James Clapper Says Nerd Magic Can Solve Terrorist Content Filtering, Create Safe Encryption Backdoors

from the harry-potter-but-for-lawful-access dept

Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper went from having a comfortable, shadowy job in a comfortable, shadowy office to being the face of the American surveillance state after the Snowden leaks. Instead of only being periodically hassled by a couple of Intelligence Committee members (mainly Ron Wyden), Clapper was called to account for the NSA's apparent surveillance sins. And he handled it badly.

After plenty of evasive discussion, Clapper finally said, "Oh, you mean those phone records," and ushered in a new era of slightly less bulk metadata collection. But he still made the most of his speaking opportunities to pin the woes of the terrorized world on Snowden, noting his leaks "sped up encryption adoption by seven years." It was an oddly precise estimate, especially given the contradicting evidence showing terrorists hadn't really changed their communication methods in response to the Snowden leaks.

Clapper is no longer the Intelligence Director, but he's still beating the encryption drum during interviews. And it appears he's aligned himself with another former government employee, James Comey. Speaking to the National Press Club in Australia, Clapper called for both harder nerding and tech companies being a (possibly compelled) source of light in the growing darkness.

As governments around the world face the ongoing threat of extremism, former US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper says tech companies have a social "responsibility" to take better care of what appears on their platforms.

[...]

"I do think there is a role to play here in some screening and filtering of what appears in social media," he said.

"In the same way that these companies very directly capitalise on the information that we make available to them and exploit it, it seems that that same ingenuity could be applied in a sensitive way to filtering out or at least identifying some of the more egregious material that appears on social media."

How social media companies are supposed to auto-filter all terrorist content is, of course, left unexplained. When companies like Facebook can't even filter human breasts without screwing it up, it's a stretch to say the problem of terrorist content and communications is just a coding breakthrough away. Considering the vast amount of content posted everyday on major networks, it's not as simple as applying a bit more mental elbow grease. Much of this is relegated to algorithms, simply because there's not enough manpower in the world to handle the input of billions of social media users.

Clapper also called for tech companies to "work with" law enforcement to provide access to encrypted communications.

Clapper suggested that cooperation could mean "law enforcement particularly would be allowed access to encryption" if it could be done in a "safeguarded way."

"I hear the argument about if you share once with one person and it's forever compromised. I'm not sure I really buy into that," he said.

It really doesn't matter whether Clapper "buys" this or not. It's a fact. And it's a fact that's been demonstrated in explicit detail by the leak of NSA software exploits. A hole is hole -- one that can be used for good or for evil. The world's top intelligence agency can't even keep its exploits secure. How are we expected to believe law enforcement agencies are going to keep these backdoors from being discovered and exploited?

Clapper grooved on the Comey vibe during this talk, acting as though tech expertise is some sort of dark art used deliberately to stick it to The Man. Anyone who uses the phrase "miraculous technological things like iPhones" shouldn't expect to have their assertions taken seriously. It suggests the person making them still has trouble distinguishing between innovation and magic. Consequently, it's these sort of people who continually claim "safe" backdoors are possible, rather than being the mythical deus ex machina they actually are.

Filed Under: backdoors, encryption, filtering, james clapper, nerd harder

Australia's AG Says Public Will Be Cool With Encryption Backdoors Because They Use Facebook

from the talking-(out-of-your-ass)-points dept

In what has become standard operating procedure following a terrorist attack in any part of the (western) world, a top government official is calling for encryption backdoors. This call is being made despite the lack of evidence supporting the theory terrorists are encrypting their communications. And this particular call, being made by Australian Attorney General George Brandis, is being made despite Brandis claiming he's not calling for encryption backdoors.

Shot:

Brandis told the Sun Herald he plans to give agencies freer access to encrypted messaging, insisting the government didn't want to force companies like Facebook and Apple to have a "back door" into its messaging platforms.

Chaser:

"At one point or more of that process, access to the encrypted communication is essential for intelligence and law enforcement," Brandis said.

"If there are encryption keys then those encryption keys have to be put at the disposal of the authorities."

You can call a backdoor "keys under the doormat," but it's still a backdoor even if you're going in the front. Keys held by anyone are keys that can be compromised. It is impossible for law enforcement/intelligence agencies to claim a backdoor is a secure way to protect people's privacy while providing lawful access. See also: the dumping of CIA/NSA software exploits. See also: leaking is still a thing. See also: the TSA's (physical) master keys have been cloned… thanks to the TSA's carelessness. And etc.

But it's all OK even if someone evil manages to make copies of the encryption keys. Why? Because Facebook.

[H]e said the public's attitudes towards privacy were changing, pointing to the so-called "Facebook generation".

"I think also community attitudes, particularly among younger people towards the concept of privacy are changing," Brandis said.

"In the Facebook generation when people put more and more of their own personal data out there, I think there is an entirely different attitude to privacy among young people then there was than perhaps a generation or two ago."

Hello, false equivalency! Brandis makes statements about the government accessing people's private messages (he specifically mentioned Whatsapp and iMessages) and thinks no one will have a problem with it because of what they publicly share on social media. One would hope -- for the sake of their own sanity -- that Brandis is being deliberately obtuse for the sake of pushing his non-backdoor backdoors. The only other explanation is that Brandis is an idiot who can't suss out the difference between private communications and public sharing.

He backs up his baffling, possibly disingenuous assertion with a factoid generated out of thin air:

He suggested the the majority of people in Australia didn't prioritise privacy over giving security agencies more "tools" to fight terrorism.

This person -- who represents the public interest -- should probably spend a bit more time actually listening to the public. The only people making these sorts of assertions are government officials. You rarely hear private citizens -- especially not a majority of them -- arguing for more government intrusion, even in the wake of terrorist attacks.

Nothing stops the fear train, though, not even simple logic. Backdoors that aren't backdoors, backed with the conflation of public and private communications, and capped off with a declaration that this is what the public wants, even though the public has never expressed any such desire. It's a bullshit Triple Crown win for Brandis, who certainly shouldn't be allowed to handle any heavy government machinery in the future.

Filed Under: australia, backdoors, encryption, george brandis, going dark, social media

Theresa May Tries To Push Forward With Plans To Kill Encryption, While Her Party Plots Via Encrypted Whatsapp

from the so-about-that... dept

As we've discussed a few times, Theresa May and her colleagues have been pushing to break real encryption as part of the party's manifesto. And they've used recent terrorist attacks as an excuse to ramp up that effort -- even though the perpetrators of recent attacks were already known to law enforcement and there's no evidence encryption played any role. Earlier in the year, Home Secretary Amber Rudd had insisted that encrypted communications were completely unacceptable, and specifically namechecked Whatsapp:

It is completely unacceptable. There should be no place for terrorists to hide.

We need to make sure that organisations like WhatsApp, and there are plenty of others like that, don’t provide a secret place for terrorists to communicate with each other.

Of course, as you've certainly heard by now, last Thursday's general election in the UK (understatement alert!) didn't quite go according to Theresa May's plan, and she's now left in a much weaker position with many people expecting she will not survive long as Prime Minister. And yet, showing her uncanny ability to double down on the absolute wrong thing, May is insisting she's moving ahead with her plans to regulate the internet, which will require vast censorship and a breaking of encryption. On the encryption angle, she's already got some Parliamentary support given that (as we and others warned at the time!) the Snooper's Charter ("Investigatory Powers Act") included a bit that would require anyone offering encrypted communications to unencrypt those communications (which is impossible if the encryption is strong end-to-end, and only possible with broken, insecure, fake "encryption").

This is both dumb and... hilarious. Because while all of this is going on, Theresa May's own party has been trying to figure out what the hell they're going to do. And, of course, the way they're communicating with each other is with the encrypted Whatsapp software that Amber Rudd was trashing just months ago:

Former minister Ed Vaizey told the BBC that he supports May staying on, but that Tories were discussing possible replacements. Asked whether members were calling one another to plot May’s ouster this weekend, he denied it.

“That’s so 20th century,” he said. “It’s all on WhatsApp.”

Indeed, soon after this came out, one of the possible candidates to replace May, Boris Johnson, claimed that he was sticking by May and... released screenshots of his own Whatsapp conversations to prove that he was supporting her.

So, there you have it. Theresa May is pushing forward to break encrypted chat apps like Whatsapp, while her own party is using encrypted chat apps, like Whatsapp, to discuss whether or not to keep her in place as Prime Minister.

Filed Under: backdoors, boris johnson, encryption, privacy, theresa may, uk
Companies: whatsapp

Strong Crypto Is Not The Problem: Manchester And London Attackers Were Known To The Authorities

from the adding-hay-to-the-stack-makes-it-harder-to-find-the-needles dept

Soon after the attack in Manchester, the UK government went back to its "encrypted communications are the problem" script, which it has rolled out repeatedly in the past. But it has now emerged that the suicide bomber was not only known to the authorities, but that members of the public had repeatedly warned about his terrorist sympathies, as the Telegraph reports:

Counter Terrorism agencies were facing questions after it emerged Salman Abedi told friends that "being a suicide bomber was okay", prompting them to call the Government's anti-terrorism hotline.

Sources suggest that authorities were informed of the danger posed by Abedi on at least five separate occasions in the five years prior to the attack on Monday night.

Following the more recent attacks on London Bridge, the UK prime minister, Theresa May, has gone full banana republic dictator, declaring herself ready to rip up human rights "because terrorism". But once more, we learn that the attackers were well known to the authorities:

London attack ringleader Khuram Butt was identified as a major potential threat, leading to an investigation that started in 2015, UK counterterrorism sources tell CNN.

…

Butt was seen as a heavyweight figure in al-Muhajiroun, whose hardline views made him potentially one of the most dangerous extremists in the UK, the sources said Tuesday. The investigation into Butt involved a "full package" of investigatory measures, the sources told CNN.

Butt was filmed in a 2016 documentary with the self-explanatory title "The Jihadis Next Door", in which a black flag associated with ISIS was publicly unfurled in London's Regent’s Park. Even though police were present during the filming, they did not follow up that incident, according to the Guardian:

Police did not make a formal request for footage or information from the makers of a Channel 4 documentary that featured Khuram Butt, one of the London Bridge attackers.

The broadcaster of The Jihadis Next Door said no police requests were made for film or programme maker's notes to be handed over under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act or Terrorism Act.

The UK authorities were warned last year about another of the London Bridge attackers,Youssef Zaghba, by Italian counter-terrorism officials:

An Italian prosecutor who led an investigation into the London Bridge attacker Youssef Zaghba has insisted that Italian officials did send their UK counterparts a written warning about the risk he posed last year and monitored him constantly while he was in Italy.

Giuseppe Amato, the chief prosecutor in Bologna, who investigated Zaghba when he tried to travel from Italy to join Islamic State in Syria in March 2016, told the Guardian that information about the risk he posed was shared with officials in the UK.

Amato added that he personally saw a report that had been sent to London by the chief counter-terrorism official in Bologna about the Moroccan-born Italian citizen.

Manchester and London are not the only cases where the authorities were informed in advance about individuals. A 2015 article in The Intercept looked at ten high-profile terrorist attacks around the world, and found that in every single case, at least some of the perpetrators were already known to the authorities. Strong encryption is not the problem: it is the inability of the authorities to act on the information they have that is the problem. That's not to suggest that the intelligence services and police were incompetent, or that there were serious lapses. It's more a reflection of the fact that far from lacking vital information because of end-to-end encryption, say, the authorities have so much information that they are forced to prioritize their scarce resources, and sometimes they pursue the wrong leads and miss threats.

We wrote about this problem back in 2014, when an FBI whistleblower confirmed what many have been trying to explain to governments keen to extend their surveillance powers: that when you are looking for a needle, adding more hay to the stack makes things worse, not better. What is needed is less mass surveillance, and a more targeted approach. Until Theresa May and leaders around the world understand and act on that, it is likely that more attacks will occur, carried out by individuals known to the authorities, and irrespective of whether they use strong crypto or not.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

Filed Under: attacks, encryption, fud, human rights, london, manchester, theresa may, uk

Theresa May's Plan To Regulate The Internet Won't Stop Terrorism; It Might Make Things Worse

from the counterproductive-not-counterterrorism dept

In the wake of Saturday's horrific attack on London—the third high-profile terrorist incident in the United Kingdom in the past three months—British policymakers were left scrambling for better ways to combat violent extremism. Prime Minister Theresa May called for new global efforts to "regulate cyberspace to prevent the spread of extremism and terrorist planning," charging that the internet cannot be allowed to be a "safe space" for terrorists.

While May's desire for a strong response is easy to understand, her call for more expansive internet regulation and censorship is wrongheaded and will make it harder to win the war against violent extremism.

May didn't specify the details of her proposal, but to many observers it was clear that she's asking for sweeping new powers to compel tech companies to help spy on citizens and censor online content. Unfortunately, this isn't simply a knee-jerk response to horrible circumstances, but reflects a longstanding ambition of May's Conservative Party to impose draconian controls on cyberspace.

As home secretary, May introduced and oversaw passage of the Investigatory Powers Act, legislation that civil-liberties advocates have called the worst surveillance bill of any western democracy. Following last month's attack in Manchester, May's government purportedly briefed newspapers of its intent to invoke the law to compel internet companies to "break their own security so that messages can be read by intelligence agencies." David Cameron, May's predecessor, argued for internet companies to be compelled to create backdoors in their software so that there would be no digital communications "we cannot read."

Even if the U.K. government got the expansive new powers it seems to want, there's no reason to think it would stop terrorism in its tracks. Researchers have found that suicide attacks are a social phenomenon involving support networks that radicalize the perpetrators. Most people in these networks aren't themselves terrorists. Allowing them to operate openly makes it easier both for moderating voices to intervene and for intelligence agencies to track. If the communities are forced underground and offline, they'll be harder to infiltrate and monitor.

Moreover, there's no way to create communications backdoors that only apply to bad guys. While committed terrorists could easily adapt to open source or analog means of communication in response to a government-mandated backdoor, law-abiding civilians would be exposed to new cybersecurity risks and have their economic and civil liberties compromised. Experience has shown that backdoors inevitably will be hacked, making everyone less safe. As the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee noted in its report on the topic, all of the proposed solutions to access encrypted information "come with significant trade-offs, and provide little guarantee of successfully addressing the issue."

The policy also would have serious consequences for the United Kingdom's global competitiveness. As the MIT report "Keys Under Doormats" notes, mandating architectures that allow access to encrypted communications "risks the real economic, geopolitical, and strategic benefits of an open and secure internet for law enforcement gains that are at best minor and tactical." One of the factors behind the West's dominance in technology and innovation is that its apps are not government-sanctioned, as they are in China or Russia. After all, what consumer would want to buy an app or device that had a built-in backdoor?

All this isn't to say that governments should stand back and do nothing to stop terrorist activity online. It's illegal almost everywhere in the world to provide material support to terrorist activities, not to mention the obvious crimes of murder and conspiracy. But terrorists don't have free reign in cyberspace. In addition to the United Kingdom's comparatively robust domestic snooping powers, the nation's Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) already coordinates flagging and removing unlawful terrorist-related content. Since its launch in 2010, it has worked with online service providers to remove a quarter million pieces of terrorist material.

There also are already international agreements to help authorities uncover and track people engaged in these activities and to exchange intelligence about them across borders. For instance, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) allow the cross-border flow of data about criminal matters between investigative bodies. While the current MLAT agreements can be slow and cumbersome, efforts are underway to create a new process and allow U.K. authorities to go directly to U.S.-based online service providers, upon meeting certain conditions.

The United Kingdom also is already a key part of the national security data-sharing arrangements between the "Five Eyes," under which intelligence from Canada, Australia, New Zealand and, of course, the United States is shared almost in real time. While the details are classified, there is evidence that this intelligence sharing has prevented numerous attacks.

To her credit, May emphasized the importance of improving these sorts of international agreements in her speech about fighting terrorism. This is an area where we can and should make positive steps toward reform, increasing the capacity for intelligence sharing in real time and improving cooperation, while ensuring that the right checks and balances are in place.

Combating violent extremism online doesn't have to be a Pyrrhic victory for democratic societies. Certain risks are unavoidable, and no level of internet regulation will stop the most determined attackers. But there are real steps policymakers can take now to enhance our tools without sacrificing our security, liberty or global competitiveness in the process.

Zach Graves is tech policy director and Arthur Rizer is national security and justice policy director for the R Street Institut

Filed Under: censorship, encryption, internet, terrorism, theresa may, uk

UK Government Using Manchester Attacks As An Excuse To Kill Encryption

from the say-what-now? dept

It's no secret that there are those in the current UK government who are just itching to kill encryption. Earlier this year, Home Secretary Amber Rudd made some profoundly ill-informed comments about how encryption on the internet was "completely unacceptable" and saying that they needed to stop companies from providing end-to-end encryption. And, in the recently leaked Tory Manifesto, it was made clear that the current government sees breaking encryption as a priority:

In addition, we do not believe that there should be a safe space for terrorists to be able to communicate online and will work to prevent them from having this capability.

As has been explained time and time again, the only way you prevent bad guys from having encryption is by preventing everyone from having effective encryption... and that makes everyone significantly less safe. Seriously, the only way to do this is to put dangerous vulnerabilities into encryption that will certainly be hacked fairly quickly. This doesn't make people safer. It makes them less safe.

But, of course, like so many politicians these days (of all major parties) it appears that the Conservative Party in the UK can't let a good tragedy go to waste. The Independent is reporting that, because of the attack in Manchester this week, the party is ramping up its plans to outlaw encrypted communications:

Government officials appear to have briefed newspapers that they will put many of the most invasive parts of the relatively new Investigatory Powers Act into effect after the bombing at Manchester Arena.

The specific powers being discussed – named Technical Capability Orders – require big technology and internet companies to break their own security so that messages can be read by intelligence agencies.

Again, in case you're just joining us, requiring that internet companies "break their own security so that messages can be read by intelligence agencies" is the nice way of saying "kill real encryption." It means that these companies will be deliberately forced to leave vulnerabilities in encryption that will be a goldmine for hackers of all kinds, from foreign surveillance to online criminals.

And, so far, there is zero evidence that the Manchester attack had anything to do with encryption. And, even if it did, so what? If the UK forced companies to break encryption, people planning terrorist attacks would just switch to other encryption products that don't have corporate entities in the UK. Or they'd come up with other ways to communicate. It will do basically nothing to stop terrorist attacks, but will instead make it much, much easier for all sorts of people with nefarious intent to hack into the private communications of everyone.

Filed Under: amber rudd, encryption, manchester, privacy, security, theresa may, uk

Senate Given The Go-Ahead To Use Encrypted Messaging App Signal

from the feinstein,-burr-will-continue-to-use-AOL-chatrooms dept

Certain senators have repeatedly pushed for encryption bans or encryption backdoors, sacrificing personal security for national security in a move that will definitively result in less of both. Former FBI Director James Comey's incessant beating of his "Going Dark" drum didn't help. Several legislators always managed to get sucked in by his narrative of thousands of unsearched phones presumably being tied to thousands of unsolved crimes and free-roaming criminals.

It will be interesting if the anti-encryption narratives advanced by Sens. Feinstein and Burr (in particular -- although others equally sympathetic) continue now that senators can officially begin using an encrypted messaging system for their own communications.

Without any fanfare, the Senate Sergeant at Arms recently told Senate staffers that Signal, widely considered by security researchers and experts to be the most secure encrypted messaging app, has been approved for use.

The news was revealed in a letter Tuesday by Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR), a staunch privacy and encryption advocate, who recognized the effort to allow the encrypted messaging app as one of many "important defensive cybersecurity" measures introduced in the chamber.

ZDNet has learned the policy change went into effect in March.

If this isn't the end of CryptoWar 2.0, then it's at least a significant ceasefire. Senators are going to find it very hard to argue against encrypted communications when they're allowed to use encrypted messaging apps. It's not that legislators are above hypocrisy. It's just that they usually allow a certain amount of time to pass before they commence openly-hypocritical activity.

This doesn't mean the rest of the government is allowed to use encrypted chat apps for official communications. Federal agencies fall under a different set of rules -- ones that provide for more comprehensive retention of communications under FOIA law. Congressional communications, however, generally can't be FOIA'ed. It usually takes a backdoor search at federal agencies to cut these loose. So, members of Congress using an encrypted chat app with self-destructing messages may seem like the perfect way to avoid transparency, but it's the law itself that provides most of the opacity.

If encryption's good for the Senate, it's good for the public. There's no other way to spin this. Even Trump's pro-law enforcement enthusiasm is unlikely to be enough to sell Congress on encryption backdoors. With this power in the palm of their hands, they're more apt to see the benefits of leaving encryption un-fucked with.

Filed Under: encryption, end to end encryption, messaging, senate, signal

Ahead Of His Senate Hearing, James Comey Pushes His 'Going Dark' Theory

from the same-old-Comey,-same-bad-arguments dept

Ahead of his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Wednesday, FBI Director James Comey released his planned testimony, which covers a variety of subjects Comey hoped to cover during the hearing. A lot of the talking points were touched on, but Comey spent most of his time fielding questions from pissed-off senators about how much they were disappointed in recent FBI investigations.

The testimony Comey planned to give contains another discussion of the FBI-centric "going dark" issue. According to Comey, device encryption has blocked FBI's searches nearly 50% of the time, preventing it from pulling data from more than 3,000 phones. Comey also says other approaches -- such as using metadata or cellphone forensic software -- won't work. They're too expensive and won't scale. Left unsaid is Comey's desire for legislation or a few precedential court decisions to force manufacturers to compromise their customers' security.

He makes this argument by conflating privacy and security and using this conflation to arrive at a completely wrong conclusion. From Comey's testimony [PDF]:

Some observers have conceived of this challenge as a tradeoff between privacy and security. In our view, the demanding requirements to obtain legal authority to access data—such as by applying to a court for a warrant or a wiretap — necessarily already account for both privacy and security. The FBI is actively engaged with relevant stakeholders, including companies providing technological services, to educate them on the corrosive effects of the Going Dark challenge on both public safety and the rule of law. The FBI thanks the committee members for their engagement on this crucial issue.

Warrants and court orders cover the "privacy" end of the argument, but using court orders (or legislation) to force device makers to build backdoors in users' devices throws security out the window. The balancing act in the encryption debate has never been "privacy vs. security." It's been "security vs. insecurity." Comey's false equation presents privacy and security as two sides to the same coin, yet somehow completely separable in the presence of a court order. Fourth Amendment protections cover the privacy end, but showing up at a device backdoor with a warrant in hand does nothing for anyone's security.

Comey doesn't want a balancing act, despite all his assertions about "adult conversations" and deferring to the "smart people" at tech companies. He wants device owners to sacrifice security in exchange for protections they're already guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.

Filed Under: backdoors, encryption, fbi, going dark, james comey

DHS Boss Calls For More Fear, Less Encryption

from the Frightened-States-of-America dept

The Trump administration is rebranding the country: Make America Fear Again. In response to a national crime wave that doesn't exist, the head of the DOJ is rolling back police reform and replacing it with extra "toughness." Under the new regime, law enforcement officers will have the full (and, apparently, unconditional) backing of the White House.

The DHS is joining the DOJ in flexing its new muscle. DHS Secretary John Kelly has already stated he's looking to turn requests for visitors' social media/email account information into demands, which would include the mandatory relinquishment of account passwords.

Both agency heads have expressed a desire to do battle with US citizens by revitalizing the fed's war on marijuana, despite legalization referendums being passed by popular vote in several states.

Kelly... course-corrected on a previous statement he made regarding the dangers of marijuana.

Calling it “a potentially dangerous gateway drug that frequently leads to the use of harder drugs,” Kelly vowed that DHS personnel would continue to investigate and arrest those involved in illegal trade of the drug.

That comes after Kelly on Sunday told “Meet The Press” host Chuck Todd that marijuana was “not a factor” in the war on drugs, arguing that solving the nation’s drug problem does not involve “arresting a lot of users.”

These comments came during Kelly's first major public speech since taking office. His "course-corrected" statement echoes DOJ head Jeff Sessions' take on marijuana, a drug only found dangerous by agencies whose budgets rely on marijuana being viewed as a threatening "gateway drug."

Both are also looking to toss more immigrants out of the country, theorizing that stricter immigration control will somehow curb drug cartel violence -- almost all of which is contained completely in other countries. Kelly mentioned Salvadoran drug cartel MS13 in passing, claiming it was responsible for acts of violence and stateside human trafficking.

Attorney General Jeff Sessions was even less kind in his appraisal, delivering comments that made it sound as though the only thing standing between the US and societal collapse was American law enforcement:

When we talk about MS-13 and the cartels, what do we mean? We mean criminal organizations that turn cities and suburbs into warzones, that rape and kill innocent citizens and who profit by smuggling poison and other human beings across our borders. Depravity and violence are their calling cards, including brutal machete attacks and beheadings.

It is here, on this sliver of land, where we first take our stand against this filth.

The DHS head is also capitalizing on Trump's dark -- and deeply-inaccurate -- view of national security. His speech portrayed the country as being under ceaseless attack from innumerable evil forces.

“We are under attack from people who hate us, hate our freedoms, hate our laws, hate our values, hate the way we simply live our lives. And we are under attack every single day,” he warned. “The threats are relentless.”

Kelly covered a wide swath of issues — from transnational criminal organizations to cyberattacks to homegrown violent extremism, often using graphic descriptions of human suffering to illustrate the dangers.

The speech harkened back to President Trump’s inaugural address to Congress, in which he described “American carnage” outside of the Beltway.

No agency benefits more from the perception of an insecure homeland than the Department of Homeland Security. But the trickle-down effect of fear-based policy-making helps other agencies as well.

In his speech, Kelly tacitly aligned himself with the only Obama holdover Trump seems to like: FBI director James Comey.

He warned that proliferating encrypted communications technology would soon make it “impossible” to track terrorist threats.

Kelly had more to say on that subject in relation to Trump's still-unseen cybersecurity executive order. Supposedly, an updated version of the draft released in February is due any day now, and no matter what's in it, Kelly fully supports it.

“I’m standing by with bated breath,” Kelly said when Frank Cilluffo, director of the university’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, asked if there was any news on the order. “I can’t wait.”

Presumably not referencing the FBI's counterterrorism sting operations with the phrase "homegrown terrorism," Kelly again pointed to encryption as being part of the problem.

“What’s feeding homegrown terrorism is the Internet. They publish revolting how-to manuals,” Kelly said. “Thanks to proliferating encryption devices, these individuals are becoming harder and harder to detect. Our nation’s youth are prey to these predators.”

Between John Kelly, AG Jeff Sessions, and CIA head Mike Pompeo, the administration seems interested in sacrificing citizens' freedoms and protections on the altar of national security. All three are hoping loaded, hyperbolic language will convince more Americans to give up these protections willingly. Those who don't will probably be viewed as enemies of the nation -- and that includes any legislators who appear reluctant to give these agencies everything they want. Kelly again:

“If lawmakers do not like the laws they’ve passed and we are charged to enforce — then they should have the courage and skill to change the laws. Otherwise they should shut up and support the men and women on the front lines,” Kelly said, to a burst of applause in the auditorium.

This is wonderful stuff if you're a fan of authoritarianism. Shut up and show your support. It's a message that's been sent several times by the new president. Now, it's being echoed by his top officials.

Filed Under: crime, dhs, encryption, fear, going dark, john kelly