Fifth Circuit Awards Immunity To Cop Who Thought It Would Be A Good Idea To Jump On A Moving Car And Kill The Driver

from the I-had-to-shoot-him-because-I'm-a-fucking-idiot dept

OMG FIFTH CIRCUIT. What the actual fuck.

The Fifth Circuit has long been home to law enforcement friendly qualified immunity decisions, perhaps due to some form of obeisance to the Empire of Texas, which is seemingly always an election cycle away from seceding from the States. Texas has long been regarded as the idealistic long arm of the law, some of which can be blamed on the Texas Rangers being nationally-famous despite having done nothing of note for years other than provide consulting services to ridiculous TV shows.

The Fifth has been rebuked twice in recent months by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also loves shielding cops from the consequences of their actions, but seems to have realized that lots of people -- some of them in actual power -- were kind of upset with cops committing so much misconduct (a lot of it violent) and being permitted to walk away from it. So, it rejected a couple of really terrible Fifth Circuit decisions and told the Appeals Court to get it right on remand.

We'd all like to believe judges in the upper echelons of the federal court system are above engaging in territorial pissing. But it's hard to read this recent decision awarding qualified immunity to a violent cop as anything but some petty pushback against recent Supreme Court rejections. (h/t Jay Willis)

In this decision [PDF], the Fifth Circuit Appeals Court sides with a cop who put himself in a dangerous situation and reacted violently to his self-created stimuli. As if officers need any more encouragement to escalate situations needlessly or react violently at the first sign of (often imagined) danger.

Here's what happened, as recounted by the Fifth Circuit court, with the aid of body cam and dashcam footage:

A City of Arlington police officer pulled over O’Shae Terry and his passenger, Terrence Harmon, for driving a large SUV with an expired registration tag. The officer approached the car and asked Terry and Harmon for identification. After taking their information, the officer advised them that she smelled marijuana coming from the car and, as a result, had to search it. In the meantime, another police officer, Defendant Bau Tran, arrived on the scene and approached the car from the passenger’s side next to a curb. While the first officer went back to her patrol car to verify Terry’s and Harmon’s information, Tran waited with the two men. Tran asked them to lower the windows and shut off the vehicle’s engine, and Terry at first complied. Dashcam and bodycam videos capture what happened next.

After some small talk, Terry started raising the windows and reaching for the ignition. Tran immediately shouted “hey, hey, hey, hey,” clambered onto the running board of the SUV, and grabbed the passenger window with his left hand. Tran reached through the passenger window with his right hand and yelled “hey, stop.” Tran retracted his right hand and rested it on his holstered pistol. Then Terry fired the ignition and shifted into drive. Just after the car lurched forward, Tran drew his weapon, stuck it through the window past Harmon’s face, and shot 5 rounds, striking Terry four times.

"Smelled marijuana" is something officers say when it might be somewhat inconvenient to bring in a trained dog to perform an "alert." It's a vague claim that can't be substantiated in court. Neither can it be challenged, because by the time court proceedings begin, any claimed odor will obviously have dissipated. And it obviously can't be captured by any recording device, whether operated by cops or the people they're interacting with.

Even if we choose to believe the officer smelled what he smelled, the ensuing chain of events makes no sense. You really have to question an officer's instincts if a stop for an expired tag and a follow-up "smell of marijuana" encourages him to attempt to take control of the car by any means necessary. Firing a gun through an open window at the driver wasn't going to put Officer Tran in any less danger. Shooting the driver of a moving vehicle while the officer is STILL ON THE MOVING VEHICLE makes absolutely zero sense.

More violence ensued.

Terry lost control, careened across the opposite lane, and jumped the curb. The force of the SUV hitting the curb knocked Tran off and onto the street. As Tran rolled over the asphalt, the car’s rear tires just about hit Tran’s flailing limbs. Harmon then gained control of the SUV, got it back onto the street, and stopped it. An ambulance took Terry to the hospital, but he did not survive.

Police officers are not supposed to create exigent circumstances to justify constitutional violations. (they do tho) A cop can't start a house on fire as an excuse to wander inside to see what's in plain sight. Officers generally aren't supposed to stand in front of moving vehicles just so they have a reason to shoot at people. And this officer's decision to jump on the running board of a car and shoot at the driver while he was still hanging onto the window of the moving vehicle should not be greeted with tacit judicial approval of these tactics. But that's what the Fifth Circuit has handed down here: an invitation for officers to create "dangerous" situations in order to bypass constitutional protections.

All that matters to this court is a literal second of time -- not the stop itself, or the end result of the failed stop, but one single second in this horrific chain of events.

Before Terry accelerated, Tran kept his pistol holstered. But about a second after the car lurched forward, Tran drew his pistol and shot Terry four times. That brief interval—when Tran is clinging to the accelerating SUV and draws his pistol on the driver—is what the court must consider to determine whether Tran reasonably believed he was at risk of serious physical harm.

Having considered far less time than it has taken to read to this point, the court says the cop was right to do what he did.

That belief was reasonable.

To back up this single second of "reasonable" judgment, the court says the outcome of the cop's violent and injudicious actions justify the cop's violent and injudicious actions.

Indeed, what came next illustrates the danger Tran faced. Several seconds after Tran shot Terry, while the SUV was still moving, Tran fell off the running board and into the busy street.

And…

Moreover, as Tran tumbled across the asphalt, the car’s rear tires nearly overran his limbs.

Well, duh. Maybe don't jump on moving cars and shoot people. Real life ain't T.J. Hooker.

The court says it is not here to judge as it lays down its judgment:

The plaintiffs also contend that Tran could have simply stepped off the running board and let Terry drive away, the availability of that alternative, they argue, makes Tran’s use of deadly force unreasonable. But qualified immunity precedent forbids that sort of Monday morning quarterbacking; the threat of harm must be “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

It all adds up to a "reasonable" cop having a very unreasonable reaction to a developing situation. Rather than encourage cops to act with caution, the court says cops should be free to act like the protagonists of "Bad Boys" and place themselves in incredible amounts of danger. If anyone else gets killed as a result of this "reasonable" carelessness, well… that's on them, I guess.

It didn't need to go down this way. But it will happen again. And again. And again. This court says it's reasonable to act unreasonably. Cops can place themselves in harm's way and shoot their way out of it without worrying about being successfully sued for unnecessary killings and injuries.

Filed Under: 5th circuit, bau tran, police shooting, qualified immunity, shae terry, terrence harmon

Fifth Circuit Says Man Can't Sue Federal Agencies For Allegedly Targeting Him After He Refused To Be An FBI Informant

from the hard-to-prove-anything-that-can't-be-confirmed-or-denied dept

The secrecy surrounding all things national security-related continues to thwart lawsuits alleging rights violations. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has just dumped a complaint brought by Abdulaziz Ghedi, a naturalized American citizen who takes frequent trips to Somalia, the country he was born in. According to Ghedi's complaint, rejecting the advances of one federal agency has subjected him to continuous hassling by a number of other federal agencies.

The Appeals Court decision [PDF] opens with a paragraph that telegraphs the futility of Ghedi's effort, as well as the ongoing string of indignities the government has decided to inflict on people who just want to travel.

Abdulaziz Ghedi is an international businessman who regularly jets across the globe. Frequent travelers, however, are not always trusted travelers. In recent years, Ghedi has had repeated run-ins with one of America’s most beloved institutions: modern airport security.

The general indignities were replaced with seemingly more personal indignities when Ghedi decided he wasn't interested in working part-time for the feds.

Ghedi complains that ever since he refused to be an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation a decade ago, he has been placed on a watchlist, leading to “extreme burdens and hardship while traveling.”

This isn't a novel complaint. This has happened to plenty of immigrants and US citizens who visit countries the federal government finds interesting. Many, many Muslims have been approached by the FBI to work as informants. And many have reported their traveling experiences got noticeably worse when they refused to do so.

Without moving past a motion to dismiss, there can be no discovery. And national security concerns means there isn't going to be much to discover, even if a plaintiff survives a first round of filings.

Unsurprisingly, the Government refuses to confirm or deny anything.

That put Ghedi in the crosshairs of "a byzantine structure featuring an alphabet soup of federal agencies," as the court puts it. The DHS oversees everything. Day-to-day hassling is handled by the TSA (domestic travelers) and the CBP (international travelers). Ghedi saw more of one (CBP) than the other, but the TSA still handles screening of passengers and luggage, so he saw plenty of both.

The refusal to join the FBI as a paid informant apparently led to all of the following:

• an inability to print a boarding pass at home, requiring him to interact with ticketing agents “for an average of at least one hour, when government officials often appear and question” him;

• an SSSS designation on his boarding passes;

• TSA searches of his belongings, “with the searches usually lasting at least an hour”;

• TSA pat downs when departing the U.S. and CBP pat downs when returning to the U.S.;

• encounters with federal officers when boarding and deboarding planes;

• questioning and searches by CBP officers “for an average of two to three hours” after returning from international travel;

• CBP confiscation of his laptop and cellphone “for up to three weeks”;

• being taken off an airplane two times after boarding; and

• being detained for seven hours by DHS and CBP officials in Buffalo, New York in May 2012 and being detained in Dubai for two hours in March 2019.

Ghedi approached the DHS through its court-mandated redress program to inquire about his status twice -- once in 2012 and again in 2019. In both cases, the DHS refused to confirm or deny anything about his travel status or his placement on any watchlists that might result in enhanced screening and extended conversations with federal agents every time he flew.

Ghedi sued the heads of all the agencies involved, alleging rights violations stemming from his refusal to become an informant and his apparent placement on some watchlist operated by these agencies.

Ghedi brings two Fourth Amendment claims. The first alleges that the heads of the DHS, TSA, and CBP violated his Fourth Amendment rights through “prolonged detentions,” and “numerous invasive, warrantless patdown searches” lacking probable cause. The second alleges that the heads of the DHS, TSA, and CBP also violated his Fourth Amendment rights through their agents conducting “warrantless searches of his cell phones without probable cause.” The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

The district court said he had no standing to sue. The Fifth Circuit says he does. But standing to sue doesn't matter if you sue the wrong people. The Appeals Court says there's a plausible injury alleged here, but it wasn't perpetrated by the named defendants.

Even though we hold that Ghedi has plausibly alleged an injury in fact, he still must satisfy standing’s second prong—that his injury is fairly traceable to these Defendants. Here Ghedi’s Fourth Amendment claims falter. That is because Ghedi bases his Fourth Amendment claims on TSA and CBP agents’ searching him and seizing his electronics. He argues these searches and seizures are atypical actions, even for people on the Selectee List. Yet instead of suing these agents directly, Ghedi has brought his Fourth Amendment claims against the heads of DHS, TSA, and CBP. Ghedi does not allege that any of these officials personally conducted or directed the searches or seizures he has experienced. And his allegations that his experiences are atypical cut against an inference that these agents are following official policy.

Not only that, but the court says Ghedi has never been prevented from traveling. At worst, traveling has become a constant hassle, marked by hours-long delays, unexplained device seizures, and plenty of unwanted conversations with federal agents. But ultimately Ghedi got where he was going and I guess that's good enough.

Ghedi never alleges that he was prevented from ultimately getting to his final destination. At most, these allegations lead to a reasonable inference that the Government has inconvenienced Ghedi. But they do not plausibly allege a deprivation of Ghedi’s right to travel.

There are some rights the court will recognize but this isn't one of them.

In short, Ghedi has no right to hassle-free travel. In the Supreme Court’s view, international travel is a “freedom” subject to “reasonable governmental regulation.” And when it comes to reasonable governmental regulation, our sister circuits have held that Government-caused inconveniences during international travel do not deprive a traveler’s right to travel.

And, putting the final nail in Ghedi's litigation coffin, the Appeals Court says the government's secrets may harm individuals but they can't harm their reputation… because they're secret.

As we noted at the outset, Ghedi’s status on the Selectee List is a Government secret. Simply put, secrets are not stigmas. The very harm that a stigma inflicts comes from its public nature. Ghedi pleaded no facts to support that the Government has ever published his status—one way or the other—on the Selectee List. His assertions that the Government has attached the “stigmatizing label of ‘suspected terrorist’” and “harm[ed] . . . his reputation” are legal conclusions, not factual allegations.

That's how it goes for litigants trying to sue over rights violations perpetrated by agencies engaged in the business of national security. Allegations are tough to verify because the government refuses to confirm, deny, or even discuss a great deal of its national security work in court. Ghedi could always try this lawsuit again, perhaps armed with FOIA'ed documents pertaining to his travels and the many agencies that make it difficult for him. But that's as unlikely to result in clarifying information for the same reason: national security.

Heads, the government wins. Tails, the plaintiff loses. Ghedi is still free to pursue lawsuits against the individual agents who hassled him, took his stuff, and tried to coerce him into becoming an informant, but given the national security implications and the ongoing existence of qualified immunity, it's just as likely he'd lose that suit as well.

Filed Under: 5th circuit, abdulaziz ghedi, civil rights, dhs, doj, fbi, informants, somalia

Ten Seconds Of Doing Nothing Is Reasonably Suspicious, Says The Fifth Circuit Appeals Court

from the can't-make-crime-fighting-omelettes-without-breaking-a-few-Constitutional-eg dept

How much does it take to establish reasonable suspicion needed to subject a person to an at least temporary removal of most of their rights? Not much, says the Fifth Circuit Appeals Court, which appears willing to keep poking the SCOTUS bear with its mind-boggling interpretations of Constitutional rights and the power of law enforcement to bypass them.

This recent decision, highlighted by defense lawyer/"Constitutional cultist" Andrew Fleischman, says all cops need are a few seconds of observation and some vague assertions about criminal activity in the general area.

Here's the setup, as presented by the Fifth Circuit [PDF]:

Otha Ray Flowers, convicted of a federal gun violation, appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The questions on appeal are whether Flowers and Jeremy Mayo were “seized” when five or six patrol cars parked behind and around Mayo’s Cadillac with their patrol lights flashing, and if they were seized, whether Officer Stanton had reasonable suspicion to conduct a “Terry stop.”

Some cops were doing some cop stuff in the area. According to the facts on record, the officers were "looking for suspicious behavior," a supposedly "proactive" effort in an allegedly high-crime area that is meant to deter criminal acts by, apparently, rolling up en masse on anyone viewed as suspicious by these Direct Action Response Team (yes, that spells DART) officers.

Flowers and Mayo were sitting in the parking lot of a convenience store. The officers were in the area because their supervisor had directed them to patrol near there because of "recent violent crimes and burglaries." This sounds suspiciously like "predictive policing," which sends cops to where crimes have been committed under the assumption that lightning strikes twice/people are less white. The Jackson, Mississippi panopticon works, I guess. But only on the assumption that people living, working, or temporarily idling a vehicle in a high-crime area have fewer rights than those fortunate enough to be elsewhere.

So, what were these two "suspects" doing that raised enough suspicion a stop involving five police cars and six officers was warranted? Failing to do anything other than sit in a car for less time than it takes to read the previous two paragraphs:

As Officer Stanton was turning from Capitol Street onto Road of Remembrance, he saw a silver Cadillac parked in the south end of a small parking lot connected to an open convenience store. It was dark outside, but Officer Stanton observed that the vehicle was occupied by two men, one in the driver’s seat and one in the passenger’s seat. Officer Stanton observed the vehicle “for approximately 10 to 15 seconds” and noticed the occupants “didn’t appear to be exiting the vehicle, [and] didn’t appear to be patronizing the establishment.” Therefore, he decided to conduct what he characterized as a “field interview.”

Apparently, even non-movements can be furtive. The response to this momentarily-observed lack of activity was a literal swarm of police officers.

Officer Stanton testified that at this point, he and five to six other officers, all in separate patrol cars, converged upon the silver vehicle with their blue lights activated. The parking lot in front of the store was narrow, with very little space or room to maneuver. Officer Stanton later acknowledged that it would have been impossible for the silver vehicle to leave the parking lot because of the way the officers parked their cars around it.

Behold the majestic absurdity of the following assertion:

Officer Stanton got out of his patrol car and approached the silver vehicle, as did other officers. He testified that the men in the vehicle were still free to leave at this point in the encounter, but he did not communicate that to them.

Who amongst us with five or six police cars surrounding our car would feel "free to leave," whether or not that option was communicated to us by one of the six surrounding the car? No one. Not a goddamn person would feel this encounter was still voluntary.

At least the Fifth Circuit Appeals Court said it was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Pretending it was still consensual was a step too far for even this notoriously law enforcement-friendly circuit. But the very least a court should do when presented with this kind of assertion is to apprise officers that literally no one -- not even the officer making this sworn statement -- actually believes this kind of "interaction" is consensual.

The end result was the discovery of some marijuana, a gun, and an outstanding warrant. This led to felony charges. And the Fifth Circuit is fine with this outcome because, hey, don't sit in a car in a high crime area, I guess.

It bears repeating that apart from the presence of a number of police cars, the tenor of Officer Stanton’s encounter with Flowers was entirely benign until Stanton smelled marijuana. He conducted no physical frisk of Flowers’s person but simply approached the Cadillac to ask some questions. If this course of conduct is constitutionally impermissible, then it is difficult to see how any active policing can take place in communities endangered and impoverished by high crime rates.

That's the takeaway from this decision. Cops can wander over Constitutional lines as long as a court is willing to grant their "high crime area" assertions credibility. There's no legal definition of "high crime," so it can be whatever cops want it to be. And when they assert this in front of judges prone to grant every benefit of a doubt to fellow government employees, it will work nearly every time.

Flow our proxy tears, the court advocating on behalf of the policeman said:

Officers in such areas may well require safety in numbers, while the law-abiding citizens desperately need protection that will be denied if law enforcement officials believe that incriminating evidence will be suppressed or they will be sued for alleged violations of rights.

If the cops can't roll over rights to fight crime, how can they possibly fight crime? That's the question the Fifth Circuit is asking. And it should have an answer that says cops can't disregard rights just because they're patrolling areas where criminal activity is claimed to be "higher" than theoretical areas where it's apparently lower. But instead, the Appeals Court gives us this:

Under the circumstances of this case and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Government, assuming arguendo that these individuals were seized, there was reasonable suspicion to do so. We AFFIRM.

And that is that. The court has basically written a permission slip for stops based on nothing more than a few seconds of observation backed by officers' assertions that criminal activity has occurred nearby at some point in the past. Looking past the legalese, the Appeals Court is telling people their rights mean less if they happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, with the "wrong time" being a few seconds of non-movement while observed by officers trained to view literally anything as suspicious.

If there's any saving grace to this published decision, it's the dissent, which casts a whole lot of shade on the majority's conclusions while taking a shot at the overreacting cops.

As for the “dawdling” of approximately ten to fifteen seconds, the men could have been finishing a conversation, responding to text messages, watching with curiosity as a six-car police caravan passed, or engaging in other reasonable behavior that explains the delay. The facts in this case simply do not support an officer’s reasonable suspicion.

That should have been the majority's conclusion. Instead, it chose once again to elevate police officers over the policed, and ensured the poorest of the police can be treated the worst without officers feeling they might be held accountable in a court of law for the rights violations they've committed.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 5th circuit, high crime areas, jeremy mayo, otha ray flowers, police, predictive policing, searches, suspicion

Judge Don Willett Calls Out Appeals Court For Saying Setting A Suicidal Man On Fire Didn't Violate His Rights

from the Fifth-sees-writing-on-SCOTUS-wall,-shrugs dept

Earlier this year, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted qualified immunity to cops who responded to a call about a suicidal man by setting him on fire and killing him. The man, who had just finished pouring gasoline over himself, was tased by two officers, causing him to burst into flames, which soon spread to the house around him. They tased him despite knowing two things: the man was covered in gas and that the manufacturer of their [extremely-dark lol] "less-lethal" devices specifically warned against deploying them around flammable substances.

This is from the decision in which the Fifth saw nothing unjustifiable about these actions:

Upon entering, Officer Guadarrama detected the odor of gasoline. A woman directed the officers to a corner bedroom on the east side of the house. There they found Gabriel Eduardo Olivas (“Olivas”) leaning against a wall and holding a red gas can. After turning his flashlight on Olivas, Officer Elliott allegedly shouted to Sergeant Jefferson and Officer Guadarrama, “If we tase him, he is going to light on fire.”

That's exactly what happened:

Guadarrama and Elliott, at least, and maybe Jefferson as well, noticed that Olivas was holding some object that appeared as though it might be a lighter. Guadarrama, followed in short succession by Jefferson, fired his taser at the gasoline-soaked man, causing him to burst into flames. Corporal Ray and Officer Scott arrived at the scene at about this time. When they entered the house, they found Olivas engulfed in flames.

The fire spread from Olivas to the walls of the bedroom, and the house eventually burned to the ground. The officers at the scene were able to evacuate the family members who had remained in the house, but Olivas was badly burned and later died from his injuries.

The court looked past this and said the man posed a risk to himself and others. The risk was that he might set himself on fire and possibly the house as well. Before the cops intervened, it was only a risk. Once they did decide to act, it became a reality. Qualified immunity was awarded.

The plaintiffs asked the court to reconsider. It has decided it won't rethink its decision. But its denial [PDF] of an en banc hearing contains an incredibly angry dissent written by Judge Don Willett, who criticized the doctrine of qualified immunity as a rigged game the government always wins in another blistering dissent back in 2018.

Section 1983 meets Catch-22. Plaintiffs must produce precedent even as fewer courts are producing precedent. Important constitutional questions go unanswered precisely because those questions are yet unanswered. Courts then rely on that judicial silence to conclude there’s no equivalent case on the books. No precedent = no clearly established law = no liability. An Escherian Stairwell. Heads defendants win, tails plaintiffs lose.

That's the way the Supreme Court has set up federal courts to fail the public. It has made it extremely difficult for judges to actually set precedent declaring the actions before them as clear violations of rights. Instead of reaching these decisions, the courts find ways to excuse law enforcement officers for their actions.

The Supreme Court seems to have reconsidered this approach in recent months. It has rejected two Fifth Circuit qualified immunity decisions and sent them back for reconsideration. These are noted in Willett's dissent, along with the absurdity of this particular decision. As Willett sees it, refusing to reconsider it now just means the court will be dealing with it later.

In recent months, the Court has signaled a subtle, perhaps significant, shift regarding qualified immunity, pruning the doctrine’s worst excesses. The Justices delivered that message in back-to-back cases, both from this circuit and both involving obvious, conscience-shocking constitutional violations. This case is of a piece—yet more troubling. Whereas the Supreme Court’s two summary dispositions checked us for holding, on summary judgment, that there was no violation of “clearly established” law, despite obvious constitutional violations, here we held, on a motion to dismiss, that there was no violation of law whatsoever, despite an obvious constitutional violation. By giving a premature pass to egregious behavior, we have provided the Supreme Court yet another message-sending opportunity.

Willett says the court decided to -- without explaining why -- ignore the allegations as pleaded, something it's supposed to do when the plaintiff is the non-moving party. The district court had denied immunity, resulting in the officers' appeal. Courts are supposed to consider all the facts and place it in front of a jury if needed. Qualified immunity bypasses all of this -- at least the way it's interpreted by too many courts -- and allows officers' claims that their actions were justified to be all the facts they need.

These are the facts of the case:

Gabriel Eduardo Olivas was burned alive. According to the facts alleged in the complaint—which we must accept as true—and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, two police officers tased the suicidal Olivas, despite:

1. knowing that he was soaked in gasoline

2. knowing from recent training that tasers ignite gasoline, and

3. knowing from a fellow officer’s explicit warning in that instant, “If we tase him, he’s going to light on fire!”

They fired their tasers anyway, knowing full well that using a taser was tantamount to using a flamethrower. Olivas burst into flames and later died.

Those facts were ignored by the Fifth Circuit.

The panel opinion, however, invoked something resembling summary-judgment review, hesitating over “disputed facts,” crediting the officers’ allegations instead of Plaintiffs’, and speculating about what non-lethal options the officers had—declaring that Officer Guadarrama fired first and had a “readily apparent justification for use of his taser” and that Officer Jefferson fired second and “had good reason” to tase an already ignited Olivas.

The Fifth Circuit decided to give these officers a pass because they could see no other way to prevent a man from setting himself on fire other than setting him on fire, and no way to save a house from being burned down than to start a fire that eventually burned the house down. Willett says this conclusion is mind-boggling in its absurdity.

The complaint alleges a plausible Fourth Amendment violation, and an obvious one at that. How is it reasonable—more accurately, not plausibly unreasonable—to set someone on fire to prevent him from setting himself on fire? To my mind, it is unfathomable to conclude with zero discovery, yet 100% finality, that no facially plausible argument exists that these officers acted unreasonably. Perhaps discovery would have supplied crucial facts that cut the officers’ way. But we have stumbled through the looking glass when we conclude—as a matter of constitutional law at the motion-to-dismiss stage—that government officials can burn someone alive and not even be troubled with discovery.

Deciding the case ends here -- with a determination no reasonable person in the same situation would have set a man on fire -- not only ignores the evidentiary standard needed to move a case forward (plausible allegations) but it allows future rights violations to be considered gray areas where no "reasonable" cop would know to act differently. Without knowing more, the court is acting in willful ignorance that provides nothing approaching justice.

Well, what should these officers have done? After all, this was a suicidal man drenched in gasoline experiencing a severe mental health crisis. A perfectly sensible question—but a premature one. Perhaps the panel is correct that “the officers had no apparent options.” Perhaps, as Plaintiffs allege, there were options galore, with the officers picking the one measure of force that was obviously off limits—a flamethrower. I cannot predict, at this stage, whether discovery will substantiate the existence of superior alternatives. But exploring that vital question is precisely why discovery exists.

That officers face difficult decisions in difficult situations is not a free pass for them to behave recklessly or to deploy excessive force. These difficult questions demand thorough answers, not early exits from lawsuits simply because the answers don't immediately present themselves.

These officers faced a harrowing, fast-moving situation, no question. But we cannot dispense with discovery as to the reasonableness of officers’ actions whenever circumstances are difficult. This is not second-guessing what the officers did. It’s simply, and unremarkably, recognizing that facts matter—in fact, facts are all that matter—and we must actually gather some in order to determine if these officers acted unreasonably.

Being an escape hatch for wrongdoing is the side effect of the Supreme Court's continuous alteration of its self-created legal doctrine. But the two recent decisions sent back to the Fifth Circuit by the Supreme Court indicate a course correction by the nation's top court. And it's sending a message to every federal court, even though it's the Fifth Circuit that has been the recipient of its two most recent qualified immunity rejections. The procedural aspects of the doctrine are changing, Willet warns, and the Fifth Circuit's willingness to ignore the pointed rejections doesn't reflect well on it.

These two orders make clear that the Court is earnest about reining in qualified immunity’s severest applications. This doctrinal clarification may not amount to sweeping reexamination, but the upshot is plain: In cases with “particularly egregious facts,” courts must not strain to absolve constitutional violations. Even if the precise fact pattern is novel, there is no need for a prior case exactly on point where the violation is obvious.

[...]

The principle uniting these recent rebukes is that the qualified immunity doctrine does not require judicial blindness. Courts need not be oblivious to the obvious.

If Willett is right -- and every judge voting against a rehearing is wrong -- the Supreme Court will be sending this case back to the Fifth to correct at some point in the future. Allowing this decision to stand makes it that much easier for cops to kill people they're supposed to be saving.

Filed Under: 5th circuit, don willett, qualified immunity

Fifth Circuit Strips Immunity From Cops Who Ended A Mental Health Crisis By Restraining A Man To Death

from the unfortunately-it-took-a-death-to-obtain-this-result dept

The Fifth Circuit is the worst place to bring a civil rights lawsuit against law enforcement officers. But that may slowly be changing, thanks in part to the Supreme Court, which has played its own part in making qualified immunity an almost insurmountable obstacle in civil cases. Over the past few months, the Supreme Court has reversed and remanded two cases handled by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, ruling that the lower court's extension of qualified immunity was the incorrect conclusion.

This case [PDF] may reflect the Supreme Court's qualified immunity attitude adjustment. Or it just may be that there's no excusing what happened here: a man suffering a mental health crisis being helped to death by San Antonio (TX) police officers.

Jesse Aguirre was reported to dispatchers by drivers on a heavily traveled eight-lane highway. Drivers noted Aguirre seemed to be "mentally disturbed" and possibly in danger of being injured or killed since he was walking on the thin media strip dividing the eight lanes of traffic. Officers arrived at the scene and things just kept getting worse for Aguirre. Fortunately, it was all documented by the dashcam on an officer's vehicle.

Here's the first "offer" of "help" Aguirre received from a police officer:

Officer Gonzales was the first to arrive. She left her vehicle blocking the left-most eastbound lane and approached Aguirre on foot with her firearm pointed at him, ordering him to “come here” and threatening, “I’m going to shoot you, m-----r-f----r.”

Lovely. Gonzales continued to walk after Aguirre, joined by Officer Morgan (also pointing a gun) and Mendez (pointing a Taser). Aguirre then stopped and placed his hands on the concrete median barrier. All three officers rushed Aguirre, grabbing him and placing him in handcuffs. According to the video, Aguirre did not "visibly resist" being handcuffed. The officers then tossed the handcuffed man over the cement barrier, causing him to land on his head.

More officers arrived. And they apparently felt the unresisting man needed more "assistance" dealing with his apparent mental health crisis.

After one or two more officers arrived, they assisted in moving Aguirre from the car hood to the ground onto his stomach next to the median with his hands still cuffed behind him. The video does not show that Aguirre resisted during this maneuver, but instead that he stumbled with the Officers toward the median. After Aguirre was placed prone on his stomach, Officer Gonzales pushed his legs up and crossed them near his buttocks and kneeled forward on Aguirre’s legs, holding them near Aguirre’s bound hands in a hog-tie-like position. Officer Mendez knelt with one knee on the ground and the other on Aguirre’s back, later changing position to hold Aguirre’s shoulders and cheek down against the pavement with his hands. Officer Mendez testified that he was using part of his body weight to hold Aguirre down, thus applying pressure to Aguirre’s back and neck. Officers Morgan and Arredondo then joined Gonzales and Mendez, placing their hands on Aguirre’s arms and back to hold him prone in the maximal-restraint position.

More officers arrived, including a supposed "medical tech officer" (Benito Juarez) but there's nothing on video suggesting he handed out any medical advice or paid any attention to the handcuffed man's condition. One officer noted Aguirre's lips were turning blue but chalked that up to "drug use," rather than the ongoing asphyxiation that was actually occurring.

Aguirre remained hogtied face-down on the pavement for more than five minutes. At some point during that time he stopped breathing, but it was only noticed by the large group of officers after he had spent five-and-a-half minutes in that position. Once they realized he had stopped breathing, the officers turned Aguirre over and the "medical tech officer" jogged off to get some medical equipment.

But no one really seemed to care.

At this point, the Officers appear to be in good spirits; according to the Plaintiffs, in the dashcam videos, Juarez can be seen smiling as he jogs to his vehicle, and several other Officers likewise appear to be smiling and laughing as they await Juarez’s return around Aguirre’s body. Juarez returned at a walk with his medical bag approximately one minute after he left.

It wasn't until more than four more minutes had elapsed that any officer attempted to perform CPR. But it was too late. Aguirre was dead. The autopsy report confirmed what the dashcams had caught: the restraint method had asphyxiated Aguirre. The conclusion: "due to restraint by police, this case is classified as a homicide."

Despite this direct link between their actions and Aguirre's death, the officers wanted qualified immunity. The court refuses to extend it. The amount of force used to restrain Aguirre was excessive. The situation did not call for maximal restraint of a cooperative subject, especially given the criminal act (which is still a stretch) at the center of it.

Defendants do not attempt to show that the severity of any crime committed by Aguirre weighed in favor of the level of force used by the Defendant Officers. In fact, defendants do not articulate any criminal investigatory function justifying their actions, and instead rely on the existence of a threat to the public safety—namely, the potential danger to motorists and himself that Aguirre’s mental disturbance and walking along the median of the eight-lane highway caused. At most, the crime at issue was a traffic offense.

[...]

This factor thus weighs against it being reasonable or necessary to place Aguirre in the maximal-restraint position for over five minutes.

And the cops can't swing the court their way by providing testimony that was often directly contradicted by their own dashcam recording.

In their declarations below, the Defendant Officers stated that Aguirre was resisting and they feared that he would break away and run into traffic, causing a dangerous collision and potentially dragging one of the Officers with him. But the Plaintiffs’ summary judgment evidence and this court’s own review of the video evidence at minimum raise genuine questions about whether it was objectively reasonable to believe Aguirre was actively resisting or even physically capable of posing an immediate safety threat that would justify the Defendant Officers in using extraordinarily dangerous force by placing and holding him in the prone maximal-restraint position that led to his death.

The court also points out that the fact the officers suspected Aguirre had recently used drugs should have resulted in more caution being taken while restraining him, rather than less. Even the go-to excuse for in-custody deaths -- "excited delirium" -- is supported by plenty of documentation that shows hog tying suspects or holding them down with body weight increases the risk of death.

But at the end of it, the thing that undoes these officers' planned exit from this lawsuit is their own video. The court brings it up again in support of its qualified immunity denial.

Although the Officers presented their own version of events that included claims of Aguirre’s resistance—including, for example that he “was resisting and trying to pull away from” the Officers while walking near the westbound side of the median, “was still resisting” when placed on the hood of the car, and “continued to resist by shifting his body around and trying to break free” while pinned against the hood of the patrol car—these averments in contravention of what the police dashcam videos show do no more than reinforce that genuine disputes as to material facts exist at this stage of the litigation.

Clearly established enough, adds the Fifth, even without a case directly on point. The difference between "hog tying" and "maximal prone restraint" isn't enough to make it unclear to these "reasonable" officers whether the use of these nearly identical techniques in situations like this would be "excessive."

Whether or not the Supreme Court's recent hints nudged this in the right direction, at least the correct conclusion was reached: restraining someone to death -- especially an unresisting someone -- clearly violates their rights.

Filed Under: 5th circuit, jesse aguirre, mental health, police, qualified immunity, san antonio, texas

Fifth Circuit Says Tasing A Person Soaked In Gasoline And Setting Them On Fire Isn't An Unreasonable Use Of Force

from the fucking-system-burns-him-to-the-ground dept

So, here's where we're at in the Fifth Circuit: cops can literally set a person on fire and walk away from it.

Judge Don Willett's incendiary comments opposing qualified immunity notwithstanding, civil rights litigation still remains a sucker bet in the Fifth Circuit, where cops are granted judicial forgiveness more frequently than they are in any other judicial circuit.

Here's the latest depressing read from the Appeals Court, which can't talk itself into removing this shield from officers who tased a suicidal man after he covered himself in gasoline, turning a potential suicide into an actual homicide.

Some cops seem to feel suicide threats should be converted into self-fulfilling prophecies. The cops involved here -- all Arlington, Texas police officers -- turned a distress call from a family member into the very thing the family members were hoping to prevent. From the opinion [PDF]:

On July 10, 2017, Gabriel Anthony Olivas called 911 and reported that his father was threatening to kill himself and burn down their house. Corporal Ray, Sergeant Jefferson, and Officers Scott, Elliott, and Guadarrama of the Arlington Police Department responded.

Behold the thin blue line that stands between suicide and threats to burn a house down.

Guadarrama and Elliott, at least, and maybe Jefferson as well, noticed that Olivas was holding some object that appeared as though it might be a lighter. Guadarrama, followed in short succession by Jefferson, fired his taser at the gasoline-soaked man, causing him to burst into flames. Corporal Ray and Officer Scott arrived at the scene at about this time. When they entered the house, they found Olivas engulfed in flames.

The fire spread from Olivas to the walls of the bedroom, and the house eventually burned to the ground. The officers at the scene were able to evacuate the family members who had remained in the house, but Olivas was badly burned and later died from his injuries.

With results like these, it's a wonder why anyone bothers calling the cops. If the family wanted their father dead and their house burned down, they could have accomplished that by doing nothing. Hell, they might possibly have prevented it. After all, the family had more at stake and would have been more willing to de-escalate. But the cops got involved and the rest is QI history.

The question comes down to what a "reasonable" officer would have done under these circumstances. But the court decides in favor of the less-reasonable officers, despite them being warned against doing this by other, more reasonable officers at the scene.

Upon entering, Officer Guadarrama detected the odor of gasoline. A woman directed the officers to a corner bedroom on the east side of the house. There they found Gabriel Eduardo Olivas (“Olivas”) leaning against a wall and holding a red gas can. After turning his flashlight on Olivas, Officer Elliott allegedly shouted to Sergeant Jefferson and Officer Guadarrama, “If we tase him, he is going to light on fire.”

The court says it doesn't matter than the man was burned to death as a result of being tased. The only thing that matters is whether or not he deserved to be tased. The court says the dead man earned his tasing. The unfortunate byproduct of his tasing -- his death, the family home burning down -- can't be held against the officers who set him on fire.

Olivas posed a substantial and immediate risk of death or serious bodily injury to himself and everyone in the house. He was covered in gasoline. He had been threatening to kill himself and burn down the house. He appeared to be holding a lighter. At that point, there were at least six other people in the house, all of whom were in danger.

Under this line of thought, the force deployment was reasonable. That at least one other officer on the scene felt otherwise doesn't matter.

The fact that Olivas appeared to have the capability of setting himself on fire in an instant and, indeed, was threatening to do so, meant that the officers had no apparent options to avoid calamity. If, reviewing the facts in hindsight, it is still not apparent what might have been done differently to achieve a better outcome under these circumstances, then, certainly, we, who are separated from the moment by more than three years, cannot conclude that Guadarrama or Jefferson, in the exigencies of the moment, acted unreasonably.

Even if it could reasonably be foreseen that tasing a man covered in gasoline would result in serious injury or death, it was not unreasonable to tase him because of the threat he posed. That following through on this act turned the threat into a reality apparently has no bearing on the outcome. The only thing that matters is whether it was legally permissible to tase him. Everything else is just noise, according to the Fifth Circuit.

Filed Under: 5th circuit, police, police brutality, setting people on fire, unreasonable use of force

Supreme Court Rolls Back Another Horrible Qualified Immunity Decision By The Fifth Circuit

from the let's-start-this-trending! dept

The Supreme Court has done a lot over the years to shield law enforcement officers from accountability. It has redefined the contours of the qualified immunity defense to make it all but impossible for plaintiffs to succeed. Appeals Courts have been hamstrung by Supreme Court precedent, forced to pretty much ignore the egregious rights violations in front of them in favor of dusting off old decisions to see if any officer violated someone's rights in exactly this way prior to this case.

Since law enforcement officers are apparently unable to exercise judgment on their own, the courts often grant forgiveness to these poor single-cell organisms who couldn't have possibly known that, say, locking a prisoner in a feces-covered cell for days violated the prisoner's rights. And that's the conclusion the Fifth Circuit Appeals Court reached December 2019 in Taylor v. Riojas.

The Fifth Circuit is the worst circuit to bring a federal civil rights violation case. And it's still as awful as ever, even with Judge Don Willett -- who published a scathing dissent in another qualified immunity case -- sitting on the bench.

The only good news is that the Supreme Court may be slowly realizing its expansion of the qualified immunity defense is encouraging courts to give law enforcement officers a pass even when it's painfully clear rights have been violated. Almost a year after the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of prison guards, the Supreme Court reversed this decision. There may have been no case exactly on point, but for the Supreme Court that's not a necessity when there's a clear rights violation.

[N]o reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period of time.

This ruling was part of the Supreme Court's docket dispensation. No full opinion was issued. But it sent a message to the Fifth Circuit. And that message has been reinforced with another remand to the Fifth Circuit -- again for granting qualified immunity when it shouldn't have. (h/t Athul Acharya)

McCOY, PRINCE V. ALAMU, TAJUDEEN

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U. S. ___ (2020) (per curiam).

The Fifth Circuit handled Prince v. Alamu back in February of last year. Badly. It somehow managed to find that deliberately pepper spraying a prisoner in the eyes in retaliation for the actions of another prisoner was subject to qualified immunity.

Above, we held that the spraying crossed that line. But it was not beyond debate that it did, so the law wasn’t clearly established. This was an isolated, single use of pepper spray.

And that was enough to give the guard a free pass. As the dissenting opinion noted, the only reason qualified immunity wasn't stripped was because the guard didn't use his fist, a baton, or a Taser. That this involved pepper spray was the only thing separating it from being "clearly established."

The Supreme Court is to blame here. It has repeatedly rejected QI cases, telling lower courts they're supposed to read "clearly established" precedent narrowly, rather than find that similar cases (ones not exactly on point) gave government employees enough warning this new and novel violation of rights would be a violation of rights. With this reversal, the Supreme Court is reversing its own instructions. Hopefully this will continue. With enough reversals, qualified immunity will no longer be the accountability copout it has become.

Filed Under: 5th circuit, law enforcement, qualified immunity, supreme court

Fifth Circuit Tosses Child Porn Conviction Predicated On Unconstitutional Searches Of Three Cellphones

from the looking-for-evidence-of-a-crime-not-being-charged-is-pretty-fatal-to-probable-ca dept

There's a warrant requirement for cellphone searches, thanks to the Supreme Court's Riley decision. But not every search is, um, warranted, even when officers have a search warrant in hand.

A case [PDF] recently handled by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals makes this point clearly and effectively. It's the "effective" part that matters the most. A search that went outside the boundaries of the affidavit's stated purpose has resulted in a vacated child porn conviction.

It all started with a traffic stop -- one that first led officers to believe they'd made a drug bust.

Brian Matthew Morton was stopped for speeding near Palo Pinto, Texas. After the officers smelled marijuana, he gave consent to search his van. Officers found sixteen ecstasy pills, one small bag of marijuana, and a glass pipe.

Then things got a little weird.

When, however, they discovered children’s school supplies, a lollipop, 14 sex toys, and 100 pairs of women’s underwear in the vehicle, they became more concerned that Morton might be a pedophile.

But the arrest was for drug possession, since the rest of the items, while concerning, were not illegal to possess. Texas Dept. of Public Safety Trooper Burt Blue applied for a warrant to search three cellphones found in the van. But if the trooper had suspicions about possible child porn production/possession, he didn't bother to add that to the search warrant affidavit.

Trooper Blue’s affidavits for the search warrants mentioned no concerns about child exploitation; instead, the warrants purported to seek more evidence of Morton’s criminal drug activity based on Trooper Blue’s training and experience—fourteen years in law enforcement and eight years as a “DRE-Drug Recognition Expert”—as well as the drugs found in Morton’s possession and his admission that the drugs were in fact marijuana and ecstasy.

Here's what the affidavits claimed -- that Trooper Burt would be searching for evidence of drug possession.

It is the belief of affiant that suspected party was in possession of and is concealing in [the cellphones] . . . [e]vidence of the offense of Possession of [ecstasy], possession of marijuana and other criminal activity; to wit telephone numbers, address books; call logs, contacts, recently called numbers, recently received calls; recently missed calls; text messages (both SMS messages and MMS messages); photographs, digital images, or multimedia files in furtherance of narcotics trafficking or possession.

That's a weird thing to search phones for, especially when the suspect was arrested because of the drugs he had in his possession. The affidavits claimed the phones would be searched for evidence of "other criminal activity," and asked for blanket permission to search almost everything on the phones for more evidence. But the final part of this statement narrowed the scope back to a pinpoint, indicating exactly what Trooper Blue would be searching the phones for: evidence of "narcotics trafficking or possession."

Once investigators got into the phones, they completely forgot they were supposed to be looking for evidence of drug possession and trafficking.

While searching the phones’ photographs, Trooper Blue and another officer came across sexually explicit images of children. The officers then sought and received another set of warrants to further search the phones for child pornography, ultimately finding 19,270 images of sexually exploited minors. The government then indicted Morton for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) for the child pornography found on his three cellphones. The subject of drugs had vaporized.

Brian Morton attempted to suppress the original warrants -- the ones seeking evidence of drug possession -- claiming they were not supported by probable cause. The trial court ruled in favor of the government and Morton was sentenced to nine years in prison on child porn possession charges.

On appeal, the government admitted it needed separate probable cause to search each category of information targeted by warrants. A warrant to search a phone is not a blanket permission slip. Since phones carry more personal information than most people's houses at this point, the Fourth Amendment bar is raised.

The government still believes it should be able to use the good faith exception to excuse any lack of specific probable cause to search the phones for evidence of drug crimes. The court isn't willing to give the government a pass on this. While probable cause may have supported a search of text messages, IMs, and phone contacts (because to buy drugs, a person generally has to communicate with a dealer), it did not support the search of the photos that led to Morton's conviction on child porn charges.

[T]he affidavits also asserted probable cause to believe that the photographs on Morton’s phones contained evidence of other drug crimes, and on this claim, they fail the test of probable cause as related to the crime of possession. That is, they fall short of raising a “substantial chance” that the photographs on Morton’s phones would contain evidence pertinent to his crime of simple drug possession.

Trooper Blue may have "fourteen years of experience" as a drug warrior, but his assertion photos on the phones would contain further evidence of drug possession is highly flawed. It presupposes something not inherent in the amount of drugs found in Morton's van.

The syllogism that Trooper Blue offers to gain access to Morton’s photographs does not provide adequate grounds for the extensive search. In short, the syllogism is (1) Morton was found with personal-use quantities of drugs; and (2) drug dealers often take photos of drugs, cash, and co-conspirators; it therefore follows that (3) the photographs on Morton’s phones will provide evidence of Morton’s relationship to drug trafficking. The fallacy of this syllogism is that it relies on a premise that cannot be established, namely that Morton was dealing drugs. And here, Trooper Blue disregarded key facts that show that the evidence did not support probable cause that Morton was a drug dealer.

The trooper only found a single, small bag of marijuana and a few ecstasy pills. He did not find anything that would have suggested Morton was a dealer, like scales, packaging, or weapons. Also, as the court points out, Morton was originally charged with "possession," not "trafficking." This further indicates the trooper did not actually believe Morton was a dealer.

And that nullifies the searches of Morton's photos -- the ones that took the investigation in an entirely new direction.

Since it seems that no evidence supported probable cause to believe that Morton was dealing in drugs, the affidavit leaves us with only the allegations that (1) Morton was found with drugs so (2) it therefore follows that the photographs on Morton’s phones will provide evidence of Morton’s crime of drug possession. With only this bare factual support that Morton possessed drugs, the affidavits contain nothing to link Morton’s marijuana and ecstasy with the photographs on his phones. The affidavits thus do not create a “fair probability” or a “substantial chance” that evidence of the crime of drug possession will be found in the photographs on Morton’s cellphones. Therefore, under these facts and based on the specific language in these affidavits, we hold that probable cause was lacking to search Morton’s photographs for proof of his illegal drug possession.

The government gets no "good faith" award for relying on faulty warrants. Just because a judge signed off on the requests does not mean the requests were justified, even if they ultimately resulted in issued warrants.

Here, even giving the magistrate’s determination the deference due, we hold that the magistrate did not have a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed to extend the search to the photographs on the cellphones. Even if the warrants provided probable cause to search some of the phones’ “drawers” or “file cabinets,” the photographs “file cabinet” could not be searched because the information in the officer’s affidavits supporting a search of the cellphones only related to drug trafficking, not simple possession of drugs. There was thus no substantial basis for the magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause existed to search Morton’s photographs, and the search is not saved by the magistrate’s authority. The search was unconstitutional, not subject to any exceptions, and the evidence must be suppressed as inadmissible.

And, since the initial searches weren't based on probable cause, the subsequent searches following the discovery of child porn are irrevocably tainted. The evidence is thrown out and, without the thousands of child porn photos, the government has nothing left but some sex toys, women's panties, and a lollipop. That might be a little creepy in this context, but there's no law forbidding people from driving around with unusual items in their vehicles.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 5th circuit, csam, mobile phones, riley, searches