PACER Officials Give Weak, Nonsensical Excuse For Why PACER Deleted Tons Of Public Court Records With No Notice

from the total-failure dept

We were among the first to report that the federal court system's PACER electronic database of court records had deleted a ton of old cases, and once our story went live, we saw a ton of lawyers, law professors and journalists flip out over the news, which had been hidden in a little-read notice on the PACER site, posted with basically no notice at all. The Washington Post got the Administrative Office of the US Courts to provide a statement about the deletions that makes almost no sense at all.

Charles Hall, a spokesperson for the Administrative Office, told The Post via e-mail that the change was made on Aug. 11 in preparation for an overhaul of the the PACER architecture, including the implementation of the next generation of the Judiciary's Case Management and Electronic Case Files System. "NextGen replaces the older CM/ECF system and provides improvements for users, including a single sign-on for PACER and NextGen," he wrote.

However, as a result of the changes the locally developed legacy case management systems of some courts were no longer compatible with PACER, he says. Since PACER works as a sort of distributed network of different archives rather than one centralized database, that's a major problem.

However, Hall says, the dockets and documents no longer available through the system could still be obtained directly from the relevant court and "all open cases, as well as any new filings, will continue to be available on PACER."

Yes, I can understand how there might be some backwards compatibility problems, but it seems like there's a pretty straightforward way to deal with that: move the old files to the new system. But no one seems to be doing that. The claim that it's okay because the documents are available "directly from the relevant court" is a ridiculous, weak excuse. The whole point of PACER was to make the records more accessible and to get away from having the documents only available to people who have the time and resources to go down to the local court to get the documents.

The Washington Post also spoke to Brian Carver from UC Berkeley's School of Information, who recently took over the management of RECAP (the crowd-sourced effort that many of us rely on and contribute to) to post any documents obtained via PACER to the freely available web via the Internet Archive. He made a pretty good point, that it's absolutely ridiculous that no one at the courts made this information public earlier so that people could try to do something to preserve the availability of those case records:

Carver says their group would be happy to host the files publicly, and are reaching out the courts to see if that is possible. But he was still shocked by the lack of advance warning. "If we had known about it in advance maybe we could have done something to target these documents and archive them publicly," he says. "It was really an announcement of an accomplished feat -- we weren't told until after this deed was already done."

Meanwhile, Aaron Greenspan, who runs another site that makes court documents publicly available, PlainSite, (and who first alerted us to this issue), has sent the Administrative Office of the US Courts a response to this, pointing out, as we mentioned above, how ridiculous it is:

The supposed explanation that the dockets and documents were stored in an "incompatible" format is nonsensical and has no technical justification whatsoever. As you well know, database schema changes happen all the time, and it is easily within the realm of possibility to write conversion scripts—especially given how much money the AO has spent on PACER NextGen already. In fact, the technology known as ODBC exists for this very reason.

He further has offered to "reverse-engineer the supposedly legacy format(s) ourselves and make the data available to the public for free at no cost to the Government" and even asked them to ship the hard drives to him. Somehow, I doubt that's going to happen, but it seems like working with Carver or Greenspan or anyone else, frankly, would have made more sense than just deleting these public records.

Update: And... Carl Malamud of Public.Resource.Org has sent letters to all of the courts that had cases deleted, requesting copies of the deleted cases. We'll see how that goes.

While it's great that PACER is apparently moving to a new system (the login page is already different, though the underlying pages still remain horrifyingly painful to use), dumping a bunch of cases down the memory hole is a huge problem.

Filed Under: administrative office, court records, courts, pacer, public records, recap
Companies: plainsite

Court To Frat Boys: Openness Of Courts More Compelling Than Your Potential Embarrassment

from the can't-have-your-pot-and-smoke-it-too dept

Via Eric Goldman, we learn of a case in Pennsylvania where a group of six Bucknell students were trying to sue some officials at the University for unlawaful search relating to a drug bust and subsequent disciplinary action at their frat house (and some other residences). The interesting tidbit here is that the plaintiffs asked the court to keep their names a secret throughout the case. Their argument was not that they needed to be kept secret from the defendants -- who already knew exactly who they were -- but rather that since the discipline was done confidentially, to sue publicly would out these students as being disciplined over drug possession -- and that might harm their reputations.

The court however, completely rejects this request, noting the importance of open and public court procedures. While it does admit that there are cases where plaintiffs are allowed to proceed under pseudonyms, that tends to be in cases where to come forward would put them in direct danger -- not direct danger of being publicly associated with things they actually did. Basically, the court notes that while it may be embarrassing for this information to end up on the web, these guys are adults who made their own choices, and keeping the fact that you were busted with drugs secret is quite different from keeping information secret to avoid being thrown in an Iranian prison:

There is no potential for serious harm to Plaintiffs in the case at bar. There are also no special circumstances that would justify an exception to one of the hallmarks of the American democracy, the openness of our courts. This is not a case involving "abortion, birth control, transexuality, mental illness, welfare rights of illegitimate children, AIDS, and homosexuality." ... The only harm to Plaintiffs is that which they identified — the embarrassment of possession of contraband and that news media outlets may discuss the story, which will then live in perpetuity through web searches on the internet.

The Megless/Provident Life/Citizens for a Strong Ohio factors certainly mitigate against Plaintiffs arguments in favor of anonymity. Plaintiffs here are not children, but adults who have left the nest to explore the world; albiet, the semi-sheltered world of college life at a private, small, expensive liberal arts college in rural Pennsylvania.

Bucknell kept the students disciplinary record confidential; Plaintiffs have therefore been protected from public disclosure up to this point. However, the Bucknell's desire to protect its students has no bearing on the instant proceedings. The public has no compelling need to protect the identities of adults alleging Fourth Amendment violations (to be contrasted with the use of pseudonyms for sexual assault victims, the public has a compelling need to protect identities to promote disclosure by these victims). Moreover, this case does not involve private medical information; a risk to Plaintiffs of future imprisonment in the Peoples Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or even in the United States; nor does it involve the threat of loss of the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment.

Basically, the 4th Amendment issues may be worth exploring, but there's no compelling argument for keeping their names out of the case. Just because their names -- and the associated actions -- may "live in perpetuity through web searches on the internet," that's no reason to allow them to stay anonymous.

Filed Under: anonymity, courts, embarrassment, privacy

Germany Considers Setting Up A Special Court To Determine Who Can Demand To Have Embarassing Histories Deleted From Google

from the because-that-will-end-well dept

We recently wrote about a ridiculous decision in the EU Court of Justice, which accepted the bizarre concept of a "right to be forgotten" and ordered that Google had to delete links to old news stories about Mario Costeja Gonzalez even though those news stories could stay online. And, of course, this has set off a frenzy of folks seeking to have their embarrassing histories deleted, because, really, if you had an embarrassing public history, why wouldn't you?

And, within weeks, it's already reached the point that Germany is looking into setting up a special court to review such cases and determine what embarrassing histories Google will need to delete, and which embarrassing histories you'll need to learn to live with people finding on Google. Because... this is the ridiculous world we now live in (for those of you in Europe for now). At the very least, to some extent this can be seen as marginally positive. The idea behind creating this is to actually decrease the impact of the ruling, and to limit the ability for people to delete their histories. But, just the fact that you might need to set up a special court for this sounds insane.

Following a European Union court decision this month granting consumers the “right to be forgotten,” the Interior Ministry in Berlin would seek to establish “dispute-settlement mechanisms” for consumers who file so-called take-down requests. If search providers introduce automatic deletion, public information would be at risk, the ministry said.

“Politicians, prominent figures and other persons who are reported about in public would be able to hide or even delete reports they find unpleasant,” it said in a statement. The ministry suggested that the removal of information shouldn’t be left to company algorithms.

It seems some folks in Berlin recognize that public information might be at risk over this situation, but it's still troubling that a court gets to decide what public information is "legitimate" and which is not. And that, really, is the problem with all of this. While defenders of the "right to be forgotten" and the EUCJ decision keep referring to it as a "privacy" right, it is no such thing. If it was about private information, they'd have a point. But it's not. It's about public information.

It is silly to argue that public information should be forced to be made private after a certain point, and even more ridiculous to then put the burden on a third party to make that public information private. At the very least, having a special court slightly limits that burden, but just the fact that such a court would even be thought necessary should show how ridiculous and dangerous the original ruling is for public discourse.

Filed Under: courts, germany, right to be forgotten, search engines
Companies: google

Judicial Branch Finally Acting As A Check Against Government Overreach

from the the-government's-been-skating-for-far-too-long dept

At long last, there finally seems to be a recognition by members of the judicial branch that they are, in fact, there to provide checks and balances against government overreach. We've already covered the recent orders by Magistrate Judge John Facciola, who has twice sent the government back to fix its overly broad warrant requests seeking access to email accounts and cell phone content. (This is tempered somewhat by another Facciola decision, which declared the law enforcement agency in question didn't need a search warrant for a supposedly "abandoned" phone.) Facciola isn't the only judge pushing back against the government's vague warrant requests, however.

In the past year, U.S. magistrate judges John Facciola in Washington, D.C., and David Waxse in Kansas City, Kan., have rejected or modified a number of applications for warrants to search people's emails and other electronic communications at Internet firms such as Google Inc. and Yahoo Inc.

The rulings go against the grain of a federal judiciary that has generally approved them, according to current and former law-enforcement officials. They also come against the backdrop of a legal and political debate over the scope of government surveillance that has raged since the National Security Agency's bulk collection of phone records was revealed last summer.

At issue is the Justice Department's two-step process of obtaining all emails and other electronic information in the accounts of a person under investigation, and then using names and keywords to sift through it in hopes of finding evidence of wrongdoing.

The judges have ruled the government needs to refine its requests to comply with the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches.

This has been the government's process for years: obtain everything and keep whatever is deemed "relevant" to the case. Both of these judges appear to realize that they are the last line of Fourth Amendment defense between the government and the public. Presumably, the Snowden leaks have played a part in this altered mindset. As both judges have pointed out in their orders, what the government has routinely sought is unbounded access to communications via unconstitutional warrants.

These two have suggested an alternate route, if the government can't manage to operate within the constraints of the Constitution.

Both judges have suggested Internet service providers and other Web firms could do their own searches based on specific guidance from the Justice Department, and turn over only the information that appears relevant to an investigation. They have also proposed systems in which a court-appointed official or others could perform the initial search, providing a buffer between investigators and bulk data.

Of course, the government thinks these are terrible ideas.

"I don't think ISPs or email providers have the institutional competence to conduct the searches of their customers for evidence of crimes," said Neil MacBride, a former U.S. attorney in Virginia who described the magistrate judges' rulings as "outliers."

Maybe. Maybe not. But it's clear the government is no better than the private sector at performing targeted searches. Instead, it simply demands everything and expects to be trusted to only take a look at what is pertinent. Despite the fact that the government routinely asks (or rather, expects) the judicial branch, along with those defending the accused, to simply trust it with petabytes of someone's personal data, it seems completely unwilling to trust a private company with fulfilling searches for relevant data on its behalf.

The days of the government simply saying "it's complicated" and running broad warrant requests past technically-incompetent judges might finally be numbered.

Judge Waxse said he believed more people would come around to his view if they better understood recent technological advances and how service providers operate. "What Facciola and I are saying is, use what is now developed, and you can comply with the Fourth Amendment," he said. "There are too many lawyers and judges who don't have a clear grasp of how it all works."

This is also part of the problem. Far too often, technically-ignorant judges have credulously accepted the government's arguments because they don't have the knowledge to challenge these assertions. They could seek the input of those who can parse the technological demands, but rather than do so, this crucial part of the system of checks and balances has simply allowed the government to portray its circumvention of the Fourth Amendment as unavoidable.

Following the revelations of the last several months, including documents showing the NSA misrepresented its bulk records collections for nearly three years straight, the government has been shown it cannot be trusted with unlimited access to people's data and content. Hopefully, this pushback from the judicial branch will become the new standard.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, courts, david waxse, doj, john facciola, overreach, surveillance, warrants

DOJ: Some Constitutional Rights Can't Be Tested In Courts, Like Our Ability To Kill You With A Drone

from the say-what-now? dept

Another day, another crazy claim from the DOJ. The latest concerns a legal challenge to the administration's ability to use drone strikes against US citizens abroad. The US has been arguing that this issue cannot be tried in court because it's outside the court's jurisdiction and because of national security reasons. Most ridiculously of all, the DOJ has argued that there are Constitutional rights that cannot be challenged in court:

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian Hauck argued there was a difference between having a constitutional right—which he said could be protected by the executive and legislative branches—and being able to make constitutional claims in court.

Think about that statement for a second. It's not just legally wrong, it's horrifying. Thankfully, Judge Rosemary Collyer found this claim equally bizarre.

"I'm really troubled…that you cannot explain to me where the end of it is," Collyer said. "That, yes, they have constitutional rights but there is no remedy for those constitutional rights."

In case you're wondering, Hauck apparently is relying on the Political Question Doctrine, which tends to be applied very narrowly and is only supposed to mean that courts should not take on cases that present a "political" question rather than a "legal" question. But, a Constitutional issue over whether or not the US government has the right to kill a US citizen like that certainly seems like a legal question, not a political one.

Hauck further argued the executive and legislative branches could be trusted to protect the rights of citizens. In other words: "Hey, courts, don't worry about US drone strikes killing US citizens, Congress and the administration have this one covered." But, um, that's not how it works. We have three branches of government for a reason, and the checks and balances they provide is the key reason. Having an administration that is in charge of using the drone strikes, along with a very compliant Congress, as the only ones capable of determining if the use is appropriate seems to completely ignore the basic premise of the checks and balances of government, especially when it comes to the Constitutional rights of US citizens.

"The problem is, how far does your argument take you?" Collyer said, adding that she found it "a little disconcerting" that the government was arguing that there could be no court review of a decision by the executive and Congress to target American citizens abroad.

It's good to see the judge is concerned, but this case has a long, long way to go, and the administration is going to try as hard as possible to keep this issue out of court entirely.

Filed Under: administration, brian hauck, constitution, courts, doj, drone strikes, drones, political questions doctrine, rosemary collyer

Are The Courts Finally Trying To Bring Some Balance Back To Copyright?

from the technological-neutrality dept

One of the recurrent themes here on Techdirt is the increasing lack of balance in copyright, which is now heavily weighted in favor of creators and their proxies, and against the public. That bias has come about thanks to the rise of the Internet, which has turned the traditionally rather specialist area of copyright law and enforcement into a matter of everyday concern: it affects practically everything we do online, and can criminalize even the most trivial of activities there.

But there are signs that some judges are starting to recognize this imbalance and -- more importantly -- to do something about it in their rulings. Here's what Graham Smith, a UK lawyer and blogger, had to say on this trend recently:

These have been a hectic couple of weeks for copyright. Ten days ago the EU Court of Justice published the UsedSoft decision, which will have us thinking in a completely new way about exhaustion of rights online. On Thursday this week the Canadian Supreme Court delivered five separate copyright judgments on subjects ranging from fair dealing to communication to the public, each in its separate way reinforcing a more user-centric, less author-centric, approach to copyright.

The UsedSoft decision was discussed here on Techdirt a few weeks ago, and may allow software and other digital goods to be re-sold within the EU – it's not clear yet how much of an impact this ruling will have. Meanwhile, the judgments from the Canadian Supreme Court are almost certain to re-shape the copyright landscape in that country.

Smith points out that one thing the European and Canadian decisions have in common is a desire to assert "technological neutrality" -- the idea that the move from an analog to a digital world shouldn't see the balance of traditional copyright tipped towards one side or the other:

Both the ECJ and the SCC [Supreme Court of Canada] kicked back hard against what they perceived as imbalance between hard copy and digital copyright outcomes. The ECJ strove to achieve 'functional equivalence' between a fully paid permanent download and a sale on physical media. It said that what would otherwise be a communication to the public would be converted into a distribution to the public if a 'transfer of ownership' (defined in economic rather than legal terms) had taken place. The ability to rely on the first sale doctrine in order to acquire second-hand software applied in equivalent situations, regardless of whether the transactions took place on physical media or by download.

The SCC invoked a similar concept of 'technological neutrality' in several of its judgments, two of which together held that the right of communication to the public applied to streaming but not to downloads.

The key role of technological neutrality in driving the recent decisions is supported on the Canadian side by Michael Geist, who concluded a series of posts analyzing the implications of the five SCC rulings -- which he termed "the culmination of a ten year transformation of copyright at Canada's highest court" -- as follows:

the court frames technological neutrality as a matter of balance within the Copyright Act and as a means to avoid the double dipping that occurs when new fees or restrictions are layered onto new technologies.

The net effect is to firmly reject claims that users' rights is merely a metaphor. In the eyes of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is an essential component of Canadian copyright law that is integral to achieving the purpose of copyright it identified over a decade ago -- a balance that "lies not only in recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature."

Let's hope this new recognition of the essential nature of users' rights deepens and spreads to other countries where copyright in the digital age remains seriously out of kilter.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and on Google+

Filed Under: copyright, courts

Courts Losing Patience With Clearly Bogus Trademark Claims; Dismissing Them Early

from the good-for-them dept

Eric Goldman has a post about a district court (Eastern District, NY) dismissing a trademark claim against the site PissedConsumer, by a company that was upset about what people were saying about it on the site. Of course, that's a pretty clear abuse of trademark law, which isn't about letting trademark holders block any usage -- especially not reviews or criticism. Instead, trademark law is supposed to be about protecting consumers against confusion over products and services for sale. That is, it's about stopping Bob's Cola from pretending to be Coca Cola -- not necessarily because it protects Coca Cola, but because it protects the consumer doing the buying.

In a case like this -- which we've seen all too often -- Devere Group got upset about what people were saying about them on PissedCustomer, and tried to pretend that was a trademark violation. Similar cases tend to get thrown out eventually, but what struck Goldman as interesting about this is that it got tossed out early over a lack of consumer confusion at the "motion to dismiss" stage. At that point, the court is supposed to assume that everything the plaintiff is saying is true (later stages of the case can explore if that's true). So, to throw out the case at this stage is really early. As Goldman notes:

Running through a truncated likelihood of consumer confusion mutli-factor analysis, the court says PissedConsumer isn't deVere's competitor, there's no chance PissedConsumer will "bridge the gap" to become a competitor, deVere didn't allege bad faith and deVere didn't allege actual consumer confusion. The court bypasses the remaining factors, something an appeals court probably won't do. Instead, the court says that judicial precedent has held that gripe sites don't create consumer confusion.

Goldman notes that even if this is a good result (having a court dump an obviously bogus lawsuit at the earliest possible point), he expects an appeals court to overturn this for happening too early. However, in an update, he also highlights a few more cases pointed out by Rebecca Tushnet of courts doing something similar:

Rebecca sent some other recent examples of trademark claims failing on a motion to dismiss, including The Hangover II case, Forest River v. Heartland RV and Architectural Mailboxes v. Epoch.

While it may be slightly procedurally questionable, I'm wondering if this shows that courts are very, very aware that companies are seeking to abuse trademark law these days and they're having none of it. Combined with some similar early dismissals in copyright trolling cases, and it seems like judges are showing little patience for companies trying to abuse IP laws to silence others.

Filed Under: confusion, courts, dismissals, trademark

Different Treatment For Tech Related Law-Breaking Depending On Whether Or Not You Have Power

from the funny-how-that-works dept

Rick Falkvinge is noticing one of the bigger hypocrisies when it comes to the law and technology: these days, we hear all the time about the strongest defenders of copyright law being caught infringing. And yet, they never seem to get in much, if any, trouble for it. In fact, they often seem to think that as long as they apologize or ignore the controversy they'll be fine -- and that's how it often works out. But, heaven forbid you're a single parent facing accusations of sharing two dozen songs! The copyright holders get to go after you for many millions.

To Falkvinge, this is reminiscent of the "high court" and "low court" concepts from the Middle Ages, in which the nobility had the high court: where breaking the law had limited consequences, and you could get away with paying a fine and issuing an apology. Then there was the low court, where everyone else was dealt with, and might receive punishments such as "branding, have their hands cut off, or sometimes just thrown in jail if it was a petty offense; like killing another commoner, which was a lesser offense than stealing from merchants." The two classes and the double standard on punishment reminded him of today's digital world:

In reality, the high courts and low courts have been reintroduced in silence. When Sony BMG broke into millions of computers worldwide in 2005, rootkitting them to disable their ability to run instructions that would violate Sony’s own interpretation of its copyright monopoly, Sony was sentenced to send out marketing material for its own products and no individual executives were charged. When LulzSec members were arrested for breaking into systems in the singular, they get the low court treatment.

When a commoner is accused of violating the copyright monopoly, in some draconian countries like France, they can be sent into social exile without even getting a trial in the low court. In contrast, the noble Voddler (a video-on-demand service) violated the GPL egregiously by using free software to build its service — but without resharing the code, thus violating the copyright monopoly that GPL builds on, and for thoroughly commercial purposes. They were never prosecuted. In contrast, they are now speaking at hearings in parliaments on how successful they are.

What bugs me the most is that those who get away with doing these kinds of things never seem to realize how they're in a position of power and protected. They just brush off their own failure to abide by the law as if it's nothing -- and never realize what they're doing to the people they go after.

Filed Under: copyright, courts, power, punishment

Righthaven Dismisses Lawsuit After Judge Slams Its Business Model

from the smart-judge dept

It's looking like more and more judges are recognizing that the new found love of copyright trolls, to use the US judicial system as a shotgun to force people to pay settlement fees, is not a proper use of the courts. The company has been losing some important rulings, and has had to drop other lawsuits. Over in Colorado, where Righthaven has been filing a bunch of lawsuits for the Denver Post, Judge John Kane has made it clear that he's not impressed by Righthaven's business model and sees no reason to use the court to help it:

"[W]hether or not this case settles is not my primary concern. Although Plaintiff's business model relies in large part upon reaching settlement agreements with a minimal investment of time and effort, the purpose of the courts is to provide a forum for the orderly, just, and timely resolution of controversies and disputes. Plaintiff’s wishes to the contrary, the courts are not merely tools for encouraging and exacting settlements from Defendants cowed by the potential costs of litigation and liability."

This was in rejecting Righthaven's request for an extension for filing its latest motion in a case, which is a really standard thing that judges almost always grant. But here, the judge said no. That alone is a pretty big slam against Righthaven.

Righthaven then quickly dismissed the lawsuit, which had been filed against "a mentally and physically disabled" 20-year old. Amusingly, in the dismissal notice, Righthaven lashes out at the defendant for using the lawsuit to attack it and its business model, and says that's why it has decided to drop the lawsuit. Uh, yeah, right.

That sort of petulant tone probably isn't going to help Righthaven or its client, the Denver Post, considering that the judge here, Judge Kane, is the judge for all of Righthaven's Colorado cases. Either way it's nice to see more and more courts pushing back on these kinds of lawsuits. I'm curious to hear the responses of those in our comments who thought these lawsuits were all perfectly legit when they were being filed.

Filed Under: business model, copyright, copyright trolls, courts
Companies: righthaven