Ninth Circuit Tells Online Services: Section 230 Isn't For You

from the practical-effect dept

Last year we wrote about Homeaway and Airbnb's challenge to an ordinance in Santa Monica that would force them to monitor their Santa Monica listings to ensure they were legally compliant. The Santa Monica ordinance, like an increasing number of ordinances around the country, requires landlords wanting to list their properties on these services to register with the city and meet various other requirements. That part of the ordinance is not what causes concern, however. It may or may not be good local policy, but it in no way undermines Section 230's crucial statutory protection for platforms for Santa Monica officials to attempt to hold their landlord users liable if they go online to say they have a non-compliant rental listing.

The problem with the ordinance is that it does not just impose liability on landlords. It also imposes liability on the platforms hosting their listings. The only way for them to avoid that liability is to engage in the onerous, if not outright impossible, task of scrutinizing whether or not the listings on their platforms are legal. Which is exactly what Section 230 exists to prevent: forcing platforms to monitor their users' speech for legality, because if they had to police them, they would end up facilitating a lot less legitimate speech.

Yet that's what the Ninth Circuit decided to let Santa Monica do – force platforms to monitor their user-generated speech – in a decision earlier this week upholding the district court's refusal to enjoin the ordinance.

Of course, that's not how the court saw it, however. To the court, platforms weren't being forced to police the speech they hosted. They were merely obligated to police the rental transactions they facilitated.

[T]he Ordinance does not require the Platforms to monitor third-party content and thus falls outside of the CDA’s immunity … [T]he only monitoring that appears necessary in order to comply with the Ordinance relates to incoming requests to complete a booking transaction—content that, while resulting from the third party listings, is distinct, internal, and nonpublic. [p. 13-14]

However this is a distinction without a difference.

As we pointed out in the amicus brief the Copia Institute filed in support of Homeaway and Airbnb, these listings are indeed user-generated speech. It may be speech that's extremely limited in scope, little more than "I have housing to rent," but it is still user speech that, per the ordinance, may not always be legal to say. The problem is that this ordinance in effect is all about passing on liability to the platform if they allow this speech to be illegally said, which is no different than trying to pass on liability to a platform for any other speech its users may illegally say.

Yet in its decision the court insisted that platform liability attaches to something entirely apart from its role as a platform facilitating user speech:

Similarly, here, the Ordinance is plainly a housing and rental regulation. The “inevitable effect of the [Ordinance] on its face” is to regulate nonexpressive conduct—namely, booking transactions—not speech. [p. 19-20]

It went on to declare that the ordinance in no way forces platforms to monitor user content:

Contrary to the Platforms’ claim, the Ordinance does not “require” that they monitor or screen [listings]. It instead leaves them to decide how best to comply with the prohibition on booking unlawful transactions. [p. 20]

At every step in its reasoning it kept treating the ordinance as something wholly apart from an ordinance impacting speech:

Nor can the Platforms rely on the Ordinance’s “stated purpose” to argue that it intends to regulate speech. The Ordinance itself makes clear that the City’s “central and significant goal . . . is preservation of its housing stock and preserving the quality and nature of residential neighborhoods.” As such, with respect to the Platforms, the only inevitable effect, and the stated purpose, of the Ordinance is to prohibit them from completing booking transactions for unlawful rentals. [p. 20]

But no amount of handwaving by the court to try to focus on the financial transaction between landlord and renter, or insistence that this ordinance doesn't force platforms to monitor user-generated speech, will change the basic reality that it does indeed force platforms to do exactly that: police user speech for legality in order to avoid liability arising from that speech. It is exactly the sort of situation Section 230 was intended to forestall because of the inevitable chilling effect fear-driven platform monitoring obligations have on online speech and innovation.

The court seemed to try to justify its contorted reasoning by noting that because "brick and mortar" businesses have to comply with all sorts of local regulations, Internet businesses also should have to.

We have consistently eschewed an expansive reading of the statute that would render unlawful conduct “magically . . . lawful when [conducted] online,” and therefore “giv[ing] online businesses an unfair advantage over their real-world counterparts.” For the same reasons, while we acknowledge the Platforms’ concerns about the difficulties of complying with numerous state and local regulations, the CDA does not provide internet companies with a one-size-fits-all body of law. Like their brick-and-mortar counterparts, internet companies must also comply with any number of local regulations concerning, for example, employment, tax, or zoning. [p. 16]

But this thinking fails to recognize the unique differences between brick and mortar businesses and Internet business, differences that help explain why it is so important to give Internet businesses this vital protection. After all, a brick and mortar store only has to comply with the laws of the jurisdiction where the store is located – as Internet platforms also need to, in the finite number of places where they have a physical or corporate presence. But when it comes to their online presence, an Internet business is everywhere and thus theoretically exposed to the laws of every single jurisdiction, no matter how onerous these laws are, or how much they may conflict with any other's.

Because while perhaps the Santa Monica ordinance may not be too onerous for the platforms to comply with in and of itself, Santa Monica is but one city, yet the Ninth Circuit has now given the green light to every other city in every other state to come up with their own ordinances that will similarly force platforms to monitor user content. As Congress feared in 1996 when it passed Section 230, this decision now invites platforms to divert resources better spent elsewhere, overly censor user speech, withdraw from entire markets – even those that might prefer to have these services available – or risk being bankrupted by an infinite number of local jurisdictions pulling them in every possible direction.

This result is chilling not just to these platforms but to any other innovative service, especially if the service has any effect in the offline world, as so many do, or facilitates economic transactions between users, as so many also do. If bearing these indicia are enough to cause a platform to lose its Section 230 protection, then few will be able to retain it.

Filed Under: 9th circuit, california, cda 230, housing, intermediary liability, internet, platforms, santa monica, section 230, speech
Companies: airbnb, homeaway

Appeals Court Doesn't Buy Government's National Security Assertions; Says Lawsuit Against FBI Can Continue

from the 'we-can't-explain,'-they-explained dept

A lawsuit against the FBI for pervasive, unconstitutional surveillance of Muslims can continue after receiving a very key determination from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. At the center of the case are three Muslims who claim the FBI's continuous surveillance -- assisted by an FBI informant -- violated a number of Constitutional protections.

The key victory here is the court's overturning of the lower court's ruling on the national security assertions raised by the government in hopes of avoiding having to litigate the alleged violations at all. The lower court granted the government's motion to dismiss, saying the government's secrecy matters far more than an unviolated Constitution. The appeals court reverses that, noting stating that the government can't dodge litigation simply by claiming the subject of the lawsuit is too sensitive to discuss in court. From the decision [PDF]:

Plaintiffs asserted eleven claims, which fell into two categories: claims alleging unconstitutional searches, and claims alleging unlawful religious discrimination. The district court dismissed all but one of plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of the state secrets privilege, and allowed only the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) claim against the FBI Agent Defendants to proceed.

The panel held that some of the claims the district court dismissed on state secret grounds should not have been dismissed outright. The panel further held that the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence necessary for a determination of whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful following the secrecy-protective procedure set forth in FISA.

The lower court showed too much deference to the state secrets assertions. It must now reexamine the claims made by the government, as well as their application to the alleged harms. This is very helpful precedent -- one that forces lower courts to pay a lot more attention to the government's natsec hand-waving, rather than simply conclude the government knows best when it comes to state secrets.

There's more good stuff in the panel's opinion. Two FBI agents will have to defend themselves against claims of unlawful surveillance, like the following:

Plaintiffs offer sufficient well-pleaded facts to substantiate their allegation that some of the Agent Defendants—Allen and Armstrong—were responsible for planting devices in AbdelRahim’s house. Specifically, the complaint details one occasion on which Allen and Armstrong asked [FBI informant] Monteilh about something that had happened in AbdelRahim’s house that Monteilh had not yet communicated to them, and explained that they knew about it because they had audio surveillance in the house.

Plaintiffs also allege sufficient facts with regard to those two Agent Defendants in support of their allegation of electronic surveillance of Fazaga’s office in the OCIF mosque in Mission Viejo: Allen and Armstrong told Monteilh that electronic surveillance was “spread indiscriminately” across “at least eight area mosques including ICOI, and mosques in Tustin, Mission Viejo, Culver City, Lomita, West Covina, and Upland,” and that “they could get in a lot of trouble if people found out what surveillance they had in the mosques.”

The defenses raised by the sued agents forms part of the Ninth Circuit's state secrets decision. It was the agents that raised this defense, not the agency they worked for (which was also sued). As the court notes, the agents cannot possibly hope to prevail by raising a defense the government determined didn't apply to the situation.

The Agent Defendants—officials sued in their individual capacities—are not the protectors of the state secrets evidence; the Government is. Accordingly, and because the Agent Defendants have not identified a reason they specifically require dismissal to protect against the harmful disclosure of state secrets where the Government does not, we decline to accept their argument that the Government’s dismissal defense must be expanded beyond the religion claims.

What the government did do is invoke FISA's protections against open discussion of counter-terrorist surveillance programs. The court reminds the government that the law was created in response to abusive surveillance programs deployed by the government -- abuses much like those central to this case. While it did eventually lend its name to more surveillance abuses following the 9/11 attacks, it was actually more of a reform effort in its original state. Since the government appears to have forgotten FISA's original aim, the appeals court delivers this reminder.

The inference drawn from the text of § 1806 is bolstered by § 1810, which specifically creates a private right of action for an individual subjected to electronic surveillance in violation of FISA. FISA prohibits, for example, electronic surveillance of a U.S. person “solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A). Here, Plaintiffs allege they were surveilled solely on account of their religion. If true, such surveillance was necessarily unauthorized by FISA, and § 1810 subjects any persons who intentionally engaged in such surveillance to civil liability. It would make no sense for Congress to pass a comprehensive law concerning foreign intelligence surveillance, expressly enable aggrieved persons to sue for damages when that surveillance is unauthorized, see id. § 1810, and provide procedures deemed adequate for the review of national security-related evidence, see id. § 1806(f), but not intend for those very procedures to be used when an aggrieved person sues for damages under FISA’s civil enforcement mechanism. Permitting a § 1810 claim to be dismissed on the basis of the state secrets privilege because the § 1806(f) procedures are unavailable would dramatically undercut the utility of § 1810 in deterring FISA violations. Such a dismissal also would undermine the overarching goal of FISA more broadly—“curb[ing] the practice by which the Executive Branch may conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on its own unilateral determination that national security justifies it.”

To sum up, the appeals court isn't willing to let the government (or its agents) claim this apparently-illegal surveillance is too sensitive to discuss in open court. The government will still get to submit evidence and arguments to the court in ex parte hearings if it wants to argue certain elements of the case cannot be discussed publicly, but it will not be granted a blanket exception it can use to dodge the litigation in its entirety. The court ends its decision by noting the government can't have this much power if it's not willing to accept the responsibility that comes with it.

In holding, for the reasons stated, that the Government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege does not warrant dismissal of this litigation in its entirety, we, too, have recognized the need for balance, but also have heeded the conclusion at the heart of Congress’s enactment of FISA: the fundamental principles of liberty include devising means of forwarding accountability while assuring national security.

Which is exactly how it should be. Unfortunately, too many courts take the district court's path and give the government all the secrecy it asks for.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 9th circuit, constitution, doj, fbi, fisa, muslims, national security, surveillance

Judge Recommends Vacating The Sentence Of One Of The FBI's Handcrafted Terrorists

from the well...-half-the-sentence-has-already-been-served-so... dept

Nearly 13 years after the FBI managed to turn a California cherry picker into a international terrorist, one of its self-created terrorists is about to be turned back into regular California resident, albeit one missing more than a decade from his life.

Hayat went to Pakistan in 2003 to visit his mother and get married. The FBI and prosecutors insisted he went there to train to be a terrorist. When he returned to the US, he was arrested and indicted. Prosecutors tacked on some lying to federal agents charges because of course they did, pushing Hayat's sentence to 24 years.

This conviction was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals but Hayat's motion to vacate his sentence has found some sympathy from a federal magistrate judge.

A federal magistrate on Friday recommended overturning the controversial 2006 conviction of a California man accused of attending a terrorist training camp in Pakistan and plotting an attack in the United States.

Hamid Hayat, now 36, who was then a young cherry-picker from Lodi, has served about half his 24-year sentence.

But U.S. Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes said he likely never would have been convicted were it not for the inexperience of his defense attorney, who failed to call alibi witnesses.

Hayat's lawyer was clearly inexperienced, having never defended a client during a criminal trial before. The results speak for themselves. Judge Barnes' examination of the case shows Hayat was possibly coerced into a false confession and had a decent alibi for his visit to Pakistan that -- if explored more fully -- would likely have shown the FBI's speculations about his reason for returning to Pakistan were wrong.

His attorneys argue that much of the evidence used against him was faulty, including prosecution claims that Hayat attended a terror training camp in Balakot, Pakistan, in 2003 and 2004 – a facility they say had been shut down before Hayat even got to Pakistan.

Hayat's confession was obtained during a "marathon" questioning session by FBI agents. This apparently included a special agent lying about the evidence the FBI had on Hayat's supposed terrorist training.

According to court testimony, the Hayats were interviewed twice by the FBI. The first time, they both denied they knew anything about terrorism. But during a second interview at Sacramento FBI headquarters, after many hours of grilling without a lawyer, Hamid Hayat changed his story and confessed he attended a terrorist training camp for about three months. The jury asked for a read-back of FBI Special Agent Harry Sweeney’s trial testimony.

Sweeney testified that Hamid Hayat admitted to going to the camp after Sweeney asked him, “Would there be any reason why we would have a satellite image of you at a camp in 2003?”

Under cross-examination, Sweeney acknowledged there was no such photo.

Unfortunately, there's nothing illegal about federal agents lying to suspects during questioning. But there's certainly a law against lying to federal agents. The background of the case suggests the FBI may have been looking for something -- anything -- to justify its infiltration of a local mosque by one its surprisingly-expensive informants.

Naseem Khan claimed to have seen four of the world's most-wanted terrorists in Lodi, California. Over the course of three years, the FBI paid Khan $230,000 to infiltrate a local mosque, despite discovering his claims of seeing top world terrorists were completely false. It was Khan who suggested Hayat visit a terrorist training camp while visiting Pakistan. The government apparently had no evidence Hayat ever visited a training camp, relying almost solely on a confession that appears to have been coerced.

The court says there's not much here that makes the FBI look like a competent anti-terrorism force. There's a questionable confession, an even more questionable informant telling people to engage in terrorist activities, and a bunch of speculation about Hayat's activities while not under direct surveillance. As the judge points out, citizens shouldn't be locked up for things the FBI THINKS they may have done. More evidence is needed and a more competent attorney might have been able to stop this farce before it took more than a decade away from Hamid Hayat.

Filed Under: 9th circuit, doj, fake terrorists, false confession, fbi, hamid hayat, harry sweeney, own plot, terrorism

Appeals Court Says Gov't Will Be Paying Even More Legal Fees For Its Extended Loss In TSA No Fly List Lawsuit

from the quit-while-you're-behind-DOJbags dept

Fourteen years after an FBI agent mistakenly dumped Dr. Rahinah Ibrahim on the TSA's "No Fly" list, the Ninth Circuit Appeals Court is calling out the government for its horrendous behavior during the case, as well as ordering it to cough up more in legal fees.

The government's concession in this lawsuit was full and complete. It admitted Ibrahim posed no threat to national security, had never posed a threat to national security, and never should have been placed on the list, which stranded her in Malaysia back in 2005. En route to her victory, the government engaged in all sorts of malicious behavior, including arguing her No Fly status couldn't be discussed in open court, placing one of her witnesses on the No Fly list, and doing everything in its power to drag out the litigation. Stripped of all the legalese, the government basically spent most of decade arguing that an FBI agent's mistake fully justified Ibrahim being treated like a national security threat.

Ibrahim's case has made a return trip to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals -- this time asking for a second opinion on the district court's legal fee awards. The Appeals Court says the lower court shortchanged Ibrahim's representation (civil rights law firm McManis Faulkner) by failing to consider the government's horrendous behavior in its totality. The court really doesn't like the fact the government chose a mistake by a government agency as the hill it was willing to die for. From the decision [PDF]:

After the government engaged in years of scorched earth litigation, it finally conceded during trial in December 2013 that Dr. Ibrahim is “not a threat to our country. She does not pose (and has not posed) a threat of committing an act of international or domestic terrorism with respect to an aircraft, a threat to airline passenger or civil aviation security, or a threat of domestic terrorism.” But the government knew this in November 2004, when Agent Kelley completed the form; it knew it in January 2005, when the DHS agent told Dr. Ibrahim she was not on the No Fly list; and it was well aware of it two weeks after Dr. Ibrahim filed the underlying action, when a government agent ordered her “Remove[d] from ALL watchlisting supported systems (For terrorist subjects: due to closure of case AND no nexus to terrorism)” and further stated that Dr. Ibrahim was not qualified for placement on either the No Fly or TSA Selectee lists. Yet knowing this, the government essentially doubled-down over the course of the litigation with a no holds-barred defense.

The court then notes the government wasted more time (and racked up more legal fees) by stonewalling discovery efforts, evoking state secrets exceptions to anything it could, and engaging in extensive discussions about the whether the trial should be open to the public when it should have been arguing the merits of its dismissal motions.

The lower court somehow decided this lengthy headache was not the government's fault. It also decided every claim it didn't discuss was a loss for Ibrahim. The final tally was a 90% reduction in awarded fees. Ibrahim sought nearly $4 million in attorneys' fees and expenses. The district court said the extended dicking around by the government was worth less than $500,000. The Appeals Court says this is completely wrong. Ibrahim won decisively.

The achievement of Dr. Ibrahim and her attorneys in successfully challenging her No Fly list placement and forcing the government to fix its error was not just “excellent,” but extraordinary. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Although this is not a class action, and thus we assess Dr. Ibrahim’s individual success, the pathbreaking nature of her lawsuit underscores her achievement. Dr. Ibrahim was the first person ever to force the government to admit a terrorist watchlisting mistake; to obtain significant discovery regarding how the federal watchlisting system works; to proceed to trial regarding a watchlisting mistake; to force the government to trace and correct all erroneous records in its customer watchlists and databases; to require the government to inform a watchlisted individual of her TSDB status; and to admit that it has secret exceptions to the watchlisting reasonable suspicion standard. Dr. Ibrahim, in her first appeal to our court, established that district courts have jurisdiction over challenges to placement on terrorist watchlists, including the No Fly list.

And the government behaved badly throughout the years of litigation, long after it discovered Ibrahim's placement on the No Fly list was a clerical error.

In sum, the district court’s ruling that the government did not act in bad faith was in error because it was incomplete. The district court focused primarily upon Agent Kelley’s “unknowing” placement of Dr. Ibrahim’s name on the No Fly list, which it deemed “the original sin,” rather than considering the “totality” of the government’s conduct, “including conduct ‘prelitigation and during trial.’” [...] And this conduct should have included both an analysis of the government agencies’ and its legal representatives’ conduct. Dr. Ibrahim should not have had to endure over a decade of contentious litigation, two trips to the court of appeals, extensive discovery, over 800 docket entries amounting to many thousands of pages of record, and a weeklong trial the government precluded her (and her U.S.-citizen daughter) from attending, only to come full circle to the government’s concession that she never belonged on the No Fly list at all—that she is not and never was a terrorist or threat to airline passenger or civil aviation security. It should not have taken a court order to require the government to “cleans[e] and/or correct[] . . . the mistaken 2004 derogatory designation” of Dr. Ibrahim, which had spread like an insidious virus through numerous government watchlists.

Ibrahim will still have to spend a bit more time in court before all of this is done. But the Appeals Court's message to the district court is clear: she should be awarded pretty much every penny of the $5 million she's requested.

Filed Under: 9th circuit, attorneys' fees, civil rights, dhs, doj, no fly list, rahinah ibrahim, tsa

County Agrees To Pay $390,000 To Students Arrested By A Sheriff 'Just To Prove A Point'

from the MAYBE-HIRE-BETTER-PEOPLE dept

Back in September, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unshockingly decided that it's illegal to arrest schoolchildren just to "prove a point." The Fourth Amendment demands probable cause for an arrest, even an arrest of students who have (slightly) diminished Constitutional rights.

This was Deputy Luis Ortiz's solution to a problem he shouldn't even have been attempting to solve. Ortiz decided the students he was speaking to about alleged bullying weren't taking him seriously enough, so he tossed a few in squad cars and took them to the Sheriff's office. Nothing about this was legal, but the county decided to defend this all the way to the appellate level. The Ninth Circuit's assessment of Ortiz's actions was harsh but far more fair than Ortiz deserved.

Deputy Ortiz clearly stated that the justification for the arrests was not the commission of a crime, since he did not “care who is at fault,” nor the school’s special need to maintain campus safety, but rather his own desire to “prove a point” and “make” the students “mature a lot faster.” The arrest of a middle schooler, however, cannot be justified as a scare tactic, a lesson in maturity, or a chastisement for perceived disrespect.

[...]

Deputy Ortiz faced a room of seven seated, mostly quiet middle school girls, and only generalized allegations of fighting and conflict amongst them. Even accounting for what Deputy Ortiz perceived to be nonresponsiveness to his questioning, the full-scale arrests of all seven students, without further inquiry, was both excessively intrusive in light of the girls’ young ages and not reasonably related to the school’s expressed need.

It appears this loss has finally pushed the county to accept the inevitable outcome of Deputy Ortiz's unconstitutional behavior. The Daily Bulletin reports taxpayers will be paying the arrested students for Ortiz's illegal bullying.

San Bernardino County has agreed to pay nearly $400,000 to three former middle-schoolers to settle a lawsuit stemming from a 2013 arrest a federal court ruled unconstitutional.

In October 2013, a San Bernardino County sheriff’s deputy handcuffed, arrested and drove three seventh-grade girls from Etiwanda Intermediate School to the police station to “teach the girls a lesson.”

On Friday, Dec. 21, a lawyer for the girls announced the county has paid them $390,000 to settle their lawsuit.

This outcome was all but assured the moment Ortiz decided to start teaching students lessons by performing unconstitutional arrests. The county's decision to fight the district court's ruling doesn't reflect well on it or its legal representation. Somehow the county thought that if it just litigated hard enough, it would somehow talk a court into agreeing law enforcement can arrest people just to "teach them a lesson" -- even when those "someones" were teens who committed no crime and posed no safety threat to the school or the idiotic law enforcement officer it had hired.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 9th circuit, arrest, luis ortiz, san bernardino county, students

Ninth Circuit Aligns With Other Circuits: The FBI's Playpen Warrant Was Bad, But The FBI's Faith Was Good

from the winning-by-losing dept

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the latest appeals court to find the FBI's warrant for malware deployment during a child porn investigation to be invalid, but still close enough for government work. The FBI's NIT (Network Investigative Technique) was sent to visitors of a dark web child porn site called Playpen. The hitchhiking software then traveled out of the district the server was housed in (Virginia) to send back identifying info from computers and devices all over the world.

At the time the warrant was sought, warrants were only valid in the district they were issued. Multiple courts found the FBI's malware was a search under the Fourth Amendment. A smaller subset found the extrajurisdictional search unsupported by current law and the underlying warrant invalid from the moment it was issued. Challenges to the extrajurisdictional searches have all run into dead ends at the appellate level.

The First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all refused to suppress evidence, even if the courts found the search warrant invalid. The reasoning? There was no deterrent effect served by suppressing the evidence because the law changed after the warrant was issued and the malware deployed to allow the FBI to engage in extrajurisdictional searches. In essence, this is retroactive application of a law that changed after the warrant was sought, giving it the sort of blessing courts won't extend to victims of law enforcement misconduct that happened to occur before precedential decisions explicitly declared that particular form of misconduct unconstitutional.

In addition to the retroactive application of Rule 41 jurisdictional changes, these appeals courts have also granted the government "good faith." Somehow, it's believed an FBI agent seeking a warrant for a search that he knew would violate Rule 41 limits when executed wasn't the FBI rolling the dice on favorable rulings and a potential future mooting by changes to the law.

There's more of the same in the Ninth Circuit decision [PDF]. The court says the warrant was bad but the faith was good, so no harm, no foul, no suppression. (h/t Brad Heath)

We agree with Henderson that Rule 41(b) is not merely a technical venue rule, but rather is essential to the magistrate judge’s authority to act in this case.

[...]

The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, defines the scope of a magistrate judge’s authority, imposing jurisdictional limitations on the power of magistrate judges that cannot be augmented by the courts.

[...]

Relevant here, § 636 authorizes magistrate judges to exercise “all powers and duties conferred or imposed” by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1). In turn, Rule 41(b) has been asserted as the sole source of the magistrate judge’s purported authority to issue the NIT warrant in this case. But, as we have explained, in issuing such warrant, the magistrate judge in fact exceeded the bounds of the authority conferred on magistrate judges under Rule 41(b). Thus, such rule plainly does not in fact confer on the magistrate judge the authority to issue a warrant like the NIT warrant. Without any other source of law that purports to authorize the action of the magistrate judge here, the magistrate judge therefore exceeded the scope of her authority and her jurisdiction as defined under § 636.

Thus endeth the bad news for the government -- bad news severely tempered by the fact the government still gets to keep its evidence. Even though the court recognizes the warrant was invalid the moment it was signed, it still gives the government points for effort. The Ninth says it's ok for law enforcement to rely on invalid warrants, so long as they've been signed by a magistrate. And good faith or not, the court says there's no reason to suppress the evidence because the house always wins there's no future misconduct to deter.

[T]here is no evidence that the officers executing the NIT warrant acted in bad faith. “To the extent that a mistake was made in issuing the warrant, it was made by the magistrate judge, not by the executing officers.”

[...]

Further, suppression of the evidence against Henderson is unlikely to deter future violations of this specific kind, because the conduct at issue is now authorized by Rule 41(b)(6), after the December 2016 amendment. The exclusionary “rule’s sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations,” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–237 (2011), and we see no reason to deter officers from reasonably relying on a type of warrant that could have been valid at the time it was executed—and now would be.

With four circuits weighing in and reaching the same conclusions, it seems unlikely any further appellate challenges will upset the FBI's malware apple cart. And if the same conclusions continue to be reached, there will no compelling reason for the Supreme Court to weigh in. Add to that the post-facto codification of the tactics used by the FBI in this investigation and you've got dozens of unconstitutional searches being laundered into Fourth Amendment compliance by courts unwilling to penalize the FBI for overstepping its bounds.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 9th circuit, doj, fbi, good faith, jurisdiction, nit, playpen, rule 41, warrants

Stairway To Heaven Is Not Blurred Lines

from the getting-something-right dept

A few weeks ago, we wrote about the 9th Circuit overturning the district court's ruling in a copyright case questioning whether the song "Stairway to Heaven" had infringed on the song "Taurus" by Spirit. We were less than pleased with this result, as we felt the original ruling was correct. Copyright lawyer Rick Sanders disagreed with part of our analysis and made some really great points in a two part blog post series, which he's graciously allowed us to repost in slightly edited form here. Part II will be published tomorrow.

Yes, the new 9th Circuit surprising reversal of the jury verdict looks like "Blurred Lines" all over again -- only in reverse. Whereas in "Blurred Lines," the jury reached the "wrong" conclusion, and the Ninth Circuit refused to fix the jury's mistake, here it looks like the jury reached the "right" conclusion," and the Ninth Circuit is screwing up the jury's work. Techdirt all but said so, in an article 9th Cir Never Misses a Chance to Mess Up Copyright Law: Reopens Led Zeppelin 'Stairway to Heaven' Case.

I'm pleased to report that, far from taking this opportunity to further screw up copyright law, as Techdirt fears, the panel of judges is attempting to improve copyright law by replacing the Ninth Circuit's (very bad) framework for copyright infringement with a much better one. Indeed, the "Stairway to Heaven" opinion may be seen as a rebuke to the "Blurred Lines" opinion. The pity is that Led Zeppelin must bear this burden by having to do the trial all over again.

The reason the "Stairway to Heaven" has to do with our old, misunderstood frenemy, the "Inverse-Ratio rule," which is only tangentially related to why the case is being sent back for a second trial. I blogged extensively about the "inverse-ratio" rule in connection with the "Blurred Lines" case, and how the Ninth Circuit (correctly) amended its opinion to excise (its terrible) discussion of the rule. But here's the deal: the inverse-ratio rule provides that the more similarity there is between the two works, the less proof of access you need, and vice-versa. It is highly beneficial when applied to the right legal framework for copyright. It is a perverse disaster when applied to the wrong legal framework.

Two Legal Frameworks for Copyright Infringement

Generally, there are two leading legal frameworks for determining when someone has infringed copyright:

1. Plaintiff must prove (a) defendant's access to the copyrighted work, plus (b) "substantial similarity" between the two works. This framework is used by the majority of courts, so we'll call it the "Majority Framework." It is also a bad framework.
2. Plaintiff must prove (a) "copying" and (b) "unlawful appropriation." To prove "copying," the plaintiff must prove (1) access and (2) "probative similarity." "Unlawful appropriation" is pretty much the same thing as "substantial similarity," but the different term is used to avoid confusion with "probative similarity" (and is also more accurate). This framework is preferred by scholars and is used by one half of the Second Circuit, so we'll call this the "Preferred Framework."

Both of these frameworks grapple with the same thing: to infringe copyright in a work, the defendant must both copy the work and take enough of the work that, well, um, it's too much. But the key is that copying is something that must be proved. In theory, if a magical monkey banged out Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets without ever have looked at a copy of Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets, that would not be copyright infringement. It would just be unbelievably unlikely. The need to prove copying is actually a fairly important limitation on copyright law. We shouldn't lose sight of it.

Imagine that you saw me with a book and that I was writing something down on a pad of paper while obviously reading the book. Have you proved that I have "copied" the book? You certainly have proved access: there I am, with the book in hand! But, you haven't. You need one piece of evidence. You need to see what I am writing. It's possible that I'm multitasking, perhaps writing a shopping list as I read. It would take just a glance to figure that out, though, right?

Now imagine that you didn't see me with the book. No one did. And yet my notebook is word for word the same as the book. Do you need any evidence of access? Maybe just the slightest bit, like I live in the same city as a bookstore or library that has a copy of the book. (This is sometimes known as "striking similarity.")

Does this make intuitive sense? If so, congratulations! You understand the "inverse-ratio" rule, at least when correctly applied to "copying." The more access, less probative similarity is needed to prove copying. More probative similarity, less access needed.

Proving copying is only step one of a two-step process, so let me hit you with another hypothetical. Let's say that I was seen with the book at some point, and my notebook contains an extensive data table that is exactly the same as a data table in the book (but in my handwriting). There is nothing else in my notebook related to the book. The data table is otherwise unremarkable. Have you proven infringement? No! You have proven copying. I had access to the book, and the data table is too much of a coincidence to explain away. Clearly, I copied the data table. But not all copying is infringement. What I took isn't protectable because it's just facts. You haven't proven the "unlawful appropriation" (AKA "substantial similarity") element.

This hypothetical shows the difference between the two kinds of similarity: probative and substantial. (See, this is why we should re-name "substantial similarity" as "unlawful appropriation.") You can use unprotectable elements to establish probative similarity. You can't use unprotectable elements to establish substantial similarity/unlawful appropriation. Hopefully, this makes intuitive sense to you. With probative similarity, we're just trying to prove copying, so we're just looking for coincidences that, in light of the amount of access, we can't explain away. Substantial similarity/unlawful appropriation is limited to protectable expression.

Let's return to the "inverse-ratio" rule. Can you see why it's appropriate in the context of copying, when we're weighing access against probative similarity? And why it's inappropriate if you are instead weighing access against substantial similarity/unlawful appropriation? In fact, it's perverse. Imagine if you and I both took the same material from an unpublished manuscript, and that the case for substantial similarity is kind of borderline. I am found with a copy of the manuscript on my computer. You, however, have no connection with the manuscript except that you are the manuscript editor's niece's best friend (and the niece visited the editor at least once while in possession of the manuscript). We both took the same thing, but under the misapplication of the inverse-ratio rule, I'm an infringer, and you are not. That's stupid. Considering that most courts do not correctly handle the distinction between copying and substantial similarity, you can see how the inverse-ratio rule has gotten a bad rap.

The Ninth Circuit Uses a Weird Hybrid Legal Framework for Copyright Infringement, but "Stairway to Heaven" Opinion Might Fix That.

Which of these two frameworks does the Ninth Circuit use? Neither, of course. This is the Ninth Circuit we're talking about. Its framework looks like a combination of two. On the one hand, it follows the Majority Framework by requiring proof of access (instead of copying) and "substantial similarity." But then is splits the inquiry into "substantial similarity" into two tests, both of which must be proven: the "extrinsic test" and the "intrinsic test." The extrinsic test is meant to be "objective." The jury is permitted to consider both protectable and non-protectable elements, to dissect the elements and compare those, and to consider expert opinion. You know what that is? Probative similarity, but here's it's pressed into the service of substantial similarity and has been separated from the inquiry into access.

The intrinsic test is just the normal test for "substantial similarity"/"unlawful appropriation" that every other court uses. Calling it a "test" is overstating it: it's more like the jury's gut instinct, based on the "total concept and feel" of the works. Sorry, but no one has come up with a better way of formulating the test, or how "total concept and feel" works when both protectable and non-protectable elements have been taken. To be fair to the Ninth Circuit, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence was innovative at the time and served as an important stepping stone to the preferred legal framework. Alas, the way precedent works, the Ninth Circuit has been stuck at this half-way point for decades. It should go without saying that the application of the "inverse-square" rule to the Ninth Circuit's framework can be ugly.

But that's what makes the court's opinion in the "Stairway to Heaven" case so exciting. The court straight up endorses the Preferred Framework, even using the preferred terminology:

Whether Defendants copied protected expression contains two separate and distinct components: "copying" and "unlawful appropriation." A plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that a defendant copied his work, as independent creation is a complete defense to copyright infringement. In cases such as this one where there is no direct evidence of copying, the plaintiff can attempt to prove it circumstantially by showing that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work and that the two works share similarities probative of copying. When a high degree of access is shown, a lower amount of similarity is needed to prove copying. To prove copying, the similarities between the two works need not be extensive, and they need not involve protected elements of the plaintiff's work. They just need to be similarities one would not expect to arise if the two works had been created independently.

It then tackles the plaintiffs' argument about the missing "inverse-ratio" rule. I'll bet the plaintiffs were wanting an "inverse-ratio" instruction that told the jury to weigh access against substantial similarity. If so, the Ninth Circuit had some bad news for it: the "inverse-ratio" applies only to copying, not to substantial similarity.

This [inverse ratio] rule assists only in proving copying, not in proving unlawful appropriation. Even if a plaintiff proves that a defendant copied his work, the plaintiff must still show that the copying amounts to unlawful appropriation. The showing of substantial similarity necessary to prove unlawful appropriation does not vary with the degree of access the plaintiff has shown.

The court then went on to suggest strongly to the trial court that an "inverse ratio" rule might be a really good idea, in a case where there's proof of access.

But what about that intrinsic-extrinsic distinction? Surely, it's no longer relevant, right? Well, I guess the Ninth Circuit wasn't quite prepared to get that radical. With a little hocus-pocus, it sort of re-purposed the distinction in the service of substantial similarity/unlawful appropriation. Now, instead of being objective and subjective, it's about making sure you have both evidence of appropriation of protected elements and that gut-feeling. OK, whatever—that might actually be an improvement, since its one way to reconcile "total concept and feel" with a need to filter out non-protectable elements.

Emphasis on "Might"

The fight's not over. When a Circuit court takes up an appeal, it assigns a panel of three of its judges. In theory, a panel can't overrule an earlier panel—for that to happen, you need the entire court, or in the 9th Circuit a larger panel of judges, (called "en banc") to take up the case, which is rare (but not unheard of). Right now, later panels have the option of picking which framework they want to use: follow "Blurred Lines'" traditional Ninth Circuit framework, or adopt "Stairway to Heaven's" newfangled Preferred Framework. Obviously, parties are going to pick the one that works best for them. We might end up with an internally-split circuit (which is essentially the current situation with the Second Circuit). Of course, the Supreme Court to step in and fix it, but let's be serious. Indeed, it is almost scandalous that, for decades, there have been multiple frameworks for a concept CENTRAL to copyright law, and the Supreme Court has never expressed interest in the subject.

Now, as it happens, the court's discussion of the "inverse-ratio" rule, and its related description of the Preferred Framework, is not what caused the court to vacate the jury verdict and send the case back down for a second trial. I'll explain the twin brain farts that caused that disaster in a subsequent post.

Rick Sanders is a trademark, trade secrets and copyright litigator and a founding partner of Aaron & Sanders, PLLC. From 2012 to 2014, he was an adjunct professor at Vanderbilt University Law School, where he was teaching Copyright Law. He blogs at IPBreakdown and tweets at @RickSandersLaw.

Filed Under: 9th circuit, blurred lines, copyright, infringement, inverse ratio, jimmy page, led zeppelin, randy california, robert plant, spirit, stairway to heaven, taurus

Court Won't Let FBI Dodge Lawsuit By Removing American Citizen From No-Fly List Shortly Shortly After Being Sued

from the nothing-prompts-the-government-into-action-like-litigation dept

The FBI uses the "no fly" list as leverage. What should be used to keep threats to national security off airplanes is being used to turn people into informants. If someone travels to a country the US government views with suspicion, citizens and legal residents are often approached by FBI agents who use the threat of revoking flying privileges to obtain new info sources.

DOJ policy expressly forbids this sort of behavior, but the FBI doesn't care. It tells the CBP to keep an eye on travelers who visit or originate from certain countries, accost them in the airport, and subject them to invasive searches/interrogations with an eye on converting them to unofficial G-men.

Earlier this year, the Second Circuit Appeals Court said federal agents could be sued for tossing three men on the "no fly" list for refusing to become informants. The Ninth Circuit Appeals Court is saying the same thing. There are procedural differences between the two cases, but in both, the plaintiffs have been allowed to move forward with their lawsuits.

The case [PDF] from the Ninth Circuit deals with the FBI's coercive tactics. An American citizen from Oregon dealt with this after flying to Sudan:

In April 2010, while still in Sudan, Fikre was approached by two FBI agents who questioned him about his association with the as-Saber Mosque in Portland and his commercial finances. The agents told Fikre that he had been placed on the No Fly List, which identifies individuals who are prohibited from flying into, out of, or over the United States and Canadian airspace by commercial airlines. The FBI agents offered to remove Fikre from the list if he became a government informant. Fikre refused.

Then things got a whole lot worse for Yonas Fikre. He went from Sudan to the United Arab Emirates later that year where he was seized, imprisoned, and tortured by UAE police. Questioning centered on the Portland mosque and his captors told him the FBI had requested his detention. Once released, Fikre was trapped overseas. Unable to return to the US because of his no fly list status, Fikre sought refuge in Sweden.

Fikre appealed his no fly status, but the DHS refused to confirm or deny his placement on the list. Following the government's loss in another no fly list lawsuit, the DHS finally confirmed Fikre was on the list but refused to reinstate his flying privileges. The DHS claimed Fikre was a "threat to civil aviation or national security," but refused to provide further details as to why the agency believed this. Sweden's government ultimately expelled him from the country (presumably because the US government had pretty much declared Fikre a terrorist) and his wife left him while he spent a half-decade overseas trying to find a way to travel back home.

Fikre sued the FBI for a variety of Constitutional violations, asking for damages and an admission/declaration from the government that he should never have been placed on the no fly list. The government responded by trying to dodge the lawsuit altogether. It arbitrarily removed Fikre from the list and said that was enough to make all of his claims moot. The lower court agreed, deciding the attempt to dodge the lawsuit was the equivalent of making Fikre whole for the half-decade of overseas screwing he received because he refused to be an FBI informant.

The Appeals Court disagrees with this assessment of the government's attempted mooting. As Fikre points out, there's nothing preventing the FBI from putting him back on the no fly list once the lawsuit has been dismissed. The government points to no reason or underlying policy for Fikre's removal, much less makes any declaration it no longer considers him a national security threat.

[T]he FBI’s decision to restore Fikre’s flying privileges is an individualized determination untethered to any explanation or change in policy, much less an abiding change in policy. The DHS re-evaluated Fikre’s presence on the No Fly List in 2013 and 2015 pursuant to its TRIP procedure and determined that no adjustments to his status were necessary. Indeed, the DHS affirmed as late as March 2015—after it had amended TRIP to conform to the decision in Latif—that Fikre posed “a threat to civil aviation or national security” and it refused to remove him from the No Fly List. Yet it did just that fourteen months later, without explanation or any announced change in policy. [...] This record suggests that Fikre’s removal from the No Fly List was more likely an exercise of discretion than a decision arising from a broad change in agency policy or procedure.

The court grants the government some good faith it hasn't earned by saying it doesn't believe it removed Fikre from the list simply to moot the lawsuit, but notes it has done nothing to assure Fikre or the court that his removal will be permanent or has anything to do with the national security machinations used to strip his flying privileges.

The notice filed by the government averred only that “counsel recently was advised by the Terrorist Screening Center that [Fikre] has been removed from the No Fly List.” Absent an acknowledgment by the government that its investigation revealed Fikre did not belong on the list, and that he will not be returned to the list based on the currently available evidence, Fikre remains, in his own words, “stigmatiz[ed] . . . as a known or suspected terrorist and as an individual who represents a threat of engaging in or conducting a violent act of terrorism and who is operationally capable of doing so.” Because acquaintances, business associates, and perhaps even family members are likely to persist in shunning or avoiding him despite his renewed ability to travel, it is plain that vindication in this action would have actual and palpable consequences for Fikre.

Nothing will be mooted. Fikre can continue suing the government for violating his rights and hopefully obtain a full -- and honest -- declaration that he was never a threat and will not pose one in the future. Short of a big win by Fikre, it's tough to see this litigation resulting in the FBI dropping its informal policy of pressuring people into becoming informants by threatening to strand them in foreign countries. The DOJ's policies aren't worth the paper they're printed on -- not if the FBI continues to use the no fly list as leverage.

Filed Under: 9th circuit, american citizen, cbp, fbi, informants, no fly list, sudan, yonas fikre

Ninth Circuit Says No, You Fucking May Not Arrest A Bunch Of Middle School Students To 'Prove A Point'

from the Lack-Of-Respect-(Misdemeanor) dept

The Ninth Circuit Appeals Court has upheld the stripping of immunity from a school resource officer who clearly violated the rights of multiple students, but still felt the need to be told twice by consecutive federal courts.

School is school and kids will get in fights. Some accusations about bullying brought several seventh grade students to the school's office, along with Deputy Luis Ortiz. Ortiz reached the limits of his training and experience extremely quickly when he was unable to determine who was bullying who or why these seventh grade students wouldn't give him the respect he so clearly felt he was owed. So, here's how he made the most (constitutional violations) of a bad situation. From the decision [PDF]:

On October 8, 2013, a group of seventh grade girls (twelve and thirteen year-olds) were handcuffed, arrested, and transported in police vehicles from their middle school campus to the police station. An assistant principal had asked a school resource officer, Sheriff’s Deputy Luis Ortiz, to counsel a group of girls who had been involved in ongoing incidents of bullying and fighting. School officials gathered the girls in a classroom to wait for Deputy Ortiz. The group included both aggressors and victims, and the school did not identify or separate them.

When he arrived on campus, Deputy Ortiz initially intended to verify the information the school had given him and to mediate the conflict. Within minutes, however, Deputy Ortiz concluded that the girls were being unresponsive and disrespectful. He decided to arrest the girls because, as he explained to them, he was not “playing around” and taking them to jail was the easiest way to “prove a point” and “make [them] mature a lot faster.” Deputy Ortiz stated that he did not care “who [was] at fault, who did what” because “it [was] the same, same ticket, same pair of handcuffs.”

Ortiz's decision to arrest a bunch of students to "prove a point" was corroborated by his own recording, which undermines the arguments he raised trying to secure immunity. The court doesn't appear to be pleased it has to handle a case where the defendant is so very clearly in the wrong, but it does what it can to ensure Ortiz will be at least as displeased as the judges are.

There's nothing nice said here about Ortiz's actions and the court sees no reason to hedge its opinion with faint praise for law enforcement in general. At best, it admits handling school situations like these can be complicated, but the complexity of the situation doesn't excuse Ortiz's probable cause-less mass arrest of middle school students.

Deputy Ortiz clearly stated that the justification for the arrests was not the commission of a crime, since he did not “care who is at fault,” nor the school’s special need to maintain campus safety, but rather his own desire to “prove a point” and “make” the students “mature a lot faster.” The arrest of a middle schooler, however, cannot be justified as a scare tactic, a lesson in maturity, or a chastisement for perceived disrespect.

[...]

Deputy Ortiz faced a room of seven seated, mostly quiet middle school girls, and only generalized allegations of fighting and conflict amongst them. Even accounting for what Deputy Ortiz perceived to be nonresponsiveness to his questioning, the full-scale arrests of all seven students, without further inquiry, was both excessively intrusive in light of the girls’ young ages and not reasonably related to the school’s expressed need.

As for any questions about whether or not it had been clearly established officers cannot arrest students to "prove a point," the court quickly dispenses with that discussion:

At the time of the students’ arrest, it was clearly established that a police seizure at the behest of school officials must, at a minimum, be “reasonably related to its purpose, and must not be ‘excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.’” Defendants do not—and indeed, cannot—meaningfully contest Deputy Ortiz’s motivation for the arrests, which he stated multiple times. No reasonable officer could have reasonably believed that the law authorizes the arrest of a group of middle schoolers in order to prove a point.

The court is also unimpressed by the officers' attempt to lie their way into the clear.

Defendants… claim that the students’ behavior in the classroom justified the arrest because there was reason to believe the students would engage in imminent fights. That assertion is belied by the audio record of the encounter, which “quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by” the officers. The students were mostly silent, only speaking to respond to the questions posed to them. But even taking at face value Deputy Ortiz’s claim that the girls were being disrespectful to him, and whispering among themselves, this conduct in no way rose to the level of probable cause that could have justified their arrests.

In fact, as the court notes, Ortiz never attempted to determine which students were engaged in bullying before arresting them. The three plaintiffs suing him were all victims of the bullying and they were rung up just like the instigators.

There's no ducking the lawsuit. On top of that, Ortiz (and another officer named in the lawsuit) will be facing state claims in addition to the federal civil rights violation allegations. Without a doubt, officers sometimes arrest people simply to "prove a point." But usually they'll do it with a bit more subtlety and try to eliminate any recordings that might undermined their official narrative. Ortiz was so determined to teach a bunch of uncooperative seventh graders a lesson, he completely forgot to make the arrest minimally plausible.

Filed Under: 9th circuit, arrests, bullying, civil liberties, civil rights, luis ortiz, middle school, prove a point, school resource officer

Ninth Circuit Stops Monkeying Around And Denies En Banc Review Of The Monkey Selfie Case

from the it-ain't-over-till-its-over dept

Whatever will we do without the Monkey Selfie case rearing its not-actually-copyrighted head every few months? We might finally get to find out, now that the Ninth Circuit has declined to rehear the appeal en banc. This denial now makes clear that monkeys lack standing to sue for copyright, at least within the Ninth Circuit. Someday (hopefully not soon) we may find out what other Circuits have to say about primate copyrights, but for now we can finally be confident that they lack standing to sue over them here.

Provided that no cert petition is granted, of course. And given that this is a case that has thus far steadfastly refused to end, it is way too soon to be confident that this is truly the last we've heard from Naruto or any of his alleged next friends. We should at least know whether a cert petition's been filed in about three months or so, though (see Rule 13), so stay tuned...

Filed Under: 9th circuit, copyright, david slater, monkey selfie, naruto, standing
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