No, There Hasn't Been A Big Shift Away From US Datacenters... Yet

from the give-it-time dept

We've been pointing out that the various disclosures about NSA surveillance, and its ability to tap into various servers associated with US companies, should be very troubling to the US tech industry, because it will make it harder and harder to do business -- especially with those outside of the US. Of course, some are claiming that this will all blow over, and while people will make noise about it, they won't actually go anywhere else. And, of course, the latest Netcraft data suggests that there's been little movement so far:

Despite speculation that the recent PRISM revelations would result in a mass exodus from American data centers and web hosting companies, Netcraft has not yet seen any evidence of this. Within the most popular 10 thousand sites, Netcraft witnessed only 40 sites moving away from US-based hosting companies. Contrary to some people's expectations, 47 sites moved to the US, which actually resulted in a net migration to the US.

This trend is also reflected by the entire web server survey, where a net sum of 270 thousand sites moved to the US from other countries (in total, 3.9 million sites moved to the US, while 3.6 million moved from the US). Germany was the most popular departure country, with nearly 1.2 million sites moving from German hosting companies. This was followed by Canada, where 803 thousand sites hopped across the border to the US.

Of course, I think it's way too early to conclude much about this at this point for a variety of reasons. First, we're still learning about the extent of the surveillance, and some of the more damning revelations have really only just started to trickle out. Second, moving your hosting services is not generally something you just do overnight. It can take quite a bit of time. Third -- and this is a big one -- I'd argue the bigger concern is less about companies moving, but that the next generation of users will never agree to use US servers. And, finally (and perhaps most importantly), prior to these revelations, the market for more private and secure hosting and communications was fairly limited. Some have pointed out that even for those who wish to leave US services, it's not clear where to go.

But I am expecting that's going to change. One thing that these revelations have made clear is that current solutions are not as secure or private as people expected and that this is an issue that many, many people and companies are concerned about. As such, it seems quite likely that there will be investment and entrepreneurship focused on these areas over the next few years -- and I fully expect that a number of more secure and private solutions, who actively promote themselves on these features, will hit the market.

Filed Under: cloud computing, datacenters, impact, nsa, nsa surveillance, prism, privacy, us

Administration's Surveillance Review Board Appointees Mostly Sympathetic Insiders

from the totally-dying-of-shock-right-now dept

The surveillance review panel (feat. special guest James Clapper!) Obama announced on August 9th has taken shape. Four appointees have been named, and if this ends up being the totality of the panel, there's not much hope it will provide any sort of meaningful pushback on excessive or intrusive surveillance.

As the Washington Post reports, the four members of the panel are all Washington insiders.

[O]bama administration’s surveillance review panel will include former intelligence and White House staffers, including Michael Morell, Richard Clarke, Cass Sunstein and Peter Swire.

Morell is 33-year veteran of the CIA, who retired from his post just two weeks ago. Where he stands on privacy matters isn't exactly clear, but considering his former position as deputy director, it would stand to reason he's more aligned with the NSA's thinking than the public's.

Richard Clarke is a long-time cyberwar hawk, having served as the chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Security Group under George H.W. Bush, as well as a long stint on the National Security Counsel. Clarke has made recent pushes for more offensive cyberwar strategies and has generally contributed to the FUD surrounding these issues.

On the plus side, he was highly critical of the second Bush administration's actions during his testimony to the 9/11 Commission. That being said, he's really not in favor of scaling back surveillance efforts. Orin Kerr sums Clarke up this way in his piece on the surveillance panel.

[I]n my experience working on some similar issues as he did in the government, Clarke had a reputation for seeing everything as an extraordinarily grave national security threat. I would think Clarke is likely to bring in a pro-government perspective on the issues here.

This brings us to Cass Sunstein, who's a bit of a wildcard. Sunstein's written work tends to draw together a blend of constitutional law, behavioral science and economics, often reaching some very interesting conclusions. But what's most concerning about Sunstein's appointment is the views he expressed in a 2008 paper co-authored with Adrian Vermule, where he argued that the government should be paying more attention to those spreading conspiracy theories.

"The existence of both domestic and foreign conspiracy theories, we suggest, is no trivial matter, posing real risks to the government’s antiterrorism policies, whatever the latter may be." They go on to propose that, "the best response consists in cognitive infiltration of extremist groups"...

Glenn Greenwald has more on Sunstein's paper in his 2010 piece for Salon.com

Sunstein advocates that the Government’s stealth infiltration should be accomplished by sending covert agents into “chat rooms, online social networks, or even real-space groups.” He also proposes that the Government make secret payments to so-called “independent” credible voices to bolster the Government’s messaging (on the ground that those who don’t believe government sources will be more inclined to listen to those who appear independent while secretly acting on behalf of the Government).   This program would target those advocating false “conspiracy theories,” which they define to mean: “an attempt to explain an event or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who have also managed to conceal their role.”

This would be designed to increase citizens’ faith in government officials and undermine the credibility of conspiracists.

Whatever you may personally think about conspiracy theorists and the potential dangers they pose, it's hard to believe that government infiltration and propagandizing is the correct response. (It's somewhat hard to argue this sort of activity actually requires a response from the government at all.) Having someone with an inclination towards government-led espionage activities aimed at its own citizens on a surveillance review board isn't exactly a comforting thought.

The final name on the list, Peter Swire, may be the only appointee to take on an actively adversarial role. Swire has long been an advocate for privacy, having served as the Chief Counselor for Privacy in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) during the Clinton administration.

More recently he has been very active working to achieve a global "Do Not Track" standard and has, over the past several years, written articles and given interviews critical of the agency's activities, including co-signing an amicus brief arguing that the NSA's telephone metadata program is illegal. He's also been a longtime critic of parts of the PATRIOT Act. If anyone's going to be advocating for privacy, it's probably going to be Swire. Unfortunately, this may leave him as the odd man out.

On top of that, this board, composed mainly of government and surveillance proponents, will be reporting directly to confirmed liar James Clapper (the administration phrases it "reporting through") who is or isn't directly involved with the appointment process, depending on how you define the word "establish."

I guess one (or 1.5, depending on Sunstein's contribution) out of four is better than nothing. But by selecting intelligence officials and former administration staff members, Obama is (once again) sending the message that the "debate" will be still be very tightly controlled.

Filed Under: barack obama, cass sunstein, james clapper, michael morell, nsa, nsa surveillance, peter swire, review, review board, richard clarke, surveillance

Vocal NSA Critic Has Dinner With NSA Boss, Explains To Him That Abuses Are Inevitable

from the good-people-sometimes-do-bad-things dept

Jennifer Granick, a well known (and brilliant) civil liberties fighter (currently at Stanford) recently co-wrote an article with Chris Sprigman about why the NSA's surveillance efforts were almost certainly both illegal and unconstitutional. Just a few weeks later, she got to have dinner with NSA boss Keith Alexander, which she's now written about. As you might imagine, it appears that they didn't agree on very much about the NSA's surveillance efforts. Basically, Alexander more or less argues that the NSA has to do what it does to "protect Americans" and that the agency is filled with good people who don't want to invade the privacy of Americans.

I have no doubt that Gen. Alexander loves this country as much as I do, or that his primary motivation is to protect our nation from terrorist attacks. “Never again,” he said over dinner. But it may be that our deep differences stem from a fundamental disagreement about human nature. I think Gen. Alexander believes that history is made by great individuals standing against evil. I believe that brave people can make a difference, but that larger inexorable forces are often more important: history, economics, political and social systems, the environment. So I believe that power corrupts and that good people will do bad things when a system is poorly designed, no matter how well-intentioned they may be. More than once, my dinner companions felt the need to reassure the DIRNSA that none of us thought he was a bad man, but that we thought the surveillance policies and practices were bad, and that eventually, inevitably, those policies and practices would lead to abuse.

She goes on to note that the NSA's (and the administration's) further defense of the efforts have only made her point even stronger (contrary to General Alexander's promise to Granick that the upcoming revelations would show that the NSA's actions were perfectly reasonable). As she notes later in the piece, the history of abuses is well known, even if Alexander likes to ignore it:

Of course, we see mission creep – once you build the mousetrap of surveillance infrastructure, they will come for the data.  First it was counterterrorism, then it was drug investigations, then it was IRS audits. Next it will be for copyright infringement.

And of course, there also will be both “inadvertent” and intentional abuse, inevitable but difficult to discover.  Bored analysts do things like spy on women using surveillance cameras and listen to American GIs overseas having phone sex with their loved ones back home.  Or an FBI agent may investigate strange but not unlawful emails on behalf of a family friend, leading to a sex scandal that brings down the Director of the CIA.  These surveillance tools and information databases may one day end up in the hands of a J. Edgar Hoover and a President demanding embarrassing information about her political opponents, information that, in an age of mass surveillance, the government most assuredly will have somewhere in its treasure trove.

There's a reason we make it hard for the government to spy on people. We know that the temptation to abuse such powers will be strong and abuse will inevitably occur. That's the nature of a free society. And it's a problem when people like General Alexander think that the best way to "protect" a free society is to take away the very factors that make it one.

Filed Under: abuse of power, jennifer granick, keith alexander, nsa, nsa surveillance

NSA Tries Hand At Irony, Accuses WSJ Of Misleading Public

from the well,-look-at-that dept

Oh, that wacky NSA. Late on Tuesday, the WSJ revealed some new info about the NSA. A lot of it had actually been covered elsewhere before, but they got some confirmations, and some new tidbits of information, such as spying on all emails in Salt Lake City during the Olympics, and the fact that the massive violations which led to the FISC ruling about how the NSA violated the 4th Amendment went on for far longer than most people had expected.

Of course, some more details of that FISC ruling were revealed late on Wednesday. Right before the documents were released, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, apparently held an "on background" (i.e., not for quotations) press call, which, according to various reports, involved a refusal to answer any questions about the WSJ article, and an insistence that all questions had to be about the documents ODNI was declassifying, even though none of them had yet been released.

However, while everyone was focusing on those documents (which were released moments later), the NSA did push out a laughable "response" to the WSJ article, in which they don't deny any of the major claims -- such as the spying on every email during the Olympics -- but rather take issue with the opening ("the lede," as they say) of the WSJ article, which talked about how the NSA "has the capacity to reach roughly 75% of all U.S. Internet traffic." Admittedly, that 75% number was in the headline of the WSJ piece, and was what many focused on. We didn't put as much emphasis on it, because having the capability to see that much is different than actually doing so and the full article did make clear that the NSA doesn't actually sift through that much (except, you know, during the Olympics).

So, the NSA's response mostly focuses on how unfair that 75% number is:

The reports leave readers with the impression that NSA is sifting through as much as 75% of the United States' online communications, which is simply not true.

Well... there's truth and then there's "truth." And the article does make it pretty clear that the NSA isn't sifting through all of that, but rather the telcos who were "compelled" to assist the NSA, who then pass along chunks of content that trigger certain interest.

But, really, this is the NSA we're talking about. The very same NSA who has basically made sure that at nearly every public appearance it utters claims that are either outright false -- sorry, "least untruthful," -- or, more accurately uses exceptionally carefully worded phrases to say something that might technically be true, while giving the public the impression of something entirely different. Sometimes this involves redefining words like "relevant" and "target." Sometimes this means using weasel phrases like "under this program" (leaving out the obligatory "but not under others.") The NSA spends an awful lot of time deliberately saying things designed to "leave the public with the impression" of something that is untrue.

So I don't see how it gets to complain if the WSJ may have done the same thing with its headline and opening. At least with the WSJ, if you read the article, you get much more of the full picture. When the NSA offers its misleading bullshit, the full story is often kept shrouded in secrecy.

Filed Under: james clapper, misleading the public, nsa, nsa surveillance, wsj

Then And Now: What The NSA Said About PRISM vs. What Latest Declassified Document Says

from the note:-they're-not-the-same dept

So, Tim Cushing already discussed the magically declassified FISC opinion, concerning how the NSA violated the 4th Amendment for many years with its searches. There's a lot of information in that and the other documents the Director of National Intelligence is finally disclosing (mostly due to FOIA requests, rather than the administration's professed newfound love of transparency). For example, it shows how, once again, the NSA has been incredibly misleading concerning the various revelations over the past few months. Let's take PRISM, for example, the program under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act that allows the government to access certain internet communications (not metadata, actual communications).

As you may recall, the NSA and its supporters really tried to play down this program as being small and highly targeted:

According to the NSA fact sheet, this program "does not allow the government to target the phone calls or emails of any U.S. citizen or any other U.S. person anywhere in the world, or any person known to the in the United States. It only allows the targeting of communications of foreigners, and even then only when those communications may have foreign intelligence value." The agency further notes that "any information about U.S. persons that may be incidentally acquired" is subject to "minimization procedures."

Targeted communications of foreigners, only when those communications may have foreign intelligence value. Okay. So, that actually makes some sense. We expect the NSA to be, for example, trying to get access to Al Qaeda bosses' emails. But... the reality as shown in the FISC ruling suggests it's not limited, it's barely targeted and those minimization procedures aren't taken very seriously. As you may recall, this is the very same fact sheet that Senator Wyden called out for being near-complete bullshit and which the NSA then removed.

The Obama administration, however, put up a similar defense:

The Government may only use Section 702 to acquire foreign intelligence information, which is specifically, and narrowly, defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This requirement applies across the board, regardless of the nationality of the target.

Except, of course, as we've been seeing over and over again, "foreign intelligence information" is not narrowly defined, and it doesn't appear that the NSA is very careful about all of this. From the FISC ruling we learn that this "small" and supposedly "targeted" project is something much much larger:

NSA acquires more than two hundred fifty million Internet communications each year pursuant to Section 702, but the vast majority of these communications are obtained from Internet service providers and are not at issue here..... Indeed, NSA's upstream collection constitutes only approximately 9% of the total Internet communications being acquired by NSA under Section 702.

If you don't follow this closely, it can be a bit difficult to parse out. The "upstream" collection is the stuff we were just talking about concerning snarfing up data directly from telcos. This "non upstream" data that is "obtained from Internet service providers" is PRISM (as noted in a footnote), and is the program that the NSA and the White House kept insisting above are narrow and targeted. Yet, here, they're admitting that via PRISM, they're getting 91% of the internet communications they're collecting -- which is 228 million records. Collected from tech companies via PRISM.

That's not targeted. Those 228 million communications are not "only when those communications may have foreign intelligence value." And I have difficulty seeing how anyone can call it "incidental" given the size. It appears to be an absolutely massive program that, once again, the NSA, the administration and their supporters have continued to misrepresent.

Filed Under: communications, foreign, nsa, nsa surveillance, prism, targeted

Rep. Mike Fitzpatrick Introduces Bill To Smack The NSA In The Wallet For Each Data Collection Violation

from the keyed-in-the-wrong-country-code?-that's-a-paddlin' dept

Another day and another legislative attempt to rein in the NSA. NJ Congressman Rush Holt led the way by announcing his plan to introduce a bill to repeal the PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments act back on July 11th. This was followed by Michigan Congressman Justin Amash's attempt to attach an NSA-defunding amendment to the Dept. of Defense appropriations bill making its way through the house.

A little later, Amash's amendment suffered a narrow defeat, thanks in part to the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee withholding key information from other members of Congress. Rush Holt's bill is still a work in progress and Amash is planning legislation of his own that will set out to do what his failed amendment attempted. Meanwhile, a whole bunch of others in Congress have jumped in as well, which the ACLU has been conveniently tracking.

Now, another Congressman, Mike Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania, is introducing his own legislation.

Rep. Mike Fitzpatrick (R-Pa.) proposed legislation on Monday that would cut National Security Agency (NSA) funding if it violates new surveillance rules aimed at preventing broad data collection on millions of people.

"This bill tells the NSA that if they unlawfully spy on Americans again, Congress will take away their funding," Fitzpatrick said of his NSA Accountability Act. "The bill also makes it clear that the NSA can only track Americans where strong evidence suggests they are doing wrong."

The three-term Republican said his bill is a reaction to this month's press reports saying that the NSA overstepped its bounds thousands of times as it collected data on Americans from April 2011 to March 2012. An audit published by The Washington Post reported nearly 2,800 incidents of unauthorized data collection and storage.

Unlike the NSA's surveillance efforts (zing!), Fitzpatrick's bill is specifically targeted to problematic wording in the FISA Act, making a few changes to Section 501 subsection (b)(2)(a). Here's how his proposed changes would alter the current wording. [Additions in bold, strikethru hopefully self-explanatory.]

(A) a statement of specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant and material to an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment) conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, such things being presumptively relevant to an authorized investigation if the applicant shows in the statement of the facts that they pertain to clandestine intelligence activities and pertain only to an individual that is the subject of such investigation; and

(i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;

(ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation; or

(iii) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation; and

(B) an enumeration of the minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General under subsection (g) that are applicable to the retention and dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of any tangible things to be made available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation based on the order requested in such application.

What the amendment would do is (hopefully) more narrowly define "relevant." As it stands now, the FISA Act allows for the collection of tangible things presumptively relevant, which as we've seen, tends to allow for a lot of ancillary data harvesting. Fitzpatrick removes that wording and replaces it with even more specifics -- "pertain only to an individual that is the subject of such investigation." In addition, he slices out subsections (i) through (iii), which further narrows down the acceptable data the NSA can pursue.

Whether or not these wording changes will prevent extra "hops" or more massive data hauls remains to be seen. But Fitzpatrick is waving a bit of stick in the form of budget cuts should the agency reach surpass its authority.

[T]he legislation holds that any violation of Section 501 would be met with a decision to withhold all unobligated funds to carry out that section of law until the end of the fiscal year.

This may also encourage more targeted data collections, if for no other reason than so much of the NSA's work is outsourced to private contractors. Government officials may be able to protect their own paychecks in case of self-inflicted budget cuts, but they're going to have a hard time finding companies to work with them if internal malfeasance starts threatening their paychecks.

It's tough to say whether these legislative attempts have a chance in hell at passing, but the odds have vastly improved over the past few weeks. There's a ton of internal Congressional wrangling still ahead before these bills go up for a vote, but at this point, it's highly doubtful the NSA and the administration protecting it will be able to sufficiently polish their reputations before these bills hit the floor. And no matter what happens, it's refreshing to see the NSA being targeted by irate representatives and citizens, rather than the other way around.

Filed Under: budget, laws, mike fitzpatrick, nsa, nsa surveillance, violations

US Still Can't Figure Out What Snowden Took; What Happened To Those Perfect 'Audits'?

from the total-failure dept

Remember how the NSA's biggest defenders keep insisting that the NSA's perfect "audits" prevent abuse? Here's Keith Alexander insisting that such audits are perfect:

"The assumption is our people are just out there wheeling and dealing. Nothing could be further from the truth. We have tremendous oversight over these programmes. We can audit the actions of our people 100%, and we do that," he said.

Addressing the Black Hat convention in Las Vegas, an annual gathering for the information security industry, he gave a personal example: "I have four daughters. Can I go and intercept their emails? No. The technical limitations are in there." Should anyone in the NSA try to circumvent that, in defiance of policy, they would be held accountable, he said: "There is 100% audibility." Only 35 NSA analysts had the authority to query a database of US phone records, he said.

Yet, many months after the initial leaks, it's being reported that the US government still doesn't know what Snowden took:

More than two months after documents leaked by former contractor Edward Snowden first began appearing in the news media, the National Security Agency still doesn’t know the full extent of what he took, according to intelligence community sources, and is “overwhelmed” trying to assess the damage.

First off, this shows that the claims of 100% auditability are complete crap. If they can't tell what Snowden took so many months later, they don't have very good auditability at all. Furthermore, this raises serious questions about the NSA's data management capabilities. For all the claims that there are no "willful" or "intentional" violations by the NSA of people's privacy, it seems difficult to believe they can know that. Here's a case where they flat out know that someone got access to all sorts of documents, and over many months they still can't figure out what he got. And, yet, they expect us to believe that they can tell with perfect accuracy what their staffers are doing with the data they have access to? Seriously?

Yes, there have been thousands of "accidental" violations that were caught in audits, but it seems highly likely that there are intentional violations that the NSA just doesn't know about. If they can't track what an outside contractor is downloading, how can they even pretend that they have control over their data and information?

Filed Under: abuses, audits, ed snowden, keith alexander, leaks, nsa, nsa surveillance, violations

NSA Program Found Unconstitutional Went On For 3 Years; Started Right After Telcos Got Immunity

from the law-breaking?-what-law-breaking? dept

A further delve into the latest NSA surveillance bombshell from the WSJ highlights the ridiculousness of the claims that there were "no violations" by the NSA over the years. We've been aware for a while that the FISC ruled a certain NSA program unconstitutional, but the details had been kept secret. It only came out that something was found unconstitutional a year ago, through the efforts of Senator Ron Wyden. Since then, people have been digging for more. The DOJ finally has agreed to release a redacted version of the FISC ruling after fighting it for a while, but as we wait, some more details have been coming out. Last week's Washington Post story about abuses claimed that this particular program wasn't reported to the FISC for "many months."

Yet, as we mentioned last night, the WSJ article claims that the program actually went on for three years:

For example, a recent Snowden document showed that the surveillance court ruled that the NSA had set up an unconstitutional collection effort. Officials say it was an unintentional mistake made in 2008 when it set filters on programs like these that monitor Internet traffic; NSA uncovered the inappropriate filtering in 2011 and reported it.

No biggie. The NSA just illegally collected information that clearly violated the 4th Amendment (even the rubberstamp FISC says so!) for three years. But there's no abuse. No sir. No problems at all.

Marcy Wheeler, however, puts two and two together, and notes that the "start" of this admitted unconstitutional spying was in 2008 -- which is exactly when the telcos received immunity from all such cases involving warrantless wiretapping. And, so, she points out the administration and various NSA defenders may actually be using an incredibly twisted level of reasoning to claim that this program that violated the 4th Amendment doesn't count as a "violation" because since the telcos have immunity, there's no one to "prosecute" for breaking the law. Under this twisted interpretation, the government grants telcos retroactive immunity on such surveillance, and can then use that immunity to pretend that everything it does is legal since the telcos can't be prosecuted. If that turns out to be true, it's downright evil.

And, you wonder why the key part of CISPA was to basically extend blanket immunity on privacy violations between not just telcos and the government, but basically all tech companies. The more immunity the government grants, the more "legal" all its actions become. It's sickening.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, fisc, immunity, nsa, nsa surveillance, oversight, surveillance, telcos, violations

NSA & FBI Spied On All Emails In Salt Lake City Before & After The Olympics

from the minimization? dept

We've already written about the latest NSA bombshell, which came via an article in the Wall Street Journal (which they stupidly put behind their paywall) by reporters Siobhan Gorman and Jennifer Valentino-Devries. But I wanted to focus in on one aspect that hasn't received very much attention -- the revelation that the NSA and the FBI teamed up to read every email and text communication in the Salt Lake City area before and after the Olympics there in 2002:

For the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, officials say, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and NSA arranged with Qwest Communications International Inc. to use intercept equipment for a period of less than six months around the time of the event. It monitored the content of all email and text communications in the Salt Lake City area.

At the time, Michael Hayden was in charge of the NSA, and today he remains one of the staunchest supporters of the NSA's surveillance, calling its opponents losers who can't get laid for daring to question the level of unconstitutional surveillance of our communications. Perhaps -- just perhaps -- he'd like to explain the legal rationale for spying on every digital communication. Sure, sure, this happened soon after September 11th, and I'm sure US officials were worried about the possibility of a terrorist attack on the winter Olympics. But, I don't recall us turning off the Constitution or ripping out the 4th Amendment just for the Olympics. Perhaps General Hayden, rather than random name calling, could share with us how such a project was possibly anywhere in the vicinity of legal at the time?

Filed Under: email, fbi, michael hayden, nsa, nsa surveillance, olympics, privacy, salt lake city, utah

North Carolina State University Gets $60 Million To Help NSA Build Bigger And Better Haystacks

from the institute-of-spy-er-learning dept

Who wants to work on a collaborative data project with a badly wounded intelligence agency? I'm not seeing a lot of hands... How about if I ask it with a couple of exclamation points thrown in?!?! Still nothing...

Given what we know now, it's probably safe to assume that no one wants to sign a deal with this particular devil if the NSA's abortive recruitment drive at the University of Wisconsin is any indication. The recruiters appeared to believe they could just walk in and harvest a few souls hand out a few heavily-redacted business cards while talking up Team NSA's anti-terrorism efforts.

Instead, the recruiters found themselves on the receiving end of their own words, wielded with deadly accuracy by a handful of mouthy linguistics students. Forced to defend themselves, the recruiters delivered phrases like, "We don't tell complete lies," and "we drink heavily and sing karaoke while wearing wigs."

In what has to be one of the most unfortunate press releases ever released, another institute of higher education has just announced its partnership with the NSA. You can practically feel the aching jaws of several forced smiles that accompany this bit of "good news" from North Carolina State University.

A $60.75 million grant from the NSA is the largest research grant in NCSU’s history – three times bigger than any previous award.

The Laboratory for Analytic Sciences will be launched in a Centennial Campus building that will be renovated with money from the federal agency, but details about the facility are top secret. Those who work in the lab will be required to have security clearance from the U.S. government.

NCSU officials say the endeavor is expected to bring 100 new jobs to the Triangle during the next several years. The university, already a leader in data science, won the NSA contract through a competitive process.

There's nothing like two solid months of negativity to take the shine off a hard-won grant battle. If the race started today, one imagines the field might have a bit more breathing room. Everyone involved is quick to point out that the university won't be involved in the NSA's day-to-day privacy violations.

“As a university, we’re not going to be involved in the operational intelligence work of the National Security Agency,” [Chancellor Randy] Woodson said. “Our partnership with them is really about the science of big data and data analysis. I don’t think there’s anything more difficult right now for both government and the private sector than making sense out of the deluge of data that we’re all swimming in every day.”

Well, if there's anything the NSA needs, it's more haystack wranglers. Someone might want to point out that targeted surveillance efforts usually result in much more manageable "deluge." Of course, the NSA's really not interested in shallow pools of data. It would much rather swim in accumulated data, even inadvertently if it has to.

As for not being "involved?" That's probably true as far as data harvesting goes. But the leaks have shown us that every American has the chance to "get involved" by inadvertently lending their data to the NSA at some point or another, like say, the residents of Tallahassee, FL, whose area code (850) is also North Korea's country code.

Timing is everything and, through no fault of its own, NCSU has nothing. The original announcement was supposed to happen back in early June, but Snowden's first batch of leaks altered those plans. Presumably everyone was waiting for the whole "leaks thing" to blow over, but with time running off the clock to get the grant allotted before the end of the fiscal year, the university rushed out its belated announcement, just in time to coincide with the most damaging leak yet.

Synergy.

You know how it goes -- the morning starts out bright and full of promise but by the end of the day you're issuing statements that put you as far away as possible from the foul odor emanating from the NSA while still keeping the grant money within reach of your outstretched arm.

The NSA's statement, on the other hand, bears the devilish grin of someone who has not so much lost $60 million but gained a rare ally, albeit one that keeps pointing out that it's not involved with the unpleasantness.

In the announcement from the NSA, the agency’s director of research, Michael Wertheimer, said NCSU is the ideal location for the new lab.

“We have chosen the Research Triangle area for its vibrant academic and industry interest in large data analytics, and NC State for having the nation’s first, and preeminent, advanced degree program in data analytics,” Wertheimer’s statement said. “By immersing intelligence analysts with NC State’s diverse group of scientists, we hope to discover new and powerful ways to meet our foreign signals intelligence and information assurance missions – giving us an edge to better protect the nation.”

Well, it would be nice if the experts at NCSU could give the NSA some guidance on how to keep its "foreign signals intelligence" foreign and its "information assurance missions" a bit more focused. But this isn't what the NSA wants from NCSU. It's looking for bigger haystacks and better pitchforks and the occasional needle to justify it all.

Filed Under: bad timing, data collection, north carolina state, nsa, nsa surveillance