TSA Decides The Path To Flight Safety Runs Through A Passenger's Prosthetic Leg

from the TSA:-where-the-'A'-stands-for-'Assholes' dept

Apparently, the intensive training [waits for laughter to subside] TSA agents receive before hitting security checkpoints sends them the message that the more humiliating the search is for the passenger, the safer our skies are. TSA agents can find cash, but not bombs. They can find water bottles, but not weapons. And they can damn sure search the hell out of anyone with a medical condition because those citizens are the most terroristic citizens of all.

Here's the TSA getting into a wrestling match with a 19-year-old woman with a brain tumor on her way to treatment. Here's the thuggish agency searching a three-year-old with a rare cardiovascular disorder. Here are the boys in airport blue splattering the contents of a urostomy bag all over themselves and the person wearing it. Here's the thin blue line between us and air insecurity deciding a portable defib carried by an 85-year-old must be a bomb. Here's the agency deciding agents' inability to read a card informing them about breast implants' ability to set off scanners -- handed to them by a breast cancer patient -- is just part of the TSA's proper screening processes.

And here we are now, recoiling in disgust as yet another person is humiliated and invasively searched because their body didn't fit the profile of "non-terrorist." (h/t Amy Alkon)

Heather Bowser says she travels several times a year and this is the first time she was asked to go through this type of security procedure.

[..]

She was at the Minneapolis/ St.Paul International Airport when she said she was told agents would have to swab the top part of her prosthetic leg. “They swabbed the bottom of my leg and my hands,” Bowser said. “Then they said they needed to swab the top of my socket.”

She said she told the agent no. "I said if you have to swab the top of my leg that means I have to take my pants down and I don’t want to do that,” Bowser said. “That’s part of my body. I felt that was dehumanizing.”

Under threat of arrest, Bowser complied. The TSA agents actually told her she could be arrested for their stupidity. Since they couldn't wrap their minds around the concept that a prosthetic leg is just a necessary prosthesis, rather than a weapon of plane destruction, Bowser was forced to comply with their stupid, futile "search" or face losing her liberty on top of her dignity.

Bowser has filed a complaint with the TSA's redress black hole. Meanwhile, the agency has released a defensive statement ahead of the "proper procedures were followed" statement due to arrive sometime in the near future.

TSA is aware of an allegation made by a passenger who was screened at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport over the weekend. We are looking into the matter to ensure that our screening protocols were followed. We encourage the passenger to reach out to TSA so we can work with her directly to address her concerns.

Loosely translated, the statement says two things. First, the agency will say all protocols were followed. We know this because that's the conclusion it's reached in every other screening debacle. Second, it says the TSA would prefer humiliated victims of TSA searches file complaints that can be ignored, rather than force it confront its failures in public.

Revel in your air safety, fellow Americans. All it's cost us is our freedoms and dignity.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, heather bowser, pat downs, prosthetics, searches, security theater, tsa

DHS Continues Facial Recognition Deployment With An Eye On Expanding Program To All Domestic Travelers

from the ALL-YOUR-FACE-ARE-BELONG-TO-US dept

The DHS is moving forward with the deployment of facial recognition tech at ports of entry, including US airports hosting international flights. The tech is still in its infancy, more prone to ringing up bogus hits than removing criminals and terrorists from circulation. But the DHS -- like many other government agencies -- isn't afraid to let a mere toddler do an adult's job. Faces will be scanned, whether travelers like it or not.

The DHS has issued an undated Privacy Impact Assessment [PDF] meant to unruffle the feathers of Americans it informed last year that not traveling internationally was the only way to opt out of this collection. The next phase of the facial rec tech deployment dials things back a bit, offering a bit more in the way of data collection/retention constraints.

In an effort to mitigate the impacts of this expanded collection, CBP seeks to minimize the data it maintains by purging facial images as quickly as possible after use. Each traveler’s biographic and biometric data is deleted from the TSA-issued device, either at the time of the next passenger’s transaction or after two minutes, whichever occurs first. All PII collected for the TVS transaction is stored in a secure database within the CBP network. CBP does not retain images of U.S. Citizens in ATS-UPAX but does retain images of non-U.S. Citizens for up to 14 days for confirmation of the match, as well as evaluation and audit purposes. CBP deletes all photos, regardless of immigration or citizenship status, from the TVS cloud matching service within 12 hours of the match.

[...]

TSA will only use these photos for identity verification at the checkpoint and cannot access the photos after the inspection is completed.

This is one of the better data retention policies the government has rolled out, especially considering it pertains to a border security program. But the DHS is far more vague -- and in some cases appears to be fudging the truth -- when it comes to details about data sharing. DHS claims this data won't be shared with airlines because the airlines have no interest in the data. As Edward Hasbrouck of Papers, Please points out, this statement runs contrary to the DHS's actions.

The joint government/industry interest and intent to develop and deploy a shared system of automated facial image tracking and control of travelers is made clear in white papers on government/industry biometric strategy and in the agendas for events at which CBP, TSA, and industry executives get together to discuss their plans.

Next month’s Future Travel Experience Global 2018 conference, for example, includes presentations by the planning and implementation directors for CBP’s “Biometric Exit” program, followed later the same day by a “working session” with CBP, airline, and airport executives on “Implementing advanced passenger processing with automation and biometrics”.

As for allowing American travelers to opt of the program, the DHS's stance has softened from its earlier "just don't travel" posture. Travelers can bypass face-scanning kiosks, but that just routes them towards CBP secondary inspection. All the CBP/DHS has to do to encourage more opting-in is make the non-scan option as laborious and invasive as possible. As has already been observed by Papers, Please, opting out sends American citizens to the same line as foreign international travelers, ensuring the wait for clearance is much longer than utilizing the facial rec option. Bottlenecks are good way of routing traffic where you want it to go, rather than where it would naturally flow.

The end goal isn't more surveillance of international travelers. The DHS ultimately wants to harvest faces from every domestic traveler in the US. It's not stated in the Impact Assessment, but there are already signs the agency has no interest in limiting this to those arriving from foreign countries.

Use of automated facial recognition is intended by the DHS to become a routine element of the surveillance and control of all air travelers, foreign and domestic. As the head of the CBP, Commissioner Kevin McAleenan, said in a press release in June 2018, “We are at a critical turning point in the implementation of a biometric entry-exit system, and we’ve found a path forward that transforms travel for all travelers.” [emphasis in the original]

The best way to fight this is to opt out. It may subject travelers to longer waits at checkpoints, but it also forces CBP agents to process more people the old fashioned way, without the aid of the DHS's new tech. Annoying the government by refusing to be traffic-shaped by deliberate bottlenecks can be its own small victory, even if the War on Terror machinery continues to rack up loss after loss to terrorists.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, dhs, domestic travelers, facial recognition, privacy, tsa

Exposure Of Secret TSA Surveillance Program Nets The Government More Terrorist Watchlist Litigation

from the clearly-audible-responses-to-the-'Quite-Skies'-program dept

The recent exposure of the TSA's "Quiet Skies" program by the Boston Globe is leading to more terrorist watchlist litigation. The "Quiet Skies" program sends air marshals all over the US to watch travelers swallow, shop, use the restroom, and stare at things. It's suspicionless surveillance even the air marshals disagree with, with some quoted by the Globe calling the program a worthless waste of tax dollars, if not just a vehicle for repeated Constitutional violations.

The Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is using this information in two of its lawsuits against the government. Its lawsuit against the Terrorist Screening Center -- which originated in 2016 -- will hopefully be aided by the Globe's reporting. A motion to compel discovery [PDF] seeks details on the program for use in this litigation. The filing notes the government continues to hide information about its many watchlists from the plaintiffs it represents, forcing it to rely on leaked documents to obtain information it has already requested from the government.

Throughout discovery, Plaintiffs have sought to determine, at the very least, the broad outlines of the watchlisting system. And yet, throughout discovery, Defendants have kept TSA’s Quiet Skies program hidden. Even though all indicators show that Quiet Skies is responsible for engulfing thousands of innocent Americans within the watchlisting system, the program appears in no document produced to Plaintiffs nor in any answers to Plaintiffs’ discovery questions. It was conveniently left out and not referenced; deposition questions which would have unmasked it were blocked. With this latest news, the Court should conclude that Defendants continue to improperly withhold basic watchlist information.

The motion points out this exposed secret watchlist likely explains the actions observed by one of its clients -- a possible "Quiet Skies" target -- when traveling. (It should be noted that fliers noticing they're being tailed by someone is also considered suspicious activity, especially if the flier does anything to ditch the tail or otherwise expose the surveillance.)

Plaintiff El-Shwehdi reports that once at JFK he was “shadowed” by what appeared to be a plainclothes security officer. The man followed him “with a clipboard with some paper” from “near the ticket counter,” through security, continuing while El-Shwehdi put back on his belt and shoes, and kept up the monitoring for the next “two hours” in the boarding area. The plainclothes man even tailed El-Shwehdi when he went to the bathroom, and when he went to get soup. These detailed descriptions of constant monitoring by an undercover officer map precisely onto Quiet Skies.

CAIR's new lawsuit over terrorist watchlists targets a few dozen government officials and agencies, including the FBI, DHS, TSA, TSC (Terrorist Screening Center), DOJ, and CBP. The complaint [PDF] alleges the government engages in routine suspicionless surveillance of US citizens and lawful residents, resulting in a number of harmful outcomes, including a lifetime of government snooping and severe curtailment of personal freedoms.

Through their watchlisting system, the federal government makes it known— to every law enforcement agency in the country, every part of the federal government, more than 60 foreign countries, an unknown number of private companies, international bodies, and other third parties—that the Plaintiffs should be treated as dangerous threats. The Plaintiffs’ friends, family, and others with whom the Plaintiffs associate are punished for their relationship with a watchlisting system’s target.

The Defendants know that their watchlisting system has never prevented an act of terrorism inside the United States and is completely ineffective, but they continue to expand it anyways.

Plaintiffs and almost all others targeted by the watchlisting system have never been arrested, charged, or convicted of any type of terrorism-related offense. Nonetheless, the federal government has designated them as “known or suspected terrorists,” wreaking havoc on Plaintiffs’ personal, religious and professional lives.

Stuff that's legal for Americans to do -- traveling to the Mideast, speaking Arabic, worshiping at mosques -- are all considered suspicious activities by those running the watchlists. This must be discriminatory behavior since it certainly isn't justified by any paperwork or research the government's been able to produce.

Leaked government documents as well as public governmental reports, reveal that the federal government’s terrorist watchlisting system is discriminatory, standardless, and devoid of adequate procedures. These documents include the March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance (Exhibit 1), the Directorate of Terrorist Identities (DTI): Strategic Accomplishments 2013 (Exhibit 2), the Department of Justice's March 2014 Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Management of Terrorist Watchlist (Exhibit 3), and a 2018 informational bulletin on the “Quiet Skies” program (Exhibit 4).

The fact that watchlisting radiates outward from targets means children, relatives, friends, business associates, and fellow worshipers may all be added to the government's lists simply because they have frequent contact with a target. This creates exponential expansions of watchlists with each new "connection" added, all without individual, particularized suspicion.

Recourse for targeted travelers is limited and restricted to border crossings. For those targeted and traveling from place to place in the US, there's no way to challenge the TSA's "Quiet Skies" watchlist placement. And, as the lawsuit notes, the government hasn't been forthcoming about its many watchlists, so those suing may be on others they can't even begin to challenge because no one has acknowledged their existence.

This is an extremely unfortunate state of affairs for a country that used to welcome immigrants from around the world and held itself up as the standard bearer for personal freedoms. Capitalizing on a horrific tragedy, the government as a whole has used the specter of terrorism to amass and consolidate power. The multiple secret watchlists compiled without articulable suspicion is only one symptom of the country's failure to handle a terrorist attack in a manner befitting the leader of the free world.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, quiet skies, tsa, watchlist
Companies: cair

TSA Admits 'Quiet Skies' Surveillance Program Is Useless, Promises To Continue Engaging In Useless Surveillance

from the 'no-terrorists-yet-but-you-know,-we'll-just-keep-up-the-spying-because-r dept

More news comes from the Boston Globe about the TSA's "Quiet Skies" program. Having decided the skies were too quiet, the TSA started nominating people for surveillance based on god knows what and sent air marshals all over the US to tail "suspects" as they unsuspectingly went about their travels. Some of the targets included flight attendants and law enforcement officers. To those tasked with this futile (and likely unconstitutional) surveillance, the program is a waste of time and resources, if not a full-blown civil liberties catastrophe.

To the TSA, this previously-hidden bullshit is just some more discretion-flexing on behalf of the American public to save them from terrorists it inadvertently admitted aren't even targeting aircraft anymore. Why go through the hassle of the boarding process, smuggling precursors past half-inept, half-asleep TSA agents when you can just rent a van from Home Depot and drive it into a crowd?

The TSA insists the program has value and that it will continue to send air marshals out to tail flagged randos. It also insists better education of air marshals will shut complaining marshals the hell up. But what it failed to do in a Congressional hearing, called after the Globe's expose, is actually present any evidence the program works.

On Wednesday and Thursday, TSA officials shared details of the program with congressional staffers from four committees and fielded questions in closed-door briefings.

The officials said about 5,000 US citizens had been closely monitored since March and none of them were deemed suspicious or merited further scrutiny, according to people with direct knowledge of the Thursday meeting.

THIS JUST IN:

CARTS, HORSES IN EMBARRASSING MIXUP, SAY TSA OFFICIALS
Cart-horse confusion expected to continue for the foreseeable future

The TSA had to tail 5,000 people just to determine they weren't suspicious. That's the wrong way around, constitutionally-speaking. The government isn't allowed to snoop on people until it can find a reason to snoop on people. That's not how the Fourth Amendment works. The TSA's inept comparison to cops on the beat is worse than apples in regards to oranges. Cops don't tail people to see if they're going to do something suspicious. Suspicions are in place before the surveillance starts since, most of the time, law enforcement agencies don't have the manpower/funding to tail people all over town to see if they might be up to something.

Get a load of this talking point, delivered by someone who doesn't appear to care it's directly contradicted by statements made to Congress by TSA officials.

“The program analyzes information on a passenger’s travel patterns, and through a system of checks and balances, to include robust oversight, effectively adds an additional line of defense to aviation security,” TSA spokesman James Gregory said Monday.

Bullshit. All of this is bullshit. The "robust oversight" is especially bullshit since Congress was first introduced to this program by the Globe's reporting. The TSA claimed it had informed Congressional oversight about the program but oversight members pushed back, stating they'd never heard of it.

The "line of defense" is more bullshit. A program that has, to date, surveilled 5,000 people only to discover the TSA had no reason to surveill these 5,000 people is not a "line of defense." What it actually is is what the union representing the air marshals says it is: a waste of resources.

The air marshals union, which represents many of the 2,000 to 3,000 so-called flying FAMS, criticized Quiet Skies last week, saying that the criteria of the program were unacceptable and that the public would be better served to have air marshals assigned elsewhere.

Now, the TSA is being told it will need to answer questions about its no-longer-secret surveillance program -- one it instituted without input from its oversight and without informing anyone it was putting it in place. And the program has wasted resources 5,000 times to achieve zero wins on the national security front.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, congress, oversight, quiet skies, surveillance, tsa, useless

Surprisingly Rational TSA Plan To Drop Screening At Small Airports Has Almost Zero Chance Of Getting Off The Ground

from the zero-risk-of-this-ever-being-implemented dept

Finally, the TSA is considering making a smart move. After years of reacting to each attempted terrorist attack by creating another set of forbidden items based on the attack it failed to prevent, the TSA is thinking about moving away from defeatist arbitrage and towards making flying slightly more tolerable.

Internal documents from a TSA working group say the proposal to cut screening at small and some medium-sized airports serving aircraft with 60 seats or fewer could bring a "small (non-zero) undesirable increase in risk related to additional adversary opportunity."

The internal documents from June and July suggest the move could save $115 million annually, money that could be used to bolster security at larger airports.

The non-zero risk is that terrorists will target small airports and small planes. Is that risk worth taking? Yes. But, of course, that answer will turn to "No" as soon as an attack originates from one of these airports. Even with the overall risk of death-by-terrorist being extremely low, any attack at all will be used as proof the TSA's small airport approach has failed.

But this doesn't eliminate screening completely. With this proposal, those who have bypassed screening at smaller airports will receive the full TSA treatment when they arrive at a larger airport. So, it's not like most passengers embarking from a small airport will bypass screening for their entire flight. If terrorists want to take down a plane, it will be a small one flying to another small airport.

Of course, a lot of the risk assumption is based on another assumption: that the TSA actually prevents terrorist attacks. There's a lot of evidence indicating it doesn't. Screeners miss explosives and other dangerous objects at an alarming rate. And for all the bragging the TSA does about taking harmless objects away from passengers, attempted terrorist attacks have always been thwarted in the air by passengers, rather than by TSA agents on the ground or air marshals on the targeted planes.

Some feel this will result in increased attacks.

CNN terrorism analyst Paul Cruickshank said it was "stunning that this is even seriously being considered."

[...]

"This is so dangerous," a TSA field leader at a large airport said. The individual is not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.

Two senior TSA officials, who asked not to be identified, expressed serious national security concerns over the proposal.

It's not wrong to have concerns. The question is whether the concerns are worth scuttling the plan. The TSA itself has (inadvertently) admitted it doesn't believe terrorists are targeting planes. There are other, cheaper, less preventable ways to kill and injure dozens of people. The current favored attack vector is the ground, which means everyone standing around waiting to get their bodies and possession pawed at by security are sitting ducks surrounded by garbage cans full of "explosive" liquids.

What makes this plan seem so bold is its willingness to step away from the "if even one attack is prevented, it's worth it" thinking. So much of the stasis we see in government is based on this thinking. No one wants to change anything -- even the stuff shown to be mostly useless -- because no one wants to take the heat if an attack happens after changes are made.

It's highly unlikely the TSA will ever implement this plan. I would imagine Congress would step in and take this discretion away from the agency if it ever appears the TSA is going to move forward on trimming back screening at low-risk airports. That legislative action may come sooner, rather than later, as it's apparently tied to something Congress can directly control.

TSA spokesman Michael Bilello said the study reflects a recurring debate within the agency about its legal requirements.

"This is not a new issue," he said via email. "The regulations which established TSA does not require screening below a certain level, so every year is 'the year' that TSA will reconsider screening." Bilello did not respond to a request for the text of the regulations.

If commonsense needs to be eliminated from our air safety programs, Congress will be all over it. But there's only one air safety plan with "non-zero risks:" eliminating air travel. The TSA's years of minimal competence have not made traveling any safer, but forcing travelers to drive everywhere will certainly ramp up fatalities. The odds are super low anyone is going to die in a terrorist attack, but we continue to treat it as a problem worth throwing billions of dollars at every year.

The real downside to this proposal is the supposed savings: $115 million. It's a drop in the natsec bucket and it will only be used by the TSA to fund other programs that don't work either.

Filed Under: regional airports, screening, security theater, terrorism, tsa

Report: TSA's Ground-Based VIPR Teams Are Expensive, Quite Possibly Useless

from the if-we're-so-useless-how-come-we-keep-getting-$$$-every-year-smart-guy? dept

It's been awhile since we've discussed the TSA's ground-focused efforts. It's going to get acronym-heavy here shortly, so I'll set the stage. The TSA oversees more than just airports. It's also been known to wander around bus stops and weigh stations, hoping to catch less upwardly-mobile terrorists before they can kill us for our freedoms.

The teams dispatched to keep an eye on the ground have perhaps the coolest acronym in government: VIPR. Yes, the cool name probably had the acronym applied after the fact, but being suspicious of buses and truck drivers is what the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response unit is all about. It's not composed of the retail rejects and petty tyrants the TSA staffs screening areas with. Rather, it makes use of Flying Air Marshals (FAMs) who team up with local law enforcement to hang out at bus depots and weigh stations.

Since VIPR is there to catch terrorists, the Fourth Amendment is generally overlooked to remove the warrant requirement standing in the way of national security efficiency. VIPR units rely on citizen tipsters and their own unassailable hunches to search trucks, buses, rental vehicles, luggage… pretty much anything it can get its hands on. It must be working because no one has blown up a federal building with a Uhaul truck since the last time the government failed to prevent it from happening.

This may be the only metric being used by the TSA to justify the existence of its VIPR squads. A recent Inspector General's report [PDF] notes VIPR activities blow through a whole lot of taxpayer cash, but seem to have little to show for it.

Despite dedicating approximately $272 million to ground-based activities, including VIPR operations, FAMS could not demonstrate how these activities contributed to TSA’s mission. During our assessment of FAMS’ contributions to TSA’s layered approach to security, we determined that FAMS lacked performance measures for the 24 strategic initiatives and most ground-based activities outlined in its strategic plan. Additionally, FAMS’ VIPR operations performance measures fail to determine the program’s effectiveness.

The best way to feel like something is working well is to never test that theory. The TSA's mission is literally "travel safety," so you'd think ground efforts covering two areas where plenty of mileage is racked up (buses, trucks) would be having some measurable effect. But that would be assuming the TSA and its underlings care about operational efficiency and it's apparent they don't.

Not only could VIPR units not justify their existence, but the grounded Air Marshals don't actually know how much is being spent getting nothing useful done.

FAMS could not provide a budget breakout by division or operational area. Without effective performance measures or detailed accounting of funds, FAMS cannot ensure it is maximizing its resources to address its highest risks and cannot measure the value of its investments in these ground-based activities.

The only thing FAMS has in place to measure effectiveness values looking busy over making America safer. The report points out the only metric used by VIPR/FAMS is "output-based" rather than "outcome-oriented."

FAMS insists the VIPR program mere existence is proof positive of its effectiveness. Can't bust terrorists if they're too intimidated by federal agents milling around aimlessly.

FAMS contends that the highly visible nature of VIPR operations deters potential terrorists.

The OIG disagrees with this assessment, pointing out that if FAMS is going to use that argument, it should at least come up with some supporting facts before attempting to rely on it.

FAMS should measure progress based on whether VIPR operations improve the security of our transportation systems, including whether deterrence significantly contributed to this outcome. Measuring VIPR operations’ deterrence capacity is important, considering that FAMS relies on its visible presence to dissuade potential attackers. Without well-developed, outcome-oriented performance measures, FAMS cannot adequately assess whether operations contribute to increased transportation security.

While the TSA did concur with the OIG's recommendations, it still took the time to complain about the report's original title. According to the TSA, the draft title was a little too ego-bruising, so it recommended one that softened the blow (and removed FAM from the headline). The OIG met it a little less than halfway.

TSA requested the Office of Inspector General modify the report title to TSA Lacks Effective Performance Metrics for Ground-based Assignments. They asserted there is an implication from the title of the draft report, FAMS Could Not Demonstrate the Value of Its Ground-Based Assignments, that the assignments do not provide value. Although we disagree that our report made such an implication, we modified the title of the final report to FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-based Assignments Contribute to TSA’s Mission.

I guess the new title restores some hope: FAMS may one day produce supporting evidence for this perceived value. Until then, truckers and bus passengers will be hassled by federal agents hoping to stumble across VIPR program value while performing warrantless searches of people and vehicles.

Filed Under: ground teams, security theater, tsa, useless, vipr

TSA Sending Air Marshals All Over The US To Tail Non-Terrorist US Citizens

from the skies-must-be-almost-too-quiet dept

The TSA is still wasting time and money making no one any safer. Documents obtained by the Boston Globe show the agency is sending its most limited resource -- air marshals -- on useless trips around the nation to surveil people who may have done nothing more than pause in front of an airport shop window.

The previously undisclosed program, called “Quiet Skies,” specifically targets travelers who “are not under investigation by any agency and are not in the Terrorist Screening Data Base,” according to a Transportation Security Administration bulletin in March.

The internal bulletin describes the program’s goal as thwarting threats to commercial aircraft “posed by unknown or partially known terrorists,” and gives the agency broad discretion over which air travelers to focus on and how closely they are tracked.

"Quiet Skies" relies on in-person surveillance of targets by "Flying Air Marshals" (referred to as FAMs in the program's documents). The TSA doesn't say very much about the program exposed by the docs leaked to the Globe. It prefers to point at its "broad discretion" to counteract terrorism -- something its doesn't do much in practice, but spends millions every year doing in theory.

"Whatever it takes" apparently includes adding people to watchlists simply because they've passed through certain foreign countries or are somehow "connected" to someone on the US government's multiple watchlists, no matter how tenuous that link is. This has led to air marshals following flight attendants, business people, and even other law enforcement officers all over the country, jumping from plane to plane as often as their targets do.

Marshals are given a sheet to list observations of the target's behavior while traveling, noting how often they sleep, use the restroom, access electronic devices, or otherwise do the things terrorists and non-terrorists alike do while on airplanes. But the surveillance extends to the airport itself. The checklist marshals are given also asks them to make note of "suspicious" behavior in airports, like changing directions when walking, looking into shop windows (supposedly checking reflections to see if they're being followed), or simply having the misfortune of being the last person on the plane.

The TSA apparently feels this suspicionless tracking of US citizens is not just Constitutional but somehow doing something to keep Americans safer. The air marshals actually performing the tracking disagree.

“What we are doing [in Quiet Skies] is troubling and raising some serious questions as to the validity and legality of what we are doing and how we are doing it,” one air marshal wrote in a text message to colleagues.

[...]

In late May, an air marshal complained to colleagues about having just surveilled a working Southwest Airlines flight attendant as part of a Quiet Skies mission. “Cannot make this up,” the air marshal wrote in a message.

One colleague replied: “jeez we need to have an easy way to document this nonsense. Congress needs to know that it’s gone from bad to worse.”

That those on the inside of the TSA's travel safety racket are questioning its means and methods isn't a good sign. The expressed concern about possible legal/rights violations indicates the criteria for turning an average US citizen into a "Quiet Skies" target must be absurdly low. Other comments indicated that even if the program somehow manages to be fully legal and Constitutionally-compliant, it's still a waste of resources.

Several air marshals, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak publicly, told the Globe the program wastes taxpayer dollars and makes the country less safe because attention and resources are diverted away from legitimate, potential threats.

This latest exposure of TSA tactics shows the agency is far more interested in exploring the outer limits of its "broad discretion" than actually nailing down its primary task: keeping terrorists and explosives off airplanes. The US government maintains multiple terrorist watchlists -- each of those the result of "broad discretion" -- that provides the TSA with numerous targets for extra screening and increase in-person observation. Apparently, that's not enough for an agency that has consistently failed to uphold its end of its post-9/11-attack mandates.

Filed Under: air marshals, quiet skies, surveillance, tsa, us citizens, watch list

Appeals Court Says TSA Agents Are Beyond The Reach Of Federal Lawsuits

from the agents-in-baggy-tactical-pants-shouting-'u-can't-touch-this'-forever dept

Well, this is disappointing. The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals has just made it pretty much impossible to sue a TSA officer, no matter how you've been treated or how many of your rights have been violated. Reuters has the rundown on the decision, which all comes down to the court's definition of the words "law enforcement officer." (via Parker Higgins)

In a 2-1 vote, the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia said Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screeners were not “investigative or law enforcement officers,” and were therefore shielded from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).

The majority said it was “sympathetic” to concerns that its decision would leave fliers with “very limited legal redress” for alleged mistreatment by aggressive or overzealous screeners, which adds to the ordinary stresses of air travel.

“For most people, TSA screenings are an unavoidable feature of flying,” but it is “squarely in the realm” of Congress to expand liability for abuses, Circuit Judge Cheryl Ann Krause wrote.

Thanks, Judge Krause. I'm sure Congress will get right on that. Seeing as there's no personal benefit to Congress members and ample opportunity to piss off fellow government employees with the power to make their travel experiences closely resemble an abduction by aliens, there's little chance of this being pursued, no matter how many cases are shrugged into their lap.

Here's the background: the appellant (Nadine Pellegrino) was selected for additional screening. She demanded a private screening and things went from bad to worse quickly. Items were carelessly packed and unpacked. Personal belongings were damaged. TSA agents were unhelpful, rude, and apparently deliberately obstructive. Agents claimed Pellegrino "hit" them with her belongings while in the screening room. Not "hit" as in the endpoint of a swing, but "hit" as in things bumped into them while they were dealing with an unhappy traveler. Oh, and she called the two officers in the room "bitches." This is how a bunch of government employees -- starting with the TSA agents -- chose to handle it. From the decision [PDF]:

When the police arrived, Pellegrino was frisked, handcuffed, and arrested. Labbee confiscated her driver’s license and, along with Abdul-Malik, swore out criminal complaints against her. Kissinger offered a witness statement corroborating the allegation that Pellegrino struck Labbee in the leg with her bag. The police escorted Pellegrino out of the airport in plain view of other passengers. She was held for roughly 18 hours and released after her husband posted approximately $400 in bail.

The police incident report stated Pellegrino struck both Labbee and Abdul-Malik with her bags and shoes that she tossed out of the private screening room. It also noted both TSOs suffered from leg pain and a stomach bruise as a result of Pellegrino’s actions.

Did things calm down? Hardly. The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office charged Pellegrino with ten criminal violations: two counts of felony aggravated assault, see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702; two counts of possession of an instrument of a crime (the suitcases allegedly used to hit the TSOs), see id. § 907; two counts of making terroristic threats, see id. § 2706; two counts of simple assault, see id. § 2701; and two counts of recklessly endangering another person, see id. § 2705. (Someone must have taken creative charging and aced the test; either that or there was a lot of lawyer-lounge temporizing.)

That's where this all starts. This is how the 3rd Circuit chose to end it.

The long decision spends most of its running time interpreting various words to the detriment of the public at large. TSA officers enforce laws, detain people, perform searches of both people and their things and yet, somehow, they're not "investigative or law enforcement officers." The court unhelpfully explains the only reason TSA officers are called "officers" is because the agency threw employees an undeserved bone to lift flagging morale.

[A]s we noted previously, TSOs were originally called “screeners,” and their title was changed in 2005 merely as part of an effort to improve employee incentives and “upward mobility opportunities within [the] profession.” Specifically, it appears that the title change and related adjustments were intended to “give TSOs an opportunity to . . . apply for DHS law enforcement positions”—further undermining the notion that TSOs already constitute a species of law enforcement officer.

If we can take any joy from this decision at all, it's the fact that the "promotion" from "screeners" to "officers" was as meaningless as everything else the TSA does. That's the most cynical way to appreciate this decision -- one that decides a whole bunch of words scattered across a few dozen pages somehow alters the fact that these "officers" do stuff associated with law enforcement and investigation, even if they have to turn over actual arrests and bookings to local cops.

Judge Thomas Ambro's dissent highlights how ridiculous -- and ridiculously unhelpful -- the majority's dissembling is.

No other Court of Appeals has gone as far as they do by categorically barring certain classes of individuals (i.e., those who are not criminal law enforcement officers) from the reach of the proviso. Nor has any other Court of Appeals relied on another statute’s and an agency’s classifications to determine whether a federal agent is an “investigative or law enforcement officer” under § 2680(h).14 The majority’s reasoning would allow Congress—and perhaps even agencies—to exempt individuals from the proviso’s reach simply by categorizing them as employees who lack criminal law enforcement powers. See Majority Op. at 43 (citing a TSA directive that discusses the distinctions between TSOs and law enforcement officers). It would also empower courts to disregard § 2680(h)’s statutory definition of “investigative or law enforcement officer” in favor of those terms’ meanings as perceived by the particular judicial panel. Such a rule would allow courts to expand or contract statutory definitions as they see fit.

This isn't any way to run a law shop. But this is the way the Third Circuit runs its jurisdiction. This is its second shielding of TSA officers from federal civil rights lawsuits -- something it says it does reluctantly, but also apparently repeatedly.

TSA officers are empowered to search for violations of federal law and enforce federal travel regulations. However the TSA chooses to define their duties -- and it deliberately chooses to describe them as outside the reach of federal torts whenever convenient -- they are officers of the law and there's even a hint of "investigation" to the work they do. Then again, what do you expect from an agency that defines the airport screening process this absurdly?

The Government [...] contends TSA screenings are not searches under § 2680(h)’s proviso because they are consensual and limited in nature.

They're only "voluntary" in the sense that no one holds a gun to your head and forces you to buy a plane ticket. Other than that, they're mandatory. If you're flying, you're submitting to a search the federal government says lies outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment and, in this case, outside the reach of a federal lawsuit, should a TSA officer steamroll your rights.

Filed Under: 3rd circuit, law enforcement, lawsuits, tsa

TSA Has Been Compiling A Shitlist Of Travelers It Just Doesn't Like

from the this-time-it's-personal dept

The TSA is the worst. Super-secret watchlists can keep people from flying -- people deemed too dangerous to travel but not dangerous enough to arrest. This isn't the TSA's fault. Not these lists. Those are maintained by agencies who could possibly cobble together enough intel to build a flimsy case against these "dangerous" would-be travelers.

The TSA, however, maintains its own database of travelers. It can't necessarily keep them from boarding airplanes, but it can give agents a heads up that the person in the queue probably needs to be detained and hassled. [via Boing Boing]

The Transportation Security Administration has created a new secret watch list to monitor people who may be targeted as potential threats at airport checkpoints simply because they have swatted away security screeners’ hands or otherwise appeared unruly.

A five-page directive obtained by The New York Times said actions that pose physical danger to security screeners — or other contact that the agency described as “offensive and without legal justification” — could land travelers on the watch list, which was created in February and is also known as a “95 list.”

It's an agency shitlist, and only the TSA knows who's on it. This list doesn't contain people who've actually assaulted agents, but people who've expressed their displeasure with intrusive gropings through words or non-violent deeds. The agency's official statements make it clear this is an arbitrary way to punish travelers who make agents unhappy, noting that it neither requires "injury" to a TSA employee nor the intent to do so. Instead, the list contains anyone who presents a "challenge" to the "safe and effective completion of screening."

That's about the end of the TSA's honesty on the matter, however.

So far, the names of fewer than 50 people have been put on the watch list, said Kelly Wheaton, a T.S.A. deputy chief counsel.

But two other government security officials who are familiar with the new watch list, describing it on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss it, said that the number of names on the list could be higher, with travelers added daily.

Without evidence, the TSA claims a whole 34 of its screeners were "assaulted" last year. Keep in mind this number pales in comparison to the millions of travelers screened every year. The fact that this happened eight more times last year than it did the year before (26 in 2016) does not demonstrate the need for a special list of argumentative travelers. Also keep in mind the TSA's definition of "assault" -- much like law enforcement's -- covers actions or words that do cause "injury" and may have been committed with zero intent to cause harm.

On top of the seemingly punitive motivations for creating the "95 list", there's the fact that once you're on this list -- like other government lists targeting travelers -- you may never come off.

The directive obtained by The Times does not specify how members of the public can appeal being included on the list.

Just like all the other travel-related watchlists, then. Great. So, the TSA can freely antagonize travelers and slap them on a watchlist if they respond antagonistically. I guess we can mark this down as a win for terrorists because it sure doesn't feel like a win for Americans.

Filed Under: 95 list, list, tsa

'Tis The Season To Fail To Catch Contraband And Explosive Devices At TSA Checkpoints

from the ho-ho-ho-now-I-have-an-explosive-precursor dept

Just in time for the travel season to kick in, the TSA is operating at peak efficiency. Streamlining travelers' pre-boarding procedures this year -- just like every year preceding it -- will be the agency's inability to keep dangerous items from making their way onboard.

Two years ago, the TSA's Inspector General discovered it could sneak contraband -- including explosive devices -- past the agency's pizza box recruits 95% of the time. A follow-up audit two years later was just as unimpressive. The IG's "Red Team" audit team called it quits after sneaking 17 of 18 forbidden items past TSA screeners. At 94.4%, it's hard to tell whether this is the TSA's idea of improvement or just the result of a smaller sample size. (The first audit team made 70 smuggling attempts, succeeding 67 times.) Theoretically, given enough attempts, the TSA may have been able to push this number much closer to 100%.

Good news of a sort then: the latest screening sting operation shows exponential improvement by TSA screeners. The problem is multiples of super-low numbers still result in large amounts of failure.

In recent undercover tests of multiple airport security checkpoints by the Department of Homeland Security, inspectors said screeners, their equipment or their procedures failed more than half of the time, according to a source familiar with the classified report.

When ABC News asked the source familiar with the report if the failure rate was 80 percent, the response was, “You are in the ballpark.”

And that ballpark is the Mendoza Line. The TSA can now tell travelers it's capable of batting .200 against would-be terrorists, just as airports begin to see increased amounts of air travel. And that's only at the airport tested. Your travel safety mileage may vary, depending on point of departure.

The report itself remains classified for the time being, presumably at the request of the terminally-embarrassing agency. Hopefully, the Inspector General won't allow this to remain buried for much longer or redacted to uselessness by America's perennial underachiever.

As for the TSA, it says it's definitely going to be buckling down and taking travel safety seriously.

“We take the OIG’s findings very seriously and are implementing measures that will improve screening effectiveness at checkpoints,” said TSA administrator David Pekoske. “We are focused on staying ahead of a dynamic threat to aviation with continued investment in the workforce, enhanced procedures and new technologies,” he added.

It is to LOL. This is a carbon copy of statements made after every egregious security failure by the TSA. The last few years of screening failures show little in the way of improvement. As for "staying ahead of dynamic threats," the TSA certainly can't do that when un-dynamic threats can walk past checkpoints carrying explosive devices. And the TSA isn't actually known for "staying ahead" of anything. Every new dehumanizing procedure and item added to the no-fly list is the result of threats screeners didn't catch before they boarded planes and wreaked havoc.

These are all just words meant to make the agency sound like it truly wishes to serve some higher purpose. But the facts flatly contradict the assertions made by the TSA in the wake of multiple successive failures.

Filed Under: contraband, failure, security theater, tsa