Judge John Facciola On Today's Law Enforcement: I'd Go Weeks Without Seeing A Warrant For Anything 'Tactile'

from the 'start-canvassing-the-neighborhood-for-unlocked-cellphones' dept

We lost one of the "good guys" when Magistrate Judge John Facciola retired late last year. Facciola was a leading figure in the small -- but important -- "Magistrates' Revolt" that emerged in the wake of the Snowden leaks. Multiple times the government approached Facciola for a signature on overly-broad warrants seeking the entire contents of a phone or an email account, only to find the judge unwilling to help it pack for its fishing trip.

More than once, the government was forced to rewrite its requests, and on one memorable occasion, it went "judge shopping" in hopes of obtaining the signature Facciola wouldn't give it, only to be rebuffed by the unamused judge on the opposite coast.

Zoe Tillman of the National Law Journal has a fascinating interview with the retired judge. Facciola was one of the few magistrates who actively attempted to understand the legal nuances inherent to today's interconnected world. According to Facciola, magistrate judges who allow technological advances to pass them by aren't doing the public any favors by not staying current. Law enforcement has moved on, and it's tough to act as a check against overreach if you don't understand the subject matter. The mental image of investigators dusting for fingerprints and tossing suspects' residences is completely outdated. Investigative work now involves -- almost exclusively -- more ethereal methods.

When asked how his job had changed since he took his post in 1997, Facciola responded:

[I]n March 2012, my criminal month, at the end of the month I realized something: I had not issued a warrant or an order for anything that was tactile. Everything I issued was for some form of electronically stored information. Whether it was a Facebook account or cell site information.

You almost look forward to the day when a guy will just want to break a door down and go in and get cocaine. Those days are gone forever apparently.

This would explain law enforcement's outspoken opposition to any form of electronic encryption. Today's law enforcement agencies seemingly have little stomach for old-fashioned police work. Searching something "tactile," like a suspect's residence, is almost always an afterthought. These agencies would rather dig through every communication they can obtain before they even think about utilizing methods that have worked for years. (And default mode for today's law enforcement has shifted the approach to physical searches as well. Increasingly, handling the "tactile" means going "tactical" with no-knock warrants, military rifles, full body armor, repurposed mine-resistant vehicles and a hell of a lot of guys shouting contradictory instructions/firing weapons in contradictory directions within moments of the "breach.")

This nearly-exclusive focus on digital searches poses a problem for the magistrates charged with vetting warrants for Constitutionality, not the least of which are the outdated laws and guidelines governing searches of citizens' communications and data. And this can't be fixed by the courts themselves.

[T]he problem is not a judicial one, the problem is Congress has not looked at the Stored Communications Act since 1986. My gosh. 1986. [...] If you look at the opinions about the Stored Communications Act, they are some of the most complicated opinions you will see because it's a classic example of the square peg not fitting in the round hole… There [is] out there a lot of wonderful thinking about how the act could be amended to bring it kicking and screaming into the 21st century. But no movement by Congress. That's deeply troubling.

Not that the judicial system hasn't tried. It's just that the conclusions are still unclear and mainly deal with warrantless searches. The Sixth Circuit Court ruled that email contents are covered by the Fourth Amendment, contrary to the claims of those who rely on the outdated SCA. The Supreme Court had a chance to weigh the SCA against the Fourth Amendment in 2010, but chose to carefully avoid the subject. So, if it's to be fixed, it's up to Congress, and there is only a very slim chance that it will be willing to alter a law so thoroughly exploited by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, even given the events of the past couple of years.

Particularization is what's needed in the digital realm, according to Facciola, but that's clearly not what the government wants. It wants to dump peoples' computers and devices on the metaphorical carpet and root through the pile until it finds what it's looking for. (Or, as has happened frequently, find something it wasn't looking for and pursue that angle instead/in addition, occasionally necessitating additional warrants.)

Particularized searches of ethereal contents is easier said than done, especially when one half of the parties involved has no interest in limiting its searches. Facciola has suggested searches of this type be handled by the third party that holds the data, but that has been shot down by other judges as "impractical." Facciola additionally suggests wholly separating the search team and the evidence review team (using a "Chinese wall") to help assure the search won't exceed the limitations provided by the warrant. The last resort is still the front line, however.

The third solution… is more careful supervision of the conduct of the search by the magistrate judge.

That's where Facciola fit in. He challenged the government on its broad search requests and forced it to reconsider its tactics. Unfortunately, there's usually been another judge willing to grant warrants that don't meet the standards of more demanding magistrates.

In his parting comment, Facciola points out that judges aren't the only technologically-resistant participants in the judicial system. Those on the other side of the bench have their issues as well.

We have to get across to lawyers that they really have to read outside of their fields. Every day I read the tech section of The New York Times. I find almost every article has to do with the law. And that's an important thing.

I learned from [a law professor] that — did you know this? — the telephone was in existence for 10 years before lawyers started to use it. They thought it was beneath their dignity. You wondered, did they use the elevator?

Filed Under: 4th amendment, john facciola, law enforcement, magistrate's revole, surveillance, warrants

Magistrate Judge Shoots Down Government's Attempt To Gag Yahoo Indefinitely Over Grand Jury Subpoenas

from the checked-and-balanced dept

California judge Paul Grewal continues to hold up his end of the "Magistrates' Revolt." Grewal was the magistrate who shot down the government's open-ended request to grab every email in a person's Gmail account and sort through them at its leisure. He was actually the second magistrate to shoot down this request. The government went "judge shopping" after Judge John Facciola told it the scope of the request needed to be narrowed considerably before he would even think about granting it. The government decided it still wanted all the email and traveled across the country to see Judge Grewal… who told them to GTFO without even giving the feds the option to rewrite the request.

Grewal is once again siding with the public and acting as a check against government overreach.

Law enforcement cannot indefinitely forbid Yahoo Inc from revealing a grand jury subpoena that seeks subscriber account information, a U.S. judge ruled, because doing so would violate the company’s free speech rights.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul Grewal in San Jose, California on Thursday wrote that the government’s request would prohibit Yahoo from disclosing the subpoena, even years after the grand jury concluded its probe. The court order does not disclose the target of the federal investigation.

“In an era of increasing public demand for transparency about the extent of government demands for data from providers like Yahoo!, this cannot stand,” Grewal wrote.

Yahoo has had its fill of government secrecy. It spent a long time fighting both broad subscriber data requests from the NSA and their accompanying 25-year gag orders. Its ardent defense of its subscribers against broad government requests would still be under seal, but thanks to recently declassified documents, it has been able to address the subject publicly -- nearly 18 years before the gag order would have "aged off."

The DOJ again wants to maintain its subpoena secrecy, hoping to keep internet platforms like Yahoo, Twitter and Facebook from discussing grand jury subpoenas until… well, it's not entirely clear there's really an ending date.

Instead of asking that Yahoo be gagged for 60 or 90 days, the government asked that the company be gagged until further order of the court.

Grewal's rejection points out that the government feels entitled to indefinite gag orders, but has yet to offer any reasons why it should have its wishes granted.

The government did not demonstrate why such an indefinite request was necessary, Grewal wrote.

Judge Grewal has sent the government back to perform a rewrite -- either providing justification for its ridiculous demands, or to request something less illogical, like a finite gag order. The government has availed itself of many judicial rubber stamps over the years, but it looks like it's still running into resistance on both coasts: Paul Grewal in California and John Facciola in Washington D.C.

The ACLU has also been engaged in this fight against government secrecy since early last year, bringing more attention and legal expertise to an issue that hasn't achieved the terminal velocity of mainstream media attention. It's a bit more trench warfare, pitting magistrate judges and amicus briefs against the DOJ's assumption that it should have whatever it asks for, because terrorism, drugs, grand juries or whatever.

Filed Under: gag order, grand jury, indefinite gag order, john facciola, law enforcement, magistrate judge, magistrates revolt, paul grewal, subpoenas
Companies: yahoo

Snuffing Out The Magistrate's Revolt: DC District Court Judge Roberts Grants Another Rejected Warrant Application

from the 'I-concur-with-my-own-finding-that-this-complies-with-the-4th-Amendment' dept

As we've been covering for the past few months, there seems to be an emboldened set of magistrate judges willing to push back against broad electronic search requests by the government. While it would be nice to see a stronger pushback originate somewhere closer to the top, it is (or was, it seems...) refreshing to see those on the lower rungs defend citizens' rights by rejecting what can only be termed "general warrants," the very thing that prompted the Fourth Amendment in the first place.

But it appears the rest of the judicial system is more interested in quelling what Scott Greenfield has memorably termed the "Magistrates' Revolt." As was noted here back in May, a DC district court judge overrode DC Magistrate John Facciola's refusal to bury a subpoena to Twitter under a gag order (Facciola actually went one step further and invited Twitter to respond in court). Judge Richard Roberts allowed the burial, utilizing a lot of "government knows best" rationale, even while pointing out the government was using the wrong venue to attempt an appeal of a magistrate's decision.

Another Facciola refusal, one that had twice crossed his desk has now been overridden as well. This warrant application -- seeking the entire contents of a person's .mac email account -- was summarized (twice) by Facciola as being "overly broad" for making no attempt to balance law enforcement interests with the expectation of privacy inherent to electronic communications.

The DOJ again appealed this decision and got the same judge -- Richard Roberts -- it got last time. And in spite of his earlier admonishment that the district court does not act as the appellate level for magistrate court decisions (a "mistake" the DOJ has made twice -- involving the same two judges and pointed out in the decision with the exact same footnote), Roberts again found that the government should generally be deferred to because it "knows best."

With very little preamble, Roberts announces that rules were followed and everything is on the level, but in the next 20 pages raises very few questions about the application of these rules to this specific situation, much less the digital reality of everyday life.

Because the government’s application complies with the Fourth Amendment and the specific procedures for executing the warrant are permissible under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and controlling case law, the magistrate judge’s order will be vacated, and the government’s application for a search warrant will be granted.

Just simply saying something "complies with the Fourth Amendment" doesn't magically make it so. Judge Facciola saw the same warrant application (twice) and came to a completely opposite conclusion. There's probably some middle ground that allows the DOJ to pursue this, but it's highly unlikely that Roberts (and the DOJ) are 100% right and Facciola is 100% wrong when it comes to the Fourth Amendment.

But Roberts is more of a business-as-usual judge. And business had gone on pretty much uninterrupted until recent months. When laying out the background of the case, Roberts nods to the Stored Communications Act, a particularly bad law that combines the worst parts of the Third Party Doctrine with being nearly out-of-date by the time it was codified in 1986.

As Roberts notes, the government did scale back its request after its first rejection, but only from "all email ever" to "all email from Jan. 14, 2014 going forward." While the government listed more specifics about its search and minimization efforts, Facciola still felt the DOJ was asking for more than it needed to achieve its aims.

While Facciola argued that the old way (grab everything and dig through it later) just doesn't mesh with the reality of the situation in terms of upholding the Fourth Amendment, Judge Roberts finds no issues with the government using warrants to engage in fishing expeditions.

Several courts have found the two-step procedure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, provided that there is a valid warrant supported by probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding government’s seizure of electronic data for a subsequent offsite search where there was a fair probability that evidence would be found on the defendant’s personal computer and other electronic devices); United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 2012) (6th Cir. 2012) (“The federal courts are in agreement that a warrant authorizing the seizure of a defendant’s home computer equipment and digital media for a subsequent off-site electronic search is not unreasonable or overbroad, as long as the probable-cause showing in the warrant application and affidavit demonstrate a ‘sufficient chance of finding some needles in the computer haystack.’” (quoting United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999))).

And who does Roberts rely on to ensure that not too "haystack" is idly thumbed through during the search for "needles?" The government itself, the most trustworthy of the participants, at least in this judge's eyes. Roberts says the judicial system plays an important part in weighing the balance between the government's desires and personal privacy, but then states that if anything gets abused, it can always be fixed after the damage is done.

As the government argues in its challenge, law enforcement officers are provided with considerable discretion in determining how to execute a particular search warrant. The Supreme Court has explained that a search warrant’s execution is “generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant[.]” Dalia, 441 U.S. at 257.

That said, although law enforcement officers are afforded wide discretion in executing search warrants, “the manner in which a warrant is executed is subject to later judicial review as to its reasonableness.” Id. at 258; see also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559–60 (1978). Accordingly, the government will be afforded deference in deciding how to execute the search warrant, subject to later review by a court to determine whether the search complied with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.

So, everything's fine. The government can be trusted to only look at the stuff it's supposed to (even though it has access to plenty it doesn't need), and if it proves unworthy of that trust, the person whose rights have been violated can sleep well knowing a "later review" by the court will ensure no such abuse happens ever again. Until the next time.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, doj, john facciola, magistrate judges, richard roberts, warrants

DC District Court Overrides Judge John Facciola's Orders, Grants DOJ Request For Gag Order On Subpoenaed Companies

from the throwing-a-shoulder-into-the-government dept

It appears Washington, DC magistrate judge John Facciola is still making the government earn everything it asks for. Facciola is the judge who has been sending the government back to its desk to rewrite overly broad warrants seeking electronic data. In one of these cases, the government decided that it would rather go "judge shopping" all the way across the country rather than narrow its request, but was shot down by a California district court judge.

Facciola's orders are the basis for two memorandums recently issued by DC District Court Judge Richard Roberts concerning a case still mostly under seal as part of federal grand jury investigation. (The government also asked for these to be filed under seal, but that has obviously been declined.)

The government challenges two orders issued by Magistrate Judge John Facciola regarding the government's application for an order under 18 U.S.C. The first order invited Twitter, Inc. to intervene as a respondent and file a notice with the court on whether Twitter intended to be heard on the merits of the government's application. The second order instructed the government to file a public, redacted copy of its application and draft order.

Facciola also issued a similar order for Yahoo, the other company being subpoenaed. Both sets of orders invited the companies to challenge both the gag order preventing them from informing their customer(s) of the government's interest in their data. The government understandably wasn't thrilled with these orders and filed an appeal (of sorts) seeking to have Facciola's orders vacated. The District Court notes that the judicial system -- at this level -- doesn't exactly work this way.

On March 27, 2014, the government filed what it styled as an appeal from the magistrate judge's two orders regarding the government's application for an order under 18 U.S.C. The government moved to vacate the orders issued by the magistrate judge and moved for the district court to grant its application for a nondisclosure order. In addition, the government moved to seal the appeal and resulting order.

This faux pas by the government is explained a bit further in a footnote, as is the judge's rationale for treating this as an "objection," rather than an "appeal."

The government styles its challenge as an appeal, but the reference is a misnomer. With the exception of authority granted by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58 concerning misdemeanor proceedings handled by a magistrate judge under 18 U.S.C. 3401, the district court does not exercise appellate power. See, United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) ("The magistrate judge is not an inferior court, and the district court does not stand in an appellate capacity over the magistrate.") For the reasons explained below, the government's appeal will be considered as an objection to the magistrate judge's two orders.

Several more pages of judicial rationale follow, pointing out that grand jury deliberations are not subject to transparency and that Facciola erred by suggesting Twitter and Yahoo could either challenge the gag order or inform their customers. Judge Roberts points out that there's very little either company can offer in terms of judging the "merit" of the government's gag order, or the subpoena itself. Further discussions also defer to "government knows best" mentality, suggesting that any notification would "jeopardize" ongoing investigations. That this investigation is tied to a grand jury slams the door shut on any appeal of the gag order.

Because the express terms of 18 U.S.C. 2705(b) and applicable legal precedent governing public access to grand jury proceedings and materials do not support the first order inviting Twitter [and Yahoo] to intervene or the second order instructing the government to file a public, redacted copy of the non-disclosure application, the orders will be vacated.

So, the government gets its win, but it had to put in a little extra paperwork. It hoped these documents would be sealed as well, but you can't win them all, especially when memos in question contain only one redactable sentence each. If this is how the last few months have gone in Facciola's court, it's little wonder the government has been making road trips to other venues.

Filed Under: dc district court, doj, gag order, john facciola, richard roberts, subpoenas
Companies: twitter, yahoo

Government Goes 'Judge Shopping' For Email Warrant Rubber Stamp, Gets Request Shot Down By Second Judge In A Row

from the setting-the-example-for-our-nation's-law-enforcement-agencies dept

As we covered recently, a couple of magistrate judges (Judge John Facciola and Judge David Waxse) have started pushing back against the government's broad warrant requests for electronic data. Facciola has now twice sent the government back to rewrite its warrant requests, once in relation to a seized iPhone and another dealing with a person's Gmail account. In the latter, Facciola stated the following:

[T]he government continues to submit overly broad warrants and makes no effort to balance the law enforcement interests against the obvious expectation of privacy e-mail account holders have in their communications.

The government apparently decided that rather than narrow its request, it would just ask another judge. It took this warrant request all the way across the nation to another magistrate judge in California, hoping to get the rubber stamp it couldn't coax out of the Washington, DC court. Judge Paul Grewal of California's Northern District has just joined Facciola in rejecting the request as being overly broad. He attacks the government's wish to "seize first, search later" approach as inappropriate for the securing of data stored by third parties, which face none of the limitations inherent to searching a computer on site.

The court is nevertheless unpersuaded that the particular seize first, search second proposed here is reasonable in the Fourth Amendment sense of the word. On past occasions, the government at least submitted a date restriction. Here, there is no date restriction of any kind. The activity described in the application began in 2010; Gmail has been broadly available since 2007 and in beta release "since 2004." Nor has the government made any kind of commitment to return or destroy evidence that is not relevant to its investigation. This unrestricted right to retain and use every bit Google coughs up undermines the entire effort the application otherwise makes to limit the obvious impact under the plain view doctrine of providing such unfettered government access.

Even though the warrant and all other court documents are sealed, based on what Grewal states here, it's reasonable to assume the government is seeking every email in this account, dating back to the account's creation. This sort of broad seizure meets no reasonable person's definition of "relevant," especially considering the lack of timeframe limitation.

Grewal goes on from there to criticize the government for its attempt to find someone to rubber stamp its haystack-building efforts.

A final point. This is not the first time that the substance of this application has been before a magistrate judge. On March 26, 2014, United States Magistrate Judge John Facciola denied a previous application for a similar warrant in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

The judge grants the government points for not attempting to hide its intentions, but doesn't let it off the hook for its unwillingness to narrow its warrant request.

But there is a long-recognized presumption against duplicating court efforts, what some charitably call "judge shopping."

He points out that the government had other options, including modifying its request or seekng a writ of mandamus. Instead, he states, the government made the shadiest and shabbiest choice: taking its business elsewhere. But it didn't work, and the government's warrant request has again been denied. Judge Grewal doesn't even give the government the option of rewriting and resubmitting, meaning it's probably going to have to take another run at this warrant in front of Judge Facciola. Or maybe it will just go on a tour of courthouses until it finds the rubber stamp it wants -- one that doesn't care about the messy paper trail of failure it's leaving behind it.

Filed Under: doj, email, john facciola, judge shopping, paul grewal, warrant

Magistrate Judges Emboldened By Snowden, Pushing Back On Overly Broad DOJ Requests

from the good-for-them dept

A couple weeks ago, we wrote about how the judiciary was finally pushing back on overly broad and vague warrant requests from the DOJ, with magistrate judge John Facciola leading the way. That was based on a Wall Street Journal article highlighting how magistrate judges like Facciola and David Waxse have been pushing back much more regularly on requests. The Washington Post has now written a very similar article (though, like most stuck up mainstream publications, it never mentions the WSJ article that beat it to the punch) that is worth reading as well. While it repeats much of the same story from the WSJ one, it also adds some interesting details. The basic story is basically the same. Facciola and others have been pushing back steadily on requests:

Among the most aggressive opinions have come from D.C. Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola, a bow-tied court veteran who in recent months has blocked wide-ranging access to the Facebook page of Navy Yard shooter Aaron Alexis and the iPhone of the Georgetown University student accused of making ricin in his dorm room. In another case, he deemed a law enforcement request for the entire contents of an e-mail account “repugnant” to the U.S. Constitution.

For these and other cases, Facciola has demanded more focused searches and insisted that authorities delete collected data that prove unrelated to a current investigation rather than keep them on file for unspecified future use. He also has taken the unusual step, for a magistrate judge, of issuing a series of formal, written opinions that detail his concerns, even about previously secret government investigations.

The article also notes that it's very likely that the Ed Snowden revelations have played a big role in the sudden uptick in magistrate judges pushing back:

The seeds of what legal observers have dubbed “the Magistrates’ Revolt” date back several years, but it has gained power amid mounting public anger about government surveillance capabilities revealed by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. Judges have been especially sensitive to backlash over the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which made secret rulings key to the growth of the surveillance programs.

A lawyer quoted in the article notes that the judges are now realizing that if they approve a bogus warrant, which later becomes public, it may now become an embarrassment:

“There’s a newfound liberation to scrutinize more carefully,” said Albert Gidari Jr., a partner at Perkins Coie who represents technology and telecommunications companies. “They also don’t want to be the ones who approve an order that later becomes public and embarrassing. . . . Nobody likes to be characterized as a rubber stamp.”

Of course, the inference there is depressing, if unsurprising. Back when they could work in relative secrecy, judges were a lot more willing to just go along with law enforcement. We've been saying since the beginning that transparency, sunlight and accountability are important components in maintaining the Constitution, and this newfound backbone from the judiciary certainly seems to suggest that's true. It also shows just how far-reaching the impact of Snowden's actions have been. It's not just about the NSA, but it's priming the key folks who make the federal judiciary function, the magistrate judges, sit up and pay more attention.

The other tidbit of information, is that the magistrate judges apparently all have a mailing list where they discuss some of this stuff, suggesting that this growing "revolt" (if you can call actually following the Constitution a "revolt") may continue to spread:

Magistrate judges, who do much of the routine work of the criminal justice system, influence each other through conversations at judicial conferences and through the federal e-mail system, which allows any magistrate judge to query all others on a vexing legal question with a single click of the mouse.

Perhaps even more interesting is that one of the magistrate judges handling these issues has even designed a joke t-shirt that he sends to any judges who have to rule on warrants concerning mobile phone information:

Tackling such issues, even in the face of possible reversal by higher courts, has become something of a badge of honor among some magistrates. Judge James Orenstein of Brooklyn, a former federal prosecutor who also wrote an early, influential ruling on cellphone location data, once joked with Smith that they would soon have enough like-minded magistrates to form a bowling team, Smith recalled.

That prompted Orenstein to design shirts featuring the image of a bowling ball rolling toward a cellphone and nine cell towers arranged in a triangle like a set of bowling pins. Above the image it read, “CSI: Cell Site Information.” Below it read, “Bowling for Dialers.”

When other magistrates write opinions on the issue — regardless of which side they take in the debate — they are offered one of the shirts.

While a bit more jokey than you'd normally expect from some judges, things like this certainly help remind the judges that these kinds of requests are important to pay attention to, and aren't "just another" request to rubber stamp. That's a good thing.

While the article notes that the government is starting to more aggressively appeal these magistrates (and some federal judges have been overturning them) it's still good to see the magistrates stepping up and tackling this issue.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, david waxse, doj, ed snowden, john facciola, magistrate judges, warrants

Judicial Branch Finally Acting As A Check Against Government Overreach

from the the-government's-been-skating-for-far-too-long dept

At long last, there finally seems to be a recognition by members of the judicial branch that they are, in fact, there to provide checks and balances against government overreach. We've already covered the recent orders by Magistrate Judge John Facciola, who has twice sent the government back to fix its overly broad warrant requests seeking access to email accounts and cell phone content. (This is tempered somewhat by another Facciola decision, which declared the law enforcement agency in question didn't need a search warrant for a supposedly "abandoned" phone.) Facciola isn't the only judge pushing back against the government's vague warrant requests, however.

In the past year, U.S. magistrate judges John Facciola in Washington, D.C., and David Waxse in Kansas City, Kan., have rejected or modified a number of applications for warrants to search people's emails and other electronic communications at Internet firms such as Google Inc. and Yahoo Inc.

The rulings go against the grain of a federal judiciary that has generally approved them, according to current and former law-enforcement officials. They also come against the backdrop of a legal and political debate over the scope of government surveillance that has raged since the National Security Agency's bulk collection of phone records was revealed last summer.

At issue is the Justice Department's two-step process of obtaining all emails and other electronic information in the accounts of a person under investigation, and then using names and keywords to sift through it in hopes of finding evidence of wrongdoing.

The judges have ruled the government needs to refine its requests to comply with the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches.

This has been the government's process for years: obtain everything and keep whatever is deemed "relevant" to the case. Both of these judges appear to realize that they are the last line of Fourth Amendment defense between the government and the public. Presumably, the Snowden leaks have played a part in this altered mindset. As both judges have pointed out in their orders, what the government has routinely sought is unbounded access to communications via unconstitutional warrants.

These two have suggested an alternate route, if the government can't manage to operate within the constraints of the Constitution.

Both judges have suggested Internet service providers and other Web firms could do their own searches based on specific guidance from the Justice Department, and turn over only the information that appears relevant to an investigation. They have also proposed systems in which a court-appointed official or others could perform the initial search, providing a buffer between investigators and bulk data.

Of course, the government thinks these are terrible ideas.

"I don't think ISPs or email providers have the institutional competence to conduct the searches of their customers for evidence of crimes," said Neil MacBride, a former U.S. attorney in Virginia who described the magistrate judges' rulings as "outliers."

Maybe. Maybe not. But it's clear the government is no better than the private sector at performing targeted searches. Instead, it simply demands everything and expects to be trusted to only take a look at what is pertinent. Despite the fact that the government routinely asks (or rather, expects) the judicial branch, along with those defending the accused, to simply trust it with petabytes of someone's personal data, it seems completely unwilling to trust a private company with fulfilling searches for relevant data on its behalf.

The days of the government simply saying "it's complicated" and running broad warrant requests past technically-incompetent judges might finally be numbered.

Judge Waxse said he believed more people would come around to his view if they better understood recent technological advances and how service providers operate. "What Facciola and I are saying is, use what is now developed, and you can comply with the Fourth Amendment," he said. "There are too many lawyers and judges who don't have a clear grasp of how it all works."

This is also part of the problem. Far too often, technically-ignorant judges have credulously accepted the government's arguments because they don't have the knowledge to challenge these assertions. They could seek the input of those who can parse the technological demands, but rather than do so, this crucial part of the system of checks and balances has simply allowed the government to portray its circumvention of the Fourth Amendment as unavoidable.

Following the revelations of the last several months, including documents showing the NSA misrepresented its bulk records collections for nearly three years straight, the government has been shown it cannot be trusted with unlimited access to people's data and content. Hopefully, this pushback from the judicial branch will become the new standard.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, courts, david waxse, doj, john facciola, overreach, surveillance, warrants

DC Judge Smacks Down Government For Vague iPhone Search Warrant

from the 'with-a-computer'-doesn't-really-specify-a-search-method dept

Trying to pin down DC Magistrate Judge John Facciola is tricky. Early in March, he issued an order denying a government warrant for an email search, stating the following:

[T]he government continues to submit overly broad warrants and makes no effort to balance the law enforcement interests against the obvious expectation of privacy e-mail account holders have in their communications.

So far, so good, as far as upholding the Fourth Amendment goes. Then later in the month, Facciola appeared to switch sides, rejecting a warrant application for a cell phone search because, as he saw it, there was no need for the police to obtain one. This determination was based on the warrant application's description of the phone as being "abandoned" by the suspect, when in all reality, it may have just been dropped inadvertently. This strange order put the police in the strange position of being forbidden to obtain a warrant, something that could potentially jeopardize the prosecution's case if another judge later determines a warrant was, in fact, needed before performing the search of the phone.

That backwards step has now been followed by another step forward in terms of the Fourth Amendment. Facciola has again smacked down a government warrant request for being too broad and too unconcerned with potential privacy implications.

Although Attachment B provides a sufficiently particularized list of the data that the government will search for and seize, the Forensic Analysis section fails to provide this Court with the same level of detail as to the methodologies to be used to conduct the search. Specifically, the government fails to articulate how it will limit the possibility that data outside the scope of the warrant will be searched. For the reasons stated below, the government’s Application for a search and seizure warrant will, therefore, be denied.

Specifically, Facciola finds this warrant approved from others he has blocked in the past, but the government still seems hesitant to explain exactly how it plans to limit its search to just pertinent data and documents.

The Court also requires a search protocol for a separate Fourth Amendment reason—to particularly describe the place to be searched. In a broad manner, describing the iPhone and its specific IMEI number certainly describes the “place to be searched” in a particular manner. But an electronic search is not that simple. An iPhone 4 has either 16 GB or 32 GB of flash memory, 10 which could allow storage of up to around two million text documents. Obviously no one—especially not a college student—would fill an iPhone with text documents, but it is inconceivable that the government would go file by file to determine whether each one is within the scope of the warrant. Instead, as the government has explained in extremely general terms, it will use some sort of “computer-assisted scans” to determine where to look because those scans will determine which parts will be exposed “to human inspection in order to determine whether it is evidence described by the warrant.”

Facciola notes that the fact that so much can be stored similarly increases the chance of abuse. All he's asking for is for the government to be more specific in its description of how it will minimize accessing data not related to the case at hand, and all the government has provided so far is vagaries like "computer-assisted scan" and "keyword searches."

It tells the Court nothing about what will actually happen and does not provide a means of searching so that this Court is assured that it is the type of particularized search that the Fourth Amendment demands. What the government has submitted is no better than the vague explanation in In re Search of Odys Loox that it will “image each device, search them, and keep all files.”

If Facciola sounds irritable, it's probably because this is the third time he's sent the government back to work on this particular warrant request. And this is the third time he's had to make this statement, one which still seems to elude the agency making the request.

Until the government actually explains how the search will proceed, and thus how the government intends to limit its search of data outside the scope of the warrant, this warrant cannot be issued.

So, it appears Facciola's fighting for citizens' Fourth Amendment rights against a government that seems unwilling or unable to narrow the scope of its electronic searches. Of course, this protection seemingly only extends to citizens whose phones have been properly seized as evidence, rather than dropped/abandoned and claimed by pursuing law enforcement agents. If it's the latter, Facciola appears to believe it's an imposition on law enforcement to demand a warrant. Still, two out of three (in just this month alone) is a pretty good batting average for Americans' rights, something that tends to be subverted very easily by expansive judicial readings of the Third Party Doctrine.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, john facciola, search, warrants

Judge Rejects Warrant Application, Because He Thinks None Is Needed

from the this-is-troubling dept

Orin Kerr has a post about a bizarre decision by DC Magistrate Judge John Facciola, who decided to reject a warrant application not because he thought there wasn't probable cause, but rather because he didn't think that the government needed a warrant at all, and could do the search it wanted without such a warrant. This is problematic on a variety of different levels, and Kerr covers them all. The story involves a police chase of a suspect with a gun. During the chase, he threw away the gun. The police found the gun, and while they were at it, the guy's mobile phone. The warrant was to do a thorough search of the phone. Facciola said they didn't need a warrant since the phone had been "abandoned." Whether or not the phone was actually abandoned, the ruling is problematic (in part because Facciola has no way of knowing if the phone was actually abandoned). But, just in general, it seems that he doesn't have the discretion to make this kind of ruling anyway:

Judge Facciola seems to be assuming that warrants only should be obtained when the Fourth Amendment would be violated without them, and that he, as a magistrate judge, has the power to say ex ante when that will be. But I think that’s pretty clearly wrong. Magistrate judges do not have the discretion to deny applications if they don’t think one would be necessary. The language in Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 41(d)(1) is mandatory: “After receiving an affidavit or other information, a magistrate judge. . . must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize a person or property” (emphasis added).

As Kerr points out, the law is structured to encourage police to get warrants (for the obvious reason of making sure such searches are constitutional). If a magistrate judge is taking it upon himself to decide that no warrant is needed, then it seems to be going against the Supreme Court's belief that police should be encouraged to get a warrant.

The second problem is that Facciola seems to be making a constitutional determination (i.e., there's no 4th Amendment issue here) based on seriously incomplete facts. He only has the request for the warrant, which just seeks to present enough evidence for probable cause for the warrant. He doesn't know anything beyond that, and he doesn't know the other side of the story. It's entirely possible that the search doesn't need a warrant, but that's not the kind of thing a magistrate judge should be determining at this stage, especially when the police themselves have asked for a warrant.

And, as Kerr notes, this actually puts the police in quite a bind about whether or not to do the search:

Further, Judge Facciola’s decision puts the government in a bind. Under his ruling, the police cannot get a warrant. But if they search the phone without a warrant, they run a serious risk that a future court will rule that Magistrate Judge Facciola’s prediction was wrong and that they should have obtained one. If so, it’s damned if you do and damned if you don’t.... The way out is for magistrates to issue warrants based on whether the government has satisfied the facial requirements of probable cause and particularity, as Rule 41 requires, not to hinge the issuance of the warrant on whether the magistrate expects such a warrant to be a legal necessity.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, john facciola, law enforcement, warrants