taken four years prior. He was listed in an ad the DA’s office ran in the Worcester Telegram & Gazette, as having no known address. Jones-Bernier didn’t know his name had appeared there until he was contacted by WBUR. He said Early’s office could have sent a letter to his home address, which was on his driver’s license at the time of the arrest.

This is how you end up with default "victories" that ensure the DA's office scores some cash while doing nothing to serve the interests of the public. Nothing about this deters criminal activity. The DA's office isn't helping cops put bad people away and disrupt major criminal organizations. This is the work of a government-funded pickpocket.

WBUR’s analysis of Worcester County forfeitures from 2017 through 2019 found that more than half of the seizures in these cases were for less than $500. In one incident, Fitchburg police seized $10 from a man listed as homeless. In another, Sturbridge police took $10 from a 14-year-old boy.

Stealing is the DA's business. And business is good.

His office brought in nearly $4 million in forfeitures in just the latest four years, from fiscal 2017 through 2020, according to analyses by the state’s trial court.

Despite all evidence to the contrary, the DA continues to claim this is a worthwhile venture, rather than the petty theft it appears to be.

Early said he’s proud that his office has spent large sums of confiscated money on youth programs and drug prevention. “I love taking the drug dealers’ money. I love taking their lifeblood and putting it back into the community,” he said.

Taking $10 from a 14-year-old is giving back to the community? Did you at least throw the homeless person's $10 bill into the general fund to support shelters? Is your county more free of drugs since you've thrown your weight behind shaking down citizens for spare change?

All signs point to no. Here's the data: Worcester County is still one of the most dangerous counties in the nation. Lifting loose cash from random residents hasn't improved things at all. If there's any downward trend noticeable here, it's got nothing to do with the supposedly drug warring DA. It has to do with the general trend towards lower crime rates that has been ongoing for years all around the nation. Here's the county's crime rate per 100,000 people, sourced from the FBI's crime data.

And the cops in Worcester are just as lousy as the District Attorney.

Worcester taxpayers have paid more than $4 million since 2010 to settle almost 30 lawsuits against the police department, according to records gathered by the group Defund WPD.

[...]

The payouts across the 27 settlements range from as low as $8,000 up into the millions. There are also more than a dozen lawsuits against Worcester police that haven't been settled yet.

Seems like the $4 million forfeited by the DA's office over the last four years would have covered the PD's lawsuits for an entire decade. Maybe that's where those funds should go. But until legislators in Massachusetts get serious about reforming this obvious abuse of an ideal, government employees like DA Early will continue to treat residents like ATMs.

Filed Under: asset forfeiture, civil asset forfeiture, district attorney, drug war, due process, joseph early, legalized theft, massachusetts

After Eight Years And Three Reviews Of The Case, Indiana Supreme Court Rules Police Must Return Seized Car To Its Owner

from the thousands-of-dollars-spent-fighting-against-the-public's-interests dept

It's now been eight years since Indiana law enforcement seized Tyson Timbs' Land Rover following his arrest for distributing drugs. In eight years, this case has made multiple visits to the state trial court, the state court of appeals, the state's Supreme Court, and the nation's Supreme Court.

This isn't just due to Timbs' tenacity and his desire to have his car returned. His only car -- worth $35,000 when it was seized -- has been sitting in an impound lot for most of decade, all because of criminal charges that netted Timbs $1,200 in fines and one year of home detention.

No, these multiple trips are due to the state of Indiana attempting to prevent precedent from being set that would prevent it from seizing whatever it wants whenever it wants. Previous rulings found excessive fines -- in this case taking the form of a $35,000 vehicle seizure over $400 of heroin sold to undercover officers -- violate the Eighth Amendment. And these rulings also reminded the state that it had incorporated that part of the US Constitution years ago and couldn't try to ignore it now just because it still wants to avail itself of Benjamins when ringing up people on nickel-and-dime charges.

So, for the third time, the Indiana state Supreme Court is forced to handle the Timbs case because the state has refused to accept every previous ruling that has gone against it, including the one handed down by the US Supreme Court. The opening of the ruling [PDF] expresses some of the court's exasperation with the state's stubbornness.

We chronicle and confront, for the third time, the State’s quest to forfeit Tyson Timbs’s now-famous white Land Rover. And, again, the same overarching question looms: would the forfeiture be constitutional?

Reminiscent of Captain Ahab’s chase of the white whale Moby Dick, this case has wound its way from the trial court all the way to the United States Supreme Court and back again. During the voyage, several points have come to light. First, the vehicle’s forfeiture, due to its punitive nature, is subject to the Eighth Amendment’s protection against excessive fines. Next, to stay within the limits of the Excessive Fines Clause, the forfeiture of Timbs’s vehicle must meet two requirements: instrumentality and proportionality. And, finally, the forfeiture falls within the instrumentality limit because the vehicle was the actual means by which Timbs committed the underlying drug offense.

All of these questions have been capably handled at each step of this long, laborious process. The problem is the state doesn't like the answers it's been getting. And the state Supreme Court doesn't appear to like the state's refusal to listen. There are some facts to consider, but as far as the state's top court is concerned, they were answered amply by the lower court.

[U]ntil now, the proportionality inquiry remained unresolved—that is, was the harshness of the Land Rover’s forfeiture grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Timbs’s dealing crime and his culpability for the vehicle’s misuse? The State not only urges us to answer that question in the negative, but it also requests that we wholly abandon the proportionality framework from State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 35–39 (Ind. 2019). Today, we reject the State’s request to overturn precedent, as there is no compelling reason to deviate from stare decisis and the law of the case; and we conclude that Timbs met his burden to show gross disproportionality, rendering the Land Rover’s forfeiture unconstitutional.

The key is the excessive fines part of the Eighth Amendment. The courts must decide whether the seizure was proportionate. The lower court -- after hearing from witnesses on Timbs' behalf (the state decided not to call any of its own) -- made the right call by weighing the cost against the crime. The seizure of Timbs' only vehicle didn't serve any greater public interest. All it did was enrich the state at Timbs' expense.

[C]ontrary to the State’s position, we conclude that the $35,000 market value of the vehicle and the other sanctions imposed on Timbs point to the punitive, rather than remedial, nature of the forfeiture. As Timbs II explained, it’s appropriate to evaluate the market value of the forfeiture relative to the owner’s economic means—because “taking away the same piece of property from a billionaire and from someone who owns nothing” do not reflect equal punishments. 134 N.E.3d at 36. And, here, taking away a $35,000 asset from someone who owned nothing else was significantly punitive. Likewise, imposing the forfeiture on top of other sanctions—sanctions that included six years of restricted liberty as well as $1,200 in fees and costs -- shows that the vehicle's seizure was not for remedial purposes.

Finally this comes to an end, years after it should have been obvious seizing Timbs' car violated the Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive fines.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court; and the seven-plus-year pursuit for the white Land Rover comes to an end.

The state and its law enforcement agencies are now subject to a proportionality test that weighs the severity of the crime against the value of the items seized. If this test stands during criminal asset forfeiture -- the seizures accompanying actual criminal charges -- it needs to be applied to cases where law enforcement can't even be bothered to affect an arrest, much less pursue criminal charges when seizing property. This is good news for Indiana residents. And it has the potential to disrupt forfeiture efforts nationwide.

Filed Under: 8th amendment, asset forfeiture, civil asset forfeiture, due process, illinois, tyson timbs

EFF Tells Court Defendants Must Be Allowed To Examine The DNA Software Used To Convict Them

from the rolling-dice-with-more-sides-but-they're-still-just-dice dept

A proper adversarial system means the accused can confront the accuser. But that's rarely the case when crime solving software is involved. The FBI doesn't allow accused child porn downloaders to examine the malicious software it used to identify their computers. Multiple law enforcement agencies have dropped cases rather than discuss Stingray devices in open court.

All DNA analysis is handled by software. Most DNA analysis utilizes proprietary code created by private companies which license it to government agencies. The analysis may be performed by government agencies and employees, but when it comes to giving defense lawyers and their clients a chance to examine the software used to generate evidence, it suddenly becomes a very private matter.

Companies routinely intercede in criminal cases, telling judges that handing over source code or other information about their algorithms would somehow make it impossible for them to compete in the crime solving market. In most cases, judges are sympathetic to claims about trade secrets and proprietary code, allowing the accused to only confront their accuser by proxy, via a government expert or an employee of the software company.

In rare cases, the court actually finds in favor of the defendant. Earlier this year, a case involving third-party DNA software and the EFF's intercession went the defendant's way with a federal judge in Pennsylvania telling the government it couldn't hide behind third-party trade secret assertions to keep this code out of the accused's hands. As the court reasoned then, if DNA evidence is central to the case against the defendant, the defendant should have access to the evidence and the software that created it.

The EFF is hoping for a similar outcome in a case being handled in California. It deals with the possibly wrongful conviction of a 70-year-old man for rape. And it involves a DNA software company whose algorithm was the only one that tied the suspect to the crime.

An elderly woman was sexually assaulted and murdered in her home and two witnesses described seeing a black man in his 50s on the property on the day of the murder. Dozens of people had passed through the victim's home in the few months leading up to the murder, including Mr. Davis and another individual. Mr. Davis is an African American man who was in his 70s at the time of the murder and suffers from Parkinson’s disease. Another individual who met the witnesses’ description had a history of sex crimes including sexual assault with a foreign object.

DNA samples were taken from dozens of locations and items at the crime scene. Mr. Davis’s DNA was not found on many of those, including a cane that was allegedly used to sexually assault the victim. Traditional DNA software was not able to match Mr. Davis to the DNA sample from a shoelace that was likely used to tie up the victim—but STRMix did, and the prosecution relied heavily on the latter before the jury.

As the EFF points out in its brief [PDF], DNA software is anything but infallible. STRMix was caught a half-decade ago when a bug in its code possibly led to dozens of false arrests and convictions. Presumably that bug has been patched, but if no one outside of STRMix is allowed to examine the code, it's impossible to see if it might be leading prosecutors and government experts to overstate the certainty of DNA matches.

The necessity of independent source code review for probabilistic DNA programs was starkly demonstrated when FST (a counterpart to STRmix that was used in New York crime labs) was finally provided to a defense team for analysis. According to a defense expert, the undisclosed portion of the code could incorrectly tip the scales in favor of the prosecution’s hypothesis that a defendant’s DNA was present in a mixture. Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. as to Kevin Johnson at 19-21, United States v. Kevin Johnson, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017) (No. 15-CR-565 (VEC), D.I. 110). In fact, STRmix8 has suffered from programming errors that created false results in 60 cases in Queensland, Australia.

The problems caused by nondisclosure are especially acute in the context of the latest generation of probabilistic DNA analysis because there is no objective baseline truth against which the output from the program may be evaluated—and thus it is impossible to gauge the accuracy of these programs by examining their results.

If there's no objective baseline, every DNA analysis program is allowed to grade on its own curve. DNA matches aren't actually matches. They just reflect the likelihood of a match. With no baseline, the probability of it being an actual match is left to the discernment of prosecutors and their expert witnesses -- all of whom come out looking better if they can secure a conviction.

Unlike breathalyzers, the latest generation of complex DNA analysis tools cannot be measured against an objective truth. Instead, these DNA programs are more akin to probabilistic election forecasting models, such as those designed by FiveThirtyEight and The Economist. The outputted results are based on the calculation of the probability of events—that the defendant, rather than a random person, contributed to the DNA mixture or that person X will win an election—a value that is not an objectively measurable fact. This is why different DNA programs, and even different laboratories using the same program, will generate substantially different results for the same sample.

This is why courts should allow defendants to examine the software that has, for the most part, accused them of committing crimes. If different algorithms produce different outcomes using the same inputs, none are to be trusted until they're independently examined. And DNA software companies aren't interested in that happening -- not solely because of any trade secrets but because any defendant who successfully casts doubt on the accuracy of test results undermines their business model.

But protecting a business model isn't the court's business. The courts are there to serve justice, which means protecting the rights of the accused from accusers utilizing proprietary tech while waving around signed NDAs.

Filed Under: dna, due process, evidence, software