Homeland Security Starts Banning Laptops & Tablets On Planes From The Middle East

from the that-is-going-to-piss-off-a-lot-of-people dept

It's been a very long time since I last flew somewhere without my laptop. I actually am more productive than usual on planes, and I tend to use flying time to just focus in and get a ton of stuff done. I can't even begin to explain how ridiculously frustrating it would be to find out that I wouldn't be allowed to bring a laptop onto a plane, and yet it appears that our new Homeland Security overlords have put in place new restrictions on flights to the US from certain countries in the middle east barring tablets and laptops from the cabin (apparently no American carriers are impacted -- just foreign ones). Passengers are being told to check such things (which is odd, since normally you're not supposed to check lithium ion batteries...). Flights from 13 countries are being hit with this, and Homeland Security won't give any further explanation beyond the usual "national security." And, just this morning, the UK announced that it would be doing the same thing.

Homeland Security has been hinting that this is due to some sort of specific threat -- so it sounds like there's intelligence around a planned attack using such a device. Perhaps then the extra precaution is sensible. But, once again, this feels like a form of overkill security theater: inconveniencing basically everyone (to extreme levels) based on the slight possibility of a very small number of bad actors. There has to be a better way. Every time one of these new restrictions is put in place, it not only completely inconveniences people, but it shows people that if they somehow convince the scaredy cats at DHS of some new type of threat, they can inconvenience people even more. It's almost as if each additional inconvenience is impacting things way more than an actual exploding laptop or whatever might.

Of course, it should be no surprise that former TSA boss Kip Hawley, is now running around arguing that this is no big deal and Wired is happy to tell everyone to calm down and just "buy a book." But that's kind of crazy -- especially for people who have important or sensitive information on their laptops and don't want to hand them off to baggage carriers with a history of snooping through bags and stealing expensive electronics.

Also, since this is limited to just a few Middle Eastern airports, it's not hard to think that if there are terrorists planning something, they'll just head to different airports instead. Yes, I'm sure that someone saw something that they thought was a threat, and it's reasonable to put in place plans that try to minimize some of that risk. But it has to take into account the cost side too, and there has to be a better way to deal with it than such a blanket ban impacting so many people.

Filed Under: dhs, flying, laptops, middle east, national security, security theater, tablets, terrorism, threats, tsa, uk, us

TSA Now Making Its Intrusive Searches Even More Gropey & Assaulty

from the hello-sexual-assault dept

For years we've pointed out the sheer insanity of the TSA's security theater, which is intrusive, insulting and does little to actually make us any safer. One aspect (of many) that has been particularly troubling is the way that the TSA has basically enabled sexual assault of travelers. If you felt that wasn't too bad, have no fear, the TSA is apparently increasing the sexual assaulty nature of these searches:

The new physical touching—for those selected to have a pat-down—will be be what the federal agency officially describes as a more “comprehensive” physical screening, according to a Transportation Security Administration spokesman.

Denver International Airport, for example, notified employees and flight crews on Thursday that the “more rigorous” searches “will be more thorough and may involve an officer making more intimate contact than before.”

Got that? I love the way they dance around the fact that this is randomly allowed sexual assault on people who just want to travel somewhere. But it's described as "physical touching" that is more "comprehensive" and "may involve an officer making more intimate contact."

So why are TSA agents allowed to get more gropey, just a year or so after it was discovered that some TSA agents were scheming specifically to be able to sexually assault travelers they found attractive? Well, it's because it's been revealed how useless TSA security theater is. Really. After yet another set of reports pointed out that all this security theater is useless, the TSA said "welp, the answer to that must be moar sexual assault!:

The change is partly a result of the agency’s study of a 2015 report that criticized aspects of TSA screening procedures. That audit, by the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General, drew headlines because airport officers had failed to detect handguns and other weapons.

This is madness. The answer to the TSA's awful and useless security theater should never be to give TSA agents more power to sexually assault travelers with "more intimate contact." This is not about security. This is about the TSA wanting to make it look like they're doing something, and apparently that includes groping strangers who are just trying to get somewhere. How the hell does sexually assaulting travelers make anyone any safer?

Filed Under: 4th amendment, groping, searches, security theater, sexual assault, tsa

What It Looks Like When The Terrorists Win: The JFK Stampede Over Fans Cheering For Usain Bolt

from the defeat dept

We've talked a great deal here about what a theater of security our national airports have become. Far from accomplishing anything having to do with actually keeping anyone safe, those in charge of our airports have instead decided to engage in the warm fuzzies, attempting to calm an easily-spooked traveling public through bureaucracy and privacy invasion. The hope is that if everyone suffers the right level of inconvenience and humiliation, we'll all feel safe enough traveling.

But it's quite easy for the 4th wall in this security theater to be broken by the right sort of circumstance. In case you missed it, one such circumstance happened recently at JFK Airport. The fallout was described in a first-person account in New York Magazine by David Wallace-Wells. Following a long plane ride after a delayed departure, Wallace-Wells describes the start of the ensuing chaos as he and his wife waited to get to passport control:

On the right of the hallway was that familiar line of people-movers, each of them stalled, when suddenly somebody realized that you could lap the line by walking down it like it was a highway shoulder in a traffic jam. Risa turned, smiled, and dashed off to take advantage. I made a show of protesting, hanging back for a second, and then followed her, but probably 50 people had swum into that lane between us in the meantime, and I couldn’t even catch sight of her to roll my eyes. Then the screaming began. I can’t remember what happened first — the flashing light of a fire alarm, the yelled warnings of a bomb and a shooter, the people turning around in a mob panic. I thought I saw smoke. I know I saw bags dropped, people falling to the floor and others stomping past them, through them, on them. Everybody was screaming. And I couldn’t find Risa. See her, really. Because there was no moving in the other direction. There was not even time or space to process what was happening, really. People were shouting about terrorism right next to me, as they ran next to me, but I wasn’t thinking about a shooter; I was just thinking, GO!

He goes on to describe being in the middle of one of several literal stampedes that had broken out throughout the airport, with travelers scattering in many directions and trampling one another. Members of the public were escorted out onto the tarmac, then back inside, then back out onto the tarmac again. Airport security alternatively either bolted for the exits when the scare began, or else were ineptly ushering the public in one direction or another. NYPD officers were inside the airport terminals, clearing them, but nobody seemed to be informing or instructing the public as to what to do. It was, in simple terms, chaos. A woman in a hijab called to her family, and everyone around her panicked. Even the set-pieces of the security theater contributed to the bedlam.

When people started running, a man I met later on the tarmac said, they plowed through the metal poles strung throughout the terminal to organize lines, and the metal clacking on the tile floors sounded like gunfire. Because the clacking was caused by the crowd, wherever you were and however far you’d run already, it was always right around you.

There was a second stampede, I heard some time later, in Terminal 4. I was caught up in two separate ones, genuine stampedes, both in Terminal 1. The first was in the long, narrow, low-ceilinged second-floor hallway approaching customs that was so stuffed with restless passengers that it felt like a cattle call, even before the fire alarm and the screaming and all the contradictory squeals that sent people running and yelling and barreling over each other — as well as the dropped luggage, passports, and crouched panicked women who just wanted to take shelter between their knees and hope for it, or “them,” to pass.

I can only imagine the terror one must feel being caught within a panic inside an airport under these circumstances. As the author notes, it was clear to anyone in the airport that day just how silly the idea is that authorities could respond to a threat at an airport in a methodical and organized way. Part of the lesson of this story is just how useless the security theater we've allowed to be propped up before us actually is. Useless as a system for when a terror event actually occurs, but more useless at keeping travelers calm and feeling safe.

Because the cause of this chaos would be laughable if it weren't so terrifyingly frustrating.

When the first stampede began, my plane had just landed. It started, apparently, with a group of passengers awaiting departure in John F. Kennedy Airport Terminal 8 cheering Usain Bolt’s superhuman 100-meter dash. The applause sounded like gunfire, somehow, or to someone; really, it only takes one. According to some reports, one woman screamed that she saw a gun.

That's all it took. A spooked public whose fear is unassuaged by the pretend security the government has set up at the airport, mixed with applause for an Olympic athlete, gets you bedlam. This is everyone's fault, from a public that can't bother to keep the threat of terrorism in perspective, to politicians that decided on a feel-good show at airports that couldn't even achieve that goal, to federal agencies keeping everyone so on edge that simple applause rang as gunfire in the minds of some.

It's hard to think of a more powerful example of how terrorism works than that.

Filed Under: fear, jfk, security theater, stampede, terrorism

Half Of TSA's 30,000 Employees Accused Of Misconduct; Nearly A Third Multiple Times

from the too-big-to-fix dept

The TSA is a multibillion dollar agency with nearly zero redeemable qualities. It can only act in hindsight, does almost nothing to make traveling safer, and seemingly devotes most of its screening efforts to toddlers, cancer patients, and ensuring carry-on liquids do not exceed three ounces.

What it lacks in competency, it makes up in misconduct. Lines at security checkpoints have slowed to a crawl. Making it through the tedious, invasive process sometimes means inadvertently "donating" expensive electronics to sticky-fingered agents. The TSA's morale is generally on par with Congress' approval rates. And, when it's all said and done, the people hired to protect travelers just plain suck at their job.

Despite the Transportation Security Administration's ten-point action plan to reduce long lines at airports across the country, lengthy queues remain. Now, the TSA's summer may be getting even worse: According to a recent report from the House Homeland Security Commission entitled "Misconduct at TSA Threatens the Security of the Flying Public", nearly half of the TSA’s 60,000 employees have been cited for misconduct in recent years.

As Katherine LaGrave of the Conde Nast Traveler points out, the problem is only getting worse. Complaints are up 28% over the last three years, with larger airports averaging a complaint a week. Long lines may be causing a spike in the complaints, but the misconduct detailed in the report has very little to do directly with this issue.

Attendance issues are part of the problem, but the offenses listed in the report range from missing work to smuggling drugs/humans to "engaging in child pornography activities." Although processes are in place to handle disciplinary issues, they are both bureaucratic and inconsistently applied. Worse, the investigation found that the agency has no specific process in place to fire problem employees.

But the obvious takeaway from this report is that the TSA is not improving. It's getting worse, despite the institution of an action plan and added layers of direct oversight. The report also cautions that this will never improve, at least not if the TSA continues to ignore internal issues. It notes that misconduct allegations have increased by nearly 29% in the last three years but opened investigations not increased, but have actually gone down 15% over the same period.

Then there's this:

Almost half of TSA’s entire workforce allegedly committed misconduct, and almost half of that number allegedly did so repeatedly. According to TSA data, from fiscal year 2013 through 2015, almost 27,000 unique employees had an allegation of misconduct filed against them. Moreover, about half of those employees had two or more misconduct allegations filed against them, with some employees having 14, 16, and 18 allegations. In fact, 1,270 employees had five or more misconduct allegations filed against them.

The TSA knows -- or should know -- who its problem employees are. It just isn't willing to do anything about them.

The TSA's toxic culture didn't form in a vacuum. It started at the top, thanks to legislators granting the agency far too much power and demanding far too little in terms of accountability in return. The TSA has crafted policies containing several exploitable loopholes for upper management to abuse. TSA officials are unwilling to fix internal issues, and have provided nothing to Congressional oversight when questioned about the agency's disciplinary problems.

On March 10, 2016, Chairman McCaul requested data from TSA on the number of directed reassignments that have taken place to understand the depth of this type of misconduct and to give TSA an opportunity to present information in its defense. However, almost four months later, TSA has only provided about half of the requested data stating that it has required manual review of case files. If this information is not readily available to provide to Congress, it is likely not readily available to TSA decision-makers, and indicates that TSA is not providing oversight of these types of reassignments.

The agency refuses to track misconduct on its own, suggesting it would rather have a bunch of warm bodies in place than anyone truly interested in the important job they've been entrusted with. Everything rolls downhill from there. If the agency is unwilling to do even the minimum to curb misconduct, it should come as no surprise that it's become host to a large number of misbehaving employees. Fifteen years of mismanagement has turned a response to a horrific attack into a playground for people who like lots of power and zero accountability.

Filed Under: abuse, misconduct, security, security theater, tsa

Former DHS Secretary Says We Can Make Airports Safer From Terrorists By Rearranging Security Checkpoints

from the another-security-theater-script-rewrite-in-the-works dept

Another terrorist attack somewhere in the world* has provoked another round of punditry from former government officials on how to protect America from future attacks. Over the coming weeks, there will be no shortage of stupid ideas, useless ideas and pointless discussions about "heightened security" at any place people gather.

*"World" = Western Europe only

None of it will matter. Security has never really been scaled back anywhere since the 9/11 attacks -- certainly not to the levels seen prior to September 2001. There's only so much security anyone can actually provide but endless off-Broadway productions of security theater to be explored.

Michael Chertoff -- head of the Chertoff Group and former Homeland Security secretary -- spoke to CBS This Morning about what might need to be done to make airports more secure. Chertoff is right about one thing: TSA checkpoints create a tempting target of massed humans -- all waiting for their chance to be probed, scanned and groped by government employees.

“Well I have to say this is something I’ve spoken to people about for some time. The actual portion of the airport before the checkpoint is not really controlled by the federal government, it’s controlled by the local authorities. And it has increasingly become vulnerable, because as people wait to go through security they actually congregate there.”

I'm not sure the local boys will appreciate this dig at their security skills. But Chertoff's "solution" is just a literal expansion of federal government territory.

“And so now there’s an effort I think on the part of TSA to start to move the airports into pushing the security envelope back. We’ve seen some of that in terms of not allowing you to park in front of the terminal, but I think we’re going to have to step that up.”

So… move the target. Instead of being deep inside the airport, it will be closer to the entrance. As Gawker's Alex Pareene notes, at some point you can't push the envelope back any further. And there's no expansion point that will magically protect fliers from terrorist attacks.

Ah. Of course. We’ll “push the security envelope back.” The old checkpoints created crowds, sure, but once we move the security checkpoints back, just a bit bit further (to just before you enter the airport, I guess), it will be much safer for everyone, at least once everyone gets past the new checkpoints. Maybe eventually we can push the security envelope back to before you get in your car to go to the airport—your garage door, maybe?

Push people closer to the entrance. Make them more vulnerable to car bombs/larger groups of attackers. Push the envelope all the way out to the connecting roads. Same problem but with the added bonus of intrusive vehicle searches for everyone heading to the airport, whether they're planning to fly or not. There's no point where traveler safety suddenly spikes. Every nudge of the envelope opens as many attack vectors as it shuts down.

That's the ridiculousness of the TSA. It has done almost nothing to make flying safer. The only thing anyone can say for sure is that the TSA has made flying more annoying.

Maybe they'll move the checkpoints. Maybe they won't. Airplanes aren't the target. People are. And people are everywhere. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, you can't save all of the people all of the time, but you can make most of them miserable most of the time. That's how the DHS works. Actions must always be followed by reactions specifically tailored to address the parameters of the last attack or perceived threat. Somehow, we'll be safer by staying one step behind and ceding control to the government.

Filed Under: brussels, checkpoints, dhs, michael chertoff, security, security theater, tsa

Techdirt Crowdsourcing: How Will The TSA Idiotically Respond To The Laptop Terror Bomb?

from the giving-them-ideas dept

The terrorism arms race marches on, apparently. You may have heard of the recent attack on a passenger plane taking off from Somalia. By all accounts, the attacker managed to get onto the plane with a laptop that contained a bomb, which he detonated during takeoff. The result? The bomber was sucked out of the hole he created in the plane and died, while a couple of other passengers were mildly wounded. The universe, it seems, is not without either a sense of justice or humor.

Still, you absolutely know that this will create a typical shitstorm at the TSA. Security theater stops for nobody, after all, and this latest attempt is sure to put a focus on any computer devices passengers are bringing with them on flights. Laptops and tablets are already screened by the TSA, of course, but somehow this guy got on the plane with his bomb-filled notebook. Even though it happened outside the US (so not directly a TSA failing), it's not difficult to expect that things are predictably and stupidly going to get more strict on the rest of us. We thought it might be fun to engage in a little crowdsourcing of predictions as to what the TSA reaction will be. In our writing room, your esteemed Techdirt writers came up with some ideas to help you get started:

• If you have not upgraded to Windows 10, passengers will be forced to do so at the security checkpoint.
• If you run a machine using Linux, yeah, you're not getting on the damn plane.
• The TSA will have a special USB key that it will plug into every computer. It won't actually detect explosives, but it will download any nude photos you have of yourself on the machine for TSA employees to enjoy. They love that shit, after all.
• All laptops must be in a vaccuum sealed plastic bag and cannot be opened until the plane has landed.
• Any laptop over a certain weight will immediately be tossed in the same bin as all of the breast milk, insulin, and contact solution.
• If your machine contains a copy of Minesweeper, you are shot on sight.

We know our community can do much better than the above, however, so feel free to comment with your own predictions for how the TSA will battle the scourge of laptop explosives that probably don't actually exist. As a side note, one wonders how useless all of that in-flight WiFi equipment is going to be in the near future.

Filed Under: bombs, laptops, security theater, tsa

TSA: Terrible At Security But Finally Willing To Work On Its Problems

from the failing-forward dept

The TSA's inability to live up to the "S" in its acronym is on display again. The agency's Inspector General recently testified before a Congressional oversight committee. Fortunately, no one stepped forward to shoot the messenger -- seeing as the message was more bad news about TSA incompetence. I imagine TSA Administrator Peter Neffenger would have jumped at the chance to be the triggerman, but was fortunately limited to delivering his own prepared remarks in response.

After speaking to the "difficulty" (apparently insurmountable) of the TSA's "mission," Inspector General John Roth referred to the difficult nature (in the parental sense) of the agency itself.

My remarks were described as “unusually blunt testimony from a government witness,” and I will confess that it was. However, those remarks were born of frustration that TSA was assessing risk inappropriately and did not have the ability to perform basic management functions in order to meet the mission the American people expect of it. These issues were exacerbated, in my judgment, by a culture, developed over time, which resisted oversight and was unwilling to accept the need for change in the face of an evolving and serious threat. We have been writing reports highlighting some of these problems for years without an acknowledgment by TSA of the need to correct its deficiencies.

Is the TSA willing to change now? Possibly. But some things haven't changed, like its ability to do its job. Roth's office has performed another round of covert testing. Last time this testing was performed, the IG's fake terrorists nearly aced the test.

However, the latest covert testing wasn't nearly as "covert," as Lowering the Bar's Kevin Underhill points out. But it didn't go much better.

“In September 2015, we completed and distributed our report on our most recent round of covert testing.” This is where undercover DHS inspectors do stuff like try to smuggle bomb parts through checkpoints, and succeed … let’s see … 96% of the time. Or at least that’s how it’s gone in the past. How about now?

“While I cannot talk about the specifics in this setting [it’s classified, y’all], I am able to say that … the test results were disappointing and troubling,” and were “consistent across every airport” tested. Roth also noted that the tests were conducted by personnel “without any special knowledge or training,” which might seem odd unless you know that the TSA reacted to the earlier 96-percent-failure-rate findings partly by complaining that the IG had used personnel who were specially trained to defeat TSA’s efforts. (You know, sort of like an actual terrorist might be.) So this time, the IG deliberately chose people with no special knowledge or training to carry out its audits. I interpret this to mean that people who basically had no real idea what they were doing consistently and successfully breached security at every airport tested.

While the nuances of transportation security continue to elude the Transportation Security Agency, one thing has changed: an actual reaction from the TSA's parent agency, the DHS.

The Department’s response to our most recent findings has been swift and definite. For example, within 24 hours of receiving preliminary results of OIG covert penetration testing, the Secretary summoned senior TSA leadership and directed that an immediate plan of action be created to correct deficiencies uncovered by our testing. Moreover, DHS has initiated a program — led by members of Secretary Johnson’s leadership team — to conduct a focused analysis on issues that the OIG has uncovered, as well as other matters. These efforts have already resulted in significant changes to TSA leadership, operations, training, and policy…

You know, the sort of thing the DHS and TSA should have done when similar failings were found in 2014. And 2012. And 2011...

The testimony/rebuttal offered by TSA Administrator Neffenger opens with statements ranging from "factually" to "laughably" false.

We remain deeply committed to ensuring that TSA remains a high-performing, risk-based intelligence-driven counterterrorism organization. We are working diligently to ensure we recruit, train, develop, and lead a mission-ready and highly-capable workforce, placing a premium on professional values and personal accountability.

Or this, which makes the claim that failing nearly 100% of the time proves the system is still effective.

It is important to acknowledge that the OIG covert tests, as a part of their design and execution, focused on only a discrete segment of TSA’s myriad capabilities of detecting and disrupting threats to aviation security. This was not a deliberate test of the entire system and while there were areas for improvement noted by the Inspector General – with which we concurred -- that the system as a whole remains effective and, as a result of this series of tests, has only gotten stronger.

Scoring higher against an opponent of a lower skill level (the Average Joe Bomb Carrier "operatives" deployed by the OIG in 2015, rather than the "covert operatives" who performed the 2014 test) doesn't exactly signal systemic strength. But whatever, it's the system we have -- one we neither want nor deserve.

And then there's this part of the statement, which could easily support a full-fledged buzzword-based drinking game all on its own.

Solutions to the challenges facing TSA will require a renewed focus on the agency’s security mission, a commitment to right-sizing and resourcing TSA to effectively secure the aviation enterprise, and an industry commitment to incentivizing vetting of passengers as well as creating conditions that can decrease the volume and contents of bags presented for screening in airports.

"Incentivizing vetting of passengers?" Isn't that pretty much the only task the TSA performs? (I mean, when not running its Instagram account or helping the DEA walk off with a traveler's money…) After 15 years on the job, you'd think the TSA's vetting incentive program would be humming away like a well-funded machine. Apparently not, though. As the Inspector General points out, the TSA still approaches airport security in a disturbingly haphazard fashion.

[W]e believe that TSA’s use of risk assessment rules, which granted expedited screening to broad categories of individuals unrelated to an individual assessment of risk, but rather on some questionable assumptions about relative risk based on other factors, created an unacceptable risk to aviation security. Additionally, TSA used “managed inclusion” for the general public, allowing random passengers access to Precheck lanes with no assessment of risk. Additional layers of security TSA intended to provide, which were meant to compensate for the lack of risk assessment, were often simply not present.

While I am still of the belief that a majority of the TSA's actions are a perversely expensive and intrusive form of pantomime, the least the agency could do is maintain consistency across its security "offerings." If PreCheck is only "safe" because of the vetting process, then limit it only to those who have been pre-cleared. If 99% of travelers are no threat and can be waved through expeditiously, then do that and ditch the stupid "please throw out your breast milk while your TSA-friendly locks are broken" playacting that keeps lines backed up at security checkpoints.

The TSA has proven it's far better at officiousness and bureaucracy than security. And for years, it's been more interested in making excuses than fixing its problems. IG John Roth hopes this is the beginning of the end of the TSA's abysmal track record. In his comments to the Congressional committee, he expresses his support for the Inspector General Empowerment Act which would, among other things, maintain the office's independence and force agencies to cough up documents and information in a more timely fashion.

But it's hard to believe the culture will change. At the TSA, aviation security is just a job -- something that only deserves a minimal level of attention or competence. And that's all we'll get, for years and years to come: government-mandated harassment that hassles far more travelers than terrorists.

Filed Under: congress, john roth, security, security theater, tsa

'We Should Put A Metal Detector On The Other Side': The Laughable Waste Of TSA Body Scanners

from the common-sense dept

If anyone needed the perfect example of the giant waste, fraud, and abuse a government emboldened by fear and ineptitude can achieve, that example absolutely has to be the TSA's body scanners. These glorious devices that didn't work in catching weapons or explosives but did let TSA agents see you naked, and which are administered by the TSA, an agency so perfectly unable to do its job properly that all us Techdirt writers now have carpel tunnel syndrome from writing up posts on its exploits, now have a detailed price tag associated with them. So, what did the public pay for all of this fail?

Oh, only $160 million of taxpayer money, according to Politico.

The cost breakdown, which the TSA recently turned over to some members of Congress, provides the latest look at the agency’s investment in body imaging technology since it decided to make the scanners the centerpiece of the checkpoint screening process. The price tag averages more than $150,000 per unit since the agency bought the first batch of 45 devices in 2008.

And for that money, lawmakers privy to classified reports say, the TSA has gotten a woeful failure rate. Senate Homeland Security Chairman Ron Johnson has such low confidence in the scanners’ ability to catch explosives and weapons that he says the agency should make fliers walk through metal detectors after passing through the body imaging machines.

Yes, dear sirs and madams, full body scanners, so inept that esteemed government officials are suggesting people exiting them should immediately go through a traditional metal detector, come at a $150k/ea price tag. But the danger of a program like body scanners, when it comes to government malfeasance, isn't solely in the primary failure of the program. Rather, the danger is in the way the failure then begins to infect everyone around it, like some kind of IQ-deteriorating brain bacteria. For example, the esteemed SHS Chairman mentioned above, who suggested metal detectors be used immediately after the body scanner, begged pardon if you had thought he meant that the body scanners weren't still needed.

“If you really want to keep using those, and I’m not saying we shouldn’t, at a minimum we should put a metal detector on the other side,” the Wisconsin Republican said in an interview. “Why not go through two? You’ve just gotta use common sense.”

Ah, yes, common sense. Well, Senator, let me try some of this common sense thing you speak of for myself. My common sense suggests that any procedure about which the following can be written ought be permanently done away with:

A recent security audit found that TSA had failed to find fake explosives and weapons in 96 percent of covert tests. And members of Congress familiar with the classified details say the body scanners are to blame for much of the problem.

Common sense does not inform me that, rather than removal of these devices, our best bet is to simply stack devices upon devices through which we should walk, all while being uncertain of their efficacy. The problem isn't a lack of devices to walk through; the problem is there are too many.

Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has said he has received assurances from L-3’s CEO that the company will work with the department to improve the technology.

Ah, yes, an assurance that this next go 'round they'll get it right, from a company that screwed it up the first time. You'll excuse me, sirs, if I am laughing. The point is that it's time to give up the game. The security we get at our airports is mere theater and we know it. The devices that didn't work the first time around while costing American taxpayers a hundred and sixty million dollars shouldn't get another bite at the apple. 9/11 is far enough in the rearview mirror that we can't use fear as an excuse any longer. It's time to end the masquerade and get on with it.

Filed Under: body scanners, metal detectors, security theater, tsa
Companies: l-3

TSA At The Movies: Theater Chain Looks To Bring Security Theater To The Movie Theater

from the more-hassle,-same-safety dept

Thanks to a string of theater-related tragedies, going to the theater is about to become as enjoyable as going to the airport.

Following two recent deadly incidents at movie theatres in the US, the Regal Entertainment Group – the nation’s largest movie theater chain – this week added a bag and purse check policy as a security measure in some of the 569 theaters it operates.

“Security issues have become a daily part of our lives in America. Regal Entertainment Group wants our customers and staff to feel comfortable and safe when visiting or working in our theatres,” the chain said in a statement.

This may sound like a harmless bit of "doing something" in response to a few tragic incidents, but there's nothing really harmless about it.

First off, it subjects everyone to the same level of scrutiny -- provided they're carrying a bag of some sort. If you have a purse or backpack or (god forbid) a fanny pack, you're a potential threat. Everyone else? Free to go. Weapons tucked into waistbands or shoved into pockets will go undetected.

And, like the TSA its emulating, the security measures will be easily thwarted and ultimately useless. For every weapon the TSA brags about seizing, many more end up on planes. A recent audit of the TSA's security efforts found it missed 95% of smuggled weapons and explosives. Anyone thinking Regal's security force is going to be better trained and more thorough than the TSA is kidding themselves.

Like the TSA's efforts, this will give moviegoers the illusion of safety, rather than actual safety. An illusion might be comforting enough for most moviegoers and it's all Regal can actually offer. This move is more about PR than reality.

According to a new survey conducted by consumer research film C4, following the Nashville incident, 48% of moviegoers are willing to pay $1 or more per ticket for the additional measures. Nineteen per cent of respondents said they would pay $3 or more.

And I'm sure Regal will be more than happy to take $1-3 more from every moviegoer in exchange for a hassling a few moviegoers. But Regal's move -- while good-intentioned -- is ill-advised. Offering your customers mostly-theoretical protection places responsibility for any future shootings almost solely on each individual theater. Now, if anyone shoots up a theater, Regal will very likely be successfully targeted in wrongful death suits. After all, it instituted additional measures to prevent further shootings... and then failed to prevent a shooting from happening. The additional measures seem unlikely to dissuade anyone but the most easily-deterred shooters from following through with their plans. In exchange for little more than a temporary bump in goodwill, Regal is assuming a great deal of liability.

And given what we know about the most recent theater shootings, a bag check wouldn't have stopped anything. James Holmes, who killed 12 and wounded 70 in Aurora, CO, stashed his weapons in his vehicle. The shooter in Louisiana may have had a backpack (reports are inconclusive), but it wasn't on or near him when police got to him, and a controlled detonation later proved there was nothing harmful inside it. The shooter at the Antioch, TN theater was carrying two backpacks -- one of which was strapped across his chest. When police engaged him, he was also wearing a surgical mask. Most of what was in his bags weren't actually weapons, though. Pepper spray, a hatchet and an Airsoft gun were used in the theater attack. Only one of these is an actual weapon, and Regal's new policy doesn't make it clear what will happen to those who bring in legal items that aren't weapons but the theater decides could be deployed as one.

This focus on bags also makes it clear to potential attackers that security will be looking out for one thing -- backpacks and bags. Avoiding scrutiny simply means not doing that one thing. So, while some moviegoers will be comforted by this security charade being performed on their behalf, many more will be irritated that attending a movie will be nearly as annoying as boarding a plane.

Filed Under: bag checks, movie theaters, movies, security, security theater, tsa
Companies: regal entertainment

Irish Airport Security Bravely Defends Plane From Toddler's Fart-Gun

from the heroes dept

Here at Techdirt, we've had a great deal of fun at the expense of the TSA and the agency's wonderful brand of security theater masquerading as actual airport security. Yes, the government putting on a kind of clinic in the simultaneous overreach into civil liberties for false security and the kind of wasteful government spending that makes the conservative talkshow hosts of the world dip back into the Oxy has been an ongoing source of entertainment. But the TSA can take the same kind of heart that thousands of purported UFO abductees do: you are not alone.

No, as it turns out, foreign airport security agencies can be just as laughable as we can be. Witness the Irish, for instance, and the way they bravely disarmed a three year old of a toy fart-gun.

Can't believe that a minion fart gun was taken from friends toddler, security felt it posed a threat @UniversalPics pic.twitter.com/iAPLlmdTv3 — Paula (@NursepollyRgn) August 16, 2015

As Paula pointed out, this is a replica of the "Fart Blaster" wielded by the minions in "Despicable Me." So I guess it does have a track record of being used for evil purposes. But in real life it doesn't do anything except make noise and apparently emit an odor that thankfully is said to be banana-scented. Do I want a kid to wield one of these on a plane? No. Does it need to be confiscated by security personnel? No.

Well, I do want a kid wielding one of these delightful toys on an airplane, sirs. The very idea of a three year old tumbling down the aisle spraying a bunch of uptight, too-stiff adults with insufficient senses of humor in the face with banana-farts is exactly the kind of life, liberty and happiness no government ought be denying my right to pursue. What's far less funny - kind of - was the Irish authorities' insistence that they confiscated the "weapon" because it violated the rules against replica guns. Replica guns typically refer to realistic representations of actual firearms that don't work. The fart gun is not a representation of a real gun at all. And it most certainly works as intended.

The spokesperson noted that the toy was "being kept safe at the airport" so the child can get it back when the family returns, so that's nice.

It's not nice; it's exceptionally stupid. The Irish authorities are sitting on a children's toy that they absolutely know is not a weapon over a ham-fisted attempt to play by bureaucratic rules. I think it's time these lads went and had a Guinness and let the kid have his toy back.

Filed Under: airport security, fart gun, ireland, minions, security theater, tsa