stories filed under: "drm"
Newfangled DRM Even Better At Punishing Paying Customers
from the that-sounds-backwards dept
Slashdot points us to an interesting story that highlights the ongoing farce that is Hollywood's anti-piracy efforts. A guy named Davis Freeberg says he purchased a shiny new high-definition monitor, and discovered that one of the consequences of his upgrade was that he could no longer play movies downloaded (legally) from Netflix. After some further research (research that a lot of consumers would have neither the patience nor the knowledge to perform) and several tech-support phone calls, he concluded that the procedure for re-enabling Netflix would likely cause him to lose the ability to watch videos downloaded from other services such as Amazon Unbox. The really absurd thing about this is that all of these "security" features don't in any way prevent him from going to a peer-to-peer site and downloading illegal copies of the movies he wants to watch. It's only when he foolishly tries to obey the law and pay Hollywood for the movies he watches that he's cast into tech support hell.This kind of problem is a predictable consequence of Hollywood's constantly-escalating demands for copy protection. Normal engineering principles dictate that devices should be designed for reliability, and should attempt to recover if it detects a problem. But DRM turns this principle on its head: if something appears to be amiss, it assumes someone must be trying to circumvent it and shuts down. So as DRM becomes more and more intrusive (and the copy protection systems in Vista are downright pervasive) it becomes more and more likely that something will go wrong. As a result, you end up with the absurd situation in which paying customers are punished with a never-ending stream of mysterious tech-support problems.
Antitrust Lawsuit Wants To Force Apple To Add WMA Support To iPods
from the right-diagnosis-wrong-solution dept
We've noted a few times that people have gotten way too trigger-happy about invoking antitrust law any time a company does something they don't like. Antitrust law is supposed to prevent the abuse of actual monopolies like Ma Bell. It's not supposed to be an all-purpose weapon to be used against any company whose market share exceeds 50 percent. A lawsuit filed on New Year's Eve claims that Apple has violated antitrust law by declining to license the WMA DRM format from Microsoft for the iPod. There are several obvious problems with this. In the first place, while Apple has undeniably dominated the market for portable music players, there's no shortage of competition. Big companies like Microsoft, Sony, and Samsung make competing MP3 players. Consumers who don't like the formats supported by the iPod have no shortage of alternatives. Second, it's really not a good idea for the courts to be getting embroiled in technical debates over what formats devices should support. The issues involved are complicated, and the market evolves quickly. By the time the courts get around to making a final decision, the issue is likely to be ancient history. Third, it's hard to fault Apple for failing to support WMA-based DRM when even Microsoft itself broke compatibility with its old DRM scheme when it introduced the Zune. Surely if Microsoft can't be bothered to support its own audio format, it's hard to justify forcing Apple to do so.It's also worth noting that none of this would be an issue if the DMCA didn't give digital rights management technology the force of law. This sort of thing isn't a problem with non-DRMed music formats because there are plenty of tools out there for converting from one music format to another. Without the DMCA, there would be similar tools for converting copy-protected music to the appropriate format. But under the DMCA, such a tool would be an illegal "circumvention device." Repealing the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions is a much better solution because it would give consumers the freedom to play their music on the device of their choice without getting the courts involved in the messy business of deciding which MP3 players have to support which audio codecs.
Filed Under: anti-circumvention, antitrust, dmca, drm, itunes
Companies: apple, microsoft
MPAA Finally Realizes That Proprietary DRM'd Screener DVDs Are A Waste
from the it-took-this-long? dept
Way back in 2003, then head of the MPAA, Jack Valenti, got so worried about "piracy" of movies coming from insiders that he banned the use of "screener" DVDs for those voting for the Academy Awards. If you're unaware, traditionally, Motion Picture Academy members received "screener" copies of the movies up for awards on DVD or VHS tape so they could watch them at home and decide how to vote. Yet, in Valenti's twisted world, this had to be stopped because screener copies were appearing online. Of course, banning screeners created quite a mess for the folks who actually had to vote on the awards, as there was no longer an easy way to actually see the movies. It also really upset smaller studios, who knew that their movies were less likely to be seen by Academy members if they couldn't send out screeners. Eventually, the MPAA relented, but the following year came up with a new ridiculous solution. Rather than sending DVD screeners that members could watch with their existing home theater setup, it hired a company to make special DRM'd DVDs that would only play on special DVD players. Then it sent these special DVD players with the screeners to the Academy members. Of course, this was both a huge expense and still a tremendous pain in the ass for voters, who had to hook up this special DVD player that could only be used for screeners. It also made it difficult if the Academy member wanted to take the DVD somewhere else (say on vacation) and watch it elsewhere without dragging along this "special" DVD player. Apparently it only took 3 years of complaints before the MPAA realized that perhaps this was a dumb idea (that also didn't stop the movies from getting online anyway). This year, it's apparently phasing out the special DVD players and will provide (gasp!) normal DVDs for voting members.Filed Under: drm, dvds, oscars, screeners
Companies: cinea, mpaa
Memo To Macrovision: Interoperable DRM Is An Oxymoron
from the snake-oil dept
Macrovision "chief evangelist" Richard Bullwinkle has an article at News.com that's a bit of a head-scratcher. He sings the praises of Apple's iPod ecosystem, but then complains that Apple's DRM prevents content from being played on non-Apple devices. Consumer electronics manufacturers and content creators, he says, need to "work together to create standards" for digital media. That's music to my ears. Except that I suspect that Bullwinkle isn't actually talking about open standards. Macrovision, after all, is a DRM vendor. If companies wanted to distribute their music or movies in open formats like MPEG, they wouldn't need Macrovision's help to do it -- they could just ditch DRM altogether (which, clearly, Macrovision doesn't want). What Macrovision appears to be pushing for Apple and other vendors to switch to its own "open" DRM format. But in fact, there's no such thing. DRM is a walled garden by definition. Some walled gardens are easier to get into than others. The DVD format, for example, has been licensed to a bunch of different vendors. But that doesn't change the fact that there's still a DVD cartel that shuts down innovative devices they don't like. An even more egregious example is Microsoft's "interoperable" PlaysForSure format. Microsoft touted it as an "open" alternative to FairPlay until last year, when—surprise!—they decided not to allow people to play PlaysForSure media files on the Zune. Ultimately, Macrovision isn't interested in getting rid of walled gardens. It's just upset when it's not the gardener.Filed Under: drm, interoperability
Companies: apple, macrovision
Why Would Any Company Trust Microsoft Over DRM Ever Again?
from the fool-me-once dept
It really was just last week, right, that Microsoft was last seen totally screwing over all those partners who had signed up to use its misnamed "PlaysForSure" DRM? Apparently, bygones are bygones and other companies have no problem stepping right up into Microsoft's embrace on a new DRM solution -- this time in the mobile space. Nokia is apparently agreeing to use Microsoft's mobile DRM offering dubbed "PlayReady" on a variety of Nokia devices. You would have thought that after the PlaysForSure debacle, Microsoft would avoid dubbing its DRM anything similar. Give it a few years and perhaps Microsoft will support some totally different DRM on its own phones (like it did with the Zune) and then we can ask again what Nokia was thinking.Filed Under: drm, mobile, playready
Companies: microsoft, nokia
Was Kindle's DRM Hacked?
from the reverse-hacking dept
Engadget is reporting that someone has "hacked" the Kindle. But that's a little misleading: it doesn't mean someone has figured out how to crack the copy-protection on Kindle-formatted e-books. Rather, someone has figured out how to convert protected books in MobiPocket format (which Amazon owns) to the closely-related Kindle format. That means that if you've purchased protected Mobipocket books, you now have the option to play them on your Kindle. That's good news, but it's not exactly a major crack in the Kindle's DRM scheme. It's more reminiscent of Real's Harmony software, which allowed Real's DRMed music to be played on iPods. Still, it's only a matter of time before someone figures out how to crack Kindle's DRM wide open. My guess is that so far no one has bothered because there aren't enough Kindles around for anyone to care.PlaysForWhatNow? Microsoft 'ReBrands' Misnamed DRM
from the confused-for-sure dept
Sometimes you wonder if Microsoft is just messing around with people for the hell of it. Remember Microsoft's fairly useless DRM offering called PlaysForSure? The one that was (like pretty much all DRM systems) easily hacked? The one that was used to convince a bunch of partners to sign up as Microsoft partners? The one that Microsoft itself then ditched itself when launching the Zune, abandoning all of the partners who could only laugh at the irony of Microsoft devices not playing content using Microsoft's own "PlaysForSure" system? Well, Microsoft has decided that perhaps it was time to change the name of PlaysForSure. Given how inaccurate the name is, perhaps that makes sense -- though, not nearly as much sense as just letting the damn thing die. However, even in changing the name it appears Microsoft has bungled the situation. The new name is "Certified for Windows Vista" which (oops) just so happens to be the same classification used for the Zune and its content... yet, as just noted, PlaysForSure content doesn't work on the Zune. Confusing enough for you? To recap: we've got DRM from Microsoft called PlaysForSure that surely doesn't play on Microsoft's own Zune player -- so Microsoft changes the name to "Certified for Windows Vista" using the same logo as found on the Zune, even though the content still won't play on the Zune. And the company thinks this isn't going to confuse and upset even more people?Filed Under: confusion, drm, playsforsure, zune
Companies: microsoft
Why Would A DRM Company Buy TV Guide?
from the because-it's-thinking-in-the-wrong-direction dept
Macrovision, a company that's well known for its DRM products, made quite a splash today with its announced plans to buy Gemstar-TV Guide for $2.8 billion. The rationale for the deal seems to be that the folks at Macrovision may actually believe the commonly stated myth that DRM "opens new business models." Macrovision talks about how combining its DRM with Gemstar listings and content could enable a bunch of new offerings -- but it's difficult to believe those new offerings will be particularly compelling. DRM has never been about enabling new business models, but about making any content less valuable by limiting its usefulness in the hopes of being able to charge separately for each use. Perhaps that's what they mean by "new business models" but it's hardly a business model if it's simply pissing off consumers. As Saul Hansell at the NY Times notes, the direction Macrovision seems to be moving in is (along with the recent story of hard drives that block MP3 sharing) one where technology companies feel that they need to be policing how people use content. That's a very anti-consumer position to be in -- and it's generally not a good business proposition to be focused on limiting consumers. Apparently, investors agree -- as they've sent the stock price of both companies way down in reaction to the deal.Filed Under: content, drm, tv guide
Companies: gemstar, macrovision, tv guide
Noncompete Agreements Are The DRM Of Human Capital
from the bad-news-all-around dept
Over the weekend, venture capitalist Bijan Sabet kicked off an interesting discussion by saying that he doesn't believe in noncompete agreements and suggesting, anecdotally, why he thinks that they do more harm than good. Venture capitalist Fred Wilson responded by disagreeing and suggesting that noncompetes do more good than harm. This is a topic that I've become deeply familiar with recently, for some research I've been working on. My interest in the specifics of noncompetes was kicked off by a small part of David Levine and Michele Boldrin's book Against Intellectual Monopoly, where they discuss how the lack of noncompetes helped Silicon Valley grow. This lead me to a lot of research on the topic, some of which I thought it would be worth bringing up, as the discussion has become so heated -- with almost all of it focused on anecdotal points, rather than actual research. Some of this research was for a separate project I am working on, but with so much interest in the topic, I thought it would be worth a detailed post.Much of this discussion kicked off with AnnaLee Saxenian's 1994 book Regional Advantage that tries to understand why Silicon Valley developed into the high tech hub it is today, while Boston's Route 128 failed to follow the same path -- even though both were considered at about the same level in the 1970s. Saxenian finds that the single biggest difference in the two regions was the ability of employees to move from firm to firm in Silicon Valley. That factor, ahead of many others, caused Silicon Valley to take off, while the lack of mobility in Boston caused its tech companies to stagnate and make them unable to compete against more nimble Silicon Valley firms. Saxenian claims that the difference in mobility was simply due to "cultural" differences between the east coast and the west coast. However, the impact was massive. The frequent job changes helped speed up the process of innovation, as ideas flowed more freely, allowing ideas to quickly change and grow and build upon other ideas leading to faster and better innovation. In contrast, employees in Boston stuck with their firms. The firms grew bigger, but slowly, and new ideas didn't flow nearly as easily. There was less direct competition from firm to firm, so firms were able to rest on their laurels rather than increasing their own pace of innovation.
Ronald Gilson found this to be interesting, and followed it up with his own research suggesting that that it had much less to do with cultural reasons and much more to do with the legal differences between the two places, specifically: California does not enforce noncompetes, while Massachusetts does. Gilson looks at a few of the other possible explanations for the difference and shows how they're all lacking, leaving the difference in noncompetes as being the key difference between the two regions in terms of the flow of information and ideas leading to new innovations. He also explains the history of non-enforcement in California, showing that it was mostly an accident of history more than anything done on purpose.
The problem with all of this research was that none of it really showed how much more mobile employees were in California than elsewhere, so that job fell to some researchers from the Federal Reserve and the National Bureau of Economic Research, who produced some data to back up the findings of Saxenian and Gilson in their report Job Hopping in Silicon Valley. Their data showed that, indeed, there was much greater mobility in Silicon Valley than elsewhere. Their research further backed up Gilson's suggestion that it was noncompetes that made the difference by showing that other high tech communities in California outside of Silicon Valley also showed greater job mobility -- suggesting it was a California-wide phenomenon.
Finally, to make the case even more compelling, some researchers from Harvard Business School put out some research earlier this year that not only compared the situation in Silicon Valley to Boston, but added a third natural experiment in Michigan. You see, Michigan used to not enforce noncompetes, but in 1985, Michigan inadvertently began allowing noncompetes to be enforced again. The research showed that immediately following the change, mobility of inventors in Michigan decreased noticeably, slowing the spread of certain ideas. Their research found that "The networks of small companies so crucial to Silicon Valley's growth would be less likely to develop in regions that enforce noncompetes."
Noncompetes Are The DRM Of Human Capital
In order to understand how this makes sense, just think of noncompetes as the "DRM" of human capital. Just as DRM tries to restrict the spread of content, a noncompete seeks to restrict the spread of a human's ideas for a particular industry within the labor arena. Both concepts are based on the faulty assumption that doing so "protects" the original creator or company -- but in both cases this is incorrect. What it actually does is set up an artificial barrier, limiting the overall potential of a market. It may not be easy to see that from the position of the content creator or company management (or investors). It's natural to want to "protect," but it's actually quite damaging.
We're already seeing this in the recording industry, of course. The desire to protect has actually limited the market size of other avenues for the music industry to make money. It's held back the ability to use music as a promotional good to build up the overall market for other tangible goods. In the same way, noncompetes limit the market size of the industry where those noncompetes are enforced. It holds back the ability of firms to innovate. Innovation is an ongoing process -- and the fuel of that process is the continual spread of ideas that allows multiple parties to build on those ideas, try different approaches and seek better solutions. While it may seem scary to a firm that supposedly "risks" losing some of its top employees to direct competitors, that's not necessarily the best way to look at this. What it does is force companies to keep on innovating and keep trying to come up with newer, better solutions to top those competitors. At the same time, that free flow of ideas means that the companies in the space have more fuel with which to attack the problem, rather than quarantining those ideas off in separate bins that can't be connected.
While it may seem easier to "protect" your ideas and your people, what you really end up doing is blocking off your own access to many of the ideas that you need to continue to innovate. You limit the vital mix of ideas to build not just decent products, but great products. Just as DRM has helped to destroy the record labels when competing against more nimble, more open technology -- noncompetes destroy businesses when competing against more nimble, more open technology clusters.
Filed Under: boston, detroit, drm, noncompetes, silicon valley
