TSA Sending Air Marshals All Over The US To Tail Non-Terrorist US Citizens

from the skies-must-be-almost-too-quiet dept

The TSA is still wasting time and money making no one any safer. Documents obtained by the Boston Globe show the agency is sending its most limited resource -- air marshals -- on useless trips around the nation to surveil people who may have done nothing more than pause in front of an airport shop window.

The previously undisclosed program, called “Quiet Skies,” specifically targets travelers who “are not under investigation by any agency and are not in the Terrorist Screening Data Base,” according to a Transportation Security Administration bulletin in March.

The internal bulletin describes the program’s goal as thwarting threats to commercial aircraft “posed by unknown or partially known terrorists,” and gives the agency broad discretion over which air travelers to focus on and how closely they are tracked.

"Quiet Skies" relies on in-person surveillance of targets by "Flying Air Marshals" (referred to as FAMs in the program's documents). The TSA doesn't say very much about the program exposed by the docs leaked to the Globe. It prefers to point at its "broad discretion" to counteract terrorism -- something its doesn't do much in practice, but spends millions every year doing in theory.

"Whatever it takes" apparently includes adding people to watchlists simply because they've passed through certain foreign countries or are somehow "connected" to someone on the US government's multiple watchlists, no matter how tenuous that link is. This has led to air marshals following flight attendants, business people, and even other law enforcement officers all over the country, jumping from plane to plane as often as their targets do.

Marshals are given a sheet to list observations of the target's behavior while traveling, noting how often they sleep, use the restroom, access electronic devices, or otherwise do the things terrorists and non-terrorists alike do while on airplanes. But the surveillance extends to the airport itself. The checklist marshals are given also asks them to make note of "suspicious" behavior in airports, like changing directions when walking, looking into shop windows (supposedly checking reflections to see if they're being followed), or simply having the misfortune of being the last person on the plane.

The TSA apparently feels this suspicionless tracking of US citizens is not just Constitutional but somehow doing something to keep Americans safer. The air marshals actually performing the tracking disagree.

“What we are doing [in Quiet Skies] is troubling and raising some serious questions as to the validity and legality of what we are doing and how we are doing it,” one air marshal wrote in a text message to colleagues.

[...]

In late May, an air marshal complained to colleagues about having just surveilled a working Southwest Airlines flight attendant as part of a Quiet Skies mission. “Cannot make this up,” the air marshal wrote in a message.

One colleague replied: “jeez we need to have an easy way to document this nonsense. Congress needs to know that it’s gone from bad to worse.”

That those on the inside of the TSA's travel safety racket are questioning its means and methods isn't a good sign. The expressed concern about possible legal/rights violations indicates the criteria for turning an average US citizen into a "Quiet Skies" target must be absurdly low. Other comments indicated that even if the program somehow manages to be fully legal and Constitutionally-compliant, it's still a waste of resources.

Several air marshals, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak publicly, told the Globe the program wastes taxpayer dollars and makes the country less safe because attention and resources are diverted away from legitimate, potential threats.

This latest exposure of TSA tactics shows the agency is far more interested in exploring the outer limits of its "broad discretion" than actually nailing down its primary task: keeping terrorists and explosives off airplanes. The US government maintains multiple terrorist watchlists -- each of those the result of "broad discretion" -- that provides the TSA with numerous targets for extra screening and increase in-person observation. Apparently, that's not enough for an agency that has consistently failed to uphold its end of its post-9/11-attack mandates.

Filed Under: air marshals, quiet skies, surveillance, tsa, us citizens, watch list

Appeals Court Says Government Doesn't Have To Disclose Contents Of Its Secret Terrorist Organization List

from the terrorist-farm-teams-or-something dept

An attempt to force the government to reveal its secret list of terrorist groups has been shot down by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals [PDF]. The Heartland Alliance Immigrant Justice Center's FOIA request for "Tier III" terrorist groups can remain unfulfilled. [h/t Brad Heath]

Without giving too much away (and neither the court nor the government does), "Tier III" is apparently more nebulous and fluid than tiers I and II.

Tier I and Tier II organizations are publicly identified terrorist groups such as ISIS and al‐Qaeda. Tier III organizations are defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) as any group of two or more people that engages in terrorist activity (as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)), even if their terrorist activity is conducted exclusively against regimes that are enemies of the United States. Tier III organizations tend to have a lower profile than Tier I’s or Tier II’s, not only because the government does not publish their names but also because they tend to be groups about which the U.S. government does not have good intelligence, making it essential that the Department be able to obtain information about them during screening interviews that are as focused and complete as possible.

The government withheld this info under FOIA 7(E), which covers "techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions." As the government argued, divulging these "groups" of two or more possible terrorists would likely allow screened immigrants to hide their involvement in these groups.

[A]s explained in the government’s brief, “an alien who becomes aware that a particular organi‐zation has been found to fall within the definition of a Tier III organization will have a very strong incentive to falsify or misrepresent any and all encounters, activities, or associations that he or she may have had with that organization.” If the alien doesn’t know that a terrorist organization that he has belonged to, been affiliated with, or maybe simply has provided supplies or money to, has been identified by our government as a terrorist organization, he is likely to be less guarded in answering questions about his activities in or associations with the organization. But if he knows that the organization he belonged to or was associated with is deemed a terrorist organization, he is likely to deny having ever had any connection to it or even having ever heard of it.

The Justice Center pointed out that the government's fear of slippery foreigners might be overstated. After all, members of terrorist groups -- whether publicly acknowledged by the government or not -- would be just as likely to lie about their affiliation even if privy to the contents of the Tier III list.

The Appeals Court doesn't think much of the Justice Center's counterargument, positing that any interrogation predicated on the Center's assumptions would be a "dumb interrogation." In the eyes of the court, the government's secrets allow it to more gracefully handle questionings, allowing it to tease out affiliations detainees would otherwise be unwilling to disclose.

The court isn't much kinder to the Justice Center's speculations about the contents of the Tier III list.

We learn in the Center’s reply brief that its primary concern is not with names but with the Tier III category itself, for it says for example that “the designation of Tier III organizations is often doubtful.” It hopes that if it can obtain the names of all the organizations—its goal in this litigation—it will be able to discredit some or perhaps many of them. Deeply distrustful of the U.S. government, by the tone and content of its briefs the Center signals its disbelief that the government has secrets worth keeping from asylum seekers and their helpers (such as the Center), but it does not explain what the government would gain by pretending that harmless organizations are actually terrorist groups.

The court does give the government a bit more credit than it deserves. It's not so much that the government would try to gain something by designating harmless groups as terrorist organizations. It's that government agencies have shown a willingness in the past to designate political groups they don't like as enemies or criminals, subjecting them to unlawful surveillance and other rights violations.

The concurring opinion raises another concern -- one that the court finds bolsters the government's secrecy assertions, but one that could also be read as a call for more scrutiny of this particular list.

At oral argument, the government noted plausible foreign relations grounds for the government withholding this information under other FOIA exemptions. Specifically, it noted that U.S. government relations with Tier III organizations might change on short notice, and that revealing certain Tier III organizations might have foreign policy ramifications. What one day might be an allied Christian militia fighting against the Islamic State (ISIS) might the next day be our nation's enemy, and while not rising to the level of a Tier I or II organization, might fall under Tier III. All of this suggests that the government has, in our nation’s FOIA law, adequate alternative claims for exemption that it chose to avoid, so there is no need to broadly construe 7(E).

The unasked question is this: if alliances shift, does the government immediately release detainees affiliated with groups the government has arbitrarily decided are now the nation's allies? Or do they just sit around forgotten in detention centers while the government moves organization names on and off the list? Who knows. The opinion suggests this is a problem for Congress to solve -- either by scaling back the scope of the FOIA exemption or by actually using its oversight powers to periodically review the Tier III list.

Filed Under: doj, foia, terrorists, tier iii, watch list

Tying Rights To Useless 'Terrorist Watchlists' Is A Terrible Idea

from the the-right-to-remain-rightless dept

No matter how you may feel about the Second Amendment or firearms themselves, there's no way you can feel comfortable with access to Constitutional rights being predicated on something as worthless as the government's ever-expanding "you might be a terrorist" lists.

But that's what's being sought by legislators. In the wake of the Orlando shooting, politicians are searching for answers to unpredictable violent acts, and have seized on the FBI's multiple investigations of the shooter as a potential terrorist for deciding who can or can't obtain a gun. A "dramatic" sit-in by Congressional reps hoped to force the issue, even though it ended up pushing nothing forward at all.

Some legislators want gun ownership tied to terrorist watchlists -- the same watchlists that have turned 4-year-olds into suspected terrorists and designated entire families as suspicious simply because a single member somewhere in the branches of the family tree is under investigation.

This kneejerk reaction not only would eliminate rights but also any form of due process. As it stands now, there's very little chance anyone wrongly designated as a suspected terrorist by the US government will be able to remove themselves from these lists. A recent court decision about the TSA's "no fly" list has at least raised the redress procedure to "extremely difficult" from its previous status as "nonexistent."

But that's only one of the government's terrorist watchlists. Another watchlist contains thousands of Americans with no known ties to any terrorist group. The fact that these known unknowns comprise 40% of the watchlist is only part of the problem.

As we've seen from the FBI's neverending series of terrorist investigations, the government is more than happy to create all the "terrorists" it needs to ensure a steady flow of income to certain agencies and a steady decline in civil liberties for the rest of us.

Even if the list used to deny gun purchases is limited to those deemed too dangerous to board an aircraft (but not dangerous enough to arrest), rights will be denied to thousands who've never done anything wrong. The no fly list is a debacle as anyone but the TSA (and those pushing this legislation) will admit. The no fly list has, in the past, contained both people no one would normally consider unfit for gun ownership (Sen. Ted Kennedy, Rep. John Lewis), as well as an 18-month-old toddler. Accurate, it is not, and yet, legislators are more than willing to strip a right away from citizens based on an incredibly flawed database. Logic has no place in gun control arguments, though, as Rep. John Lewis is one of the legislators leading the charge, even though he should know personally how worthless and inaccurate the no fly list is.

What's even more disconcerting is the number of politicians who believe multiple rights should be stripped from those on watchlists. Senator Joe Manchin actually let these words tumble out of his mouth during an interview with MSNBC.

Really, the firewall we have right now is due process. It’s all due process. So we can all say we want the same thing, but how do we get there? If a person is on a terrorist watch list, like the gentleman, the shooter in Orlando? He was twice by the FBI — we were briefed yesterday about what happened — but that young man was brought in twice. They did everything they could. The FBI did everything they were supposed to do. But there was no way to keep him on the nix list or keep him off the gun-buy list, there was no way to do that.

So can’t we say that if a person’s under suspicion there should be a five-year period of time that we have to see if good behavior, if this person continues the same traits? Maybe we can come to that type of an agreement, but due process is what’s killing us right now.

Due process is "killing" Americans. And he's not the only one who feels this way. Senator Dianne Feinstein believes Americans are born with only one inalienable right: the right to earn their other rights by "proving their innocence."

Dems now expect Americans to "prove your innocence" before taking advantage of Constitutional rights.

All the while, legislators are tossing out catchy slogans like, "No Fly, No Buy" with zero awareness of the implications of that action. Others claim such a law would have prevented the Orlando shooting, similarly unaware of the fact that the shooter wasn't on a terrorist watchlist when he purchased his guns.

If lawmakers want to prevent suspected terrorists from purchasing guns, they need to base this on something far better maintained and narrowly defined than our current terrorist watchlists. The ones we have operate as dragnets -- bulk surveillance but for human beings. These lists already eliminate due process. They shouldn't be used to further diminish citizens' rights just because the perpetrator in the latest mass shooting was the subject of a terrorism investigation.

Filed Under: dianne feinstein, due process, guns, john lewis, no fly, terrorism, watch list

Citizens On Terrorist Watchlist - Including A 4-Year-Old Boy - Sue Government For Violating Their Rights

from the a-database-fueled-by-faith-and-fear dept

A class-action lawsuit has been filed in Virginia challenging the government's terrorist watchlist. Eighteen plaintiffs -- including a 4-year-old boy who was placed on the watchlist at the age of 7 months -- claim their placement on the watchlist is discriminatory and has deprived them of their rights.

The government's super-secret watchlist for suspected terrorists is, for the most part, the end result of the collective hunches of hundreds of intelligence and law enforcement employees. Despite the lack of anything approaching evidence, people are shrugged onto the watchlist at an alarming rate. The lawsuit points out that only 16 people were on the government's "No Fly" list in 2001. By 2013, the list had 47,000 names on it.

The larger federal watchlist -- overseen by the Terrorist Screening Center, which approves nearly every nomination forwarded to it (98.96%) -- is even more comprehensive. According to the information the plaintiffs have obtained, this database is growing at the rate of 20,000 names per year.

Not all of the plaintiffs are forbidden from flying or leaving the country. All of them, however, have cut back on airline use as every plaintiff has been given the TSA's "SSSS" designation, which brands them (again, without any evidence) as suspected terrorists. Because of their watchlisting, the plaintiffs are routinely subjected to extra scrutiny when traveling -- including detentions that can last for hours.

For others on the list, it's even worse. Once out of the county, all bets are off.

On December 20, 2010, Mr. Gulet Mohamed arrived at the Kuwait International Airport to renew his visa, just as he had done every three months since he arrived in Kuwait.

After an abnormally long wait of several hours, Mr. Mohamed contacted his brother in Virginia via email to inform him that the visa process was taking longer than usual. This is the last communication anyone received from Mr. Mohamed for more than a week.

While at the airport, two men in civilian clothes approached Mr. Mohamed, handcuffed him, blindfolded him, escorted him to a waiting SUV, and drove him to an undisclosed location approximately fifteen minutes from the airport

During Mr. Mohamed's abduction, he was repeatedly beaten and subjected to severe torture by his interrogators. Mr.Mohamed's interrogators struck him in the face with their hands regularly and in Mr. Mohamed's estimate more than a hundred times. The interrogators whipped his feet and forced by his interrogators to stand for prolonged periods of time. At one point, the interrogators threatened to run currents of electricity through Mr. Mohamed's genitals. In another instance, Mr. Mohamed's arms were tied to a ceiling beam and left in that position until he lost consciousness.

Even while in the US, plaintiffs on the watchlist have been subjected to lengthy detention in holding cells, had their electronic devices seized and taken to nearby CBP or FBI offices to be examined, and pressured to become government informants in exchange for the "privilege" of boarding airplanes.

The lawsuit also notes that despite the recent ruling that the redress program for the government's "no fly" list is unconstitutional, the alterations made are still far from adequate. It also points out that the government has disingenuously been "delisting" people whenever challenged, rather than risk having its hunch-based nomination process subjected to additional judicial scrutiny.

On top of that, the lawsuit points out that the nomination process itself is highly suspect. Nominations appear to be based on race, religion and protected First Amendment activity, rather than any suspicion of involvement in terrorism. In addition, nominations to the watchlist also appear to be based on a presumption of guilt by association -- if one family member is nominated and placed on the list, it's a safe bet that anyone related to that member will be listed shortly thereafter.

The plaintiffs are asking the court to examine a multitude of Constitutional violations stemming from the government's abuse of its terrorist watchlists. If this suit is granted class status, it will make it that much harder for the government to simply delist plaintiffs and hope the legal challenge goes away.

[Public shaming time: this is being reported everywhere thanks to the Associated Press, which can't be bothered to provide any of its millions of readers with an actual copy of the filing. Techdirt may not have as many resources as AP, but it does know how to navigate PACER and make court filings available to its readers.]

Filed Under: class action, virginia, watch list

How A Treasury Terror List Is Preventing Americans With 'Scary' Names From Using Online Services

from the scary-names dept

We've talked a few times before about the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control, a government office theoretically designed to keep money from flowing to and from scary people in scary countries or whatever. Its work typically amounts to keeping businesses from doing business-y things with people in places like North Korea and such. On the other hand, sometimes the folks at the OFAC get their knickers in a twist over a graphic novel about some of these scary people, so it's not like these folks have a spotless record when it comes to keeping the proper targets in its collective sights.

But a couple of stories have been trickling in having to do with non-scary people who share names too-closely associated with actual scary people suddenly being denied online services due to the OFAC scare-list. The first of these concerned a man named Muhammad Zakir Khan being refused a registration for a multiplayer video game.

Gamasutra, which broke the story, reports that when Khan submitted his request, he received an unusual denial, one explaining that his name had come up as “a match against the Specially Designated Nationals list maintained by the United States of America's Office of Foreign Assets Control.” Epic was, in other words, refusing Khan the opportunity to try out its new game simply because his name resembles that of someone who might be financially involved with terrorism.

Khan tweeted a a screengrab of the rejection form and hashtaged it “#Islamophobia.” Surprisingly, Epic Games founder Tim Sweeney replied to another tweet about the issue, claiming that it had been caused by an “[o]verly broad filter related to US trade restrictions.”

Which, you know, good for Epic Games. And I wouldn't really refer to this as "islamophobia" so much as I'd refer to it as broad laziness by both a government agency and a corporation. Let's think this through for one moment. If our Treasury Department is going to cast a worried eye towards Islamic terrorism such that it compiles a list of names that businesses are refused from interacting with, and if those names come from a region of the world where there is a certain repetition of these sorts of names (Muhammad Khan sounds like it could be akin to John Smith), then how useful is this directory of scary people to begin with? The point of the list is to identify bad actors, but if innocent folks are getting caught up in it, then it isn't serving its chief function particularly well, now is it? But no matter, says the government agency. Just add the name to the list and damn the fallout to hell.

The broader question, of course, is why an online game should be checking registrations against the CFAC list to begin with. In this particular case, it appears the check was ported over from the game engine itself.

Unreal Engine 4 has a wide range of uses, both domestic and foreign, that apparently bring it under the umbrella of trade guidelines. Under ordinary circumstances, those restrictions should only apply to people who are using the engine to create new games. (For instance, the U.S. government presumably doesn't want ISIS to use the engine to create a recruiting game.) But when Epic used the engine to make Paragon, it accidentally left those restrictions in place. Thus, the filter shouldn't have been there in the first place, and no one should have been banned from Paragon, regardless of whether they show up on a watch list.

As I said: government laziness and corporate laziness combine to keep an innocent person from playing a video game. Success!

Such innocent circumstances don't appear to be replicated in the story of Noor Ahmed's attempt to sign up for a payment app called Venmo, which is normally a cinch to register for, but for which Ahmed still isn't able to use.

When she tried to sign up last year, Venmo refused to add her. The company sent her an email instead, asking Ahmed to provide a stack of additional information to verify her identity. What followed was the opposite of simplicity: Ahmed had to obtain paper copies of her utility bills as well bank statements, and then find a fax machine (a practically unheard of technology for many younger people) to send them to Venmo. After complying with this rigamarole, Ahmed still was unable to sign on to Venmo.

It turns out that she, like thousands of other Americans, shares a name with someone on a list created by a Treasury group called the Office of Foreign Assets Control. This list is called “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons,” and includes (on page 33) a 41-year-old Afghan man also named Noor Ahmed. The New York-based Ahmed, said she is familiar with such mix-ups.

“I was born and raised in California, but I’m taken into secondary customs at the airport no matter what because of my name,” said Ahmed. “I think it’s now extending to other parts of my life.”

Whatever your thoughts on terrorism and international politics, it's quite clear that this isn't helpful. It isn't stopping a terrorist from using the app; it's stopping a US citizen from using it. It isn't helpfully identifying a person for a US business to steer clear of; it's mis-identifying a US citizen. Hell, the list can't even keep men and women straight. For the CFAC list to useful, never mind non-discriminatory, it should at least be able to keep a valid US citizen from being caught up in the web.

If it can't manage that simple task, it's probably worth revisiting whether this list should be employed at all.

Filed Under: ofac, office of foreign asset control, terrorists, treasury department, watch list

Man Calls Cops To Turn In Drug Paraphernalia He Found, Gets Home Placed On Federal 'Drug Lab' Watchlist For 2 Years

from the helping-out,-getting-hurt dept

"If you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear," right? Here's how that works in reality. (via Reason)

On Jan. 5, 2012, Paul Valin called the police to report he'd found a backpack containing what he believed to be meth-making equipment. That simple act of good citizenship landed his and wife Cindy's house on the National Clandestine Laboratory Register [NCLR], the federal Drug Enforcement Agency's list of meth labs.

Valin spotted a backpack in a river while kayaking. He took it home and opened it up looking for some identification that might point to its owner. Instead, he found tubing and chemicals. Being a good citizen (with nothing to hide), he called local law enforcement who came and removed the backpack… and then put him on a federal list that put his house in the same category as property where drugs had been seized (you know, as opposed to voluntarily and proactively given to police officers).

The NCLR's website openly admits that no federal agency verifies the information being forwarded to it. Valin's house was added to this list by local law enforcement, who filled out a standard form that failed to note that Valin had found the backpack and at no point had the "drug lab" ever crossed the threshold of his house (it had been in the back of Valin's pickup the entire time).

Once Valin was made aware of his home's placement on this list by a local TV reporter, he contacted the DEA in hopes of being delisted.

Valin sent an email to the DEA explaining the facts of his case and asking that his address be removed from the NCLR. The reply he received three weeks later was not encouraging.

An unsigned email from NCLR@doj.gov explained that Valin's address had been listed because of a Clandestine Laboratory Seizure form the DMPD submitted to the DEA following the collection of the backpack.

According to the email, the DMPD officer who filled out the report had checked the boxes for "abandoned lab" and "boxed lab," but didn't include any other information, such as where and how Valin found the backpack.

The email also stated that the DEA was only the "caretaker" of the NCLR site and, again, pointed out that it doesn't perform any sort of verification of submitted forms. According to the email, Valin had a couple of options: persuade the Des Moines, IA police department to contact the DEA and straighten out its paperwork error or have a local health agency declare his home free from drug contamination.

Unsurprisingly, the DEA's suggestions were both dead ends.

The second option isn't possible. No local or state health agencies in Iowa conducts such inspections. The state hasn't even set any standards for what constitutes meth-related contamination.

Valin hasn't had much luck with the first option, either. He's still waiting for a reply to the voicemails he left at the DMPD phone number he was told to call.

The good news is that someone finally decided to do something about this error. Special Agent Eric Neubauer of the El Paso branch of the DEA took the Des Moines Police Dept. investigative report (which detailed the whole chain of events) provided to him by Iowa Watchdog and used that info to delist Valin's home. The DMPD still hasn't explained why the details on its internal investigative report failed to make their way onto the form sent to the DEA -- an omission that put Valin's home on a national "drug lab" watchlist for two years.

Filed Under: dea, drug lab, good deeds, nclr, police, watch list

NY Times Finds An 8-Year-Old On TSA Flight Watch List

from the good-data-mining dept

Back in 2007, the TSA wrote a "mythbuster" blog post on its site claiming that no 8-year-olds were on the TSA "no fly" list, which apparently was a challenge to the NY Times. While it didn't actually find an 8-year-old on the "no fly" list, it did find one on the "watch list." To be fair, the TSA in its blog post does acknowledge that there could be some 8-year-olds on the watch list, but none on the no fly list. And the Times did not find one on the no fly list -- so the TSA's blog post is technically accurate.

That said, the TSA blog post also claims that if there are mistakes that lead to an 8-year-old being on the watch list, airlines can "automatically deselect" them. And... that did not appear to happen. The kid that the NYT found apparently gets vigorously searched every time he flies. The Times did get the TSA to say on record that "there are no children on the no-fly or selectee lists," but the fact that little Mikey Hicks gets searched so much highlights the problem. Right now, it seems like everything is based on a name alone. That's not particularly sophisticated. By this point, shouldn't the TSA have better tools than just a name to determine if someone is worth additional scrutiny?

Filed Under: 8 year olds, data mining, no fly list, tsa, watch list
Companies: tsa

TSA Staffer Hires Buddies To Build Insecure Website For Folks Falsely On Watch List

from the well-that-makes-me-feel-safe dept

We've had so many stories of government computer systems or websites that have terrible security or are just useless (but expensive!) that it shouldn't surprise us to hear of another one. Yet, there's always someone who can go a step further. Witness the news that the TSA's website for individuals who find themselves incorrectly on the security watchlist has been found to be insecure, with hundreds of falsely accused travelers exposing personal details by using the site. Even better, it turns out that the company that was hired to build the site got the job in a no-bid contract (meaning there wasn't any competition -- it was just chosen) and the guy responsible for figuring out who to hire just so happened to have been a former employee at that company. So, basically, what happened was that a guy who had taken a job at the TSA hired his former coworkers, with no competition for the job and apparently little oversight, to just build a website that turned out to be insecure. And, of course, without any oversight, it took months before anyone even noticed the site was insecure. And, remember, that this is the TSA we're talking about here -- an organization who's main concern is supposed to be security. I feel safer already.

Filed Under: security, tsa, watch list