Clapper Continues To Pretend He Didn't Lie To Congress About Domestic Surveillance Programs

from the six-years-of-deflection dept

James Clapper is going to take his Section 215 lie to his grave. One day after the first Snowden leak exposed the breadth of the NSA's phone metadata program, Sen. Ron Wyden asked the then-Director of National Intelligence if the agency collected data on Americans. Despite published documents clearly showing otherwise, Clapper went with this answer:

Wyden: Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans?

Clapper: No sir.

Wyden: It does not?

Clapper: Not wittingly. There are cases where they could, inadvertently perhaps, collect—but not wittingly.

Since everyone clearly knew he was lying, Clapper spent the next several days claiming he wasn't. First, he said he meant the NSA wasn't "voyeurestically" reading everyone's emails. Good, but not what Wyden asked. Then he said it was the only response he could give to Wyden's "when did you stop beating your wife" question. Then he claimed he thought Wyden was asking about another collection entirely: the foreign-facing Section 702 program (which does, inadvertently, collect a lot of US person data/communications).

This is the legacy Clapper has secured for himself. He won't be remembered for his IC leadership or his post-IC career talking headmanship. Nope, it will be his super-weak, super-transparent lie, delivered to a US Senator against a backdrop of leaked documents showing the NSA did "wittingly" collect data on hundreds of millions of Americans.

Nearly six years later, Clapper is telling the same story to anyone who asks him about this hearing, ensuring the word "Clapper" and "lie" will remain inseparable. The Section 215 program Clapper was alluding to -- the program exposed in the first Snowden leak -- is back in the news, thanks to an unexpected early retirement.

In an interview with CNN about the surprise Section 215 shutdown, Clapper again pretended he didn't know what program he was being asked about.

“As far as the comment, the allegation about my lying, I didn’t lie, I made a big mistake and I just simply didn’t understand what I was being asked about. I thought of another surveillance program, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act when I was being asked about Section 215 of the Patriot Act at the time, I just didn’t understand that...”

Clapper's repetition of this excuse hasn't made it any more believable. None other than Senator Ron Wyden popped up on Twitter to point out Clapper's lies about his lie.

If you can't see/read the tweet, it says:

James Clapper needs to stop making excuses for lying to the American people about mass surveillance. To be clear: I sent him the question in advance. I asked him to correct the record afterward. He chose to let the lie stand.

That's the face of IC leadership, as portrayed by James Clapper. Clapper managed to exit the public sector unscathed, turning over a limping surveillance ship to his successor while stepping into the private sector with no threat of punishment hanging over his head. He lied to Congress and got away with it. And he's going to spend the rest of his life pretending he didn't.

Filed Under: james clapper, lies, mass surveillance, nsa, ron wyden, section 215

The NSA Appears To Have Shut Down Its Bulk Collection Of Phone Records

from the program-so-valuable-no-one-could-find-a-use-for-it dept

The program considered so "essential" NSA defenders said it couldn't even be slightly modified is apparently no longer in use. During a recent Lawfare podcast, national security advisor Luke Murry dropped a bit of a bombshell. Charlie Savage summarizes Murry's comments:

The National Security Agency has quietly shut down a system that analyzes logs of Americans’ domestic calls and texts, according to a senior Republican congressional aide, halting a program that has touched off disputes about privacy and the rule of law since the Sept. 11 attacks.

[...]

Mr. Murry brought up the pending expiration of the Freedom Act, but then disclosed that the Trump administration “hasn’t actually been using it for the past six months.”

“I’m actually not certain that the administration will want to start that back up,” Mr. Murry said.

Murry is referring to the Section 215 bulk data collection. Exposed by the Snowden leaks, Section 215 was modified by the USA Freedom Act, which went into effect June 2015. The biggest modification was where the records were stored. The NSA could no longer collect all phone records from providers and search through the data at its leisure. Instead, it had to provide telcos with lists of targeted numbers. The data remained in the hands of service providers, with the NSA only having access to suspicion-supported phone records.

The alterations to the Section 215 program resulted in the NSA purging a bunch of records that didn't fit the new parameters. The NSA finally let go of a few of its haystacks, conveniently destroying records integral to multiple lawsuits against the agency. The USA Freedom Act modifications -- combined with the NSA's long history of abusing its collection authorities -- seem to have made it impossible for the NSA to continue utilizing its phone records collection program.

The bulk records collection is now in the hands of telcos, resulting in a slimmed-down dataset the NSA didn't seem particularly enthused to have. Apparently the program is as useless as critics have said it is. The NSA has gone at least six months without asking for data via this authority. This program is due for renewal at the end of this year, but the comments made to Lawfare suggest the NSA may be content to let it expire.

Marcy Wheeler suggests a few underlying motivations for the NSA's abandonment of the Section 215 collection -- and one might be the Supreme Court's extension of Fourth Amendment protections to cell site location info.

[This] suggests that the problem with the records may not be the volume or the content turned over, but some problem created either by the specific language of the law or (more likely) the House Report on it or by the Carpenter decision. Carpenter came out on June 22, so technically after the NSA claims to have started deleting records on May 23. It also may be that the the NSA realized something was non-compliant with its collection just as it was submitting the 6th set of 180-day applications, and didn’t want to admit to the FISC that it had been breaking the law (which is precisely what happened in 2011 when the government deleted all its PRTT records).

Wheeler says the NSA may have been asking for location data as well to better track the phones it targeted. The IC may have seen the writing on the third-party wall following the Supreme Court's oral arguments in November 2017. This may account for its plug-pulling a month ahead of the decision's release.

Or it may be something far less respectful of the Constitution. It could be the NSA has found another way to collect this same data without having to run it by the newly-adversarial FISA court. As Wheeler points out, Section 215 may have been restricted but the powers granted by Executive Order 12333 continue to expand.

Whatever the real motivation, it appears the domestic surveillance program that never prevented a terrorist attack will continue to never prevent terrorist attacks. The upside is we may not be throwing any more tax dollars at a national security program that adds nothing to our nation's security.

Filed Under: bulk surveillance, ed snowden, mass surveillance, metadata, nsa, phone records, section 215

As Trump Prepares Ban On Huawei, Few Notice The Major Holes In The Underlying Logic

from the do-as-we-say,-not-as-we-do dept

During the Trump era, the government has dramatically ramped up claims that Chinese hardware vendor Huawei is a nefarious spy for the Chinese government, blackballing it from the U.S. telecom market. From pressuring U.S. carriers to drop plans to sell Huawei phones to the FCC's decision to ban companies from using Huawei gear if they want to receive federal subsidies, this effort hasn't been subtle.

This week, there are rumblings that the Trump administration is about to take things further with a total ban on Huawei gear anywhere inside of the United States. The news is to be formally announced ahead of the Mobile World Congress trade show in Barcelona, likely with a heavy emphasis on how the move will cement U.S. dominance in the "race to 5G," a largely nonsensical concept drummed up by networking hardware vendor marketing departments.

The problem: there's still no public evidence Huawei uses its network gear to spy on Americans, and much of the motivation for this assault on Huawei has been proven to be largely about protectionism, not national security.

There's no doubt that Huawei, like AT&T here in the states, isn't a shining beacon of ethical behavior. At the same time, the dulcet undertones justifying much of the blacklisting is based on the premise that the company spies on Americans. Yet nobody has provided evidence of that. In fact, one 18-month investigation into Huawei in 2011 (the last time we had a flare of up this hysteria) found that there was no evidence supporting that claim:

"We knew certain parts of government really wanted” evidence of active spying, said one of the people, who requested anonymity. “We would have found it if it were there."

Also ignored is that U.S. hardware vendors like Cisco have a very long history of trying to gin up hysteria on Capital Hill on this front among lawmakers who aren't too keen on, well, facts:

"What happens is you get competitors who are able to gin up lawmakers who are already wound up about China,” said one Hill staffer who was not authorized to speak publicly about the matter. “What they do is pull the string and see where the top spins."

Also ignored in most tech press coverage of the moves against Huawei is the fact that the United States is guilty of most of the stuff we accuse Huawei of. In fact, Snowden docs revealed that the NSA (aka the United States) had broken into Huawei as early as 2007 in a bid to steal source code and covertly implant backdoors into Huawei products. Similarly you'll recall how the NSA was also busted intercepting Cisco hardware in transit, taking that gear to a special facility, then outfitting it with backdoors. That sends a pretty clear message: unethical behavior is okay when we do it.

Also ignored is the fact that our own telecom operators don't have stellar backgrounds on this subject either. AT&T, for example, is effectively bone-grafted to our nationwide intelligence apparatus, and almost certainly helps the United States spy on citizens all over the world. AT&T, a company just busted paying $600K to a dubious NYC fixer and confessed criminal, has a long history of turning a blind eye to all manner of frauds and cons being perpetrated on its own customers. Again, the message sent is: unethical behavior is okay when we do it.

Look, Huawei is no pillar of virtue, having been caught copying code and (depending on how the court battle goes) potentially violating sanctions. But a large portion of the justification for blacklisting them (in turn escalating an already troubling and costly trade war) is based on the idea that Huawei has been caught spying on Americans, something that hasn't been publicly proven. And in filings with the FCC (pdf), small carriers say they'll actively be harmed by a ban on this cheaper Huawei hardware, since the lower costs help them better compete with larger U.S. rivals.

In short, this subject is far more complicated than most press coverage suggests, and a little fuller context when it comes to discussing these moves doesn't seem like too much to ask. Especially given that the American press and government would be positively apoplectic were foreign countries to ban our own network gear as punishment for our own, well-documented sins. Patriotism oddly blinds us to our own hypocrisy on this subject, lending some wonderful cover to U.S. companies who've been pressing all the right buttons in DC in a protectionist bid to avoid having to compete with cheaper Chinese gear.

Filed Under: china, competition, donald trump, nsa, surveillance, telco equipment
Companies: cisco, huawei

Ex-NSA Personnel Spied On Americans And Journalists For The United Arab Emirates

from the all-the-'good-guys'-doing-all-the-bad-stuff dept

When former NSA employees and contractors decide to start working for a journalist-murdering authoritarian, they should feel sick. Instead, after targeting journalists, dissidents, and other people the United Arab Emirates government doesn't like, they felt exhilarated.

Working together with managers, Stroud helped create a policy for what to do when Raven swept up personal data belonging to Americans. The former NSA employees were instructed to mark that material for deletion. Other Raven operatives would also be notified so the American victims could be removed from future collection.

As time went on, Stroud noticed American data flagged for removal show up again and again in Raven’s NESA-controlled data stores.

Still, she found the work exhilarating. “It was incredible because there weren’t these limitations like there was at the NSA. There wasn’t that bullshit red tape,” she said. “I feel like we did a lot of good work on counterterrorism.”

That quote comes from a disturbing account of UAE "counterterrorism" work performed by a unit of Americans linked to the NSA published at Reuters. That "bullshit red tape" is, for the most part, known as the Constitution. The quote comes from Lori Stroud, who worked with a unit of hackers known as Project Raven, targeting whoever the UAE felt needed targeting. She is the only person from that unit willing to publicly-out her identity. Everyone else involved either spoke anonymously or refused to say anything at all. Here's the deafening silence that accompanied the Reuter's article:

An NSA spokesman declined to comment on Raven. An Apple spokeswoman declined to comment. A spokeswoman for UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to comment. The UAE’s Embassy in Washington and a spokesman for its National Media Council did not respond to requests for comment.

Lori Stroud's work with the NSA dates far enough back that it includes a stupendous irony: she recommended the NSA add Ed Snowden to her Booz Allen contracting team. A few months later, Snowden was gone, taking with him a pile of documents that Stroud's recommendation had helped him gain access to.

Hacking for the UAE meant hacking American targets and British journalists.

One of the program’s key targets in 2012 was Rori Donaghy, according to former Raven operatives and program documents. Donaghy, then 25, was a British journalist and activist who authored articles critical of the country’s human rights record. In 2012, he wrote an opinion piece for the Guardian criticizing the UAE government’s activist crackdown and warning that, if it continued, “those in power face an uncertain future.”

This is what counterterrorism looks like in UAE. This is what it can look like anywhere, once mission creep sets in and the government decides criticism is suspicious behavior. But this was done by US intelligence personnel who took better-paying offers to spy for a nation we somehow consider an ally, despite its stances on pretty much everything being antithetical to ours.

The quote opening this post was from the aftermath of an indiscriminate deployment of a virus that infected every visitor of a targeted Islamist forum. It swept up plenty of communications from Americans, but even with safeguards in place to remove inadvertent collections, it was clear UAE did not consider Americans' communications off-limits.

It should have. The UAE claims to be a partner in the War on Terror, citing its positive relationship with the United States as an intelligence partner. Even though Project Raven was run by the UAE using former US intel personnel, the NSA still was supposed to be notified before operation deployments or prior to presentations that might discuss classified techniques. What's published here shows either the NSA was cut out of the loop by UAE or that the NSA appears to have made no effort to keep tabs on operations run by its surveillance partner.

The UAE government took the project in-house, using a local tech contractor to create a company called DarkMatter that severed any ties the project might have with the US Intelligence Community. To their credit, at least eight former US intelligence analysts left when it became apparent targeting dissidents, journalists, and American citizens was going to be a large part of their work.

Lori Stroud eventually realized targeting Americans was a feature, not a bug.

When she questioned the apparent targeting of Americans, she received a rebuke from an Emirati colleague for accessing the targeting list, the emails show. The target requests she viewed were to be processed by “certain people. You are not one of them,” the Emirati officer wrote.

Days later, Stroud said she came upon three more American names on the hidden targeting queue.

Those names were in a category she hadn’t seen before: the “white category” — for Americans. This time, she said, the occupations were listed: journalist.

“I was sick to my stomach,” she said. “It kind of hit me at that macro level realizing there was a whole category for U.S. persons on this program.”

But sick or not, it was the UAE government that removed her from DarkMatter, terminating her employment when she kept objecting to the targeting of Americans. She was met by the FBI when she returned to the US. The entire operation is now under FBI investigation, but not necessarily for the illegal targeting of Americans. The FBI appears to be more concerned about possible leaks of classified surveillance techniques. It also wants to know if any US "systems" were targeted, suggesting it will be looking at attacks against US government entities and domestic corporations. It appears spying on journalists and Americans isn't worthy of an investigation.

Filed Under: journalists, lori stroud, mercenaries, nsa, project raven, surveillance, uae, united arab emirates
Companies: darkmatter

Gov't Used An Ambiguously-Worded Tweet As The Basis For The Raid Of NSA Contractor's House

from the and-that's-OK,-says-the-judge dept

The prosecution of former NSA contractor Hal Martin continues. Martin somehow managed to exfiltrate sensitive documents and code for nearly 20 years without the NSA noticing. It finally started paying attention after its hacking tools and exploits made their way into the hands of the public via the "Shadow Brokers." These tools then made their way into the computers of the public, wreaking worldwide havoc and giving the leaky agency -- whose literal middle name is "Security" -- another PR black eye.

Hal Martin was suspected of handing over tools to the Shadow Brokers but the charges against him are solely related to the mishandling of classified info, indicating the feds no longer believe Martin was involved. But this original suspicion was apparently enough to justify the FBI raid of Martin's residence, according to the federal judge handling his case. The probable cause appears to have been generated by a tweet from Martin's Twitter account, at least according to what can be gleaned from the redacted order [PDF] handed down by Judge Richard Bennett. Josh Gerstein of Politico has the details.

Passages in the decision from U.S. District Court Judge Richard Bennett were deleted from a version made public by the court, but the remaining details suggest that investigators believed Martin was offering sensitive information to someone online shortly before a nebulous internet-based entity, the Shadow Brokers, released NSA hacking tools in August 2016 through the attention-grabbing technique of an online auction.

“In these messages, @HAL_999999999 asked for a meeting with the [redacted] and stated ‘shelf life, three weeks,’” Bennett wrote, describing the government’s assertions in court filings still under seal. “The Defendant’s Twitter messages … were sent just hours before what was purported to be stolen government property was advertised and posted on multiple online- content-sharing sites, including Twitter.”

These details have been made public as the result of Martin's attempt to suppress the evidence gathered against him. The court notes the tweet could have had a more innocuous meaning, but given the circumstances and the timing, it was not unreasonable for the FBI to believe Martin may have been involved in the leaking of classified NSA exploits.

That's not the only rejection handed to Martin. The court also denies his request to have cell-site location info obtained without a warrant suppressed, noting that the government obtained this data before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Carpenter.

However, a key bit of evidence is no longer the government's to use: Martin's own statements. The court says the government illegally obtained these statements by not properly Mirandizing Martin prior to questioning him. There is no doubt Martin was in custody at the time he was questioned without a Miranda warning. The government denies Martin was ever taken into custody, but the court points out a person who doesn't feel they're free to go is being held against their will, which is all it takes to define "custody."

In this case, the facts demonstrate ~at a reasonable person in the Defendant's position would have perceived a police dominated atmosphere before and during the interrogation. The Defendant was initially approached by nine SWAT agents dressed in protective gear, some of whom had their guns drawn at the Defendant... Multiple other officers were also on the scene, including eight FBI agents and three State Trooper vehicles - a fact that "goes a long way towards making the suspect's home a police dominated atmosphere." The Defendant was immediately placed face down on the ground and handcuffed, "demonstrating that the officers sought out [the Defendant] and had physical dominion over him."

Although the Defendant's handcuffs were removed prior to the interrogation, "the experience of being singled out and handcuffed would color a reasonable person's perception of the situation and create a reasonable fear that the handcuffs could be reapplied at any time."

Further, after his initial detention, the Defendant was interrogated by three agents for approximately four hours.ll During the interrogation, the agents confronted the Defendant with incriminating evidence discovered on his property, which may certainly cause a reasonable person to feel compelled to cooperate with the police. Moreover, the Defendant's freedom of movement was significantly restricted during the interrogation. Indeed, he was only permitted to leave the interrogation space once -- i.e., when he went to his home office to help Hajeski access his computer equipment -- at which time he was accompanied by agents. In addition, the Defendant was isolated from his partner until the end of the interrogation -- a tactic that the Supreme Court has recognized as one of the distinguishing features of a custodial interrogation.

[...]

Taken together, these facts demonstrate that a reasonable person in the Defendant's position would have felt that he was not free to leave.

The government still records a win on most of the suppression motion. It's difficult to tell how solid the underlying warrant affidavit actually is since it -- along with several other filings -- are still under seal. It's also unclear how much ammo Martin's defense had when mounting this challenge. If the government was granted the opportunity to engage in ex parte presentations of evidence, Martin's team could be working blind.

His team may be working partially blind anyway. There's reason to believe the government is now a whole lot more cagier about its classified/sensitive evidence after accused CIA hacking tool leaker Josh Shulte was found to be leaking documents from prison -- documents he apparently obtained as part of the government's discovery obligations. It will likely be months before the public sees any part of the government's warrant affidavit. It may be years before anyone other than this court sees all of it. Still, an ambiguously-worded tweet seems like pretty thin probable cause, even if its timing seemed to align with the Shadow Brokers' actions at the time the warrant was sought.

Filed Under: classified, hal martin, nsa, shadow brokers

FBI Swept Up Info About Aaron Swartz While Pursuing An Al-Qaeda Investigation

from the stocking-the-back-room-for-a-rainy-day-of-searches dept

The FBI has the power to collect massive amounts of data and communications during its investigations. This power periodically ingests NATSEC steroids, pumping the FBI's data stores full of stuff not relevant to the NSA's work, but possibly relevant to the FBI's crime-fighting duties.

You would think the FBI would toss anything not relevant to an investigation. Just in terms of storage and haystack-sorting, it would only make sense to discard data/communications not needed for ongoing investigations. But you'd be wrong. The FBI holds on to everything it gets because you never know: the irrelevancies you hoovered up yesterday might be useful today.

That's pretty much what happened to Aaron Swartz, according to documents published by Dell Cameron of Gizmodo.

Nearly two years before the U.S. government’s first known inquiry into the activities of Reddit co-founder and famed digital activist Aaron Swartz, the FBI swept up his email data in a counterterrorism investigation that also ensnared students at an American university, according to a once-secret document first published by Gizmodo.

The email data belonging to Swartz, who was likely not the target of the counterterrorism investigation, was cataloged by the FBI and accessed more than a year later as it weighed potential charges against him for something wholly unrelated.

The data collected -- most likely obtained with an NSL -- came from Pittsburgh University. It was part of a data haul associated with the FBI's terrorism investigation. Swartz was never the target of this Al-Qaeda investigation but the information obtained remained in the FBI's data stores even though the FBI had no reason to hold onto non-hit data.

When the FBI did start looking in Swartz's activities, it found his email address in the stored data it had obtained from the university in 2007. This apparently happened in 2008, around the time the FBI was trying to determine if Swartz had violated any laws by freeing millions of court documents from PACER.

The FBI targeted a foreign terrorist entity but ended up with an untold amount of email metadata originating from US persons' accounts. The only reason we're seeing any evidence of the FBI's backdoor domestic searches come to light is Aaron Swartz's inadvertent involvement. If it hadn't been for a high-profile prosecution and Swartz's tragic suicide, public interest in the FBI's investigative activities surrounding Swartz would likely have minimal public interest. But Swartz's prosecution and death have put more eyes on the case, including those of transparency group Property of the People, which obtained this document through an FOIA lawsuit against the agency.

This document is more evidence the FBI abuses its investigative privileges. The agency engages in foreign-facing terrorism investigations, hoovering up as much "relevant" data as it can. Rather than discard everything not related to the investigation, the FBI stores it indefinitely. When the FBI opens a domestic investigation, it can give itself a head start by digging through its data stores for info it has "inadvertently" gathered on American citizens. The information the FBI already has on hand -- info it really can't justify keeping -- helps build cases against Americans while depriving them of their right to challenge the evidence against them. Americans don't know about this evidence because it's laundered by NSLs, warrants, and whatever else the FBI needs to deploy to duplicate the results of data store searches the agency has already performed.

Filed Under: aaron swartz, al qaeda, backdoor searches, fbi, foia, nsa, terrorism

EternalSuffering: NSA Exploits Still Being Successfully Used To Hijack Computers More Than A Year After Patching

from the can't-stop-won't-stop dept

Everything old and awful is new again. And still awful. Zack Whittaker reports for TechCrunch that the NSA's purloined kit of computer nasties is still causing problems more than a year after security patches were issued by affected vendors.

[A]kamai says that attackers are using more powerful exploits to burrow through the router and infect individual computers on the network. That gives the attackers a far greater scope of devices it can target, and makes the malicious network far stronger.

“While it is unfortunate to see UPnProxy being actively leveraged to attack systems previously shielded behind the NAT, it was bound to happen eventually,” said Akamai’s Chad Seaman, who wrote the report.

There are more technical details in Akamai's report, which notes the deployment of EternalRed and EternalBlue, which target Linux and Windows machines respectively. It appears to be a massive crime of opportunity, with attackers possibly scanning the entire internet for vulnerable ports/paths and injecting code to gain control of computers and devices. The "shotgun approach" isn't efficient but it is getting the job done. Akamai refers to this new packaging of NSA exploits as EternalSilence, after the phrase "galleta silenciosa" ("silent cookie/cracker") found in the injected rulesets.

The damage caused by this latest wave of repurposed surveillance code could still be rather severe, even with several rounds of patches immunizing a large number of devices against this attack.

Currently, the 45,113 routers with confirmed injections expose a total of 1.7 million unique machines to the attackers. We've reached this conclusion by logging the number of unique IPs exposed per router, and then added them up. It is difficult to tell if these attempts led to a successful exposure as we don't know if a machine was assigned that IP at the time of the injection. Additionally, there is no way to tell if EternalBlue or EternalRed was used to successfully compromise the exposed machine. However, if only a fraction of the potentially exposed systems were successfully compromised and fell into the hands of the attackers, the situation would quickly turn from bad to worse.

More of the same, then. Perhaps not at the scale seen in the past, but more attacks using the NSA's hoarded exploits. Hoarding exploits is a pretty solid plan, so long as they don't fall into the hands of… well, anyone else really. Failing to plan for this inevitability is just one of the many problems with the NSA's half-assed participation in the Vulnerability Equities Process.

Since the tools began taking their toll on the world's computer systems last year, there's been no sign the NSA is reconsidering its stance on hunting and hoarding exploits. The intelligence gains are potentially too large to be sacrificed for the security of millions of non-target computer users. It may claim these tools are essential to national security, but for which nation? The exploits wreaked havoc all over the world, but it would appear the stash of exploits primarily benefited one nation before they were inadvertently dumped into the public domain. Do the net gains in national security outweigh the losses sustained worldwide? I'd like to see the NSA run the numbers on that.

Filed Under: exploits, malware, nsa, online security, vulnerabilities

Order Now To Get Your Techdirt Gear Before Christmas!

from the give-a-gift dept

The holidays are approaching, and if you want to give the gift of Techdirt Gear to someone on your shopping list this year (or just treat yourself) then you've only got a couple weeks left to place your order with Teespring and ensure it ships in time!

The cutoff date to ensure delivery by Christmas with standard shipping is December 11th for US orders and December 4th for international orders! Rush shipping is also available in some locations for an extra fee, pushing the deadline to December 19th.

Be sure to check out our recent t-shirts, hoodies, mugs and stickers like the First Emojiment gear featuring an internet-ready translation of the first amendment:

And for those who are getting tired of a certain oft-repeated mantra about free speech that just happens to be completely incorrect and useless, check out our Free Speech Pro-Tip gear:

Also, earlier this year we took a treasure trove of old NSA propaganda posters that were obtained via a FOIA request from Government Attic and turned 24 of the best ones into t-shirts, hoodies and mugs. You can browse them all in our Teespring store or click on one of these thumbnails to head straight to the design of your choice:

Remember, US orders are due by December 11th for standard delivery by Christmas. Check out our store on Teespring for other great Techdirt gear!

Filed Under: first amendment, free speech, gear, nsa

NSA Will Try To Stop Turning Whistleblowers Into Leakers With Kinder, Gentler Official Channels

from the ALL-WHISTLES-MUST-BE-BLOWN-INSIDE-THE-HOUSE----The-management dept

The NSA is promising to be kinder to whistleblowers.

The U.S. National Security Agency’s top oversight official, Robert Storch, is working to repair the spy agency’s reputation with whistleblowers in an effort to encourage staff to report wrongdoing internally, rather than go public.

“It’s really important we encourage whistleblowers to come forward and that they feel comfortable doing so and if there are allegations of reprisal then we take that very seriously,” Storch said in an interview with Reuters last week.

This is important, at least to the NSA, because its most famous whistleblowers have eventually gone outside the system to deliver news of systemic surveillance program abuse to the masses. I don't think NSA officials necessarily want to handle internal complaints and scale back abusive collection programs. I think they just want to make sure no one outside of the NSA and its direct oversight hear about it.

That being said, the NSA definitely needs to work on its interpersonal relationships with disgruntled employees. People yelling about Snowden not going through the proper channels didn't have much to say about his proper channel being on the chopping block for retaliating against a whistleblower. And protections for contractors are still weaker than those offered to federal employees, which means the NSA can keep complainers quieter by continuing to rely on outsiders to handle the dirty work of analyzing incoming intel.

To be fair, this effort to protect whistleblowers seems a lot more earnest than past efforts. At least in this case, the NSA consulted with outside groups for input on anti-retaliation policies.

Storch said he has made progress by working with civil rights and privacy groups.

That effort included a February meeting with the non-profit Project on Government Oversight and other similar organizations.

Even so, whistleblower protections work better in theory than in practice. The NSA is the government's most secretive agency and has a long history of abusing its surveillance authorities. It's been resistant to internal change for much of its lifespan and change is something nearly every whistleblower is seeking. If it can keep whistleblowers from becoming leakers, it can better hide its misdeeds from the public. And that's something we need to be wary of anytime the NSA starts talking about protecting employees who aren't happy with its programs, policies, or practices.

Filed Under: leaks, nsa, official channels, proper channels, whistleblowers