Why Is Google Turning Chrome Into An Operating System?

from the slow-down dept

There have been rumors for years that Google might someday release its own operating system, but the announcement that it's turning the Chrome browser into an operating system is an odd duck for a variety of reasons (amusingly, the "Google browser" was also rumored for years before Chrome showed up). Why is it odd?

• Google already has an operating system in Android. While that was initially focused on mobile devices, it's already being expanded to netbooks, so turning that into a more complete operating system seems like the way to go.
• Chrome itself still needs a ton of work. I've tried using it, and it's crazy buggy and so unstable -- I simply gave up and went back to Firefox. Jumping from just browser functionality to a full on OS before the browser code is really stable seems like a big leap.
• The idea of turning a browser into an operating system has been around since the days of Netscape (folks there used to talk about how it was making Windows obsolete), but reality has proven otherwise. In fact, it was partly Netscape's desire to take down Windows by making Netscape more OS-like that caused Netscape to get so bloated as to be nearly useless.
• Why now? Why an OS? Part of the appeal of the growth of the web itself (and Google with it) is the fact that it's made the whole operating system less and less integral to the computing experience. With the move towards more of a "cloud" based world (which Google has been a big part of driving) there just isn't as much value in the operating system as much as in the past. So why jump on that bandwagon now?
• Given all of the above, it just seems like a confused strategy. There will likely be conflicts between Android and Chrome and consumer confusion as well, not to mention worries from folks who just want Chrome to be a simple, competent browser.

Perhaps Google can route around all of these issues, but at a first pass... it just seems like a confusing direction for Google to go in.

Filed Under: android, browser, chrome, operating system, strategy
Companies: google

MPAA Matches RIAA In Massive Layoffs

from the couldn't-happen-to-a-nicer-bunch dept

I missed this one when it initially happened, but it looks like the MPAA is following in the footsteps of the RIAA -- who recently laid off a bunch of folks. Apparently the MPAA quickly followed suit and drastically scaled back after the studios cut the MPAA's funding by about 15 to 20%. Apparently some of the entertainment companies are finally realizing that the strategies employed by the RIAA and MPAA (lobbying for favorable laws and suing the crap out of anyone who dares to innovate) aren't actually helping them build a stronger business. Of course, it seems likely that they'll keep making the wrong moves, even at a reduced budget -- but maybe, just maybe, they'll finally start to realize that their recent strategy has been a colossal failure.

Filed Under: layoffs, mpaa, strategy
Companies: mpaa

Massive Layoffs Hit The RIAA: Maybe Focus On Building Business Rather Than Suing Customers Next Time?

from the just-a-thought dept

Details have been spilling out over the last few days that the RIAA has been making pretty massive cuts to staff. We already knew that EMI was cutting back on its support of the RIAA/IFPI, and it seems that with the rest of the RIAA's major label supporters also having economic troubles, the writing is on the wall that the RIAA is about to go through a major transformation. I'm sure some will somehow "blame piracy" for this turn of events, but it's hard to see how that's even remotely the issue. The real issue is that the RIAA has basically managed to run one of the dumbest, most self-defeating strategies over the last decade. Rather than helping major record labels adjust to the changing market, it continually, repeatedly and publicly destroyed its own reputation and the reputation of the labels -- each time shrinking their potential market by blaming the very people they should have been working to turn into customers. They may claim that they "had" to take this strategy because it's what the labels wanted (and, indeed, that was Hilary Rosen's excuse), but that's ridiculous. It was evident to pretty much anyone who took the time to understand the issues back in the mid- to late-90s, that the internet represented an opportunity to those who embraced it. The RIAA's decision to fight progress and its own customers at every turn has been nothing short of a complete disaster. That the group is now being gutted is the inevitable result of a poor strategy that could have easily been avoided.

Filed Under: layoffs, riaa, strategy
Companies: ifpi, riaa

Warner Music Sues Again!

from the just-can't-stop-it dept

We've discussed in the past Warner Music's penchant for suing pretty much any new web startup that does anything even remotely innovative around music. So, whaddaya know, Warner Music is suing yet again. This time it's German startup Songbeat, who vows to fight the lawsuit, insisting that what it's doing is perfectly legal.

It's fairly amazing that Warner Music -- remember, this was the company that swore it was done fighting its fans -- still thinks that this is a good strategy. Now, before the entertainment industry lawyers who read the site protest "how can you complain about a company defending its rights?" let's think this through a bit. Sure, Warner can defend its rights, but so far, all that's done is pissed off a ton of fans, shut down a bunch of innovative services that fans want to use to support artists, and Warner's sales numbers and stock price reflects this (though, the stock did get a bump yesterday after earnings were less dreadfully awful than expected): Isn't it, maybe, time to try something different? Perhaps treating fans with respect? Actually joining the conversation? Letting musicians actually post their own videos to YouTube? Basically, isn't it time that Warner Music stopped viewing everything and everyone as a threat, and started actually embracing an opportunity or two? That would be a really amazing day.

Filed Under: lawsuits, recording industry, strategy
Companies: songbeat, warner music group

RIAA Caught Lying About Stopping Lawsuits

from the shocking dept

The RIAA and the record labels who make up its main membership keep asking folks like us to "trust them" when they come up with new plans to force people to hand over money. They say that we shouldn't criticize them until the plan is set, but they haven't yet shown the slightest reason to grant them an ounce of trust. Just last week, we suggested that they stop suing people, if they were so intent on turning over a new leaf. And, while they did finally announce plans to abandon mass lawsuits, the fine print is anything but encouraging (and, it's increasingly clear that it was done more to save money than out of any more reasoned strategy).

However, there was a bit of surprising news that came out of the press barrage after the announcement about giving up on the mass lawsuits: the RIAA claimed that it had stopped filing lawsuits months earlier. That certainly didn't fit with the story we had just seen earlier in the week of new lawsuits, and now Ray Beckerman has put together a list of recently filed lawsuits by the RIAA and its major record label members in the last few weeks.

In other words, the RIAA has been caught lying yet again. Shocking. And, yet, they expect us to "trust them" to come up with a better solution -- one negotiated in backrooms behind closed doors without major stakeholders getting to take part? Forgive us for being skeptical that any such deal will be reasonable. What's really disappointing, though, is to see some major tech publications get taken in by this, insisting that somehow the RIAA really has turned over a new leaf. You would think that reporters covering this space wouldn't be so gullible.

Filed Under: copyright, lawsuits, strategy
Companies: riaa

Newspapers Finally Realizing That Online Ads Shouldn't Be Ignored

from the it's-a-little-late-for-this-epiphany dept

With the Christian Science Monitor going online only, many newspapers are again re-evaluating their online strategies. When you listen to newspaper execs, you usually hear the same line over and over again: even though online page views are up and paper sales are down, the amount of ad revenue coming from online is still tiny compared to print. That's definitely true, but a large part of the problem is that many newspapers don't really concentrate on online sales -- especially among the best targets: local businesses. Many small businesses advertise online, but because newspapers don't court them, they go elsewhere, such as directly to Google.

The NY Times is writing about how at least some newspapers are realizing that, rather than focusing their sales efforts almost entirely on print ads, they need to start focusing on selling online ads as well. Amazingly, many of these newspapers have almost all of their sales commissions for print ads. In those cases, is it any wonder that they don't get more online ads? In fact, many ad sales folks simply "throw in" some online ads as a bonus to get companies to sign the dotted line for print ads, which is exactly the wrong incentive needed if you're trying to grow the online ad business.

What's really amazing is that newspapers are just now catching on to this. They're only about five years too late. The local businesses, which would have been interested five years ago, have figured out that there are other options for online advertising from Google to "local" sites like Yelp and CitySearch.

Filed Under: newspapers, online ads, strategy

Five Years Into Suing Fans, RIAA's 'Sue Everyone' Strategy Has Failed, Miserably

from the and-yet-it-continues dept

The EFF has a long and comprehensive look into the RIAA's five year (and running) legal campaign against file sharing. It's a great overview that not only brings you up to speed if you haven't been following the whole thing, but also puts the entire campaign in perspective. The summary? Almost every move the RIAA has made in its legal campaign has backfired.

It started with suing technology providers. All that did was make more people aware of file sharing. When it succeeded in getting Napster shut down, plenty of others showed up that were much more difficult to shut down. So, then, the RIAA shifted to suing individuals accused of unauthorized sharing, claiming that it was an "education campaign" to teach people that unauthorized file sharing was illegal. All that's done is turn many more people against the RIAA, while continuing to educate them that file sharing exists. In fact, many more people engage in file sharing now than five years ago when the campaign started.

So, effectively, the lawsuits haven't worked (the RIAA has not had a full trial turn out in its favor yet). It's turned public opinion massively against the RIAA and its associated record labels. It hasn't done anything to slow down unauthorized file sharing, and may have actually helped promote it. About the only "success" of the strategy is that it's turned into something of a cash generator for the RIAA, by frightening people, with strong legal language around flimsy evidence, into paying "presettlements" to avoid being sued. It's like a protection racket from organized crime. Oh yeah, it's worth noting that the musicians don't actually see any of that money.

So, by now it should be clear that this strategy has absolutely nothing to do with helping the music industry thrive or to actually deal with unauthorized file sharing. From the beginning it's always been a way to squeeze more money out of people through threats and intimidation. While I strongly disagree with the EFF's proposed "solution" to this issue (a compulsory licensing scheme), the review of the history certainly puts the whole campaign in perspective, and makes you wonder why anyone (especially any politician) actually thinks it's about helping musicians.

Filed Under: copyright, lawsuits, strategy
Companies: eff, riaa

iPhone Shows That Cheaper Phones Are Still Important

from the price-is-important dept

The iPhone has received plenty of well-deserved (and plenty of not-so-well-deserved) hype and press over the past year or so, but one of the key points that Apple tried to make when it launched was that a premium phone deserved a premium price -- and people would pay for it, even without a massive subsidy from a mobile operator, as is typical of other phones. And, while there definitely was a huge crush of Apple fans who had to buy the iPhone early, the fact that Steve Jobs quickly lopped $200 off the price, just months after it was introduced, suggested that the number of people willing to pay that kind of premium wasn't as much as expected. In today's keynote, as was widely predicted, Jobs launched the new 3G iPhones with another $200 cut off the price, so the base model with 8gigs is now $199 -- down into the range of your typical subsidized smartphone.

While the iPhone has done plenty to get people to rethink mobile interfaces, it seems clear that Apple may have initially misjudged how people would respond to premium-priced phones. Jobs had promised 10 million iPhones sold in the first 18 months, and has reached about 5 million in the first 12 months (nothing to sneeze at, obviously). However, to get up to that 10 million number, he had to drop the price to be competitive with other phones. It's a smart move (though, it's not clear if the $199 is subsidized or not), given the market conditions, but beyond the lessons that everyone will talk about concerning Steve Jobs' strategy in launching the iPhone, the most interesting of all may be how the initial pricing structure backfired -- but was changed so quickly.

Filed Under: iphones, pricing, steve jobs, strategy
Companies: apple

How Wall Street's Short Term Thinking Can Destroy Tech Businesses

from the gotta-look-to-the-long-term dept

For whatever you think of either Amazon.com or Google, one thing that's worth giving both companies kudos for is their ability to ignore the short term questions raised by Wall Street in favor of much more strategic long term thinking. It's been less clear with Google, who has consistently done well. But Amazon has, for years, faced numerous questions from Wall St. analysts who consistently seem to get upset by the company's willingness to invest in big long-term projects. Other companies, unfortunately, get swayed too easily. For example, last year, Sprint gave in to short-term thinking from investors who got upset that the company was spending so much on its next generation wireless strategy -- despite it being an absolute necessity.

The latest place where that may be happening is with Netflix, which has been investing heavily in its digital download strategy -- causing some Wall Street folks to complain that the company is spending too much, and it won't make sense until the majority of users switch over. However, as Greg Sandoval points out, if Netflix follows this path, it'll be dead. That's because these projects take time. If you wait until the majority of your customers will switch over, they've already switched over... to your competitors who didn't wait around for Wall Street's short-term thinking to catch up.

This same issue comes up all too often, by the way, in discussing the various business models that the entertainment industry can adopt -- with people insisting that the record labels and movie studios should wait until the model is proven and everyone else is doing it. The problem, at that point, is that the laggards have lost all relevance, and their brand and reputation are worthless at that point. Betting on the long-term means not being a follower -- because in waiting for others to create the new market, you'll be left too far behind.

Filed Under: long term, short term, strategy, wall street
Companies: netflix

Advertising Isn't A Mobile Strategy

from the content-comes-first dept

ReadWriteWeb has an article claiming that the way to beat Google is by having a better ad platform (via Matt Asay). It says that "the company that can corner the mobile web ad market is going to be able to go toe-to-toe with Google." This is getting things completely backwards. Google doesn't dominate the search engine market because it has the best advertising platform. It dominates the advertising market because it has the best search platform. Other companies, such as AOL, that have seen themselves as an advertising company first and a content/applications company second have gone nowhere. This is especially true because the best advertising platforms are tightly integrated with their associated applications. One of the reasons Google's search advertising is so lucrative is that Google figured out how to make its ads highly relevant to users' search terms. This had two benefits. It increased click-through rates, obviously, but more importantly, it made the ads more useful -- and therefore less annoying -- to users. The same principle applies to the mobile space. Mobile advertising will only work if companies figure out how to make the overall user experience positive so that the ads don't scare users away. The way to do that is not to focus on building the best possible mobile ad platform, but rather to build the best possible mobile services, and worry about monetizing them after they've built up a significant user base.

Filed Under: advertising, business models, platforms, strategy