DOJ Argues No One Has Standing To Challenge Metadata Collection Even As It Says Govt Can Legally Collect Everyone's

from the no-expectation-of-privacy-and-no-right-to-sue dept

Privacy activists EPIC have taken a novel approach to challenging the bulk records collections. Rather than work its way up through the circuit courts, it has appealed to the Supreme Court directly, asking it to find that the NSA has exceeded its authority by collecting data on American citizens.

Like the ACLU, EPIC is a Verizon customer. Both have used the first of Snowden's leaks to pursue lawsuits against the intelligence agency. But EPIC's is the first to attempt to initiate proceedings in the nation's highest court.

Arguing that no lower court would have the authority to rule upon the legality of that FISC order, EPIC took its plea directly to the Supreme Court. Its filing in July asked the Court to rule that the FIS Court has wrongly claimed authority for its global data-gathering under a 2001 federal law. That law gave the FIS tribunal the power to issue electronic surveillance orders to produce "tangible things" during an investigation of potential threats to national security.

EPIC asked the Supreme Court either to vacate the FIS Court order to Verizon or to bar its further enforcement, contending that the compelled "production of millions of domestic telephone records . . . cannot plausibly be relevant to an authorized investigation" of potential terrorist activities.

The government has filed a brief arguing that EPIC's complaint should be routed through lower courts first. The government's rebuttal leans heavily on procedural arguments, first pointing out that only the federal government itself or the entity receiving the FISC orders can challenge these orders. In addition, the government points out that the law creating the FISA Court does not provide protection to third parties like EPIC.

It also argues (as it has successfully in the past) that EPIC can't prove it has suffered harm from the collection of its phone data.

Further, the government contended, EPIC has not offered proof that it could satisfy the requirements of the Constitution's Article III as a party with a specific claim to an injury as a result of government action.

Notably, the government isn't arguing that EPIC can't prove its metadata was obtained. Snowden's first leak eliminated that issue. Instead, it's arguing that no citizen or entity other that the entity the records were obtained from has standing to sue or otherwise challenge FISA court orders.

But the government has gone even further, playing both sides of the issue in order to both continue to acquire the bulk records and prevent anyone from challenging the collection. The government wants to enjoy all of the benefits of the bulk collection without suffering from any of the drawbacks. So far, this has paid off. Its arguments are inconsistent (to put it mildly), and a recent court case involving a convicted terrorist may test the limits of its arguments.

Seven months after his conviction, Basaaly Moalin's defense attorney moved for a new trial (PDF), arguing that evidence collected about him under the government's recently disclosed dragnet telephone surveillance program violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Moalin's is the only thwarted "terrorist plot" against America that the government says also "critically" relied on the National Security Agency phone surveillance program, conducted under Section 215 of the Patriot Act.

The government's response (PDF), filed on September 30th, is a heavily redacted opposition arguing that when law enforcement can monitor one person's information without a warrant, it can monitor everyone's information, "regardless of the collection's expanse." Notably, the government is also arguing that no one other than the company that provided the information—including the defendant in this case—has the right to challenge this disclosure in court.

The court (well, the FISA court) has agreed with this as well, at least part of it. It has stated that rights do not suddenly appear because a collection that is deemed legal for one person (like phone metadata) is used to collect data on several people.

The government's opposition to a new trial relies heavily on a recently declassified opinion from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which concluded that "where one individual does not have a Fourth Amendment interest, grouping together a large number of similarly situated individuals cannot result in a Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo."

But that same argument should work against the government's claim that no single person or entity (other than the company handing over the data) has standing, especially in this case. Just as certainly as rights do not "spring into existence," standing doesn't suddenly disappear because the collection is untargeted. If the government can use the argument that a collection of millions of records is no more illegal than the collection of a single person's records, then it would seem reasonable that every person who "provides" these collectible records to third parties would have standing to challenge these disclosures.

What the government is doing in Moalin's case is highly hypocritical.

The government has always argued that there's no reasonable expectation to privacy in information handed to a third party like your phone or Internet provider, commonly referred to as the "third-party doctrine." But [EFF staff attorney Hanni] Fakhoury says that in this case, the government is taking an even more aggressive stance. In essence, its argument is that "these records aren't even Moalin's to begin with so he can't complain."

Fakhoury disagrees "with the idea that the user has no standing to challenge the use of evidence that says something about him" and thinks the government undermines its own argument about who has standing to contest the evidence. "[T]hey want to use the phone records to prove a fact about Moalin but then claim that these records aren't his."

The government needs this win very badly as it's using Moalin's case to prove the necessity of the 215 bulk records collections. But it wants to do so by arguing that someone who can assert they've suffered direct harm from this collection (Moalin is in jail, after all) doesn't have standing.

The government wants an unchallenged bulk collection and is throwing down every argument it can in order to head off possible challenges, either to the collection itself or to the evidence it provides. The end result is a very thorough abuse of the Third Party Doctrine that, so far, has allowed intelligence agencies to reap all the benefits and suffer none of the consequences. If the government wants to argue that collecting from everyone is no different than collecting one person's records, then it shouldn't be able to turn around and claim no one has standing to challenge the collected data -- either as evidence or the constitutionality of the collection.

Filed Under: doj, metadata, standing

Either The Solicitor General Lied To The Supreme Court, Or Senator Feinstein Lied To The Public About Warrantless Wiretapping

from the pick-one dept

While there's been plenty of attention over the last month or so concerning the revelations from Ed Snowden about NSA surveillance, there have been a series of important ongoing lawsuits that tried to challenge the various aspects of the surveillance efforts. Unfortunately, most of these have ended badly, leading some to wonder if there even is any way at all to legally challenge these programs. At the end of 2011, for example, in a case testing the legality of the telcos helping the government with warrantless surveillance, Hepting v. AT&T, one of the key reasons why the court rejected the challenge was because it basically said, "well, you can always sue the government, but the government has the right to absolve companies of such wrongdoing." Except that, as the Supreme Court ruled earlier this year, because the government keeps the program a complete secret, no one has standing to sue. That is, unless you can prove that you were spied on via this specific program, you can't sue because there's been no harm.

The Supreme Court Justices were clearly troubled by the idea that the government could implement a secret surveillance program that could never be challenged in court, and homed in on that key point in questioning the Solicitor General of the US (and former top RIAA litigator), Donald Verrilli. As the NY Times notes, Verrilli insisted that it simply was not true that no one would ever have standing, because if the government ever used information from such surveillance programs in a court case against someone, the government would have to reveal that the info came via that program.

“Is there anybody who has standing?” Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked.

Yes, said Mr. Verrilli, giving what he called a “clear example." If the government wants to use information gathered under the surveillance program in a criminal prosecution, he said, the source of the information would have to be disclosed. The subjects of such surveillance, he continued, would have standing to challenge the program.

Got that? Of course people would have standing, because the government has to tell them where the information came from. So those people could always challenge the program. When the eventual Supreme Court ruling came out, the majority decision relied very heavily on this particular claim:

...if the Government intends to use or disclose information obtained or derived from a §1881a acquisition in judicial or administrative proceedings, it must provide advance notice of its intent, and the affected person may challenge the lawfulness of the acquisition.... Thus, if the Government were to prosecute one of respondent-attorney’s foreign clients using §1881a-authorized surveillance, the Government would be required to make a disclosure.... In such a situation, unlike in the present case, it would at least be clear that the Government had acquired the foreign client’s communications using §1881a-authorized surveillance.

Ok. Now, here's the important part. In defending the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), which is what enabled these kinds of warrantless wiretaps, politicians have been pointing to all of those "examples" where this program was supposedly instrumental in "stopping terrorists." And this includes a few cases that involved federal prosecutions. Senator Dianne Feinstein, the staunchest defender of these programs, has called out two specific prosecutions as "specific cases where FISA Amendments Act authorities were used," saying that "these cases show the program has worked."

While it's arguable whether or not these cases actually showed whether or not the program worked, they do give us two cases where, according to the US Solicitor General and the Supreme Court, the feds were required to reveal to the defendants the source of the information. And take a wild guess whether or not the government actually informed the defendant how it obtained the info? You're psychic!

In a prosecution in Federal District Court in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., against two brothers accused of plotting to bomb targets in New York, the government has said it plans to use information gathered under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, or FISA, which authorized individual warrants. But prosecutors have refused to say whether the government obtained those individual warrants based on information derived from the 2008 law, which allows programmatic surveillance.

Prosecutors in Chicago have taken the same approach in a prosecution of teenager accused of plotting to blow up a bar.

In fact, the magistrate judge in the Florida case has told the government it needs to disclose whether or not the surveillance was based on the FAA, but the government, so far, is refusing to say anything, and is asking the court to reconsider.

As far as I can tell, there are a few possibilities here, none of them good:

1. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli lied to the Supreme Court about whether or not the federal government would need to reveal the source of surveillance info obtained under the FAA.
2. Senator Dianne Feinstein lied to Congress about the FAA supposedly being instrumental in those cases.
3. The US Attorneys are now withholding information they are, by law, required to reveal.

It's possible that the reality is a combination of all three. But I can't see how you can explain the present situation without at least one of the three statements above being true.

The ACLU has called this "a shell game" and it's that and more. No matter where you point for the legal authority to challenge these programs, the government insists you have to look elsewhere. Can't sue the companies, but can sue the government. Can't sue the government unless you can prove standing. Can't prove standing unless you're in a case which involves this surveillance, at which point we have to tell you. Of course, in cases where it's been revealed that this kind of surveillance is used, well, now the government insists it doesn't have to admit that. Basically, the feds are going to keep trying to avoid ever having to face an actual legal challenge on this, which suggests they know the reality: the program is illegal and unconstitutional. If they were sure that it was a legitimate, constitutional program, why not just stand up in court and say that?

Filed Under: dianne feinstein, donald verrilli, faa, fisa amendments act, standing, supreme court, warrantless wiretapping

Appeals Court Agrees That Righthaven's Copyright Assignment Was A Sham, But Tosses Key Fair Use Ruling

from the good-and-bad dept

This isn't a huge surprise, but in Righthaven's big appeal concerning the key issue over which it lost all of its cases -- whether or not it had standing -- has resulted in yet another huge loss for Righthaven. The court basically agreed with every single other court that has ruled on this matter, noting that when Stephens Media "assigned" the copyrights to Righthaven, it really did no such thing. Instead, it merely assigned the bare right to sue, which you can't do under copyright law. Considering how some of our critics insisted that Righthaven would win this point on appeal, I'm curious to see how they respond. The court basically agreed with all of the points that a bunch of district court judges had all pointed out: the Strategic Alliance Agreement (SAA) left all the power in the hands of Stephens, including ultimate control over every single one of the official rights associated with copyright law under section 106. Thus, it did not, in fact, assign the copyright, and Righthaven had no standing to sue.

The SAA provided that Stephens Media automatically received an exclusive license in any copyrighted work it assigned to Righthaven, so that Stephens Media retained “the unfettered and exclusive ability” to exploit the copyrights. Righthaven, on the other hand, had “no right or license” to exploit the work or participate in any royalties associated with the exploitation of the work. The contracts left Righthaven without any ability to reproduce the works, distribute them, or exploit any other exclusive right under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. Without any of those rights, Righthaven was left only with the bare right to sue, which is insufficient for standing under the Copyright Act and Silvers.

The appeals court walks through each one of Righthaven's attempts to get around this basic fact and shows how none are even remotely persuasive, because all ultimately show the same basic argument, which is that the copyright was assigned to Righthaven who then handed back an exclusive license to Stephens. The fact that Righthaven retained none of the key copyright rights shows that this was all a sham. Or, as the court notes, it "emphasizes form over substance." The court also rejects Righthaven's claim that the agreement was later fixed, by pointing out that what matters is the standing at the time of the lawsuit.

The ruling isn't all great, however. The court did overturn the part of the Hoehn ruling in which the court had said that his use of the Las Vegas Review-Journal article (even the entire article) was fair use. Basically, this is a bit of a procedural thing. Effectively, the court is saying that once the district court ruled that Righthaven had no standing, there are no other issues to rule on, so the fair use ruling is inappropriate. This was the part of the case that the RIAA, in particular, wanted thrown out, because it doesn't want any ruling on the books saying that using an entire work might be fair use. And, on this front, the RIAA got its wish. While the court doesn't say that the use was not fair use -- and in fact notes that "we understand why the district court reached the fair use issue" -- it also notes that, legally, the court really has no right to delve into that issue after it's decided that Righthaven has no standing.

because we agree that Righthaven did not have standing, it is not appropriate for us to go further or for the district court’s alternative ruling to stand. We therefore vacate the portion of the district court’s order that analyzed the merits of the fair use defense and granted the motion for summary judgment.

This is not a huge surprise, but it is unfortunate, because the original Hoehn ruling on fair use was a great example of how using an entire work can be fair use. There are other such cases, but losing one of those rulings is unfortunate.

Either way, this should confirm that Righthaven is officially dead and buried. I can't see them appealing to the Supreme Court, though stranger things have happened (just like Prenda took over the mantle of absolutely crazy copyright trolling from Righthaven a long time ago).

Filed Under: copyright, copyright trolling, dibiase, fair use, hoehn, marc randazza, standing, thomas dibiase, wayne hoehn
Companies: righthaven, stephens media

Supreme Court Effectively Says There's No Way To Challenge Warrantless Wiretapping

from the but-of-course dept

This probably won't come as a surprise to anyone, but the Supreme Court has completely shot down the ACLU (and some activists and journalists') attempt to invalidate the part of the FISA Amendments Act that "legalized" warrantless wiretapping. As we guessed at the time of the oral hearings, it seemed like it was going to be difficult to convince a majority of the court that the plaintiffs had any standing to complain, since they couldn't show that they had been directly impacted. And, indeed the court ruled 5 to 4 that there was no standing here. So, basically, there is simply no way to challenge the constitutionality of warrantless wiretaps.

Doesn't that seem like a serious constitutional problem? The government can pass laws that it can spy on people in private, and there's no way to then challenge that law. Oh, and if you happen to discover (by accident!) that you've been spied upon the government can just claim sovereign immunity, and that's it. Case closed.

The full ruling is pretty depressing. The court basically says any harm is "speculative," and thus there can't be any standing at all.

We decline to abandon our usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.

That's from the majority ruling, written by Justice Alito, and signed by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy. Dissenting were Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan. The majority also rejected the idea that merely having to take precautions not to be spied upon without warrants represents a real harm that gives standing:

If the law were otherwise, an enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure a lower standard for Article III standing simply by making an expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear.

Perhaps a legitimate concern, but it still seems somewhat ridiculous that there is no actual way to test the constitutionality of a law that clearly has 4th Amendment consequences.

The dissent pointed out that it's crazy to suggest that the fact that this will be used on the plaintiffs was "speculative," and clearly worried about the implications of such a ruling and what it means for the government's ability to pass these kinds of laws without real judicial review.

The upshot is that (1) similarity of content, (2) strong motives, (3) prior behavior, and (4) capacity all point to a very strong likelihood that the Government will intercept at least some of the plaintiffs’ communications, including some that the 2008 amendment, §1881a, but not the pre-2008 Act, authorizes the Government to intercept. At the same time, nothing suggests the presence of some special factor here that might support a contrary conclusion. The Government does not deny that it has both the motive and the capacity to listen to communications of the kind described by plaintiffs. Nor does it describe any system for avoiding the interception of an electronic communication that happens to include a party who is an American lawyer, journalist, or human rights worker. One can, of course, always imagine some special circumstance that negates a virtual likelihood, no matter how strong. But the same is true about most, if not all, ordinary inferences about future events. Perhaps, despite pouring rain, the streets will remain dry (due to the presence of a special chemical). But ordinarily a party that seeks to defeat a strong natural inference must bear the burden of showing that some such special circumstance exists. And no one has suggested any such special circumstance here.

Consequently, we need only assume that the Government is doing its job (to find out about, and combat, terrorism) in order to conclude that there is a high probability that the Government will intercept at least some electronic communication to which at least some of the plaintiffs are parties. The majority is wrong when it describes the harm threatened plaintiffs as “speculative.”

They go on to point to a series of other cases where standing was granted based on "probable" injury. It also notes a bunch of scenarios that seem ridiculous, but which are logically implied by this ruling. And, indeed, the standard the Supreme Court ruling makes here is a very high bar that is going to deny standing in many cases, and often allow the government to act with impunity in cases where oversight is needed. This is very unfortunate. And, of course, it's unlikely that Congress will do its job and step in to fix this.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, harm, standing, supreme court, warrantless wiretapping
Companies: aclu, amnesty international

Righthaven's Big Appeal Kicks Off With About As Much Success As Its District Court Cases

from the not-looking-good dept

These days, with the likes of Prenda Law and Charles Carreon, it feels like we've all forgotten last year's favorite legal punching bag: Righthaven. While its comical failures had resulted in at least one of its major appeals going away, the company somehow convinced another lawyer to represent it, and he actually showed up in the 9th Circuit appeals court yesterday to try to revive Righthaven's chances in two of its key cases: the DiBiase case and the Hoehn case.

Not surprisingly, Righthaven's new lawyer, Erik Syverson, is discovering he has an uphill battle ahead of him.

Syverson tried to argue that the deal with Stevens Media, the parent company of the Las Vegas Review-Journal, involved an actual copyright transfer. "Righthaven and Stevens Media were well aware of the Silvers case and attempted to comply," said Syverson early on in his argument.

"It looks like form over substance," said one of the judges on the three-judge panel. "It seems like an attempt that's too cute by half to get around Silvers."

Another judge noted that Stevens could take back any of the rights at any time, meaning any "transfer" of copyright wasn't very meaningful. Righthaven couldn't really have licensed the copyrights or published the articles it had the rights to, since Stevens Media could have reclaimed those rights at any time.

If you don't recall, the key issue was that Righthaven never really had any control over the copyright in the cases. They involved content from the Las Vegas Review-Journal, but the agreement between Righthaven and Stevens Media (the owner of the LVRJ) made it clear that the LVRJ had full say in things and could take back the copyright at any time. In effect, the only thing really transferred to Righthaven was the "bare right to sue" and you can't do that, because such a "right" is not a separate right of copyright. You can only transfer one of the actual listed copyright rights (e.g., the right to reproduce, distribute or perform) and with that comes the ability to sue. The Silvers case referred to above is Silvers v. Sony Pictures which makes that point clear.

That said, as Joe Mullin reports in the link above, the appeals court justices seemed somewhat less bought into the idea, raised in the Hoehn case, that the use of the LVRJ material was fair use. That's unfortunate. It was a good ruling that found that even when you repost a full article it can be fair use. The argument was mainly that when Wayne Hoehn posted it, it was not for the same purpose or in any way competitive with Righthaven (who merely wanted it to sue). But the court wasn't as receptive to that argument:

First of all, Hoehn's use wasn't "transformative," noted one judge on the panel. "How is the nature and character of the article changed at all, by posting it to a website?" he asked. "Have you ever seen a newspaper that didn't have space for letters to the editor, or a space for comments?"

Just the fact that he meant to inspire debate doesn't justify copying the full work, said another judge. "What if I copied Justice Sotomayor's book into a blog post and invited people to comment on it?" he asked.

Hopefully the panel reconsiders before issuing its ruling. The way Hoehn used it was not the same way that Righthaven or the LVRJ were using it -- and it's that aspect that was transformative. Still, it won't surprise me if that argument fails, but it will be unfortunate. Either way, if Righthaven actually "wins" on that point, it won't much matter for the company, considering its likely to lose on whether or not it even had standing to sue in the first place. However, for those of us concerned about fair use, and how widely it can be applied, this second issue may be a lot more important. Having a strong fair use ruling on the books concerning the reposting of full content (in a particular context) would be a good thing to have, though it sounds unlikely.

Filed Under: appeals, copyright, fair use, hoehn, right to sue, righthaven, standing, thomas dibiase
Companies: righthaven

Case Against UCLA For Streaming Licensed DVDs To Students Dismissed Yet Again

from the good-rulings dept

A few years ago we wrote about how UCLA professors were barred from continuing an existing program in which they had streamed properly licensed DVDs to students. The lawsuit came from the Association for Information Media and Equipment (AIME). We noted that one of the key aspects of "fair use" is supposed to be that it allows for educational use, and it seemed ridiculous that any such streaming wasn't fair use. After thinking it over, UCLA decided to stand up for itself and put the videos back online. AIME sat on this for eight or nine months and finally sued, arguing that its contract with the University meant that UCLA had given up its fair use rights, and that even if it was fair use, it was a breach of contract. A year ago, the judge dismissed the case, mostly focusing on the question of whether or not AIME even had standing to sue and whether or not, as a state university, UCLA could hide behind a sovereign immunity claim.

AIME filed a new (amended) complaint against UCLA... which basically restated everything it had lost over, and then added a few claims. The court apparently was not impressed. It just dismissed the case all over again with prejudice, meaning that AIME can't just refile. On top of that it actually dealt a bit more with the copyright questions. First, it was not at all impressed by AIME's decision to just replead the same exact thing a second time:

In its order dismissing the FAC, the Court dismissed with prejudice all claims against the Regents and claims seeking damages against individual defendants in their official capacity on the grounds that these individual defendants are immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity... Plaintiffs have verbatim re-pleaded those claimsfrom the FAC for purposes of appeal.... As these claims have already been dismissed with prejudice, the Court does not analyze them further.

Later the court goes through a relatively quick fair use analysis, focused mainly on the question of whether it would have been obvious to the average person that this use was not fair use. The court finds plenty of ambiguity in the fair use analysis, and thus notes that it is not obviously a case of infringement, so AIME's claim that this was clearly infringement doesn't hold up.

Then there are a few other interesting points, including a discussion of whether or not streaming is a form of "distribution." Remember that we were just discussing the whole distibution right under copyright law, even pointing out that if you read what copyright law actually says, it only refers to "material objects" in which a copyright-covered item is "fixed" -- not to transient digital files. This appears to be one case where the court actually noticed that fact, and points out that with a stream, the digital product was not actually distributed:

Under the Copyright Act, distributed items must be “material objects” in which a copy is “fixed.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Plaintiffs’ new allegations that “the Video Furnace system administrator retains an original copy of the AVP DVD while distributing copies to end users, which copies remain on the end user’s computer as long as the Video Furnace InStream player remains open” does not change this outcome. For a copy to be fixed, it must be “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The “copy” on the end users computer, as alleged, is not fixed.

They also have an interesting response to the anti-circumvention DMCA claim in the amended lawsuit. One of the main problems many people have with the anti-circumvention clause is that it appears to apply absent any actual infringing activity. That is, under the DMCA it appears that merely circumventing DRM, even if for legitimate, non-infringing uses, is considered against the law. But here, the court rules that since the copy is legal, there is no problem with circumventing the DRM. That's very interesting:

This Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to cure the defects with their DMCA claim. First, the allegations in the SAC do not support a claim that Defendants violated 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) by using the HVS Video Furnace software to “circumvent . . . a technological measure that effectively controls access to” the DVDs because UCLA had lawful access to the DVDs and Plaintiffs essentially allege improper usage of the DVDs.

Either way, the latest ruling is a complete victory for UCLA and yet another loss for AIME. While the question of fair use is still mostly brushed aside (unfortunately), the overall ruling is a good thing.

Filed Under: copyright, fair use, sovereign immunity, standing, streaming
Companies: aime, ucla

Book Scanning As Fair Use: Google Makes Its Case As Authors Guild Appeals Hathitrust Fair Use Ruling

from the make-the-case dept

Two new developments in the two big cases concerning book scanning and fair use: first up, we've got the somewhat unsurprising news that the Authors Guild is appealing its rather massive loss against Hathitrust, the organization that was set up to scan books from a bunch of university library collections. As you may recall, Judge Harold Baer's ruling discussed how the book scanning in that case was obviously fair use. It was a near complete smackdown for the Authors Guild.

The appeal will cover a few different issues beyond just fair use, such as why the Authors Guild itself is even the plaintiff in the case, since it doesn't actually hold any of the copyrights in question. It would seem that the Authors Guild has an uphill battle.

Meanwhile, in a closely related case, involving the Authors Guild suing Google over its book scanning efforts, Google has filed its appeal brief in response to an earlier ruling, which said that the Authors Guild can represent authors and has standing to sue. Google is arguing that its offering is also a clear case of fair use, as in the Hathitrust case. This is something we thought Google should have pressed strongly from early on.

Google Books is a revolutionary search technology for books—a modern and marked improvement over the traditional card catalog. Google has scanned and indexed more than 20 million books by agreement with major research libraries. The Google Books tool allows any user to enter a search query, obtain a list of books containing the user’s search terms, and view limited “snippets” of surrounding words showing how the terms are used. Google Books does not allow users to read a book online, or even a single page of a book, without express permission from the rightsholder. But its search capabilities help users find books to buy or borrow, connecting them with the books they need, and thus bringing to light a wealth of information previously hidden, undiscoverable, in books sitting on library shelves. Google Books thus offers enormous benefits to authors and readers and to the progress and diffusion of human knowledge.

It also argues that the Authors Guild cannot represent the class of authors in the case, since many authors are helped by Google Books and don't agree with the Authors Guild that it's somehow evil. As a result of that (and how copyright law works) Google also points out that the fair use determination may need to be on a book by book basis, rather than as a whole:

Despite the individual issues at the heart of Plaintiffs’ suit—and unrebutted evidence that a significant portion of the proposed class in fact approves, and benefits from, Google Books’ uses—the district court certified a plaintiff class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) consisting of “[a]ll persons residing in the United States who hold a United States copyright interest in one or more Books reproduced by Google as part of its Library Project.” SPA2. That decision was error, for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs cannot adequately represent, as required by Rule 23(a), the large number of class members who would be harmed if Plaintiffs prevail—that is, the many class members who benefit economically and in other ways from the Google Books project and do not want to see it curtailed.

Not surprisingly, the argument here is compelling. Even if you don't buy the fair use argument, it's difficult to see how the Authors Guild can realistically represent such a diverse group of authors while claiming to represent them all. No matter what happens, as these cases move forward, I'm sure we'll have plenty to discuss.

Filed Under: book scanning, copyright, fair use, standing
Companies: authors guild, google, hathitrust

Supreme Court Puzzles: How There Can Be Oversight Concerning Warrantless Wiretapping If No One Can Sue?

from the that-would-appear-to-be-a-problem dept

One of the more ridiculous things about the government's ongoing campaign of secret surveillance on Americans is how hard it's fought back against anyone who has sought to have the policy tested in the courts. If the feds were confident that what they were doing was legal, they wouldn't be so aggressive in blocking each and every attempt. When the ACLU and others filed suit over the warrantless wiretapping under the FISA Amendments Bill (the Clapper v. Amnesty International case) the lower court rulings were especially troubling, because it was ruled that there was no standing to sue, because there was no direct proof of such spying. So that leaves the public in quite a bind. They can't complain about the program unless they can prove they've been spied upon, but they can't do that unless they know more about the program, which is secret. Someone page Joseph Heller.

The part of the case now at the Supreme Court is only over whether or not there is significant standing for Amnesty International and the ACLU to move the case forward. The government insists, quite vehemently, that as long as no one knows it's spying on them, they can't sue. The SCOTUS blog has a nice recap, saying that the Justices were "sensitive" to the lawyers who want to sue, but as we've warned before, what Justices say at oral hearings is not always a good barometer for how they'll eventually rule. Still, we might as well go through the transcript for some key points. The report kicked off with Solicitor General (and former entertainment industry litigator) Donald Verrilli being quizzed on the fact that, under his interpretation, no one could ever bring a lawsuit until after they were charged with a crime and knew about the details. That's neither fair, nor reasonable. Verrilli tries to cook up some other scenarios, but they all appear quite unlikely.

And, thankfully, Justice Ginsburg calls him on this point:

General Verrilli, can you be specific on who that person would be? Because, as I understand it, it's unlikely that, for example, the lawyers in this case would be charged with any criminal offense. It's more probable that their clients would be; but, according to the government, their clients have no Fourth Amendment rights because they are people who are noncitizens who acted abroad.

So it's hard for me to envision. I see the theoretical possibility, but I don't see a real person who would be subject to a Federal charge who could raise an objection.

In other words: "don't we have a problem when any effective oversight is written out of the law?"

Later, Ginsburg also wonders if the government will just claim state secrets to get out of having to provide info anyway. In the end, the debate comes down to if a lawyer just thinking that the government is spying on his phone calls, such that he's already modifying his behavior, is a form of "harm," and whether or not we trust the special FISA court (set up to monitor this stuff) to do a good job in weeding out abuses. Concerning "thinking" that the government is spying on a call, Verrilli tried to claim that there's no real harm there because a lawyer has an ethical obligation to take greater precautions. Seriously:

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, is it really such speculation, General? I mean, just imagine that -- yourself in this lawyer's position, and the lawyer says, I'm representing a person associated with a terrorist organization, I'm representing KLM in the case of one of these lawyers, and I'm going to be talking to that person's family members and associates and trying to find out everything that I can.

Now, as a lawyer, would you take precautions, or would you pick up the phone and start writing e-mails to all those people?

GENERAL VERRILLI: If I took precautions, it would be because of a belief that I had to comply with an ethics rule, and the ethics rule would be the cause of me taking those precautions. It doesn't change the standard.

JUSTICE KAGAN: I don't even think it has to do with an ethics rule. If you're a good lawyer -forget the ethics rule and how the ethics rules apply. Are you really going to tell me that you, as a lawyer, would just pick up the phone in the face of this statute and talk to these terrorists' associates?

On the side of the lawyers seeking standing, their lawyer, Jameel Jaffer, tried to build on the hypothetical that the Justices raised, in which there's a "substantial risk" of having communications intercepted, leading them to change their behavior. Here Chief Justice Roberts kept pushing back that the standard is "certainly impending" rather than "substantial risk."

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You have two arguments; one is likelihood of future injury and the other is present obligations or cause. I want to focus on the former. Our standard is certainly impending, and you articulated it by saying, substantial risk. There is obviously a vast difference between those two.

MR. JAFFER: Well, I don't think, Your Honor, that the Court has settled on certainly impending. The cases that the -- the Government cites are cases like -- I think that the one that the Government cites, relies on most heavily is Summers. But in Summers, the distinction between likelihood and certainly impending was not one that the Court relied on in -- in that decision. The Court said that plaintiffs couldn't meet even the lower standard. So I think that the discussion of certainly impending -

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But both in Summers and Monsanto the Government tells us: We knew that the governmental act was occurring, and then once we knew that, the question was substantial risk.

MR. JAFFER: Justice Kennedy, the -- the -the cases that we rely on, Monsanto, Laidlaw, Meese v. Keene, these are cases in which the Court didn't look to the certainly impending standard at all. The question that the Court asked in those cases was: Is there a substantial risk? Is there a substantial risk that effectively compels the plaintiffs to act in the way they are -- they are acting?

Meanwhile, Justice Scalia seemed to think that the FISA Court could really be trusted to automatically ferret out 4th Amendment violations without, say, lawyers being spied upon being able to raise the issue themselves. Scalia, it would appear, is tremendously trusting in the powers of the FISA Court to actually stop excessive surveillance. While Jaffer points out that the current fight to renew the FISA Amendments Act suggests otherwise, since it removed the basic tests that the FISA Court had to look at the specifics (about the particular person or location being monitored) and gives the government much more leeway to spy broadly:

JUSTICE SCALIA: Does that assessment take into account the fact that a court is going to pass upon the Government's ability to intercept these communications?

MR. JAFFER: It does, Justice Scalia. I mean you -- you are right that there is a court that in some sense stands between plaintiffs and the future injury that they -- that they fear.

JUSTICE SCALIA: With the obligation to apply the Fourth Amendment.

MR. JAFFER: I don't think it's that simple. The -- the -- the court, the FISA court, is tasked with assessing the reasonableness of targeting and minimization procedures. But the statute itself forecloses the court from imposing the kinds of limits that plaintiffs think the Fourth Amendment requires. So for example, the statute itself in section (g)(4) says that the Government is not required to identify the facilities to be monitored. And the statute itself in defining targeting procedures defines them to be procedures intended to ensure that the targets are outside the United States.

JUSTICE SCALIA: But if as you say those procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, it doesn't matter what the statute says.

MR. JAFFER: Well, the Court would have to -

JUSTICE SCALIA: If those statutory provisions would produce a violation of the Fourth Amendment, they are null and void, right?

MR. JAFFER: Well, I think that's right.

The -- the court -

JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. So the FISA Court would presumably know that.

MR. JAFFER: Well, I think if that had happened over the last 4 years, the Government wouldn't be seeking reauthorization of the statute now.

Later, he pushes back again, noting that the FISA Court doesn't get enough details to make the determination:

JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't see how the rest of your challenge or your challenge to the remainder of this statute can be characterized as a facial challenge, because it necessarily assumes that the FISA court will mistakenly say that there has been no Fourth Amendment violation, doesn't it?

MR. JAFFER: I don't think that's so, Justice Scalia. Our concern is not -- not that -- that the FISA court will make mistakes, although it well might. The concern -- the main concern is that the reasonableness inquiry that the FISA court engages in is a narrowly cabined one. They court can't say this is unreasonable because you haven't identified the facilities. They can't say this is unreasonable because you haven't identified a specific target.

On the whole, it does seem like it may be difficult to convince a majority of the Justices that there is standing here. This is unfortunate, because clearly some of the Justices are worried about the implications of the federal government being able to pass a law for secret spying that no one can ever challenge since they'll never know about it. But, if they can't prove that the spying actually took place, then it's tough for them to be able to show the actual harm. Hopefully the Court recognizes that the uncertainty surrounding the likely monitoring of communications is legitimate harm... but it seems like a longshot.

Filed Under: fisa, fisa amendments act, standing, supreme court, surveillance
Companies: aclu, amnesty international

Twitter To Appeals Court: Just Because Some Tweets Are Public Doesn't Mean Our Users Have No Privacy

from the good-for-them dept

Earlier this year, we noted that Twitter was standing up for the rights of one of its users, Malcolm Harris, who had been charged with disorderly conduct during an Occupy Wall St. protest event. The government had sought info on Harris' Twitter account using a 2703(d) order. Twitter told Harris about the request, and Harris sought to quash the order. The courts said that Harris had no standing, because he had no interest in his own tweets, based on a complete misreading of Twitter's terms of service (which actually say the user retains ownership of the content).

Unfortunately, the NY court didn't buy it, and told Twitter to hand over the info. It ignored many of the bigger questions, and basically just says that since Harris tweeted publicly, there is no issue here. But that ignores a few things: (1) not all of the info sought was just what he tweeted and (2) not all of the tweets are available publicly.

Harris has appealed, and it's good to see that Twitter is also appealing, arguing that the court made some significant mistakes. The company basically reiterates its earlier argument that Harris has standing to quash the order, and also some reasonable privacy protection in some of the content sought.

Twitter respectfully submits that its users have standing on three separate and independent grounds to move to quash subpoenas directed to Twitter for their records. First, Twitter’s users have standing under New York law because Twitter’s Terms of Service have long established that users have a proprietary interest in their records. Twitter users own their Tweets and should have the right to fight invalid government requests. Second, Twitter’s users have standing under § 2704(b) of the federal SCA, which provides that a user who receives notice of a subpoena for their account records “may file a motion to quash such subpoena . . . in the appropriate . . . State court.” 18 U.S.C. § 2704(b). Finally, Twitter’s users have standing based on a long line of precedent establishing that individuals whose constitutional rights are implicated by a government subpoena to a third party can challenge the request. Accordingly, the Court should find that Twitter’s users have standing on any one, or all, of these bases.

Defendant’s Tweets are also protected by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and art. I, § 12 of the New York Constitution because the government admits that it cannot publicly access them, thus establishing that Defendant maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in these communications.

Seems pretty simple and straightforward, though the courts haven't bought this argument yet. Hopefully the appeals court is a bit more enlightened and/or informed.

Filed Under: malcolm harris, privacy, protests, standing
Companies: twitter

Twitter Forced To Hand Over Occupy Protestor's Info

from the privacy? dept

We recently wrote about Twitter standing up for a user, Malcolm Harris, who had participated in the Occupy Wall St. protests, and whose info was sought by the government under a 2703(d) order (which has fewer protections than an ordinary warrant). Twitter told Harris about the order, and Harris sought to have it blocked -- but the court claimed he had no standing to do so, as it was just an issue between the government and Twitter. Twitter pushed back, noting that individuals control the content of their own account, so Harris should have standing. Unfortunately, a NYC judge has told Twitter to give up Harris' info, though it did say that the government would need to get a warrant for the last day's worth of info, due to a technicality on timing. The court basically punts on the larger issues, focusing on the fact that most of the information requested, Harris' tweets, are already public, and thus there's little to be concerned about. Of course, if that's the case, it's unclear why the government needs to request info from Twitter in the first place...

Filed Under: malcolm harris, occupy protests, privacy, standing, warrants
Companies: twitter