The FBI Claims Failure To Guess Password Will Make Data 'Permanently Inaccessible,' Which Isn't True

from the all-in-service-of-future-writs-and-exploitations dept

The FBI's attempt to force Apple to help it break into an iPhone hasn't been going well. A lot of that has to do with the FBI itself, which hasn't exactly been honest in its portrayal of the case. It tried to fight off claims that it was trying to set precedent by claiming it was just about this one phone… which worked right up until it dropped details about twelve other phones it couldn't break into.

Comey's protestations of "no precedent" were further undermined by law enforcement groups filing briefs in support of the FBI that basically stated they, too, would like Apple to be forced to comply with orders like these. And then there was the whole thing about some "dormant cyber pathogen" that was basically laughed off the internet within hours of its appearance.

There were also claims that Apple has done this sort of thing 70 times in the past but was just being inexplicably obstinate this time for reasons the FBI could not comprehend. But that wasn't true either. Apple does provide law enforcement with access to data it can retrieve from its end -- which is nothing like writing software that would allow the FBI (and anyone else who gets their hands on it -- or who makes similar demands following an FBI win) to bypass the security features of its phones.

Dan Gillmor of the ACLU has taken another look at the FBI's motion to compel and found it has misrepresented how Apple's "auto-erase" (which occurs after a certain number of failed login attempts) actually works.

The FBI has been unable to make attempts to determine the passcode to access the SUBJECT DEVICE because Apple has written, or “coded,” its operating systems with a user-enabled “auto-erase function” that would, if enabled, result in the permanent destruction of the required encryption key material after 10 failed attempts at the [sic] entering the correct passcode (meaning that, after 10 failed attempts, the information on the device becomes permanently inaccessible)…

That's not what actually happens, Gillmor points out. All data is not erased once 10 failed attempts are recorded. An agency with as many technically-astute employees -- as well as access to a variety of data recovery and software forensic tools -- should know -- or likely does know -- that it doesn't work this way. The phone doesn't erase all of the data, nor does it make it "permanently inaccessible." Instead, it just destroys one of the keys to the data.

The key that is erased in this case is called the “file system key”—and (unlike the hardwired “UID” key that we discussed in our previous blog post) it is not burned into the phone’s processor, but instead merely stored in what Apple calls “Effaceable Storage,” which is just a term for part of the flash memory of the phone designed to be easily erasable.

The data is still intact. The front door isn't. But the FBI can work around this by preventing the key from being destroyed in the first place -- without Apple's help.

So the file system key (which the FBI claims it is scared will be destroyed by the phone’s auto-erase security protection) is stored in the Effaceable Storage on the iPhone in the “NAND” flash memory. All the FBI needs to do to avoid any irreversible auto erase is simple to copy that flash memory (which includes the Effaceable Storage) before it tries 10 passcode attempts. It can then re-try indefinitely, because it can restore the NAND flash memory from its backup copy.

Even if the FBI fails in its attempts to brute force the code, the data on the phone remains intact. By working with a copy of the flash memory, the FBI can restore the phone to its "10 guesses" state repeatedly until it finally guesses the code.

The FBI can simply remove this chip from the circuit board (“desolder” it), connect it to a device capable of reading and writing NAND flash, and copy all of its data. It can then replace the chip, and start testing passcodes. If it turns out that the auto-erase feature is on, and the Effaceable Storage gets erased, they can remove the chip, copy the original information back in, and replace it. If they plan to do this many times, they can attach a “test socket” to the circuit board that makes it easy and fast to do this kind of chip swapping.

It's literally unbelievable that the FBI doesn't have access to the tools to perform this or the expertise to get it done. Which leads Gillmor back to the inescapable conclusion: this isn't about one iPhone or even twelve of them. This is about convincing a judge to read the All Writs Act the way the FBI would like it to be read -- a reading that would not only push the envelope for what it can demand from unrelated parties in the future, but that would also give it software to modify and exploit.

If it gets to that point, device users are going to have to start eyeing software/firmware updates very suspiciously.

The FBI wants to weaken the ecosystem we all depend on for maintenance of our all-too-vulnerable devices. If they win, future software updates will present users with a troubling dilemma. When we're asked to install a software update, we won’t know whether it was compelled by a government agency (foreign or domestic), or whether it truly represents the best engineering our chosen platform has to offer.

This is the end game for the FBI, even though it doesn't appear to realize the gravity of the situation. To it, Apple is the obstacle standing between it and the wealth of information it imagines might possibly be on that phone. Even is Apple is forced into compliance and the phone contains nothing of use, it will still have its precedent and its hacking tool and we'll be headed towards a world where patch notes contain warrant canaries.

Filed Under: all writs act, burden, doj, fbi, hacking, iphones, passwords, security
Companies: aclu, apple

Judge Calls Bluffs On Encryption Debate; Asks Apple To Explain Why Unlocking A Phone Is 'Unduly Burdensome'

from the no-more-FBI-shitposting? dept

Things on the Crypto War 2.0 battlefront just got a little more interesting. The administration won't seek backdoors and neither will Congress. The intelligence community has largely backed away from pressing for compliance from tech companies. This basically leaves FBI director James Comey (along with various law enforcement officials) twisting in his own "but people will die" wind.

Comey continues to insist encryption can be safely backdoored. He claims the real issue is companies like Apple and Google, who hire tons of "smart people" but won't put them to work solving his "going dark" problem for him. As pretty much the entirety of the tech community has pointed out, holes in encryption are holes in encryption and cannot ever be law enforcement-only.

We may get a chance to see who's telling the truth. As the Washington Post's Ellen Nakashima reports, a NY federal judge is calling everyone's bluff.

Magistrate Judge James Orenstein of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York released an order Friday that suggests he would not issue a ­government-sought order to compel the tech giant Apple to unlock a customer’s smartphone.

But before he can rule, the judge said, he wants Apple to explain whether the government’s request would be “unduly burdensome.”

The order details what the government is trying to accomplish, but has yet to succeed in doing.

In a sealed application filed on October 8, 2015, the government asks the court to issue an order pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, directing Apple, Inc. ("Apple") to assist in the execution of a federal search warrant by disabling the security of an Apple device that the government has lawfully seized pursuant to a warrant issued by this court. Law enforcement agents have discovered the device to be locked, and have tried and failed to bypass that lock. As a result, they cannot gain access to any data stored on the device notwithstanding the authority to do so conferred by this court's warrant.

The order demands Apple submit a response by October 15th. First, it seeks an answer as to whether the government's request is even "technically feasible." If it is, Apple will need to explain why complying with the order would be "unduly burdensome." If further discussion is needed, oral arguments from both parties will be heard a week from that date (at this point oral arguments are purely optional).

The order also closely examines the government's request in light of the All Writs Act. This would be the 1789 law the DOJ is trying to use to "cover" a gap between what Congress has specifically authorized and what the FBI is hoping to have granted. The presiding judge in this case -- Judge Gabriel Gorenstein -- has had previous experience with the FBI, phone manufacturers, and the All Writs Act, having dealt with a similar case back in 2005. In that case, he noted the government's request seemed to be a "Hail Mary play" designed to elude statutory restraints, the checks and balances built into the system, and put the magistrate judge in the position of granting something possibly beyond his power to grant.

The government thus asks me to read into the All Writs Act an empowerment of the judiciary to grant the executive branch authority to use investigative techniques either explicitly denied it by the legislative branch, or at a minimum omitted from a far-reaching and detailed statutory scheme that has received the legislature's intensive and repeated consideration. Such a broad reading of the statute invites an exercise of judicial activism that is breathtaking in its scope and fundamentally inconsistent with my understanding of the extent of my authority.

The All Writs Act is challenged here by Gorenstein again, nearly a decade later. After quoting a lengthy bit of report on "going dark" written by everyone's favorite terrorist-sympathizer Peter King, Gorenstein goes on to challenge Comey's public statements in light of his agency's desire to deploy a 1789 law to punch holes in 2015's phone encryption.

More specifically -- in a lengthy footnote -- Gorenstein basically calls Comey a hypocrite.

In a similarly-titled article published shortly before his Senate testimony, Director Corney discussed the extent to which companies like Apple should be compelled to ensure law enforcement access to the user content stored on its devices. Pertinent to the instant analysis of the All Writs Act, he wrote:

Democracies resolve such tensions through robust debate… It may be that, as a people, we decide the benefits here outweigh the costs and that there is no sensible, technically feasible way to optimize privacy and safety in this particular context, or that public safety folks will be able to do their job well enough in a world of universal strong encryption. Those are decisions Americans should make, but I think part of my job is [to] make sure the debate is informed by a reasonable understanding of the costs...

Director Corney's view about how such policy matters should be resolved is in tension, if not entirely at odds, with the robust application of the All Writs Act the government now advocates. Even if CALEA and the Congressional determination not to mandate "back door" access for law enforcement to encrypted devices does not foreclose reliance on the All Writs Act to grant the instant motion, using an aggressive interpretation of that statute's scope to short-circuit public debate on this controversy seems fundamentally inconsistent with the proposition that such important policy issues should be determined in the first instance by the legislative branch after public debate - as opposed to having them decided by the judiciary in sealed, ex parte proceedings.

The order also points out that the previous use of the All Writs Act to secure phone records is a completely different legal animal than the current demand that Apple open up a customer's phone and expose all it contains to federal investigators.

[U]nlike the Telephone Company, Apple is not "a highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the public[.]" It is a private-sector company that is free to choose to promote its customers' interest in privacy over the competing interest of law enforcement. Indeed, whereas in New York Tel Co. "it [could] hardly be contended that the Company ... had a substantial interest in not providing [the requested] assistance," it is entirely possible, if not likely, that Apple has thus far made a deliberate decision to balance those competing interests in favor of its customers' privacy preferences, as discussed further below.

Similarly, unlike the Telephone Company, which as the Supreme Court noted, regularly used pen registers for its own business purposes, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Apple has or wants the ability to defeat customer-installed security codes to access the encrypted data that its customers store on Apple devices after purchasing them.

Gorenstein also notes that the government has other ways of obtaining the contents of the phone, including the use of coercive measures to force the owner to unlock it. This has its own constitutional implications, but they are not under the purview of the magistrate judge. (There are also any number of third-party services utilized by the phone's owner that may be more amenable to turning over information in response to court orders.)

Gorenstein says the government's interpretation of the All Writs Act seems to exceed the intent of that law and completely bypasses the checks and balances built into the system -- namely, the legislative branch, which has notably not pushed for mandated backdoors no matter how much Comey and others have complained about the threat it poses to the safety of Americans.

In the end, though, Gorenstein says it comes down to Apple pointing out why decrypting this phone would be "unduly burdensome," if it is actually possible at all. Judging from the content of the order, it appears the Gorenstein is far more skeptical of the government's claims than Apple's, but we won't know for sure until he responds to Apple's response. If Apple responds with answers the government doesn't like, it may move to have any further discussion on the matter sealed, which means we may not find out where this stands until years from now.

Then again, it may mean nothing at all. As Nakashima points out, this particular battle may not provide the best chance to defeat Comey's backdoor fantasies.

Law enforcement officials said Saturday that the device at issue is a phone that runs on an older version of Apple’s operating system that Apple can unlock.

Filed Under: all writs act, burden, encryption, fbi, going dark, james comey, james orenstein
Companies: apple

New Libel Law Proposed In The UK; Gives ISPs Two Weeks To Respond

from the a-fortnight? dept

It's no secret that the UK's defamation laws are extremely problematic. They've longed been used for "libel tourism" as well as to silence critics. There's been a lot of talk in the UK about fixing those issues, but little action. Now it appears that a new libel bill has been introduced that, among other things, will give ISPs a 14-day window to respond to claims of libel. This seems sort of half-way between the typical "notice-and-takedown" and "notice-and-notice" proposals we've seen elsewhere. A two week window could actually give an ISP the chance to get a response or a challenge from the creator of the content before taking it down. However, not surprisingly, some are claiming this window is way too long, and ISPs should be forced to take down any content that is called libelous.

The bill does have many good aspects, including a defense for "responsible publication on matters of public interest," but appears to leave out a lot of important things as well, including shifting the burden of proof from the accused to the accuser. It's hard to believe that anyone, in this day and age, could possibly still have a libel law that puts the burden on the accused to prove they didn't libel someone. It's too bad that the UK doesn't appear ready to fix that glaring problem just yet.

Filed Under: burden, defamation, libel, libel tourism, safe harbors, uk