Judge Unseals, Tosses Warrant Used By The San Francisco PD To Obtain A Journalist's Phone Records

from the have-fun-sleeping-in-the-fucked-up-bed-you-made,-SFPD dept

Back in May, the San Francisco Police Department raided the home of a local "stringer," hoping to discover who had leaked a sensitive police report to the journalists. This raid violated the state's journalist shield law and the First Amendment. Since it was obvious the source of leaked document was an SFPD officer or employee, the raid was also incredibly stupid… unless the real point of the show of force was to discourage journalists from publishing leaked documents.

It took a few days before the SFPD police chief was willing to condemn the raid. According to the chief, the still-unseen affidavit glossed over the target's occupation -- an omission that likely would have seen the warrant application tossed if it had been included.

Speculation about the contents of at least one of the warrants is about to come to an end. The judge overseeing stringer Bryan Carmody's challenge of the warrant has ordered the affidavit to be unsealed.

“The search warrant will be unsealed with the exception of one portion,” San Francisco Superior Court Judge Rochelle East said in court.

One paragraph of the 11-page warrant must be blacked out to protect the identity of a confidential police informant. The unsealed file will be released by July 23 at 10 a.m. to attorneys for three press advocacy groups and a freelance journalist whose home was raided by police.

The same judge has also declared the warrant invalid. Matthew Keys has more details at the California Globe:

A judge in San Francisco tossed a search warrant she issued against a freelance journalist in May, saying police did not disclose to her that the target of the warrant worked in the news media industry.

The ruling, handed down in San Francisco County Superior Court, means materials gathered from the home and office of journalist Bryan C. Carmody cannot be used as evidence against him or anyone else as police continue their investigation into the leak of documents and photographs related to the death of former San Francisco Public Defender Jeff Adachi.

Unfortunately, this only takes care of one of the warrants targeting Carmody. This one sought phone records linked to the numerous cellphones Carmody owns. The other warrants -- targeting Carmody's home and office -- are still being challenged.

The good news is those warrants are likely to meet the same fate. It's highly unlikely the affidavits attached to those search warrants included the fact that the target was a journalist. Two more hearings are set to discuss those warrants, but it seems pretty clear from the ruling here that SFPD officers lied to a judge (or judges) to get around the state's shield law.

If those hearings go the same way, the SFPD will lose all the evidence it collected during its bullshit raid. It won't have anything to use against Carmody, but it seems unlikely a prosecution would even be pursued at this point. But a stack of bad warrants also invalidates anything it might have wanted to use against the employee who leaked the document. The SFPD probably should have kept its internal investigation internal, rather than bring it to the doorstep of a journalist's house.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 4th amendment, bryan carmody, investigation, journalism, phone records, san francisco, sfpd, warrant

FBI Serves Incredibly Broad Warrant To 8chan, Demanding Info On All Users Who Responded To A Shooter's Post

from the not-how-probable-cause-works dept

Internet hellhole 8chan has been hit with a federal search warrant. The site, created to serve those who felt 4chan's nearly-nonexistent moderation was too restrictive, has been front and center recently due to its hosting of manifestos by mass shooters who apparently frequented the site.

In this case, an investigation into a shooting at a California mosque has led the FBI to the pages of 8chan. Postings at the site -- along with some at Facebook -- have linked the shooter to the Christchurch shooting in New Zealand. According to the affidavit [PDF], the FBI believes the California mosque shooter was "inspired and/or educated" by the New Zealand's shooters manifesto and actions.

The Poway shooter is already in custody, so the value of the information sought here is questionable. While the info may have some value in establishing the shooter's state of mind, as well as his connection to other crimes, the warrant does bear some resemblance to a fishing expedition.

From the affidavit, it appears the feds have no shortage of evidence to use against the shooter:

Using various search methods, Whitney Buckingham an SDSD system data miner, found a manifesto on Pastebin.com written by a person identifying himself as John Earnest. In the manifesto, which he named "An Open Letter", Earnest made many anti-Semitic and anti-muslim statements. One such statement which is a direct quote is, "As an individual, I can only kill so many Jews." He states he is not a terrorist but that he hates anyone who he sees as a threat to his country. Earnest took credit for a fire that had been set at mosque in Escondido a few weeks earlier. His exact statement was "I scorched a mosque in Escondido with gasoline a week after Brenton Tarrant's sacrifice and they never found shit on me. Additionally, he wrote "I spray-painted on the parking lot. I wrote 'For Brenton Tarrant -t./pol/."

Tarrant is the New Zealand shooter Earnest apparently tried to emulate. Obviously, the threat of copycat killers is always a concern following mass shootings, but what the government is demanding here has the potential to sweep up dozens of users who did nothing but reply to threads involving the arrested shooter.

Agents seek IP address and metadata information about Earnest's original posting and the postings of all of the individuals who responded to the subject posting and/or commented about it. Additionally, agents seek information about any other posting coming from the IP address used by Earnest to post the subject posting.

This seems like a lot of people to be investigating for just being in the wrongest place on the internet at the wrong time. The justification for this is speculation that others who viewed the post will either become shooters themselves or somehow conspired with the shooter to carry out this horrible crime in which Earnest was the only shooter.

As discussed above, Earnest made a posting in which he thought to draw attention to his forthcoming attack on the Chabad of Poway, share his views through his open letter, and offer people the opportunity to observe the attack itself. Several people responded, both individuals who were taken aback about the posting as well as people who were sympathizers. As a result, some of the individuals may be potential witnesses, co-conspirators and/ or individuals who are inspired by the subject posting. Based on agents' training and experience, following attacks such as those conducted by Earnest, other individuals are inspired by the attacks and may act of their own accord.

By its own admission, the FBI is seeking information about posters "taken aback" by Earnest's post -- users unlikely to be "inspired" by the shooting or his co-conspirators. Apparently, the FBI doesn't trust 8chan to make that assessment, so it's asking for everything so it can sort through it and draw its own conclusions, engage in its own "non-custodial" interviews, subpoena a number of other service providers for more info, etc.

In fact, the FBI would prefer Ch.net -- the host for 8chan -- just hand over everything demanded by the warrant without getting involved at all.

In order to accomplish the objective of the search warrant with a minimum of interference with the business activities of Ch.net, to protect the rights of the subject of the investigation and to effectively pursue this investigation, authority is sought to allow Ch.net to make a digital copy of the entire contents of the accounts subject to seizure.

However you may feel about 8chan and its denizens (and I hope those feelings are mostly negative), this is not a justifiable demand for information. The FBI wants everything on everyone in that thread, even as it states some of the users it's targeting were appalled by what they were seeing. This makes everyone in the thread a suspect and treats anonymous users of this site as inherently suspicious, no matter what their posts actually say.

Filed Under: brenton tarrant, christchurch, fbi, fishing expedition, john earnest, mass shootings, poway, warrant
Companies: 8chan, ch.net

Court: Planning To Get A Warrant Is As Good As Actually Having A Warrant When Searching A House

from the thoughts-and-affidavits dept

What do you give a DEA agent who has everything (but a warrant)? If you're the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, you give them the warrant -- the one agents obtained hours after they performed the search of someone's home. From the conclusion of the court's decision [PDF]:

All agree: the DEA entry team entered Huskisson’s house unlawfully. We do not condone this illegal behavior by law enforcement; the better practice is to obtain a warrant before entering a home. Ordinarily, the evidence found here would be excluded. But because the government had so much other evidence of probable cause, and had already planned to apply for a warrant before the illegal entry, the evidence is admissible.

It's not just the "better practice." It's a Constitutional requirement. Probable cause alone does not give the government permission to search a person's home. Probable cause simply gives the government what it needs to obtain a warrant to search a home. The home is given the utmost protection by the Fourth Amendment. Here's what the Supreme Court had to say about this issue in 1961:

At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.

Planning on getting a warrant is not -- and has never been -- the equivalent of obtaining a warrant.

The footnote under this conclusory paragraph is as useless as the Seventh Circuit's opinion, which gives the government a free pass to search first, affidavit later, so long as they have enough probable cause to support a warrant application.

See Order Den. Mot. to Suppress at 9–10, ECF No. 76; Order Den. Pretrial Mot. at 6, ECF No. 165 (denying defendant’s motion to reconsider denial of suppression motion); Trial Tr. vol. 2 at 298–99, ECF No. 211 (posttrial order again denying motion to suppress). Additionally, as noted above, at trial three DEA agents testified the plan was always to seek a warrant once Hardy had confirmed there were drugs in Huskisson’s home.

The beginning part says the lower court came to the same conclusion: a warrant in mind is as good as a warrant in hand. The second part just confirms the facts of the case: the DEA agents searched a house before obtaining a warrant.

The facts of the case don't help. They don't really explain two consecutive courts' decision to treat a warrantless search as a Constitutional search. The DEA was working with a cooperative drug dealer it had already arrested, using him to set up drug buys with its target, Paul Huskisson. DEA agents listened in on phone calls their informant made, building up plenty of probable cause to support the arrest of Huskisson and the search of his house. Agents listened in on nine calls over the course of a day discussing a drug purchase.

The DEA wanted corroboration Huskisson had illegal drugs inside his house. Agents sent their informant into the house to complete the purchase. The informant gave the drug task force team (DEA agents plus local drug warriors) the signal that he'd seen the methamphetamine inside the house. At that point, law enforcement entered the house and arrested everyone inside. Huskisson refused to consent to a search of his house, but the meth was out and plainly visible to officers.

A few hours after this search, the DEA finally applied for a search warrant.

[T]he warrant application contained the following two sentences that underlie this appeal: “The law enforcement officers observed an open cooler with ten saran wrapped packages that contained suspected methamphetamine. The suspected methamphetamine later field tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine.” The magistrate judge issued a search warrant for Huskisson’s house around 10:30 p.m. the night of Huskisson’s arrest, about four hours after the initial entry.

The lower court said this was fine. Even without the lines about the meth the warrant contained enough probable cause to support a search of the house. So does the appeals court. In both cases, the fact that a house was searched without a warrant is handwaved away by the existence of other probable cause and supporting evidence. But that still doesn't address the illegal entry in the first place.

Nothing in the opinion does. The entire discussion revolves on whether or not the meth seen in plain sight after the illegal entry influenced the obtaining of a warrant four hours after the search occurred.

The court carefully weighed the evidence from both sides; when faced with two inconsistent statements from the same witness, the court credited one based on the totality of the evidence. In so doing, the district court concluded that an errant statement by Detective Kinney did not outweigh the other evidence of the government’s plan to request a search warrant, regardless of what they found in the house.

Because the presence of drugs in plain sight apparently didn't nudge the needle on the warrant request (and despite the affidavit including the drugs in plain sight), the lack of a warrant doesn't affect anything. That appears to be the Seventh Circuit standard: as long as law enforcement has some probable cause and plans to seek a search warrant at some point, it can step inside someone's home and take a look around. Everything else explaining away the removal of a warrant requirement is nothing more than rights-damaging filler.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 7th circuit, dea, warrant

SFPD Finally Admits The Search Of A Journalist's Home Over A Leaked Document Was Probably Illegal

from the at-least-a-day-late-and-several-dollars-short dept

The raid of stringer Bryan Carmody's home by the SFPD has detonated directly in the face of the department. After someone in the department leaked a police report in an effort to smear a prominent public defender following his unexpected death, an internal investigation was opened to determine which SFPD employee was the source of the leak.

This internal investigation quickly went external. Bryan Carmody had shopped copies of the police report to a few news stations, which resulted in the SFPD raiding his home and seizing $10,000 of his equipment, including phones, laptops, and storage devices.

After a brief round of "this is all by the book" by a number of SF officials, it soon became apparent this was not at all by the book. In addition to Carmody's First Amendment protections, the stringer was also likely shielded by state law, which forbids searching and seizing journalists' property for the sole purpose of trying to identify a source.

The mayor walked back her statement defending the SFPD for its actions. So did a couple of council members. The District Attorney delivered the harshest criticism of the police force, saying he couldn't imagine a situation where this search would have been appropriate.

At long last, the department itself is coming around to how much it fucked this whole thing up. A qualified apology has been delivered, as Evan Sernoffsky reports for SF Gate.

After two weeks of growing outrage, San Francisco Police Chief Bill Scott apologized Friday for raiding a journalist’s home and office in a bid to unmask a confidential source, admitting the searches were probably illegal and calling for an independent investigation into the episode.

Police “should have done a better job,” Scott said in an interview with The Chronicle. “I’m sorry that this happened. I’m sorry to the people of San Francisco. I’m sorry to the mayor. We have to fix it. We know there were some concerns in that investigation and we know we have to fix it.”

Among Chief Scott's concerns are the possibility the search warrants didn't specify Carmody's occupation. It seems clear they didn't. If they did, they likely would have been rejected as impermissible under state law, not to mention the First Amendment.

“One of the issues that I saw in this is in the initial warrants,” he said. “There’s one that’s particularity troubling and concerning. The issue is the clarity in the warrant. The description of what his role entails as a journalist — there should have been more clarity there. That is going to be a concern that has to be explored further.”

Scott has seen the underlying documents, so this hedging is a little disingenuous. But it's probably necessary, at least from the department's perspective. The SFPD is likely planning its defense against Carmody's inevitable lawsuit, so it does the agency no favors if the chief states plainly officers conducted illegal searches using warrants obtained untruthfully. The SFPD may also be holding out hope the judge presiding over the coming lawsuit will find stringers aren't journalists, but that eventuality seems unlikely.

Furthermore, "issue of clarity" just sounds like fancy words for lying. It's incredibly unlikely the officers didn't know what Carmody did for a living. Stringers are fixtures at crime scenes, car accidents, and other emergency calls. This information appears to have been downplayed in the affidavit, if not omitted completely.

The independent investigation could lead to additional charges. Not only will this investigation try to find the source of the leak, but it's going to go after the officers who used a bogus affidavit to violate the state's journalist shield law. The end result of all of this is the stripping away of another layer of trust and a widening of the gap between the police and the policed.

Filed Under: 1st amendmentbill scott, 4th amendment, bryan carmody, journalism, san francisco, searches, sfpd, warrant

Washington State Supreme Court Tries, Fails To Protect The Rights Of The State's Residents

from the no-points-for-effort dept

A correct conclusion was almost reached by the Washington Supreme Court… but it was foiled by the fact that only eight justices reviewed the case. Here's the backstory to the decision that almost was, via Nick Sibilla of Forbes.

The case began more than three years ago in Shoreline, Washington when a late-night shouting match between Solomon McLemore and his girlfriend prompted a bystander to dial 911. When the officers arrived and repeatedly demanded to be let in, the yelling stopped though no one answered the door. After 15 minutes and still no response, police heard glass shattering and, suspecting domestic violence, began forcing their way inside. As the officers broke down the door, McLemore told police that they were infringing on his rights and that they needed a warrant. Officers also heard McLemore tell his girlfriend to tell police that she was ok.

Once inside, police determined that the woman was not injured and promptly threw McLemore in handcuffs. But McLemore wasn’t charged for domestic violence. Instead, police arrested McLemore for “obstructing a law enforcement officer,” which involves “willfully hinder[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties.” For refusing to open his door to police, McLemore was convicted for obstruction and sentenced to 20 days of house arrest.

The issue before the court should have been a foregone conclusion, but the court's headcount helped prevent that from happening.

Here's the question: is a citizen obligated to grant the government access to their residence in the absence of warrant? The answer should obviously be, "No." It certainly shouldn't be obstruction charges. It's not that there aren't exceptions to the warrant requirement. It's whether or not citizens have a legal duty to assist officers with their warrantless entry.

The officers definitely had a legitimate exception at their disposal. A report of possible domestic violence gives officers all the permission they need for a warrantless entry under the community caretaking function. Entering the apartment to ensure any possible victims weren't in need of medical care or other assistance is justifiable. McLemore, however, refused to allow the officers to enter without a warrant.

But a valid warrant exception doesn't automatically place a burden on homeowners to allow officers inside. McLemore's refusal to open the door and, once officers were inside, refuse to help officers sort out the domestic situation shouldn't be a crime. That was the conclusion originally reached by the nominal "majority" of the split court [PDF].

Criminalizing the refusal to open one's own door to a warrantless entry would be enormously chilling and inconsistent with our deeply held constitutional values.

[...]

Even under the more limited protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment than our own constitution, "[w]hen law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do. And whether the person who knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak."

[...]

Under the limited construction of the statute required by our constitution, a defendant's conduct that amounts to passive delay will not sustain an obstruction charge.

That was the correct conclusion to reach. It would have brought the state in line with the rest of the country. As the ACLU noted in its amicus brief, Washington is the only place where "an individual can be convicted for peacefully refusing a warrantless home intrusion."

Less than a day after the court had decided to join the other 49 states in decriminalizing non-criminal behavior, the court recounted its votes and decided the tie was actually a loss for state residents.

It is hereby ordered that that the lead opinion of Gonzalez, J., filed April 18, 2019, in the above entitled case is changed as indicated below.

On page 17, line 2 of the slip opinion, beginning with "We", strike all material down to and including "opinion." on line 3 and insert:

We in the lead opinion would hold the city presented insufficient evidence to sustain McLemore's conviction and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, we recognize this opinion has garnered only four signatures. "Therefore, there being no majority for the reversal of the judgment of the trial court, it necessarily stands affirmed, and the order of this court is that the judgment appealed from be and it is hereby affirmed." Peterson v. City of Tacoma. 139 Wash. 313, 313, 246 P. 944 (1926).

Thanks to this reversal of its own reversal, cops can continue to arrest people for exercising their rights. That's no way to run a judiciary. Equally concerning is the fact that four justices apparently decided the lousy status quo wasn't worth upending. A reversion to an "enormously chilling" standard shouldn't be an acceptable conclusion, but that's all Washington residents have left until this is appealed to the highest court in the nation.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, obstruction, solomon mclemore, warrant, washington

State Investigator Granted Immunity For Hours-Long Detention Of Doctor At Gunpoint During A Search For Medical Records

from the CAREFUL!-HE'S-GOT-A-FAX-MACHINE! dept

How far can a law enforcement officer go to ensure an administrative search -- one looking for records, rather than contraband -- is carried out without interference? Pretty damn far, it appears.

A case before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals alleges Fourth Amendment violations during a search for medical records. Dr. Ikechukwu Okorie was on the receiving end of a search due to the state licensing board's suspicion he was over-prescribing opioids. Okorie wasn't facing criminal charges. The state board of licensing had suspended his license while it investigated. Okorie sought recertification. The board agreed to meet with him but also sought an administrative warrant to search his medical office for evidence it needed to make a determination on his recertification.

Serving a warrant of this type -- one not linked to any criminal accusations -- takes a village, apparently. From the decision [PDF]:

According to his complaint and Rule 7 supplement to that pleading, a large team made up of the following executed the warrant: five Board investigators, a Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics agent, a Hattiesburg High Intensity Drug Trafficking Agent, and two federal DEA agents.

Lots of bored federales hanging around Hattiesburg, it seems. That initial show of force -- nine officers, most of them armed -- was followed by more shows of force. One officer in particular -- a board investigator -- was especially enthusiastic about ensuring Dr. Okorie didn't leave the premises or disrupt the search.

On entering the clinic, Board investigator Jonathan Dalton brandished his gun and pushed Okorie into his office. He then served Okorie with the warrant. After reviewing the warrant, Okorie attempted to leave his office to discuss it with his staff. Dalton stopped Okorie. He pushed Okorie down while saying, “if you don’t sit down I will put you down!” Okorie feared for his life. Dalton eventually allowed Okorie to instruct his staff to fax the warrant to his lawyers and print the requested patient records. But while Okorie did so, Dalton stood next to him with his gun drawn.

This is extremely odd behavior for a Board investigator, especially since Dr. Okorie had approached the board to ask for a recertification hearing. But that wasn't the extent of the investigator's abuse of his position.

Once Okorie briefly spoke with his staff, Dalton brought him back into his office, where Okorie was detained for the remainder of the search. After two hours had passed, Okorie asked to go to the bathroom and was told no. Okorie “plead[ed]” with Dalton, explaining that he would have to urinate himself if not allowed to use the restroom. At this point, Dalton, “with his gun drawn,” escorted Okorie to the bathroom. Dalton forced Okorie to leave the bathroom door open the entire time, even though a female investigator and other individuals were present. Dalton also instructed Okorie to keep his hands where Dalton could see them. Only when the agents were done executing the search, three to four hours after it began, was Okorie allowed to leave the clinic.

The lower court granted the investigator immunity, ruling that it was not clearly established government agents couldn't act like unreasonable assholes during an administrative search not related to a criminal investigation. Sure, it seems excessive, considering how many officers were present during the search (nine) and how cooperative Dr. Okorie was, but there's a dearth of caselaw related to the Fourth Amendment and administrative searches.

The Fifth Circuit Court notes that these cases are becoming more common -- suggesting the government behaves just as badly during non-criminal searches. This is the third case dealing with administrative searches it has seen in the last year. Unfortunately for everyone who isn't a law enforcement agent, the cases haven't been perfectly identical, so government employees keep escaping being held personally responsible for rights violations.

The last case the Fifth Circuit examined dealing with these issues resulted in a win for the accused officer and a blistering statement from Judge Don Willett on the farce that is qualified immunity.

The court is right about Dr. Zadeh’s rights: They were violated.

But owing to a legal deus ex machina—the “clearly established law” prong of qualified-immunity analysis—the violation eludes vindication. I write separately to register my disquiet over the kudzu-like creep of the modern immunity regime. Doctrinal reform is arduous, often-Sisyphean work. And the entrenched, judge-made doctrine of qualified immunity seems Kevlar-coated, making even tweak-level tinkering doubtful. But immunity ought not be immune from thoughtful reappraisal.

[...]

To some observers, qualified immunity smacks of unqualified impunity, letting public officials duck consequences for bad behavior—no matter how palpably unreasonable—as long as they were the first to behave badly.

There's no dissent attached to this one, even though it ultimately finds in favor of the government. The court says Okorie's claims are valid. There was nothing about this search that justified the show of force by Dalton.

Though law enforcement has understandable safety concerns when initially securing any scene, cf. Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 195 (2013) (noting that Summers recognizes a need to “secure the premises” and for officers to take “command of the situation”), that would not seem to support hours-long detention of nonviolent individuals present at an administrative search. Yet Dalton allegedly drew his gun while accompanying Okorie and made him keep his hands visible at all times, even two hours into the detention. By this point, concerns about safety did not justify such intrusive measures. And with nine agents present in the office to execute the search, the need for such an intrusive detention was even lower.

[...]

Nothing indicates Okorie would have been uncooperative had he not been detained, and certainly nothing indicates that a drawn gun was necessary to keep Okorie restrained.

Even so, the lack of anything on point means Dalton can't be held accountable, seeing as he was the first to violate someone's rights in this particular manner.

As we have discussed, that at a minimum affects the balancing of Summers’s interests in analyzing the intrusiveness of a detention even if it does not outright eliminate the government’s right to detain without probable cause. But we have never considered the question, and only a few other courts have. The dearth of caselaw on this question might indicate the government rarely detains people while executing administrative searches, a fact that would be consistent with Okorie’s view of the Fourth Amendment. The consequence, though, is that Okorie is unable to point to caselaw clearly establishing the unlawfulness of this type of detention. As a result, qualified immunity defeats Okorie’s claim.

Here's the silver lining: if any armed officer decides to violate someone's rights this way in the future during an administrative search… well, they've been duly warned.

Going forward, an hours-long detention of a person during an administrative search of a medical clinic or similar establishment, during which a gun is drawn, will be unlawful absent heightened security concerns.

That's the bright line. It's very specific, dealing with only one type of search, and has requirements that could possibly be overlooked if the government can make the court believe the search presented "heightened security concerns." Careful with those "furtive movements," searchees.

Filed Under: 5th circuit, dea, ikechukwu okorie, immunity, jonathan dalton, licensing, qualified immunity, warrant

FBI Faked Up A FedEx Website To Track Down A Scam Artist

from the phishing-for-fraudsters dept

Trust no one. The DEA impersonates medical board investigators. Police pretend to be people's friends. FBI agents pretend to be journalists. And, in this case, federal investigators pretended they could help an alleged scammer trace a FedExed payment. Joseph Cox of Motherboard has more details, taken from recently unsealed FBI warrant applications.

The two 2017 search warrant applications discovered by Motherboard both deal with a scam where cybercriminals trick a victim company into sending a large amount of funds to the scammers, who are pretending to be someone the company can trust. The search warrants show that, in an attempt to catch these cybercriminals, the FBI set up a fake FedEx website in one case and also created rigged Word documents, both of which were designed reveal the IP address of the fraudsters. The cases were unsealed in October.

The warrant application [PDF] in one case seeks permission to use an NIT (Network Investigative Technique) to expose identifying information about a targeted device/computer. This warrant request -- relying on recent changes to jurisdictional limitations -- says the NIT deployment was necessary because the FedEx impersonation failed to obtain usable IP address info thanks to the target's use of a VPN to access the impersonated site.

On July 25, 2017, FBI Buffalo, Rochester Resident Agency purchased the domain www.fedextrackingportal.com and developed the website www.fedextrackingportal.com/apps/us-en/tracking.php?action=track&trackingnumber=731246AF7684. The website was created with the message "Access Denied, This website does not allow proxy connections" error message when accessed. The website was created to capture the basic server communication information, as IP Address date and time stamp, and user string when the website was accessed. No malware or computer exploit was deployed in the development of the website; the only information captured in the webserver logs was unencrypted basic network traffic data identified above.

The IP addresses trapped with this ruse traced back to ExpressVPN, necessitating the technique described in this warrant application: a malicious email attachment.

The deployment of the NIT will occur through email communications with the TARGET USER, with consent from the victim company, Gorbel, and the Accounts Payable manager Belt. The FBI will provide an email attachment to the victim which will be used to pose as a screen shot of the FedEx tracking portal for the sent payment. The FBI anticipates the target user, and only the target user, will receive the email and attachment after logging in and checking emails. The subject will download the attachment which will deploy a technique designed to identify basic information of the TARGET location. [...] For the email attachment approach, the FBI will use a document with an embedded image requiring the computer to navigate outside the proxy service in order to access the embedded item.

A second warrant application dug up by Motherboard details pretty much the same process: an NIT deployed via email attachment to force the target to relinquish identifying info like IP addresses and device information. The twist in the second application is that the malicious embed (an image contained in a Word document) would require the recipient to turn off "Protected Mode" to open the attachment. Simply harvesting info from an end user is one thing. Having them perform an action on their end to give the government access to their computer is another. "In an abundance of caution," the FBI requested a warrant, even though the application makes it clear the FBI believes it shouldn't need a warrant to force targeted devices to give up potentially-identifying info.

The impersonation of FedEx may be novel, but the FBI's use of NITs began well before its extrajurisdictional searches were codified by Rule 41 changes. NITs have been in the FBI's toolkit for most of this decade. Here's a 2012 application and returned warrant showing the FBI using an NIT to obtain IP addresses and device info to locate a wanted felon using an email address the agency believed belonged to the target.

The FBI's impersonation of people, places, and things is likely just as widespread, even if the rules (very loosely) governing this investigative technique suggest it shouldn't be. FedEx may have questions about the FBI's use of its name to obtain IP addresses from criminal suspects, but so far, it hasn't commented on the news. What's seen in these applications suggests some care is being taken to avoid sweeping up innocent internet users, but there's only so much that can be implied from this very small sampling of federal investigative activity.

Filed Under: doj, fake website, fbi, impersonation, nit, phishing, warrant
Companies: fedex

Officers Lose Their Evidence After Turning A Medical Emergency Call Into A Warrantless Search Party

from the [extremely-Montgomery-Burns-voice]:-'Con-sti-tu-tion???' dept

This case, coming to us via Andrew Fleischman, would be Keystone-Cops-comical if it weren't such a hideous example of law enforcement using someone's rights as a doormat. What began as a 911 call for assistance with an unresponsive infant soon devolved into a full-blown search of house by several officers without a single warrant between them.

Arielle Turner was indicted by a grand jury for the death of her infant. That's gone now, thanks to the careless, self-destructive actions of the officers at the scene. All evidence obtained during the unlawful search has been suppressed, with this Georgia Supreme Court ruling [PDF] upholding the lower court's decision.

Arielle and her mother, Terry Turner, called 911 to report her 10-week-old baby was unresponsive. EMTs arrived and began treating Turner's daughter before taking her (and Arielle) to the hospital. The child's grandmother remained at home.

The first officer to arrive was Joseph Wells who comforted Terry Turner while standing on the porch. Terry invited Officer Wells to come in and sit down because her legs were starting to hurt. They sat and conversed. Detective Victoria Bender arrived shortly thereafter, letting herself in through the open front door. Neither of these two officers performed any searches or seized any property.

Over at the hospital, an examination did not turn up any signs of abuse or foul play. Investigators believed the infant's death to be accidental. This information was relayed to Detective Bender, who passed it on to Terry Turner. Either something got lost in translation or the officers already on the scene decided to make a command decision. Suddenly, the home they were already in was declared a crime scene, despite there being no evidence of foul play.

Once that happened, the floodgates opened. From the decision:

Shortly thereafter, more officers arrived, including a crime scene investigator who, at some point, began photographing the residence. Detective Bender started questioning Terry about the events leading up to the infant’s death and asked Terry to “take her around and tell [her] what went on last night.” Terry testified that she did not consent to the officers entering or searching her home, and she explained that she did not stop the officers because Detective Bender “just told me that’s what they was [sic] supposed to do.”

As to the sudden unexplained presence of a crime scene investigator, the court has this to say about the spotty testimony offered by other officers named in the lawsuit:

At the motion hearing, none of the law enforcement officers could explain how the crime scene investigator was notified or who summoned him to the scene, and the State did not call him as a witness at the hearing.

Another officer brought Arielle Turner back to her house full of cops. About that same time, the county coroner arrived. The coroner also decided to engage in a warrantless search, which included recording some video with his cellphone. Officers seized pretty much anything baby-related and took them to the sheriff's office.

All the assembled officers believed they had a right to do this under state law. Supposedly the state's Death Investigation Act trumps the US Constitution.

At the hearing on Appellee’s motion to suppress, all of the testifying officers confirmed that they did not obtain a search warrant, that they did not have probable cause to search the house, that they did not ask for permission to search the home, and that they did not believe a crime had occurred when the search of the home took place. Instead, the officers and Alcarez explained that their investigation was done pursuant to Georgia’s Death Investigation Act. See generally OCGA § 45-16-20 (2015) et seq. In total, law enforcement remained in Appellee’s home for approximately three hours questioning witnesses, searching, photographing and videotaping the home, and seizing evidence.

The government tried to argue consent was given for a search. Supposedly, Terry Turner's request one officer (who never performed a search) come in and sit down was a permission slip for several officers to search the entire house and seize multiple items for the next three hours. The court says the law (and the Constitution) simply does not permit this interpretation.

Here, a reasonable officer would understand that Terry’s invitation for Wells to enter her kitchen was not consent for additional officers to conduct a search of the home.

The court goes on to note there was no consent, not even tacitly. If anything, Terry Turner was unaware of her rights and no officer on the scene felt compelled to obtain actual consent when it was far easier to just act like everything was being done by the book.

The record further supports the trial court’s finding that Terry merely acquiesced to the authority of the officers. The record reflects that, after the child was pronounced dead, numerous members of law enforcement responded to the Turner residence in order to investigate the death of the child without probable cause, without a search warrant, and without even a suspicion that a crime had been committed. The officers admitted at the hearing that they did not ask Terry for consent to search the home, to take photographs or video, or to remove any items from the residence. Despite this, at least four members of law enforcement, including a crime scene investigator (whose presence, astoundingly, no one can explain) participated in a search of Appellee’s home.

Law enforcement had the knowledge and the power. The officers chose to only use the latter. A deliberate misreading of the situation turned into playground for unconstitutional behavior. At any point, the search could have been stopped and the damage mitigated by a warrant request. Instead, cops took the inch Turner gave and stretched it into a country mile. And they used all this ill-gotten evidence to cook up a case against the infant's mother, even after hospital personnel stated they saw no indications of abuse or foul play.

This is the government at its ugliest -- willfully abusive and meaninglessly punitive. Hopefully this suppression of evidence will result in better behavior, but the past has shown law enforcement officers are slow learners. Why play by the rules when rolling the federal court dice still pays off regularly?

Filed Under: 4th amendment, arielle turner, georgia, medical emergency, warrant, warrantless search

Court Tells Government It Can't Search A House Just Because A Suspected Drug Dealer Once Parked In Its Driveway

from the an-affidavit-needs-to-be-more-than-a-sketchy-conspiracy-theory dept

The "good faith" exception can be difficult to overcome. Courts seem willing to grant the government this Fourth Amendment workaround even when it seems apparent the government operated in bad faith.

Take, for instance, the FBI's Playpen investigation. On the strength of a single warrant issued in Virginia, the FBI, in essence, searched computers all over the nation (and all over the world) to extract identifying info about the devices' users. Even when courts found the warrant to be invalid because of its blatant disregard for jurisdictional limitations (warrants can only be executed in the district they're issued), they still granted the government "good faith" because the FBI agent had relied on the judge's approval of the warrant to execute the search.

But this was happening while the FBI was petitioning the rest of the government to remove jurisdictional limitations with amendments to Rule 41. So, this warrant was obtained while limits the FBI wanted lifted were in place, but its execution took place before the limits were lifted. Somehow, this was still considered "good faith," even if those overseeing the warrant and investigation knew the FBI planned to violate jurisdictional limitations with the deployment of its PII-scraping malware.

This is only a small part of the federal court system's deference to law enforcement. "Good faith" is supposed to be the exception, not the rule, but hundreds of court rulings on evidence suppression bend over backwards to view law enforcement actions in the best possible light, even as evidence mounts outside the court system American policing is frequently unconstitutional, if not outright corrupt.

When you see a court actually reject the government's "good faith" advances, you can be certain law enforcement has screwed up severely. This case, brought to our attention by the Sixth Circuit Blog, is one of those exceptional strippings of a Fourth Amendment exception.

In this decision [PDF], the Sixth Circuit Appeals Court upholds the lower court's suppression of evidence. The Akron PD engaged in a lengthy drug investigation, but decided to take a few shortcuts to search a residence it vaguely speculated might be related to the drug dealer they were pursuing. The connective tissue of the warrant tore immediately upon judicial inspection. The supposed probable cause for an extensive, broad search of a residence? One time the guy they were surveilling parked his car in the driveway.

The target of the investigation was Camiolo Rocha-Ayon Jr. The rest of this is related to Carl Tucker -- the person challenging the evidence's legal origins -- in ways only clear to the officer requesting the warrant.

Akron Police Department Detective M.V. Gilbride sought a records-and-documents search warrant for the Saxon Avenue house. Citing his training and experience, as well as his observations on February 17, 2017 at 791 Saxon Avenue, Gilbride hypothesized that Rocha-Ayon had traveled to the residence “to collect drug proceeds from TUCKER to pay for [an] upcoming delivery of cocaine.” He further speculated that “a portion of the cocaine seized” from Rocha-Ayon was intended for Tucker, that “at least a portion of the currency recovered” from Rocha-Ayon was obtained from Tucker on February 17, and that Rocha-Ayon had purchased the vacuum sealer and bags on February 17 to conceal the odor of the currency that he was obtaining from Tucker, in the event that he was stopped by a K-9 unit during his return trip to Canal Winchester. Detective Gilbride attempted to bolster his conclusions by noting that the Summit County, Ohio Auditor’s Office listed Tucker as the owner of 791 Saxon Avenue; that Tucker was the account holder for the residence’s electric utilities; that the Akron Police Department had received a service call in October 2016, which suggested that drug dealing was occurring at the house; that, inter alia, Tucker had been convicted in 2000 for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine ; and that the affidavit had been presented to and approved by “the Akron Police Legal Advisor.”

Having perused Detective Gilbride's speculative affidavit, a local judge granted the Akron PD the permission to seize:

[b]ooks, records, receipts, notes, ledgers[,] and other papers and electronic equipment to store information relating to the possession, transportation, ordering, purchase and distribution of controlled substances, . . . bank statements and records and other items evidencing the obtaining, secreting, transfer and/or concealment and/or expenditure of money; financial proceeds, namely[,] U.S. [c]urrency, photographs, indicia of occupancy; and other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence related to drug trafficking.

So, based on the observation a drug suspect once parked in the driveway of a house owned by someone else, the PD was given free rein to seize everything in the house (if not the house itself, because, you know, "transfer/concealment/expenditure of money").

Then the government obtained a second warrant after finding a utility bill with Tucker's name on it listing an address on Penguin Ave. [Keep in mind, the supposed target of this investigation is still Rocha-Ayon, who once parked in the driveway of the Saxon Ave. residence.] This affidavit copy-pasted the Saxon Ave. speculation and dragged in a completely unrelated service call from the Akron PD to this Penguin Ave. for a domestic dispute involving Tucker. This warrant was approved as well.

The lower court said the Saxon Ave. warrant (the first one obtained) was so bare bones it could not possibly justify a search. And if that warrant was bad, it invalidated the second warrant because that one was largely based on evidence recovered during the first invalid search.

The appeals court agrees. And in doing so, it provides a crystal clear description of a "bare bones" warrant -- the kind that can't be salvaged by "good faith" pleas from the government. It also points out officers utilizing warrants like these terrible ones cannot expect a judge's signature to save them from their own better judgment.

Broadly speaking, an officer’s reliance on a search warrant is not objectively reasonable where “a reasonably well[-]trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” One such situation is where the affidavit is “bare bones,” i.e., is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”

Everything about the Saxon Ave. warrant was garbage. And everything arising from that one -- the Penguin Ave. warrant -- is just more garbage. Here's the PD's bare bones warrant, stripped of its boilerplate and CopSpeak, bleeding to death in the harsh light of judicial examination.

The Saxon Avenue affidavit is a prototypical example of a bare-bones affidavit. Stripped down to its basics, the affidavit asserts that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the Saxon Avenue residence because (1) a suspected drug dealer once parked in the driveway for a brief period of time, (2) the house’s owner had a 17-year-old conviction for possession with intent to distribute, and (3) a four-month-old, seemingly unverified, apparently anonymous tip suggested that drug dealing may have occurred there.

The court then drags the government's arguments on behalf of its terrible warrant into the same light and lets them soak in their own shame.

The government attempts to resist this conclusion by pointing to additional, allegedly “critical” facts contained in the Saxon Avenue affidavit. Specifically, the government notes that when Rocha-Ayon visited the residence, he was driving a car that he sometimes—but not always— used in connection with drug trafficking; that prior to his arrival on February 17, Rocha-Ayon stopped to purchase household items that are sometimes—but not always—used by drug traffickers; and that two days later, Rocha-Ayon was arrested 135 miles away while transporting cocaine. Based on these additional facts, the government claims that a reasonable law enforcement officer could “easily infer” that “ROCHA-AYON JR. [had] traveled to 791 Saxon Avenue on February 17, 2017 to collect drug proceeds from TUCKER to pay for the upcoming delivery of cocaine…"

If that's the argument the government wants to make, the court will let it. But all it does is show the officer involved in obtaining this warrant is either incredibly poorly trained or an idiot.

Contrary to the government’s assertion, no reasonably well-trained officer could draw such conclusions based upon the particularized facts in the affidavit…

Building another warrant on the skeletal framing of the first bad warrant can't save the second warrant. The court discusses the issue, but points out it doesn't even need to reach a "good faith" decision on the second warrant. It clearly sprung from the first invalid warrant/search and is similarly nothing but unconstitutional garbage. Evidence obtained from both searches is suppressed, leaving the government with its original investigation target -- the one they arrested 135 miles away from the residences searched and in which the suspect parked his car once at only one of the residences.

It's an exception to the rule that's actually supposed to be an exception. Only the worst law enforcement actions are refused the GFE pass for the halls of justice. This isn't a win for the Fourth Amendment. It just one of the few times the government's disregard for civil liberties actually results in suppressed evidence.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 6th circuit, akron, akron police, camiolo rocha-ayon, carl tucker, doj, drug dealer, fbi, mv gilbride, search, warrant