Thirty Years Of NSA 'Oversight' And The Only Change Is Better Snooping Technology

from the downhill-with-the-wind-at-its-back dept

Thirty years down the road from a Senate select committee investigation into the NSA and what's changed for the intelligence agency? Based on this 1983 New York Times article (via Bruce Sterling), it appears the only difference is computing power and storage capacity. The NSA began as a virtually uncontrolled entity in 1952 and the next thirty years only saw it expand its grasp.

The power of the N.S.A., whose annual budget and staff are believed to exceed those of either the F.B.I. or the C.I.A., is enhanced by its unique legal status within the Federal Government. Unlike the Agriculture Department, the Postal Service or even the C.I.A., the N.S.A. has no specific Congressional law defining its responsibilities and obligations. Instead, the agency, based at Fort George Meade, about 20 miles northeast of Washington, has operated under a series of Presidential directives. Because of Congress's failure to draft a law for the agency, because of the tremendous secrecy surrounding the N.S.A.'s work and because of the highly technical and thus thwarting character of its equipment, the N.S.A. is free to define and pursue its own goals.

Is it any wonder the agency is prone to abuse? It may claim other entities have oversight, but at this point, it's had 60 years of setting its own agenda and tactics. Concerns that the NSA's power and reach could be misused were voiced by Frank Church (of the Church Committee), whose investigation resulted in the only "oversight" the agency has had to date -- the establishment of the FISA court in 1978.

During the course of the investigation, its chairman, Senator Frank Church, repeatedly emphasized his belief that the N.S.A.'s intelligence-gathering activities were essential to the nation's security. He also stressed that the equipment used to watch the Russians could just as easily ''monitor the private communications of Americans.'' If such forces were ever turned against the country's communications system, Senator Church said, ''no American would have any privacy left. ... There would be no place to hide.''

This was a concern in 1983, well before the internet served as the main communication route for millions of Americans and long before storage capacity was measured in zettabytes. And the NSA did turn it on American citizens. Repeatedly. The article states the NSA surveilled 75,000 Americans between 1952-1974. These files were shared with the CIA, another agency supposedly charged with targeting non-Americans only. Together, the CIA and NSA developed files on over 300,000 Americans during this time frame. This program, along with a telegram-reading program that ran from 1945-1975, was illegal. Both shut down in May of 1975, when the Senate committee expressed an interest in them.

Thirty years ago, there were also concerns about the NSA's "oversight," as the agency's techniques and programs were pretty much incomprehensible to its Congressional oversight.

Several months after the hearing, the Senate intelligence committee issued a report that expressed great concern about both the N.S.A.'s activities and the failure of Congress and the Federal courts to comprehend them. ''The watch-list activities and the sophisticated capabilities that they highlight present some of the most crucial privacy issues now facing this nation,'' the committee warned. ''Space-age technology has outpaced the law. The secrecy that has surrounded much of the N.S.A.'s activities and the lack of Congressional oversight have prevented, in the past, bringing statutes in line with the N.S.A.'s capabilities. Neither the courts nor Congress have dealt with the interception of communications using the N.S.A.'s highly sensitive and complex technology.''

Over the past three decades, the NSA has had an active hand in the development of technology that aids its collection activities.

The already expansive appetite of American intelligence analysts was further sharpened by technical advances that were occurring, not entirely by chance, at the same time. The technology in question was the digital computer, the wondrous tool diligently developed by American scientists working for such companies as I.B.M., the RCA Corporation and Sperry Rand, and covertly underwritten in a major way by the N.S.A.

The article also details how the NSA first got its hooks into American telecom companies. After learning the Soviet Union was conducting "wholesale eavesdropping" on communications in four major cities, the Carter administration called for the installation of 100 "voice scramblers" for government use. The switching point for the voice encryption was handled by the NSA, something the administration didn't bother telling other agencies utilizing the service. In addition, the NSA was sent out to protect American communication from Soviet surveillance, laying the groundwork for its communication interception programs.

Telephone links in the areas where Soviet spies were known to be listening were rerouted via underground cable. To further reduce the leakage of the new category of information, the President directed the N.S.A. to approach large corporations and other institutions, collect information about their communications networks and assist them in safeguarding their material. The Carter directive sanctioning the N.S.A.'s involvement in the planning, organization and development of private communications systems not handling classified secrets was only one of several ways in which the power of the agency grew.

The agency has also guided developments in cryptography for more than three decades, beginning with a 1978 gag order issued to George Davida to prevent him from revealing details on his invention, a computer security device utilizing a stream cipher. A rare public speech addressing communication security given by NSA director Bobby Ray Inman in 1979 saw him calling for an "open dialogue" between intelligence agencies and the academic world. This bizarrely resulted in many institutes of higher learning applying voluntary "prior restraint" to cryptographic research.

The result of this dialogue so far has been the recommendation by a special committee of the American Council on Education, a prestigious organization of over 1,400 colleges and universities, that all researchers engaged in cryptographic research submit their work to the N.S.A. before publication.

In addition to this prior restraint on cryptographic inventions and research, the NSA further insinuated itself into the development process.

Today, the National Science Foundation routinely allows the N.S.A. to review any request for the funding of cryptographic research. The N.S.A. also has begun providing financial support for related unclassified civilian research.

We're at the point now where the NSA has 30+ years of "intercepting" cryptographic research, which gives it a head start when it comes to decrypting collected communication. Of course, the encryption method doesn't really matter if the NSA has already inserted itself into the communication stream at the pre-encryption point. And if it hasn't, it will just hold the data until it can crack it.

The NSA has been in operation for over 60 years and its history shows it's always been prone to abuse, thanks to a minimum of oversight and a nearly impenetrable cloak of secrecy. Only now, six decades later, is it finally being forced to deal with the repercussions of its actions. But what's happening now is far too little way too late, thanks to a very compliant administration and two fawning intelligence committees.

The only thing the last thirty years has brought the NSA is better, faster tools and techniques. And the efforts to rein in the agency haven't kept pace.

Filed Under: history, nsa, nsa surveillance

1,000 Sys Admins Can Copy Any NSA Document Without Anyone Knowing About It; Think Only Snowden Did?

from the perfect-audits? dept

Following on our earlier story about how Ed Snowden covered his tracks -- showing that the NSA's vaunted "auditability" of its systems is a complete joke -- comes the news that there are approximately one thousand sys admins with Snowden's authority, who can basically go through any document without any trace. Even more incredible: they can "appear as" anyone else when doing things on the system. In other words if a sys admin wanted to frame an NSA analyst, it sounds like that would be quite easy. The report also notes that, for all of the talk about how great the NSA is at cybersecurity, and the fact that part of the point of CISPA was to try to have the NSA in charge of the nation's cybersecurity, the agency does a piss poor job protecting itself:

“It’s 2013 and the NSA is stuck in 2003 technology,” said an intelligence official.

Jason Healey, a former cyber-security official in the Bush Administration, said the Defense Department and the NSA have “frittered away years” trying to catch up to the security technology and practices used in private industry. “The DoD and especially NSA are known for awesome cyber security, but this seems somewhat misplaced,” said Healey, now a cyber expert at the Atlantic Council. “They are great at some sophisticated tasks but oddly bad at many of the simplest.”

That last sentence really means: "they are great at hacking stuff, but crap at protecting stuff."

As for the thousand or so sys admins on staff, it appears that they have no restrictions or tracking of what they do:

As a system administrator, Snowden was allowed to look at any file he wanted, and his actions were largely unaudited. “At certain levels, you are the audit,” said an intelligence official.

He was also able to access NSAnet, the agency’s intranet, without leaving any signature, said a person briefed on the postmortem of Snowden’s theft. He was essentially a “ghost user,” said the source, making it difficult to trace when he signed on or what files he accessed.

If he wanted, he would even have been able to pose as any other user with access to NSAnet, said the source.

Remember how the NSA at one point said that there were only 35 analysts who could run certain queries? And that all of the queries were tracked and audited. It seems they left out the thousand or so sys admins who could do whatever they wanted with no tracking at all. Does anyone honestly think that none of those sys admins ever was involved in a "LOVINT" situation? Or something much worse?

Oh, and people will remember that the NSA's new plan to "fix" this it to get rid of about 900 of those sys admins, rather than fix the actual problem. And, of course, if you know anything about how this stuff works, you'd know that the NSA probably can't actually automate away 90% of what its sys admins do.

So we're left with an agency that collects a ridiculous amount of info, and has around 1,000 employees (who are mostly actually employed by outside contractors) who can look through anything with no tracking, leaving no trace, and we're told that the data isn't abused. Really? Do Keith Alexander, James Clapper, President Obama, Dianne Feinstein and Mike Rogers really believe that none of those 1,000 sys admins have ever abused the system? And, do they believe that none of the people whom those thousand sys admins are friends with haven't had their friend "check out" information on someone else? Hell, imagine you were someone at the NSA who understood all of this already. If you wanted to abuse the system, why not befriend a sys admin and let him or her do the dirty work for you -- knowing that there would be no further trace?

Basically, it seems clear that the NSA has simply no idea how many abuses there were, and there are a very large number of people who had astounding levels of access and absolutely no controls or way to trace what they were doing.

Filed Under: audits, cybersecurity, ed snowden, keith alexander, nsa, nsa surveillance, security, sys admins

NSA Tapping UN Isn't A Huge Surprise -- But Ability To Crack Video Conferencing Encryption Raises Questions

from the yay! dept

Over the weekend, Der Spiegel broke the somewhat unsurprising news that the NSA had bugged the UN and various EU embassies in the US and had hacked into the UN's videoconferencing software to be able to get access to such calls. On a first pass, this isn't all that surprising. As we noted with some earlier leaks, spying on foreign diplomats is just something that countries do. Spying on foreign government officials is very different than spying on the public. Of course, since the NSA insists that it does everything to avoid intercepting communications of people inside the US, I wondered how they could make that claim while directly tapping conference calls from the UN in NY. The answer is likely to be yet another classic NSA twisting of the words to find a loophole. While the UN headquarters are in NYC, "technically" the headquarters are outside of the US and in the control of the UN itself, but with an agreement that it abides by all local laws. This is similar to embassies, which are often treated as if they are the territory of the country that uses them. I'm wondering if the NSA is using that to argue these are fair game, since they're "outside" the US.

There's also the issue, as noted in the article, that President Obama has insisted that the spying on people was only done to prevent terrorism -- and spying on EU diplomats seems unlikely to have anything to do with terrorism prevention. But, again, spying between government officials is kind of expected, and not quite a huge deal, even if it may present a diplomatic problem for the US.

Much more interesting to me, however, is the snippet claiming that the NSA had figured out how to hack into the UN's video conferencing software, allowing them to record internal video conferences. In fact, after this was cracked just a year ago, a document was sent around, "celebrating" this:

Furthermore, NSA technicians working for the Blarney program have managed to decrypt the UN's internal video teleconferencing (VTC) system. The combination of this new access to the UN and the cracked encryption code have led to "a dramatic improvement in VTC data quality and (the) ability to decrypt the VTC traffic," the NSA agents noted with great satisfaction: "This traffic is getting us internal UN VTCs (yay!)." Within just under three weeks, the number of decrypted communications increased from 12 to 458.

Yay! We can spy on more things! Yay! Either way, I'm curious if anyone knows who provides the UN's video conferencing technology, because that's now a much more interesting issue. The suggestion being made that the NSA "cracked" the encryption that was being used could have much wider implications if true -- so it would be nice to know what kind of encryption, and what sort of system is being used. Either way, I'm guessing that many in the UN will be seeking out alternative communication methods shortly.

Filed Under: diplomacy, encryption, espionage, eu, nsa, nsa surveillance, spying, un, video conferencing

Why NSA Boss Believes His Agency Is All Good: Intentions vs. Actions

from the getting-real dept

Tim Lee, over at The Switch, has a really good post explaining why it might be that NSA boss General Keith Alexander might legitimately believe some of the ridiculous propaganda his organization has been throwing around to try to justify the massive NSA dragnet surveillance programs and its widespread abuses. His argument is basically that people in powerful positions are in something of a bubble that limits their knowledge of how bad things are:

The tendency to promote team players and marginalize dissenters creates a danger of groupthink at the highest levels of the organization. The problem is exacerbated by people’s reluctance to tell their bosses bad news. Each level of the bureaucracy gives its bosses a sugar-coated version of the information it receives from subordinates. By the time information reaches the top, it can be dramatically skewed.

This filtering process distorts the information powerful organizations receive from the outside, too. Powerful people are more likely to attend parties and give speeches with friendly audiences than hostile ones. An organization’s press office will naturally give preferential access to reporters who write positive stories about them. As a result, a man in Alexander’s position may rarely encounter well-informed critics who feel free to give him candid feedback on his performance.

It's a good theory, and I'm sure there's some truth to it -- though I'm not sure it really explains everything. It does appear that Alexander was certainly aware of the audits, the IG report and the FISC ruling that all showed massive abuses and problems with the NSA's actions. So I'll posit an alternative theory as to why Alexander legitimately believes the propaganda.

There's a saying that I've heard many times with slight variations:

We judge ourselves by our intentions, but we judge others by their actions

That is, when we do "bad" things, we often have good intentions, and so it's more difficult for us to view our own actions as being "bad." We meant well. Things just went bad. But when we look at others, we just see their actions, and don't fully understand their intentions -- and thus it's easier for people to assign "bad" intentions to bad actions.

A similar thing may be happening here with the NSA's surveillance. People like General Alexander (and James Clapper and Michael Hayden, and even President Obama) likely look at the things the NSA have done, and believe that they were being done with the best of intentions. That's why they immediately fall back on the defense that none of the abuses were intentional (even if some clearly were).

That's why they seem so exasperated that everyone's so upset with them for the massive spying and the abuses. They keep insisting that if we only were in their shoes, we'd be absolutely fine with how the NSA is acting, and they keep saying that no one at the NSA wants to abuse your civil liberties or to spy on your communications unless you're "bad." Some have assumed that they were implying that they really believe they've stopped potential attacks, but it might just also be that they really do believe that they intend to do "good" things, even if their actions are highly questionable.

Unfortunately, of course, the other famous saying is that the "road to hell is paved with good intentions." Good intentions only take you so far. When you have such a massive, highly questionable program with a very high number of abuses, it no longer matters that their intentions are good, because their actions are simply bad.

Filed Under: actions, bubbles, intentions, keith alexander, leadership, nsa, nsa surveillance

Ed Snowden Covered His Tracks Well; How Many Other NSA Staffers Did The Same?

from the gone-baby-gone dept

As we've seen, the NSA's story on "abuses" keeps changing. First there were no abuses at all, then there were a whole lot of abuses (but all unintentional) and now we know that there also were a bunch of intentional abuses. But here's the thing: these are only the abuses that the NSA caught. And, even then it's sketchy. As Marcy Wheeler has detailed, many of the "unintentional abuses" look like they were merely classified that way, when, in reality, they may have been intentional. Thanks to the magic of the NSA's special dictionary, they redefine abuses that exceed legal authority but are "performing the mission that the NSA wants them to perform" not as "abuses" but as "mistakes."

Either way, that only counts the abuses and "mistakes" that the NSA's audits discover. As we pointed out, it appears the NSA still has no idea what Ed Snowden took, which calls into question how good these so-called "audits" are. The latest reports coming out reveal that Snowden carefully bypassed or deleted the logs concerning his downloading actions:

The U.S. government's efforts to determine which highly classified materials leaker Edward Snowden took from the National Security Agency have been frustrated by Snowden's sophisticated efforts to cover his digital trail by deleting or bypassing electronic logs, government officials told The Associated Press. Such logs would have showed what information Snowden viewed or downloaded.

The government's forensic investigation is wrestling with Snowden's apparent ability to defeat safeguards established to monitor and deter people looking at information without proper permission, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to discuss the sensitive developments publicly.

Remember when Snowden claimed that, from his desk, he could run searches on anyone, and various NSA defenders like Rep. Mike Rogers scoffed at the idea and called him a liar? They claimed that any such searches would turn up in the audits. But, of course, if you can delete the log files, then those audits are meaningless.

And, if Snowden could do it, it's very, very likely that he's not the only one employed by the NSA or contracting for the NSA who knows how to cover their digital trail. And that leads to a very obvious question: sure, the NSA knows about thousands of unintentional violations and a bunch of intentional violations -- but what about all the violations it has no idea about because someone was able to bypass or delete the log files? Given that NSA employees almost certainly know that searches are audited, you'd have to imagine that nearly everyone who decided to willfully violate the law to, say, spy on a love interest (hello: LOVINT) or, perhaps, a personal enemy, would also seek ways to do so without leaving an incriminating log file. Snowden's efforts show that's possible -- meaning that it's likely others knew that as well.

And, given that it appears that top NSA brass may have been taken by surprise by this rather basic revelation (no audits are perfect, and smart folks like ones the NSA employs often know how to get around such things), it seems quite likely that the number of intentional NSA violations is much, much, much higher than is being reported, in part because the NSA itself still hasn't been able to figure out what happened.

Filed Under: abuses, audits, ed snowden, keith alexander, log files, nsa, nsa surveillance, violations

NSA Admits: Okay, Okay, There Have Been A Bunch Of Intentional Abuses, Including Spying On Love Interests

from the and-we're-just-now-telling-congress dept

So, this week, we wrote about the NSA quietly admitting that there had been intentional abuses of its surveillance infrastructure, despite earlier claims by NSA boss Keith Alexander and various folks in Congress that there had been absolutely no "intentional" abuses. Late on Friday (of course) the NSA finally put out an official statement admitting to an average of one intentional abuser per year over the past ten years. The AP is reporting that at least one of the abuses involved an NSA employee spying on a former spouse. Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal suggests that spying on love interests happens somewhat more often:

The practice isn’t frequent — one official estimated a handful of cases in the last decade — but it’s common enough to garner its own spycraft label: LOVEINT.

A handful is still significantly more than once. And it's a lot more than the "zero" times we'd been told about repeatedly by defenders of the program.

While the NSA says it takes these abuses seriously, there's no indication that the analyst was fired.

Much more troubling is that it appears that the NSA only told its oversight committee in the Senate about all of this a few days ago:

The Senate Intelligence Committee was briefed this week on the willful violations by the NSA's inspector general's office, as first reported by Bloomberg.

"The committee has learned that in isolated cases over the past decade, a very small number of NSA personnel have violated NSA procedures — in roughly one case per year," Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who chairs the committee, said in a statement Friday.

Of course, this is the same Dianne Feinstein who, exactly a week ago, said the following:

As I have said previously, the committee has never identified an instance in which the NSA has intentionally abused its authority to conduct surveillance for inappropriate purposes.

Yeah. Because apparently the NSA chose not to tell the committee until a few days later, despite it happening for years.

And, of course, they release this all on a Friday night, hoping that it'll avoid the news cycle...

In the meantime, the NSA just made Senator Feinstein look like a complete fool. She's been its strongest defender in Congress for years, and has stood up for it time and time again, despite all of this questionable activity. Then, last week, it lets her tell lies about it without telling her beforehand that there had been such abuses. At this point, it's abundantly clear that Feinstein's "oversight" of the NSA is a joke. She's either incompetent or lying. Either way, it appears that the NSA is running circles around her, and isn't subject to any real Congressional oversight. At some point, you'd think that maybe she'd stop defending it and actually start doing her job when it comes to oversight. You'd think the fact that it let her make a complete fool of herself by claiming there had been no intentional abuses should make Feinstein realize that the NSA situation is out of control. But, tragically, this seems unlikely. Even her statement seems to want to minimize the seriousness of the fact that she -- the person in charge of oversight -- was completely kept in the dark about very serious intentional abuses. Senator Feinstein just got hung out to dry by the NSA. You'd think she'd stop going to bat for it and its lies.

Either way, we've now gone from General Keith Alexander and Feinstein claiming "no abuses," to them saying no "intentional" abuses, to this latest admission of plenty of intentional abuses, including spying on lovers. Perhaps, instead of lying, it's time for the NSA to come clean and to get some real oversight.

Filed Under: abuses, dianne feinstein, intentional abuses, keith alexander, lying, nsa, nsa surveillance, violations

Creating Chilling Effects On Speech Is A Feature, Not A Bug, Of The Surveillance State

from the shut-up-you-people,-we're-protecting-you dept

We've discussed a few times how the pervasive surveillance efforts of the NSA and others have tremendous chilling effects on how people communicate and how they act. We've discussed how this is a "cost" to the program that not many, especially those who are backing these programs, seem interested in measuring or even thinking about. Of course, implicit in our assumption is that these "costs" are things that are negatives of the program. Others would point out that for those in power, that's not so much a cost as a benefit. It's not a bug or an unintended consequence, but a feature. Chilling speech and clamping down on communications? Why that's a good thing for those in power.

Josh Levy, from Free Press, has a great guest post over at Boing Boing where he discusses how the NSA's surveillance regime is a huge attack on free speech, and how this is both inevitable, and for some, the intent of the program:

The chilling of free speech isn’t just a consequence of surveillance. It’s also a motive. We adopt the art of self-censorship, closing down blogs, watching what we say on Facebook, forgoing “private” email for fear that any errant word may come back to haunt us in one, five or fifteen 15 years. “The mind's tendency to still feel observed when alone... can be inhibiting,” writes Janna Malamud Smith. Indeed.

Peggy Noonan, describing a conversation with longtime civil liberties advocate Nat Hentoff, writes that “the inevitable end of surveillance is self-censorship.”

Hentoff stressed that privacy invasions of this magnitude are “attempts to try to change who we are as Americans.” In fact, they are attempts to define who we are as human beings.

Meanwhile, over at the Atlantic, Bruce Schneier has a post discussing the detainment of David Miranda, where he comes to similar conclusions, that these authoritarian police states clearly have no practical benefit, except to enable a powerful government to show off its power to invade your lives:

This leaves one last possible explanation -- those in power were angry and impulsively acted on that anger. They're lashing out: sending a message and demonstrating that they're not to be messed with -- that the normal rules of polite conduct don't apply to people who screw with them. That's probably the scariest explanation of all. Both the U.S. and U.K. intelligence apparatuses have enormous money and power, and they have already demonstrated that they are willing to ignore their own laws. Once they start wielding that power unthinkingly, it could get really bad for everyone.

Of course, Schneier sees some upside to this in the long run -- which is that such blatantly ridiculous activity seems to only embolden others to push back on this trampling of our rights. Hopefully, that pushback works, because the alternative is horrifying to those who believe in a free and open society.

Filed Under: chilling effects, free speech, nsa, nsa surveillance

UK's Suppression Of Freedom Of The Press Drives Guardian To Partner With NYT On Snowden Reporting

from the will-they-threaten-the-nyt-too? dept

With the Guardian forced on orders directly from the Prime Minister's office to physically destroy some hard drives with the Ed Snowden documents on them, the Guardian made it clear that the reporting on the leaks would continue, but out of its NY offices, rather than the London ones (and, of course, via Glenn Greenwald in Brazil and Laura Poitras in Germany). However, another bit of fallout from all of this is that the Guardian has teamed up with its nominal "competitor," the NY Times to share some (not all) of the documents and to work together on the reporting of what's in them.

Amusingly, this comes just after a NYT editor argued (somewhat ridiculously) that the NYT has done more to advance the story than any other publication after the very first stories from The Guardian and the Washington Post. That statement is laughable. While the NYT has done some very good reporting on all of this, the Washington Post and the Guardian have continued to "break" a variety of big stories from the documents. The NYT has certainly added to the coverage, and added very important details to some of those stories, but it's been way, way, way behind. It will be interesting to see what happens now. Of course, one of the reasons why Snowden says he didn't go to the NYT originally, was due to stories of how they held onto some other stories, such as the original story about warrantless wiretapping, which it held for many months at the request of the feds.

Filed Under: ed snowden, freedom of the press, glenn greenwald, nsa, nsa surveillance, reporting, uk
Companies: ny times, the guardian

More Confirmation: NSA Analysts Willfully Abused Surveillance Powers

from the another-day,-another-claim-falls dept

On Monday, we pointed out that (1) it was ridiculous for NSA defenders to argue that the thousands of violations were no problem because they weren't "willful" and (2) that there was an admission by the NSA that there had been "a couple" of willful violations by NSA staff in the past few years. Five days later, Bloomberg appears to have discovered the same quotes we saw on Monday, noting that there had been willful violations:

Some National Security Agency analysts deliberately ignored restrictions on their authority to spy on Americans multiple times in the past decade, contradicting Obama administration officials’ and lawmakers’ statements that no willful violations occurred.

“Over the past decade, very rare instances of willful violations of NSA’s authorities have been found,” the NSA said in a statement to Bloomberg News. “NSA takes very seriously allegations of misconduct, and cooperates fully with any investigations -- responding as appropriate. NSA has zero tolerance for willful violations of the agency’s authorities.”

As far as I can tell, this is the identical quote that we saw from John DeLong of the NSA on Monday. Either way, it's good that the press is finally realizing that, yes, the NSA has admitted to multiple willful violations.

Filed Under: abuses, nsa, nsa surveillance, violations, willfully abused

Yes, Of Course The NSA Pays Tech Companies For Surveillance Efforts

from the taxpayer-money dept

The latest Ed Snowden leak from the Guardian shows that after the FISA court had ruled that aspects of the NSA's data collection program were unconstitutional, the NSA had to work with tech companies to change their technology to avoid capturing some of the information they weren't allowed to capture, and, as a result the NSA paid millions to those tech companies via its Special Source Operations. To be honest, this doesn't seem like a huge bombshell in terms of revelations. It's long been known that the government pays companies for law enforcement assistance/surveillance (e.g. wiretaps) -- and as long as that surveillance is legal, that makes sense and is reasonable. The fact that this cost millions of dollars, however, suggests that it's a pretty big program.

Either way, while many of the Snowden leaks have been a pretty big deal, this one seems like nothing new. It's never been a secret that tech companies were required to reveal certain information under court orders, or that the government pays the companies for the cost. The only thing here is that the companies had to change their systems to make sure that the NSA's collection effort was "in line" with what the FISA Court deemed to be Constitutional. If anything, that makes a lot of sense, as we should want the government to have to cover the costs of making sure that their surveillance efforts are Constitutional. Many of the leaks so far have been a big deal, but this one doesn't seem all that interesting.

Filed Under: fees, nsa, nsa surveillance, prism, surveillance
Companies: google, yahoo