TSA Decides Sorority Souvenir Book Carried By Dozens Of Travelers Probably A Bomb

from the some-sort-of-terrorist-convention...-even-the-letters-aren't-English dept

Hundreds of travelers attempting to fly out of Houston's Hobby Airport were delayed for hours as TSA agents confronted the massive security threat posed by a book. Actually, several books. Several identical books. Carried by several fliers leaving the same event. (via Lowering the Bar)

"We had a large group with a large number of bags to be checked and because of a certain item in those bags there was additional screening necessary," said Bill Begley with Hobby Airport.

A spokesman for the airport says the sorority members were apparently given thick booklets at the convention that could be mistaken for explosives when packed into checked bags. The booklets forced TSA officials to hand check most of the luggage.

Nice use of the word "forced." Even if the book appeared suspicious at first, perhaps the inference could have been drawn that other passengers wearing the sorority insignia on their almost-universally red clothing were carrying the same non-threatening book. Or does "Behavioral Detection" -- the TSA's mind-reading initiative that watches for suspicious patterns -- only detect suspicion, not the lack thereof?

Here's the "bomb," as displayed by one passenger during KHOU's televised report:






Better safe than sorry -- the TSA's strangulated way of thinking -- kept this from being pursued logically, as Kevin Underhill points out.

Of course, I suppose it's not impossible that ISIS coordinated an attack plan with the annual Delta Sigma Theta convention. But the chances of that are sufficiently close to zero that I'd feel safe waving these ladies through.

Maybe it wasn't ISIS. Maybe it was hundreds of "lone wolves," all wearing red and white clothing and all carrying the same bomb/book!

Instead of seeing this common element as something non-suspicious after the first thorough search, the TSA apparently treated every repeat "incident" as its own particularized threat. Flights were delayed, but not a single one was made any safer by these extra inspection efforts.

So far, the TSA has yet to comment on its actions, leaving that unenviable task to airport officials. Meanwhile, travelers continue to give the TSA more credit than it deserves.

"I'm sure they were doing their best that they could, but it just wasn't enough it wasn't enough," [sorority alumus Cassandra] Tomes said.

Their "best" is routinely terrible. And for all the talk about becoming a smarter, more responsive security agency, the TSA continues to brute force its way through the day-to-day business of keeping up appearances.

Filed Under: book, delta sigma theta, hobby airport, houston, security, security theater, sorority, tsa

Study: The TSA's Security Theater Troupes Missed 95% Of Smuggled Weapons And Explosives

from the security-theater dept

When it's not aggressively groping patrons, being outwitted by TSA-safe luggage, failing to understand the First Amendment, trying to expand its authority in strange and aggressive new ways or burning through taxpayer money, there's a popular narrative afoot that the Transportation Security Administration is supposed to protect air travelers and secure airports. Of course, as we've well documented, the agency is exceptionally awful at that as well, resulting in what it does being far more akin to security theater than anything resembling actual security.

The latest case in point: an internal Homeland Security Inspector General investigation of the TSA revealing massive failure on the part of the TSA across dozens of the country's busiest airports. According to a copy of the findings, undercover investigators were able to smuggle mock explosives or banned weapons through security checkpoints -- 95% of the time:

"According to officials briefed on the results of a recent Homeland Security Inspector General’s report, TSA agents failed 67 out of 70 tests, with Red Team members repeatedly able to get potential weapons through checkpoints. In one test an undercover agent was stopped after setting off an alarm at a magnetometer, but TSA screeners failed to detect a fake explosive device that was taped to his back during a follow-on pat down. Officials would not divulge the exact time period of the testing other than to say it concluded recently."

That's not just a little dysfunction, that's a wholesale systemic breakdown, and it once again raises the question of what precisely taxpayers are paying for. And while the TSA is quick to consistently insist it's making improvements every day, this is effectively the same thing that happened last year when a "red team" member was able to smuggle a mock bomb onto an airplane. This latest survey also piggybacks on earlier reports that indicate no matter how much money we throw at the TSA, it's still awful at doing its job, whether that's passenger or luggage screening:

"That review found “vulnerabilities” throughout the system, attributing them to human error and technological failures, according to a three-paragraph summary of the review released in September. In addition, the review determined that despite spending $540 million for checked baggage screening equipment and another $11 million for training since a previous review in 2009, the TSA failed to make any noticeable improvements in that time."

Great job, team! Of course, whenever you find this level of dysfunction you can usually find a dodgy money trail -- since just like nation destroying and rebuilding -- presenting the illusion of security is extremely profitable. That likely won't be getting better anytime soon, with a lobbyist for Rapiscan Systems (the company that provides the controversial X-ray scanners used in most major airports) taking a job with the House Appropriations Committee's Homeland Security Subcommittee, which oversees the TSA budget. We've been talking about Rapiscan's overly-cozy relationship with government for five years now.

Realizing how broken the TSA truly is can easily lead one down the path of worrying that there's a much thinner line between you and being wind-dispersed fertilizer than most would care to admit. But as Robert Graham points out, the fact that the TSA is horrible at its job -- combined with the fact that planes aren't exploding -- statistically suggests that bombs are a much smaller threat to airplanes than we've historically assumed:

"This leads to a counter-intuitive result that the TSA is really not stopping any danger. If guns and bombs are getting on planes, but planes aren't falling out of the sky, it must mean that they aren't a danger. I point this out because in the end, safety is an emotional thing rather than logical. No matter how much I do the math, people do not believe it. They believe bombs are a danger to airplanes in much the same way many don't believe the safety statistics compared to driving."

Note that's not to say we don't the need the hidden and not-so-hidden security apparatus that exists outside of this costly new game of make believe. But these latest findings continue to prop up the argument that the TSA is a glorified high school theater troupe playing dress up, doing little more than adding a very expensive layer of dysfunction to the already frequently-dismal air travel experience.

Filed Under: safety, security theater, tsa

TSA Waves Convicted Murderer With Explosives Experience Through Its PreCheck Lane

from the waving-through-felons-while-patting-down-toddler dept

The TSA's PreCheck program also expedites security screening for "notorious convicted felons" and "former domestic terrorists." Who knew? From the sounds of its in-depth pre-screening efforts, you would think (unnamed) convicted felons wouldn't be able to sail past the checkpoint without even slowing down, but apparently, that's exactly what happened. And it's not just any former felon/domestic terrorist, but one who was previously convicted of murder and offenses involving explosives. (via Kevin Underhill/Lowering the Bar)

The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure alleging a sufficiently notorious convicted felon was improperly cleared for TSA Pre✓ screening, creating a significant aviation security breach. The disclosure identified this event as a possible error in the TSA Secure Flight program since the traveler’s boarding pass contained a TSA Pre✓ indicator and encrypted barcode.

The good news (such as it were) is that the TSA did not grant the unnamed felon/terrorist PreCheck approval through its laborious and intrusive application process. It also didn't wave him/her through because lines were backing up at the normal checkpoints. (This is called "Managed Inclusion" by the TSA, but it more resembles "For the Hell of It" in practice…) That ends the good news.

It did, however, use its "risk assessment rules" to determine the terrorist/felon to be of no threat. This might be encouraging news for former felons/domestic terrorists, perhaps signaling that government agencies may ultimately forgive some criminal acts and not subject former felons to additional security harassment in perpetuity. Then again, this may just be the TSA's excuse for waving someone with questionable PreCheck clearance through security because a checkmark -- and its own internal bureaucracy -- told it to.

We also determined the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) followed standard operating procedures, but did not feel empowered to redirect the traveler from TSA Pre✓ screening to standard lane screening.

The OIG recommends more "empowerment" for rank-and-file. Good luck with that. If officers don't feel empowered, it's because management has shown them that questioning the (broken and wildly inconsistent) system isn't an option. Neither is doing any independent thinking. When this officer attempted to push it up the line, he/she ran into a pretty predictable response.

[T]he TSO knew of the traveler's TSA Pre✓disqualifying criminal convictions. The TSO followed the standard operating procedures and reported this to the supervisory TSO who then directed the TSO to take no further action and allow the traveler through the TSA Pre✓ lane. As a result, TSA does not have an incident report for this event.

One of the TSA's Behavioral Detection Officers (highly-trained in the art of the mental coin toss) was also contacted by the concerned officer. And, again, no further action was taken/recommended.

In the end, a felon/terrorist boarded a plane because the TSA's bureaucratic process can't handle contradictory variables. The PreCheck approval said "yes," but the previous convictions said PreCheck approval should never have happened. The TSA deferred to the obviously incorrect checkmark on the boarding pass. And now we have the punchline to the joke that starts, "A murderer with explosives experience walks into a PreCheck lane…"

The OIG's mostly-redacted recommendation criticizing the TSA's over-reliance on fallible pre-screening processes was mostly ignored by the agency.

TSA officials did not concur with Recommendation 1. In its response, TSA said that with respect to individuals who may pose an elevated security risk to commercial aviation, theU.S. Government's approach to domestic aviation security relies heavily on the TSDB and its Selectee List and No Fly List subcomponents. TSA said, had the intelligence or national law enforcement communities felt that this traveler posed an elevated risk to commercial aviation, they would have nominated the traveler to one of these lists and prevented the traveler from being designated as lower-risk.

To which the OIG responded, "Well, that 's obviously not working because this traveler should have been automatically denied PreCheck approval."

We consider TSA's actions nonresponsive to the intent of Recommendation 1, which is unresolved and open. TSA said it relies on the U.S. Government watchlisting process to identify individuals that represent an elevated risk to commercial aviation. However, not all non-watchlisted passengers are lower-risk and eligible for TSA Pre✓. For example, TSA has established disqualifying criteria, in addition to the watchlisting process, for an applicant seeking TSA Pre✓ Application Program membership. TSA will deny membership to an applicant convicted of any of the 28 disqualifying criminal offenses or not a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident. Even though the traveler is not watchlisted, the traveler would be permanently ineligible for TSA Pre✓.

And yet, a convicted murderer has been PreCheck approved. The TSA wants to blame the rest of the government. The OIG just wants someone to use common sense, rather than never questioning a boarding pass. The OIG has a good point. The TSA claims it's shifting to a smarter, more responsive travel security, like the PreCheck program and its many Behavioral Detection Officers. But when a situation involving both arose, it left the thinking to its brainstem -- unwavering faith in databases and policy -- rather than making any move indicative of higher thought processes.

Filed Under: precheck, security, security theater, terrorism, tsa

Lawsuit: TSA Supervisor Got Traveler Arrested For Bogus 'Terroristic Threat' Charge, Lied About Incident In Court

from the obviously,-the-'T'-stands-for-'Thug' dept

Here's more evidence the TSA really isn't about keeping travelers safe. What it is about is malevolent middle-management-types fiercely guarding the borders of their microfiefdoms and arbitrarily ejecting ticket-holding serfs for any conceivable reason.

Roger Vanderklok, a distance runner who frequently flies to events around the country, had the misfortune of passing through TSA supervisor Charles Kieser's turf at the Philadelphia airport. Vanderklok faced some legitimate questions (as legitimate as any questions based on the ever-shifting TSA list of suspicious items can be, anyway) and answered them all satisfactorily.

On this day, he was headed to Miami. In his carry-on bag was a packet of PowerBars and a heart-monitoring watch. When the bag went through the X-ray scanner, the items looked suspicious to a TSA agent whom Kieser supervises.

For the next 30 minutes, screeners checked the bag several times. Vanderklok told them that a tube-shaped case in the bag contained his watch. Then he was asked if his bag contained "organic matter." Vanderklok said no, as he thought "organic matter" meant fruits or vegetables.

PowerBars, which contain milk, grain and sugar, are considered "organic matter" and can resemble a common explosive. Terrorists often use a small electronic device, like a watch, to detonate the explosive. Hence the agent's concern.

But the TSA's Charles Kieser took issue with Vanderklok's suggestion: that agents make it a bit more clear what "organic matter" entails. Keiser decided Vanderklok didn't appreciate the severity of the situation (that situation being, apparently, that the TSA makes suggestions, not the other way around). According to Vanderklok's lawsuit [pdf link], Kieser became "confrontational." Vanderklok then asked if he could file a complaint. Bad move.

Instead, Kieser summoned the Philadelphia Police. Vanderklok was taken to an airport holding cell, and his personal belongings - including his phone - were confiscated while police "investigated" him.

Vanderklok was detained for three hours in the holding cell, missing his plane. Then he was handcuffed, taken to the 18th District at 55th and Pine and placed in another cell.

He says that no one - neither the police officers at the airport nor the detectives at the 18th - told him why he was there. He didn't find out until he was arraigned at 2 a.m. that he was being charged with "threatening the placement of a bomb" and making "terroristic threats."

Vanderklok's Kafkaesque odyssey finally ended at 4 a.m., when his wife paid 10 percent of his $40,000 bail.

Kieser provided his version of the story at Vanderklok's trial -- one that was mostly lies. He claimed Vanderklok "threatened" to bring a bomb through security. He also claimed Vanderklok made aggressive arm movements and pointed his finger in Keiser's face. Unfortunately for Kieser, surveillance footage proved nearly every accusation false.

Throughout the search, Vanderklok appears calm. His laptop computer is tucked under his arms and his hands are clasped in front of him the entire time. Without any fuss, he follows TSA agents when they move from one part of the screening area to another. He even smiles a little.

Not once does he raise his hands. Not once does he point a finger in Kieser's face. If anyone is becoming agitated, the video shows, it is Kieser.

And as for the only claim that might have held up -- the "bomb threat" -- Keiser's own words on the police statement, as well as his underlings' actions, undercut that assertion as well. No agent other than Kieser appears to be the least bit alarmed by Vanderklok's alleged bomb threat. One messes with his cellphone. Another rearranges bins. No passengers are prevented from entering the area.

In his statement to the police, Kieser claims Vanderklok said "Anyone could bring a bomb through here and you wouldn't know it." That's not a threat. That's an opinion. And, given the TSA's track record on stopping airborne terrorists, the protected opinion/non-threat comes disturbingly close to being a factual statement.

The presiding judge dismissed the charges against Vanderklok "within minutes" of Kieser's statements. Kieser's testimony must have been incredibly terrible, considering the judge never even bothered to view the video evidence that contradicted most of his claims. There must have been an obvious odor of vindictiveness permeating the courtroom during the TSA supervisor's statements. And it's that same respect-my-authority-or-else attitude that's likely going to cost the TSA some money.

Vanderklok has filed a lawsuit against the agency for his wrongful arrest, one that also names the Philly police department as co-defendants. Perhaps the video clearing Vanderklok will be seen during this court battle, or perhaps the agency will just settle quickly, rather than allow Kieser to further embarrass himself. And perhaps, Kieser will finally be out of a job. But for now, he still wields a level of power that far outpaces his ability to perform his duties in a credible and responsible manner.

Filed Under: arrests, charles kieser, philadelphia, roger vanderklok, security theater, threats, travelers, tsa

Another Batch Of Baggage Handlers Accused Of Stealing From Luggage; Because Airport 'Security' Isn't

from the shopping-for-your-goods dept

Just last week I flew into JFK airport's terminal 4, and thankfully I only had carry-on luggage, because this morning I read that seven baggage handlers from JFK -- working in terminals 4 and 7 -- have been arrested for stealing stuff from people's luggage. And doing so without much fear of getting caught (even if they were, eventually):

According to the criminal complaints, between March 2012 and June 2014, the defendants stole Apple iPads, iPhones and MacBook computers; Samsung Galaxy phones and tablets; Dell, Toshiba and ASUS laptops; and other electronic items, as well as a pair of two-carat diamond-and-gold earrings. The complaint said the items were taken from passengers' checked luggage, and all but two of the defendants are alleged to have contacted a "fence," who actually was an undercover police officer.

The defendants named their prices, set up meetings on airport grounds or nearby, and even made promises about other items that they could steal, the complaint said.

Now, if this were a one time thing, it might not even be that noteworthy. But this seems like fairly common practice at airports. A few years ago, we wrote about TSA agents stealing iPads and stories of TSA agents and baggage handlers stealing stuff from luggage are not at all hard to find. In fact, reports from a few years ago noted that over 400 TSA employees have been fired for stealing from passnegers in the past decade.

And related stories are all over the place. Hell, back in March, another group of JFK baggage handlers were arrested. On nearly the same day, it looks like a similar theft ring involving baggage handlers at LAX was broken up. Even more recently, a similar theft ring at New Orleans' Louis Armstrong International Airport. Amateur sleuths were needed to bust up a baggage handler theft ring in Charleston, South Carolina. A WSJ article from a few years ago details a long list of baggage handler thefts from a wide range of airports.

And it's not just baggage handlers, but the TSA itself, who (we're told) is supposed to be protecting us from bad people. Here's $8,500 stolen from a bag. Here's a TSA officer stealing a computer. Here's a TSA agent swiping $36 from a passenger. A few years ago, a convicted TSA agent, who admitted to stealing $800,000 from passengers at Newark Airport in New Jersey, spoke out about just how common theft was among the TSA:

"It was very commonplace, very," said Pythias Brown, a former TSA officer at Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey who admits he stole more than $800,000 worth of items from luggage and security checkpoints over a four-year period.

"It was very convenient to steal," he said.

Speaking publicly for the first time after being released from prison, Brown told ABC News his four-year-long crime spree came to an end only because he tried to sell a camera he stole from the luggage of a CNN producer on E-bay but forgot to remove all of the news networks' identifying stickers.

"It became so easy, I got complacent," Brown said.

All of this should raise a variety of questions about airport security. We're told that these people are there to protect us, but it seems that they're not able to do that. At all. Hell, as Amy Alkon points out, if it's so damn easy to take stuff out of people's bags, you know it's pretty easy to put stuff in as well. And, of course, this has been going on for years. Many of those links above are more recent, but plenty are from years past and it doesn't seem like anything has changed very much. Airport "security" remains security theater at the best of times, but it's even worse when it's actually putting people at more risk.

Filed Under: airport security, baggage handlers, jfk, security, security theater, stealing, theft, tsa

Chicago Transit Cops Start Up Their Own Security Theater, Will Start Randomly Swabbing Bags For Explosive Residue

from the what-can-we-do-that-would-be-WORSE-than-nothing,-CTA-asked dept

It appears Chicago wants to get in on New York City's racket -- steamrolling civil liberties because of a supposed terrorism nexus. For New York City, it's been every day since Sept. 11th, 2001, greatly aided and abetted by a nanny statist mayor and a police commissioner who'd never seen a personal freedom he didn't immediately dislike.

For Chicago, the terrorism connection isn't nearly as clear. In fact, there doesn't seem to be any justification for the deployment of random explosive-residue-swabbing checkpoints at public transit stations.

There is "no known terrorist threat" that prompted the new procedure slated to begin the week of Nov. 3, Nancy Lipman, Chicago police commander for public transportation, said Friday at a news conference announcing the initiative.

OK... With that, um, cleared up, here's how the TSA-Lite random acts of intrusion will go down.

Chicago police say they will randomly select one rail station each day to set up the screening table outside the rail turnstiles during rush hour. Lipman said most of the stations will be downtown but other stops will be included as well.

A team of four to five officers will man the table, which will have two explosives testing machines.

One rail station… out of dozens… selected randomly... with each search also being randomly generated.

Police will approach riders, whom they have randomly selected by picking a random number that morning, Lipman said.

For example, if police pick the number 10, they will ask the 10th person who enters the station, then the 20th and so on, Lipman said.

This randomly-selected person -- if carrying a bag -- will be asked to submit to an explosive residue test. The bag will not be opened. Unless it tests positive, in which case further impositions will be imposed.

A positive test triggers a search request. Commuters can refuse but they won't be allowed to board their train and will be asked to leave the station. Almost "free to go," but not quite. Chicago transit cops will be free to perform less voluntary searches should they decide "probable cause" exists to do so. Given that a bag has just tested positive for explosives, that should be all the justification they need.

Police spokesman Marty Maloney calls this random act of security theater a "proactive, protective measure." Nearly everyone else, if given a few minutes to think about it, will call it "futile." Or "stupid."

The multiple layers of randomness are essential to preventing charges of discrimination or other civil liberties violations. (This is what makes DUI checkpoints and the TSA's "enhanced screening" Constitutional -- you either have to stop everybody or be truly random.) But this precaution also undermines the effectiveness of the effort. In fact, everything about this program borders on uselessness.

Anyone can refuse the initial test. They can also refuse to have their bags searched if they do test positive for explosive residue. Both actions will likely be viewed with suspicion but neither leads directly to detainment.

The city boasts more than 140 entry points, just for this mode of public transportation. Anyone who would rather avoid the "random checkpoint" will have plenty of options. The program checks a random entry for random people, rather than making any attempt to truly spot suspicious individuals or behavior. The Transit Authority takes great care to explain just how painless the process will be, what with limited checkpoints and no mandatory searches, but these words of comfort only highlight the fact that the screening system is almost entirely composed of security holes. The chances that this will actually prevent an attack are so close to zero as to be completely indistinguishable from doing nothing.

In exchange for its half-assed efforts, the city will likely net itself a few additional lawsuits, thanks to that inevitable byproduct of poorly-thought-out and poorly-implemented security theater programs: civil liberties' violations.

Filed Under: chicago, privacy, random searches, security theater, terrorism, tsa

New Blog Details The Unfortunate Experience Of Being On Homeland Security's Terrorist Watchlist

from the the-S's-stand-for-'stupid' dept

You don't have to be affiliated with any known terrorist group to be added to the government's terrorist watchlist. The Intercept's publication of the numbers behind the massive amount of people the government's keeping an eye on made that perfectly clear. A full 40% of the list -- 288,000 people -- are there without any particular justification. The agencies making these nominations clearly can't articulate why certain people should receive enhanced searches and questioning each and every time they seek to board a domestic flight. But they nominate these people anyway, using something no more scientific (or counter-terroristic) than a hunch.

Kashmir Hill at Forbes has a great profile of (not-very-anonymous-after-all) blogger Peter Young, who has received the dreaded SSSS designation from the TSA. Ringing up 4 S's means every TSA agent thinks you're a terrorist and every visit to the airport means extra patdowns and questioning. Young has been detailing the humdrum existence of your everyday terrorist over at his blog, "Jetsetting Terrorist," where he notes that his decidedly non-terroristic appearance causes the consternation and confusion at smaller airports where 4-S designations are few and far between. Not that being a jetsetting terrorist doesn't have its upsides…

He discovers some of the hidden benefits of being labeled a terrorist: his boarding pass is a ticket to the front of the security line. He realizes he can turn the confusion over his flying status into a free flight and drink vouchers.

He also speculates as to why those on the terrorist watchlist aren't allowed to sit by emergency exits.

Terrorists hate humans so much we would physically block exit points in the event of a crash and/or fire.

They make you do that weird verbal confirmation thing after the fight attendant recites that exit row speech, and we’re known for only speaking Arabic.

The TSA just likes making stupid rules vacant of any rationale.

"Stupid rules vacant of any rationale" aptly describes a large swath of the Terrorist Watchlist, including Young's 4-S status, which prevents him from utilizing technological advancements like checking in electronically using a mobile device or a kiosk.

As far as Young can tell, it's a nearly two-decade-old misdemeanor that's keeping him from traveling without additional molestation.

His full time job is running an online business, but he is also a prominent animal activist; the latter is what garners him the extra TLC from the TSA. The property crime for which he was convicted dates back to 1997 when he went on a cross-country road trip freeing minks from fur farms in three states. His weapon of mass destruction was a pair of bolt cutters. On the lam for a number of years, he was apprehended and tried in 2005, and found guilty of “animal extortion terrorism.”

"Animal extortion terrorism" isn't covered under the guidelines for the Terrorism Watchlist. In fact, Young was only ever convicted of a misdemeanor (pleading down from a felony) and served on two years for his federal crime. But that's still enough to make him a feared traveler, one who is never to be trusted, not even 17 years removed from the "crime spree" that first drew the government's attention. While the prosecutor tried to connect Young with a group the DHS actually recognizes as domestic terrorists (the Animal Liberation Front), it didn't stick. Young denies any connection with the animal rights extremists.

There's another reason Young is blogging about his experiences: this very public outing of his TSA-stained laundry makes it that much tougher for the US government to simply "disappear" him, air travel-wise.

According to the Intercept, there were 16 people on the No-Fly list in 2001; in 2013, it had exploded to 47,000. “I’m worried the government will slowly move people from the Selectee list to the No-Fly list,” Young says. “I want a podium to speak from in case that does happen to me.”

As has been noted here, the No-Fly list is an unconstitutional joke. The "redress process" is so horribly ineffective that a court actually declared it to be a violation of Americans' civil rights. The Terrorism Watchlist is not only broader, but it's possibly more damaging. While it won't actually prevent you from flying (provided you don't mind every trip to the airport being the Full TSA Security Theater Experience), it does open your life up to a whole lot more government scrutiny.

In addition to data like fingerprints, travel itineraries, identification documents and gun licenses, the rules encourage screeners to acquire health insurance information, drug prescriptions, “any cards with an electronic strip on it (hotel cards, grocery cards, gift cards, frequent flyer cards),” cellphones, email addresses, binoculars, peroxide, bank account numbers, pay stubs, academic transcripts, parking and speeding tickets, and want ads. The digital information singled out for collection includes social media accounts, cell phone lists, speed dial numbers, laptop images, thumb drives, iPods, Kindles, and cameras. All of the information is then uploaded to the TIDE database.

Screeners are also instructed to collect data on any “pocket litter,” scuba gear, EZ Passes, library cards, and the titles of any books, along with information about their condition—”e.g., new, dog-eared, annotated, unopened.” Business cards and conference materials are also targeted, as well as “anything with an account number” and information about any gold or jewelry worn by the watchlisted individual. Even “animal information”—details about pets from veterinarians or tracking chips—is requested. The rulebook also encourages the collection of biometric or biographical data about the travel partners of watchlisted individuals.

This is from the same rulebook and documents that admitted that nearly 300,000 of the 680,000 people on the government's Terrorist Watchlist have "no recognized terrorist group affiliation." Just another ridiculous facet of the Dept. of Homeland Security's security theater: loading up on unrelated "extras" just so it can boast it has a "cast of thousands" (and demand a budget of billions!). No terrorism experience necessary. Enjoy your flight!

Filed Under: peter young, security, security theater, ssss, terrorist, terrorist watch list, tsa, watchlist

Former TSA Agent Explains Full Body Scanners Didn't Work, But Did Let Him See You Naked

from the but-of-course dept

There's been less discussion over the TSA's full body scanners recently, especially since the TSA's brief but insanely expensive (with YOUR money!) experiment with the "nudie scanners" went away. However, Politico has a fascinating story from a former TSA agent revealing that much of what you suspect about the TSA is true: they were able to see you naked even as the scanners had little actual value. They do target attractive women and have a rather long list of official sounding "code names" for good looking women so they can alert each other to them while appearing professional. On those nudie scanners, he has the story of the guy who taught them how to use it, who was then asked what he thought of the machines:

“They're shit,” he said, shrugging. He said we wouldn't be able to distinguish plastic explosives from body fat and that guns were practically invisible if they were turned sideways in a pocket.

We quickly found out the trainer was not kidding: Officers discovered that the machines were good at detecting just about everything besides cleverly hidden explosives and guns. The only thing more absurd than how poorly the full-body scanners performed was the incredible amount of time the machines wasted for everyone.

Of course, what he leaves out is the real reason why these were installed in airports across the country. It had nothing to do with terrorist threats, but the fact that former DHS boss Michael Chertoff was getting rich off of helping to sell them to the government agency he used to run.

As for looking at you naked, yes, the TSA folks would look and laugh:

Most of my co-workers found humor in the I.O. room on a cruder level. Just as the long-suffering American public waiting on those security lines suspected, jokes about the passengers ran rampant among my TSA colleagues: Many of the images we gawked at were of overweight people, their every fold and dimple on full awful display. Piercings of every kind were visible. Women who’d had mastectomies were easy to discern—their chests showed up on our screens as dull, pixelated regions. Hernias appeared as bulging, blistery growths in the crotch area. Passengers were often caught off-guard by the X-Ray scan and so materialized on-screen in ridiculous, blurred poses—mouths agape, à la Edvard Munch. One of us in the I.O. room would occasionally identify a passenger as female, only to have the officers out on the checkpoint floor radio back that it was actually a man. All the old, crass stereotypes about race and genitalia size thrived on our secure government radio channels.

There were other types of bad behavior in the I.O. room—I personally witnessed quite a bit of fooling around, in every sense of the phrase. Officers who were dating often conspired to get assigned to the I.O. room at the same time, where they analyzed the nude images with one eye apiece, at best. Every now and then, a passenger would throw up two middle fingers during his or her scan, as though somehow aware of the transgressions going on.

And yes, he talks about the ridiculousness of confiscating nail clippers and liquids:

I confiscated jars of homemade apple butter on the pretense that they could pose threats to national security. I was even required to confiscate nail clippers from airline pilots—the implied logic being that pilots could use the nail clippers to hijack the very planes they were flying.

Once, in 2008, I had to confiscate a bottle of alcohol from a group of Marines coming home from Afghanistan. It was celebration champagne intended for one of the men in the group—a young, decorated soldier. He was in a wheelchair, both legs lost to an I.E.D., and it fell to me to tell this kid who would never walk again that his homecoming champagne had to be taken away in the name of national security.

Basically, pretty much everything we already knew about the TSA and its security theater seems to be more or less accurate. There's a lot more in the article, but it really paints a picture of typical bureaucratic insanity. The whole setup of the TSA seems designed to do two things: to help make a few ex-gov't officials very wealthy while giving the public appearance that current government officials are "doing something" about terrorism.

As we've noted in the past, even the TSA knows that there's not much of a threat directed at air travel these days, which is probably why they've started giving up the pretense and waving large groups of folks through at times.

Of course, beyond the government officials getting rich part of this, the simple fact is that the political incentives here always will lead to these kinds of ridiculous results. When there is, inevitably, some other attack, questions will be asked about why we weren't "doing enough." So everyone has incentives to do as much useless stuff as possible, even if it's all really useless. That way they can talk about everything they had already been doing -- and then layering on some other idiotic idea (like taking off your shoes, or not carrying water bottles through security) and go on with the myth that they're "protecting" people. It's just that sometimes this leads to bored TSA agents staring at tons of people naked based on no warrant, no threat and no damned reason at all.

Filed Under: naked scanners, nudie scanners, security theater, tsa

9-Year-Old Sneaks Onto Flight; TSA Blames The Government Shutdown, Then Says It Did Its Job Just Fine

from the because-you-gotta-blame-someone dept

You may have seen this story making the rounds about a 9-year-old boy somehow getting through multiple layers of security at an airport in Minnesota to get aboard a flight to Las Vegas. It appears that there were multiple lapses here. The kid got through the TSA security checkpoint without a ticket. He got onto the plane without a ticket. The plane then took off without anyone noticing that (1) the plane had too many passengers and (2) he wasn't on their list of unaccompanied minors (something they noticed mid-flight). The TSA's response was initially to blame the the government shutdown:

WCCO contacted the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) Sunday morning, during which a spokesperson said staffing is currently low due to the number of employees furloughed in the wake of the federal government shutdown.

A few hours later, the TSA responded again, trying a different strategy. Apparently someone realized that nearly all TSA agents at security checks are still on the job, even if their pay is deferred. So, with a second shot at this, rather than blame the government shutdown, the TSA's strategy is to claim it did everything it was supposed to:

“The child was screened along with all other passengers to ensure that he was not a threat to the aircraft,” said the TSA spokesperson.

Someone else in the article also notes that the TSA's job is to make sure that the people passing through security are "not a threat," and not whether or not they're supposed to board the plane. That's an interesting argument, but doesn't make much sense. I fly fairly frequently, and these days every single time I fly there are two TSA agents who review the boarding pass before you make it through security (one as you enter security who mainly makes sure you have a boarding pass for a flight through that security checkpoint, and the second who checks your IDs and is supposed to verify that the boarding pass is legit).

Of course, these kinds of lapses aren't unheard of. In the past it used to be much easier. Comedian/actor Molly Shannon has told her story a few times about how when she was a little girl she was able to sneak onto a plane to NY (after her father suggested she try it). But that was back when airport/airline security was a lot lower. Either way, it's pretty ridiculous for the TSA to blame the government shutdown for such a lapse. People have long argued that the TSA is more "security theater" than anything else -- giving you the appearance of security, rather than any actual protections -- and this seems to support that theory.

Filed Under: flights, government shutdown, kids, security theater, stowaways, tsa

Fire Sale: TSA Now Offering You Your Civil Liberties For A Fee!

from the freedom-isn't-free dept

You've likely heard the phrase "freedom isn't free" before, probably in the context of honoring our service men and women, paying taxes, voting, or paying for audio clips of the movie Braveheart. It's one of those phrases that's been used so often that it's probably no longer worthwhile. My main complaint about the phrase, other than the generally mouth-breathing blowhards who use it, is it leaves the obvious follow up question unanswered: fine, then how much will freedom cost me? It's an important question we've never really had an answer to...until now.

And that answer is? 85 whole American dollars. No, I didn't get that out of some Hitchhiker's Guide To The Galaxy fan-fiction. I got it from the TSA, who announced an expanded program to touch your ugly bits less if you pay up.

TSA Precheck allows passengers who have been pre-approved to keep on their shoes and belt, not remove their jackets, keep their laptops inside their cases, and not have to remove select liquids and gels from their bags. In other words, besides the line, they can avoid most of the hassles of going through an airport security checkpoint.

Now, to be clear, the TSA's Precheck program has been around for some time, but this is a fairly significant expansion of that program, not to mention a sweet price drop. So all of the scare-mongering we previously heard as justification for searching through our things and our pants could have been swept away with a background check and $85? That almost sounds like a good deal, except then you remember that most airport security is futility as performance art to begin with and paying for civil liberties is the kind of thing that would have made Thomas Jefferson grab a musket and his pantaloons.

And here's another consideration: why am I to believe these background checks and $85 make a person safe to pass through large swaths of the airport security that any normal citizen must endure? A fingerprint and $85 doesn't keep someone from being radicalized at a later date. It doesn't mean all the scary terrorist groups out there can't plant someone on a long-term mission specifically to get approved for this list. There's every bit as much danger in these people as in the rest of us. Which is to say, very little, actually.

All this tells me is that if TSA security is either so poor or so unnecessary that millions of people qualify to bypass most of it, and they're expanding that bypass, maybe the answer is to scale the security theater back instead of handing everyone an $85 bill.

Filed Under: civil liberties, pre-check, safety, security theater, tsa