Judge Calls Bluffs On Encryption Debate; Asks Apple To Explain Why Unlocking A Phone Is 'Unduly Burdensome'

from the no-more-FBI-shitposting? dept

Things on the Crypto War 2.0 battlefront just got a little more interesting. The administration won't seek backdoors and neither will Congress. The intelligence community has largely backed away from pressing for compliance from tech companies. This basically leaves FBI director James Comey (along with various law enforcement officials) twisting in his own "but people will die" wind.

Comey continues to insist encryption can be safely backdoored. He claims the real issue is companies like Apple and Google, who hire tons of "smart people" but won't put them to work solving his "going dark" problem for him. As pretty much the entirety of the tech community has pointed out, holes in encryption are holes in encryption and cannot ever be law enforcement-only.

We may get a chance to see who's telling the truth. As the Washington Post's Ellen Nakashima reports, a NY federal judge is calling everyone's bluff.

Magistrate Judge James Orenstein of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York released an order Friday that suggests he would not issue a ­government-sought order to compel the tech giant Apple to unlock a customer’s smartphone.

But before he can rule, the judge said, he wants Apple to explain whether the government’s request would be “unduly burdensome.”

The order details what the government is trying to accomplish, but has yet to succeed in doing.

In a sealed application filed on October 8, 2015, the government asks the court to issue an order pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, directing Apple, Inc. ("Apple") to assist in the execution of a federal search warrant by disabling the security of an Apple device that the government has lawfully seized pursuant to a warrant issued by this court. Law enforcement agents have discovered the device to be locked, and have tried and failed to bypass that lock. As a result, they cannot gain access to any data stored on the device notwithstanding the authority to do so conferred by this court's warrant.

The order demands Apple submit a response by October 15th. First, it seeks an answer as to whether the government's request is even "technically feasible." If it is, Apple will need to explain why complying with the order would be "unduly burdensome." If further discussion is needed, oral arguments from both parties will be heard a week from that date (at this point oral arguments are purely optional).

The order also closely examines the government's request in light of the All Writs Act. This would be the 1789 law the DOJ is trying to use to "cover" a gap between what Congress has specifically authorized and what the FBI is hoping to have granted. The presiding judge in this case -- Judge Gabriel Gorenstein -- has had previous experience with the FBI, phone manufacturers, and the All Writs Act, having dealt with a similar case back in 2005. In that case, he noted the government's request seemed to be a "Hail Mary play" designed to elude statutory restraints, the checks and balances built into the system, and put the magistrate judge in the position of granting something possibly beyond his power to grant.

The government thus asks me to read into the All Writs Act an empowerment of the judiciary to grant the executive branch authority to use investigative techniques either explicitly denied it by the legislative branch, or at a minimum omitted from a far-reaching and detailed statutory scheme that has received the legislature's intensive and repeated consideration. Such a broad reading of the statute invites an exercise of judicial activism that is breathtaking in its scope and fundamentally inconsistent with my understanding of the extent of my authority.

The All Writs Act is challenged here by Gorenstein again, nearly a decade later. After quoting a lengthy bit of report on "going dark" written by everyone's favorite terrorist-sympathizer Peter King, Gorenstein goes on to challenge Comey's public statements in light of his agency's desire to deploy a 1789 law to punch holes in 2015's phone encryption.

More specifically -- in a lengthy footnote -- Gorenstein basically calls Comey a hypocrite.

In a similarly-titled article published shortly before his Senate testimony, Director Corney discussed the extent to which companies like Apple should be compelled to ensure law enforcement access to the user content stored on its devices. Pertinent to the instant analysis of the All Writs Act, he wrote:

Democracies resolve such tensions through robust debate… It may be that, as a people, we decide the benefits here outweigh the costs and that there is no sensible, technically feasible way to optimize privacy and safety in this particular context, or that public safety folks will be able to do their job well enough in a world of universal strong encryption. Those are decisions Americans should make, but I think part of my job is [to] make sure the debate is informed by a reasonable understanding of the costs...

Director Corney's view about how such policy matters should be resolved is in tension, if not entirely at odds, with the robust application of the All Writs Act the government now advocates. Even if CALEA and the Congressional determination not to mandate "back door" access for law enforcement to encrypted devices does not foreclose reliance on the All Writs Act to grant the instant motion, using an aggressive interpretation of that statute's scope to short-circuit public debate on this controversy seems fundamentally inconsistent with the proposition that such important policy issues should be determined in the first instance by the legislative branch after public debate - as opposed to having them decided by the judiciary in sealed, ex parte proceedings.

The order also points out that the previous use of the All Writs Act to secure phone records is a completely different legal animal than the current demand that Apple open up a customer's phone and expose all it contains to federal investigators.

[U]nlike the Telephone Company, Apple is not "a highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the public[.]" It is a private-sector company that is free to choose to promote its customers' interest in privacy over the competing interest of law enforcement. Indeed, whereas in New York Tel Co. "it [could] hardly be contended that the Company ... had a substantial interest in not providing [the requested] assistance," it is entirely possible, if not likely, that Apple has thus far made a deliberate decision to balance those competing interests in favor of its customers' privacy preferences, as discussed further below.

Similarly, unlike the Telephone Company, which as the Supreme Court noted, regularly used pen registers for its own business purposes, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Apple has or wants the ability to defeat customer-installed security codes to access the encrypted data that its customers store on Apple devices after purchasing them.

Gorenstein also notes that the government has other ways of obtaining the contents of the phone, including the use of coercive measures to force the owner to unlock it. This has its own constitutional implications, but they are not under the purview of the magistrate judge. (There are also any number of third-party services utilized by the phone's owner that may be more amenable to turning over information in response to court orders.)

Gorenstein says the government's interpretation of the All Writs Act seems to exceed the intent of that law and completely bypasses the checks and balances built into the system -- namely, the legislative branch, which has notably not pushed for mandated backdoors no matter how much Comey and others have complained about the threat it poses to the safety of Americans.

In the end, though, Gorenstein says it comes down to Apple pointing out why decrypting this phone would be "unduly burdensome," if it is actually possible at all. Judging from the content of the order, it appears the Gorenstein is far more skeptical of the government's claims than Apple's, but we won't know for sure until he responds to Apple's response. If Apple responds with answers the government doesn't like, it may move to have any further discussion on the matter sealed, which means we may not find out where this stands until years from now.

Then again, it may mean nothing at all. As Nakashima points out, this particular battle may not provide the best chance to defeat Comey's backdoor fantasies.

Law enforcement officials said Saturday that the device at issue is a phone that runs on an older version of Apple’s operating system that Apple can unlock.

Filed Under: all writs act, burden, encryption, fbi, going dark, james comey, james orenstein
Companies: apple

White House Takes The Cowardly Option: Refuses To Say No To Encryption Backdoors, Will Quietly Ask Companies

from the ridiculous dept

Last month, we wrote about a document leaked to the Washington Post that showed the three "options" that the White House was considering for responding to the debate about backdooring encryption. The document made it clear that the White House knew that there was zero chance that any legislation mandating encryption backdoors would pass. But the question then was what to do about it: take a strong stand on the importance of freedom and privacy, and make it clear that the US would not mandate backdoors... or take the sleazy way out and say "no new legislation for now." As we said at the time, option 1 was the only real option. You take a stand. You talk about the importance of encryption in protecting the public.

However, it appears that the White House has taken the cowardly approach. Yesterday, the leading voice in favor of mandating encryption backdoors, FBI Director James Comey, announced that the administration would not push for legislation to mandate backdoors... for now. But it will still push for backdoors quietly behind doors with companies.

After months of deliberation, the Obama administration has made a long-awaited decision on the thorny issue of how to deal with encrypted communications: It will not — for now — call for legislation requiring companies to decode messages for law enforcement.

Rather, the administration will continue trying to persuade companies that have moved to encrypt their customers’ data to create a way for the government to still peer into people’s data when needed for criminal or terrorism investigations.

“The administration has decided not to seek a legislative remedy now, but it makes sense to continue the conversations with industry,” FBI Director James B. Comey said at a Senate hearing Thursday of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

This is a totally bullshit response. Of course the administration isn't asking for legislation: because everyone knows (1) it couldn't pass and (2) it would be a really, really stupid thing to ask for. In that leaked document last month, the administration noted that with this option public interest groups "would likely see this outcome as a solid win." They're wrong. This option is bullshit. It's one notch up from literally "the least they could do." It doesn't help anyone. It provides cover to countries that do want to undermine the tech industry and mandate backdoors. It leaves open the ways to pressure tech companies to secretly include backdoors that undermine everyone's safety. And, worst of all, it takes away any and all "high ground" positions for the administration to point out that it doesn't want to undermine the safety and security of the American public.

In short, the administration didn't take the strong stand when the strong stand was the only feasible path. There are enough people within the administration who know this is the stupid choice, and yet they still took it. A very weak move from an administration that should know better (and does know better), just to please some technologically-clueless law enforcement folks.

Filed Under: cybersecurity, encryption, encryption backdoors, going dark, james comey, obama administration, white house

As US Turns Away From Idea Of Backdooring Crypto, David Cameron Has A Problem

from the saber-rattling dept

Last week, Mike wrote about what seems an important shift in US government policy on encryption, as the White House finally recognizes that adding backdoors isn't a sensible option. That leaves a big question mark over what the UK will do, since David Cameron and intelligence officials have been hinting repeatedly that they wanted to undermine encryption in some unspecified way. Just last week, the new head of MI5, the UK's domestic intelligence service, gave the first-ever live media interview by a senior British intelligence official. Asked about the alleged danger of parts of the Internet "going dark", he said:

"It requires the cooperation of the companies who run and provide services over the internet that we all use. It is in no one's interest that terrorists would be able to plot and communicate out of the reach of any authorities with the proper legal power."

That's from The Guardian, and another article there points out that the UK government's strategy of trying to get the big US online services to co-operate now looks in trouble:

If the White House does drop the battle [over backdoors] it will leave Britain with little option but to accept the widespread use of encryption. The UK's ability to directly lobby the big American technology firms is limited, and in a report leaked in June the former British diplomat Sir Nigel Sheinwald said that a new international treaty was the only way to get the co-operation of the companies. Without the support of the White House such a treaty seems unlikely.

Without the co-operation of the tech firms what the UK government can do when facing widespread encryption is limited. In June the Home Office confirmed that, for extreme cases, it was considering inserting "black box" probes into the transatlantic cables, to collect data leaving and entering the UK. But if the communications were encrypted on their way to the US, such collection would have little value.

Of course, a lot depends on the detailed policy adopted by the US government, and whether the US intelligence community manages to exploit any future terrorist attacks to get backdoors on the agenda again. But for the moment, it seems that David Cameron's anti-encryption saber-rattling will remain just that.

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Filed Under: backdoors, david cameron, encryption, going dark, mandates, uk

India's Government Looking At Mandating Backdoors In Encryption

from the selling-out-the-people-for-the-good-of-the-people dept

Here in the US, the FBI really really really wants to be able to let itself in your backdoor if it feels the urge to paw through your personal communications. (Perhaps the FBI's lack of respect for encryption is due to its own unwillingness to encrypt its communications...) Congress isn't pushing this forward and the administration has indicated it won't back an encryption backdoor mandate. Over in Europe, a mixed bag of terrorism-related legislation is going the other way, pushing for "good guys only" holes in encryption, with any negative use by criminals and foreign governments apparently being the price that must be paid to secure whatever liberty still remains once the "securing" is completed.

India's government -- never one to shy away from overreach, censorship or other bad ideas -- similarly sees encryption backdoors as A Good Thing. A draft proposal from India Department of Electronics and Technology, posted by essential government doc stash Public Intelligence, indicates that the government may be looking to mandate a variety of encryption backdoors in the near future.

It starts out with some positive thinking…

The recognition of the need to protect privacy and increase the security of the Internet and associated information systems have resulted in the development of policies that favour the spread of encryption worldwide. The Information Technology Act 2000 provides for prescribing modes or methods for encryption (Section 84A) and for decryption (Section 69). Taking into account the need to protect information assets, international trends and concerns of national security, the cryptographic policy for domestic use supports the broad use of cryptography in ways that facilitates individual / businesses privacy, international economic competitiveness in all sectors including Government.

...before cutting the floor away entirely.

This policy is not applicable to sensitive departments / agencies of the government designated for performing sensitive and strategic roles. This policy is applicable to all Central and State Government Departments (including sensitive Departments / Agencies while performing non-strategic & non-operational role), all statutory organizations, executive bodies, business and commercial establishments, including public sector undertakings and academic institutions and all citizens (including Personnel of Government / Business performing non-official / personal functions).

The "policy" is mandated backdoors -- not for "sensitive" and "strategic" government agencies, but for everyone else, from other government agencies to "all citizens."

The suggested policy splits up the country's population in three groups, with businesses and citizens designated as "B" and "C." The government says, yes, use encryption for better privacy and security... but don't lock us out.

B / C groups (i.e. B2C, C2B Sectors) may use Encryption for storage and communication. Encryption algorithms and key sizes will be prescribed by the Government through Notification from time to time. On demand, the user shall reproduce the same Plain text and encrypted text pairs using the software / hardware used to produce the encrypted text from the given plain text. All information shall be stored by the concerned B / C entity for 90 days from the date of transaction and made available to Law Enforcement Agencies as and when demanded in line with the provisions of the laws of the country. In case of communication with foreign entity, the primary responsibility of providing readable plain-text along with the corresponding Encrypted information shall rest on entity (B or C) located in India.

And any ISP looking to provide service in India -- including those not actually located in India -- is expected to give the government access to encrypted transmissions.

Service Providers located within and outside India, using Encryption technology for providing any type of services in India must enter into an agreement with the Government for providing such services in India. Government will designate an appropriate agency for entering into such an agreement with the Service provider located within and outside India. The users of any group G,B or C taking such services from Service Providers . are also responsible to provide plain text when demanded.

On top of that, creators of encryption products would be required to register with the government and submit to a "security evaluation." Presumably, the evaluation will include discussion of where to best place backdoors and/or involve a handover of Golden Keys.

The proposal also suggests the government take a more active role in the development of "indigenous" encryption products. While not specifically detailed in the draft, one assumes any government-produced, pre-compromised encryption products will make their debut accompanied by mandates requiring use going forward, if not retroactively as well.

For what it's worth, the Indian government is accepting comments on the proposed policy until October 16th. Presumably, the draft will move forward despite any negative feedback, given the country's track record on internet freedom and human rights. Factor in the threat of terrorism, and there's very little chance the government won't find some way to push this through mostly unaltered.

Filed Under: backdoors, encryption, going dark, india, mandates

Having Lost The Debate On Backdooring Encryption, Intelligence Community Plans To Wait Until Next Terrorist Attack

from the this-is-ridiculous dept

We already wrote about the Obama administration considering its options on how to handle the whole "going dark" debate concerning backdooring encryption. The key point in all of that is that there is no chance in hell that backdoors will be mandated by law. The administration recgonizes that's a lost cause. However, within the Washington Post's article that revealed this, there was also a somewhat disturbing argument from the losing side of this battle. The intelligence community seems to be gleefully awaiting the next terrorist event, knowing that it can then reintroduce its push for backdoors:

Although “the legislative environment is very hostile today,” the intelligence community’s top lawyer, Robert S. Litt, said to colleagues in an August e-mail, which was obtained by The Post, “it could turn in the event of a terrorist attack or criminal event where strong encryption can be shown to have hindered law enforcement.”

There is value, he said, in “keeping our options open for such a situation.”

In other words, Litt admits that his side has lost this battle, but he doesn't want the administration to come out totally against legislation, because, you know, if there's an attack, then maybe the idiots in the public will finally accept the intelligence community shoving backdoors down their throat. After all, such a plan worked out pretty well with the PATRIOT Act, which took a bunch of bad and rejected ideas and rushed them into law. In fact, it's almost amazing that the law enforcement community didn't get backdooring encryption into the PATRIOT Act back in 2001 in the first place...

Either way, given this, it really looks like Litt is hoping for another attack to get through, just so he can better spy on people. Why are these people in positions of power again?

Filed Under: backdoors, encryption, going dark, mandates, nsa, robert litt, surveillance, white house

White House Realizes Mandating Backdoors To Encryption Isn't Going To Happen

from the option-1-please dept

Over the last few months, I've heard rumblings and conversations from multiple people within the Obama administration suggesting that they don't support the FBI's crazy push to back door all encryption. From Congress, I heard that there was nowhere near enough support for any sort of legislative backdoor mandate. Both were good things to hear, but I worried that I was still only hearing from one side, so that there could still be serious efforts saying the opposite as well. However, the Washington Post has been leaked quite a document that outlines three options that the Obama administration can take in response to the whole "going dark" question. And the good news? None of them involve mandating encryption. Basically, the key message in this document is that no one believes legislation is a realistic option right now (more on that in another post coming shortly).

That's big!

The document's three options can be summarized as follows:

1. Option 1: Do the right thing, admit that backdooring encryption is a bad idea and dumb, and stand up for real cybersecurity by saying that more encryption is generally good for society. This will make lots of people happy -- including civil liberties folks and the tech industry, and it will also do more to protect the public. It will also help the most with many foreign countries in showing that the US isn't just trying to spy on everyone -- though it may piss off a few countries (mainly the UK) who have doubled down on backdooring encryption. Also, it will undermine China's plan to backdoor encryption as well. Let's call this the right option.
2. Option 2: Yeah, we know what the right thing to do is, but we'll take a half-assed approach to it to try to appease the FBI/law enforcement folks and not come out nearly as strongly against legislation. We'll say there's no legislation, but we'll at least leave the door open to it. In private, we may still push tech companies to backdoor stuff. This will anger lots of folks, but maybe (the administration believes) some civil liberties types will think it's enough of a win to celebrate. Then we pretend that we can hold some sort of "discussion" between people who disagree.
3. Option 3: We totally punt on the issue and don't really say anything. If we do say something, we say that this issue needs a lot more discussion and study (just like people have been saying for the last year). In other words, endless cryptowars with no end in sight.

Clearly, Option 1 is the only sensible option, and the report lays out some pretty strong arguments for why coming out against backdooring encryption would be good. It would actually make the tech industry much more willing to work with the government in productive ways, rather than stupid, privacy and security-destroying ways. It would actually better protect the public and it would stop authoritarian regimes from using our own language against us to break encryption. The cons are basically that law enforcement might whine about it. Well, the administration actually says that it "provides no immediate solution to the challenges that the expanding use of encryption poses to law enforcement and national security" but given that law enforcement still hasn't done a good job showing this is a real problem, that's not really a big deal.

In fact, law enforcement is still relying on made up ghost stories rather than any real evidence that encryption is a problem.

So, now the big question is which option the administration will choose. Will it stand up and take leadership on this issue (Option 1), thereby actually protecting Americans? Or will it do a variety of half-assed measures believing that it has to support "both sides" or some crap like that? From the leaked report, it appears that if it chooses either Option 1 or 2, the White House will make a public statement on the matter within the next few weeks.

Filed Under: backdoors, cybersecurity, encryption, going dark, james comey, obama administration, white house

Apple Refused Court Order To Decrypt iMessages For DOJ; DOJ Debates What To Do

from the warning-shot dept

For many months now, there's been a war of words over the whole "going dark" issue, with the two loudest participants being the DOJ demanding backdoors to encryption, and Apple standing up and speaking out loudly about the importance of encryption. Sooner or later you knew the two would meet in a legal situation -- and now it's happened, with Apple clearly winning round one. The NY Times is reporting that the DOJ obtained a court order earlier this summer, demanding that Apple hand over decrypted iMessage messages (in real time) for an investigation. Apple, apparently, told the DOJ that those messages are encrypted, and it has no way to comply with the order. This is exactly the scenario that everyone's been chattering about for the past year. And apparently, people inside the DOJ are debating what to do about it:

The case, coming after several others in which similar requests were rebuffed, prompted some senior Justice Department and F.B.I. officials to advocate taking Apple to court, several current and former law enforcement officials said.

However, the article notes that any plans to take Apple to court have "been shelved for now." The rest of the article focuses on a somewhat related situation that we've discussed in the past, involving Microsoft refusing to comply with a DOJ subpoena to hand over emails that are stored on an Irish server. The issue in that case is not about encryption, so much as jurisdiction and the differences between a warrant and a subpoena. That case heads back to court this week. However, the issue about encryption and demands to decrypt communications or stored data will continue for quite some time.

The article notes that Apple did turn over some information, which the DOJ took as a sign of good faith:

In the drug and gun investigation this summer, Apple eventually turned over some stored iCloud messages. While they were not the real-time texts the government most wanted, officials said they saw it as a sign of cooperation.

Of course, the major difference here is that the iMessages are encrypted end-to-end, while data stored in iCloud is not, meaning that Apple actually has access to that content. Many have pointed out that in most cases, the important information that the DOJ will want is probably backed up in iCloud anyway, so perhaps that keeps the DOJ from actually going after Apple for the time being. But, still, it is noteworthy that a clash has already happened. Sooner or later, assuming Apple doesn't give in to the backdoor demands, the DOJ is likely to take someone to court over this... Perhaps it's just waiting for a company with pockets not quite as deep as Apple's.

Filed Under: doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, imessages
Companies: apple, microsoft

FTC Commissioner Says The Public Needs Strong Encryption, Not Backdoors

from the good-move dept

It would appear that the FTC is quickly emerging as the counterforce to the FBI/NSA's push to backdoor encryption. We recently wrote about how the FTC's CTO, Ashkan Soltani, put up a blog post extolling the virtues of full disk encryption for devices, noting that it can even help to prevent or solve crimes (contrary to the scare stories you hear from the FBI and other law enforcement officials). And now, pretty quickly after that, FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny, has written a post for the Huffington Post arguing in favor of strong encryption as well. After discussing the range of threats, as well as the rise of personal data being collected by services, she notes that strong encryption is now being used to better protect consumers:

Encouragingly, many companies are taking meaningful steps to improve their security practices including greater use of encryption technology for data in transit and at rest, whether it be stored in the cloud or on devices. Encryption has helped protect the information of millions of consumers -- for example, protecting credit card information when a merchant is breached or protecting passwords when a popular website is hacked. The impact of major breaches may also be reduced the more that users' data and communications are encrypted end-to-end.

Moreover, there are more products on the market providing consumers with better security and privacy tools -- including encryption as the default for information stored on smartphones, apps that use end-to-end encryption, and services that encrypt data on devices and then back them up in the cloud. Competition in the marketplace of security and privacy technology holds considerable promise for consumers.

She also discusses how any attempt to backdoor encryption could create serious harm for future innovation and our economy:

This debate, sometimes called the crypto wars, is hardly new -- it has been going on in some form or another for decades. But what is changing is the extent to which we are using connected technology in every facet of our daily lives. If consumers cannot trust the security of their devices, we could end up stymieing innovation and introducing needless risk into our personal security. In this environment, policy makers should carefully weigh the potential impact of any proposals that may weaken privacy and security protections for consumers.

It's great to see the FTC coming out so publicly on this issue. I hope that others in other parts of the government will do the same as well. Unfortunately, thanks to the overly vocal FBI and NSA, many believe that the entire federal government believes that we should backdoor encryption, and that sets up a very unfortunate "us v. them" attitude between technologists and the government. Instead, it's clear that many, many people in government support strong encryption and are against backdoors. It's good to see more of them speaking up and making their voices heard.

Filed Under: encryption, fbi, ftc, going dark, james comey, mobile encryption, nsa, security, terrell mcsweeny

FTC CTO: Full Disk Encryption Is Important In Preventing Crime

from the taking-a-stand dept

While the FBI and NSA continue their campaign to fight against allowing encryption for devices, it's clear that not everyone in the government agrees. It does appear that there's a bit of a fight going on within the administration over where to come down (as President Obama himself admitted), and in a recent blog post, it seems pretty clear where the FTC comes down in this debate. The FTC's CTO, Ashkan Soltani, who has long been a strong user-privacy advocate (and before joining the FTC helped in some of the reporting on the Snowden documents), wrote the blog post celebrating the virtues of full disk encryption and other "end user device controls." It starts out by noting that when he recently lost his own laptop, he wasn't that worried, thanks to the fact that it was encrypted.

Strong end-user privacy and security controls, such as device encryption and firmware passwords, not only protect personal information from unwanted access – they can also make it easier to recover lost or stolen devices as well.

Last month, I had the misfortune of having a personal laptop stolen.

Fortunately for me, while I was a bit bummed about losing my two-year-old laptop, I backup regularly and always enable disk encryption which is an important step to protect the information stored on the hard-disk from unwanted access by criminals, employers, or other actors (with the exception of very sophisticated adversaries).

He notes that this actually allowed him to help track down the device, because whoever ended up with the "useless" laptop tried to bring it to an Apple Genius Bar, which resulted in Soltani receiving an email.

Fast forward to a few weeks later, when I received an email to my personal account notifying me of an upcoming Apple Genius Bar visit. I was initially confused by the email but soon realized that it's probably the thief (or the undiscerning buyer) of my laptop trying to take it into Apple for repair – likely because they’re unable to use it without knowing the firmware password I set.

I immediately began calling local law enforcement and the nearby Apple stores notifying them of the theft and this development. After a few phone calls and the help of a fantastic Sergeant in the Local Crimes Unit of the Sacramento Police department, I was able to coordinate an agreement whereby Apple would notify law enforcement if the new user brought the machine in for repair. After an initial disappointment on account of the suspect skipping his Genius Bar reservation, a representative from Apple Customer Relations notified me that the device was brought into another store and they were coordinating with Sacramento Police Department to return it to me. I’m unclear as to whether they were able to track down the original thief.

And thus, the FTC's CTO makes it clear that full disk encryption has benefits beyond even just keeping your own data safe:

In the end, strong end-user controls like device encryption and firmware passwords not only protect sensitive info stored on the device, they also prevent criminals from utilizing stolen property. The more devices feature strong end-user controls, the less likely thieves can profit from their theft on the open market.

Given that the FBI is supposed to be interested in preventing crime, you'd think James Comey would support that kind of thing...

Filed Under: ashkan soltani, encryption, ftc, full disk encryption, going dark, laptops

Jeb Bush Claims That Creating Encryption Harms America

from the wanna-try-that-one-again? dept

Sometimes you have to wonder if the various political candidates are trying to lose the knowledgeable techie vote. Chris Christie has been strongly pro-surveillance, and it's not hard to guess where he would come down on the whole "backdooring encryption" debate. However, few of the other candidates have been directly asked about that -- though that may be changing. Jeb Bush has now stated that he's against encryption, because, apparently it harms America.

“If you create encryption, it makes it harder for the American government to do its job—while protecting civil liberties—to make sure that evildoers aren’t in our midst,” Bush said in South Carolina at an event sponsored by Americans for Peace, Prosperity, and Security, a group with close ties to military contractors.

Bush said “we need to find a new arrangement with Silicon Valley in this regard because I think this is a very dangerous kind of situation.”

This is, of course, mostly deeply wrong, while also partially right, but for the wrong reasons. First of all, if we want Americans to be safer we should be demanding more encryption, not less. It is a confused state of mind that, just as we keep hearing about more and more data being leaked and hacked into whether by individual malicious hackers or, potentially, nation states, thinks the "answer" to this is somehow less security, rather than more.

However, in a weird way, Bush is actually correct. In some instances, encryption actually does make the government's job harder. But that's a feature, not a bug. Bush should, perhaps, listen to his brother's former Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff who recently came out against backdooring encryption, noting:

... we do not historically organize our society to make it maximally easy for law enforcement, even with court orders, to get information. We often make trade-offs and we make it more difficult. If that were not the case then why wouldn’t the government simply say all of these [takes out phone] have to be configured so they’re constantly recording everything that we say and do and then when you get a court order it gets turned over and we wind up convicting ourselves. So I don’t think socially we do that.

This is an important point that Jeb Bush (and many folks in favor of backdooring encryption) don't seem to get.

Separately, from Bush's quote, it appears he's not even familiar with the details of the debate (not that this stops him from opining ignorantly about it). By saying that merely "making" encryption is bad for America, he's just wrong. The debate isn't about making encryption. It's about whether or not encryption should be (or, realistically, can be) compromised via some sort of backdoor. Experts have explained why this actually makes us all worse off, but it's rather disturbing that people like Jeb Bush have summarized the "we should backdoor encyrption" side of things as "we should be against encryption."

Filed Under: cybersecurity, encryption, going dark, jeb bush, privacy