New York Times Publishes Name Of CIA's Drone Strike 'Architect' While Other Media Outlets Pretend This Is Still Some Sort Of Secret

from the 'unnamed'-means-'unaccountable' dept

The New York Times' recent coverage of the fallout from a targeted drone strike that took out two hostages -- one American, along with the suspected terrorist -- contained a detail missing from many other new outlets' coverage of the same incident: Michael D'Andrea.

D'Andrea is the "architect" behind the CIA's targeted strike program. D'Andrea's name had never been previously published by a major news source (although it had been outed elsewhere). The Washington Post -- in its pre-Snowden leak days -- featured a long profile of the chain-smoking Islam convert that included several personally-identifiable details about D'Andrea… but not his name.

Unfortunately, the Post's experience with Snowden didn't affect its stance on the publication of this official's name. Perhaps still too reliant on government assertions that naming D'Andrea would increase the risk of him being targeted by terrorists, the Post left his name out of a more recent article on his reassignment as part of a CIA reorganization.

The Post and the New York Times have both published leaked documents and both have become less willing to oblige obfuscatory requests by government officials over this time period. New York Time's executive editor Dean Baquet explained his paper's decision to publish D'Andrea's name this way:

Baquet said the Times would not reveal names in a gratuitous way, but Sunday's drone story demanded it.

“The whole story was about accountability,” he said. “In a story about accountability, how could you not mention the guys who run the program?”

Accountability is key. As long as journalistic operations continue to allow the government to decide whose names are printed, accountability will remain nothing more than an ideal towards which the government would prefer not to stride. The Post's decision to defer to government officials in its March story about D'Andrea is "explained" by a couple of sentences that could have been copied directly from an (unnamed) official's email.

Because he remains undercover, The Washington Post has agreed to withhold his full name. He has been publicly identified in the past by both his actual first name, Mike, as well as that of his CIA-created identity, Roger.

But leaders of the CIA's counterterrorism programs aren't "undercover" by default. As Gawker points out, previous occupants of D'Andrea's position weren't exactly concerned about exposure "risks."

D'Andrea's predecessor at the counterterrorism center was also treated as an undercover operative, but the position has historically been occupied by real, named senior government officials. The center's founding director was Duane "Dewey" Clarridge, a man who is not afraid of talking to reporters. Cofer Black, who ran the center during and after 9/11, was repeatedly named as such in the Post and trades on the experience to market himself as a paid speaker. Robert Grenier, who has also been named by the Post, highlighted the gig on the cover of his book.

D'Andrea wasn't (and isn't) an operative working in CIA field operations. He's an official (or was until recently) with the power to order drone strikes on foreign soil without even needing to verify the identities of those he's sentencing to death. That's too much power to hand over to someone who can't be held accountable -- not even in the most minimal fashion -- by the American public. These strikes have resulted in the death of several civilians, at least in part because D'Andrea sought -- and obtained -- permission to bypass the supposed "rules" of targeted drone strikes. When something goes wrong -- and it will -- there needs to be someone at the top of the line, known to the public, who should answer for it.

Even though the name is public knowledge (and has actually been so for a few years now), other members of the press are still acting as though it's possible to keep his identity a secret by simply refusing to do what the New York Times did.

When Times reporter Matt Apuzzo, who co-wrote the CIA drone story, appeared on MSNBC’s “Morning Joe,” co-host Mika Brzezinski signaled at the start that the segment wouldn’t veer into the agents’ identities.

“There’s a couple of different angles on this story,” Brzezinski said. "We’re going to not name names here.”

By doing this, these outlets are no better than the government they're protecting. Our intelligence agencies and various law enforcement counterparts still believe there's a way to retroactively apply secrecy to information already in the public domain. MSNBC's refusal to name names is no different than the DOJ claiming that documents it wants to keep secret are still secret simply because the order to hand them over to the public didn't originate from the DOJ itself.

Far too many articles on highly-controversial subjects contain quotes attributed only to "unnamed officials." The New York Times does this just as often as any other outlet, but at least it has shown it won't continue to obfuscate this detail about the CIA's drone strike program. Of course, the "damage" to D'Andrea is somewhat mitigated by his recent reassignment to elsewhere within the CIA, but it does at least allow the public to put a name to the faceless killings.

Filed Under: cia, classified, drones, journalism, michael d'andrea, secrecy
Companies: ny times

Crowdfunding Weaponized Drones In Ukraine

from the not-a-toy dept

Although it rarely makes it into the Western media these days, the bloody conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues to smoulder along a vague and shifting front. The lack of direct support from the West means that the Ukrainians have had to come up with other approaches to counter Russia's massive superiority in both technology and resources. According to a fascinating article in the Guardian, one way they are doing this is by using lost-cost drones, paid for by crowdfunding. One of Ukraine’s top IT outsourcing companies, Eleks, has been helping with the technical side:

Eleks, which is a private company based in both Ukraine and Nevada, pays healthy salaries. It allows staff to work on software and drone hardware projects that receive no government support or funding during work hours. They are doing this because, as their project manager, Ivan Dmytrasevych, told us, "We know we have to invest in the defence of our country. If our research works, and we can show the people that it works, then we will turn to crowdfunding to realise it."

Eleks is working on a number of drone projects. One is to help Ukrainian drones return to base automatically if signals are jammed by the Russians:

Ivan says that the Russian forces have highly advanced systems to jam and intercept Ukrainian drones, which can easily send them off course and into enemy hands. "They have $7m systems to jam drones that cost thousands of dollars,” he explains. "We just can’t match their resources." However, if they can slow down these types of losses, they can build up a useful force.

Another is to use drones to map Russian forces on the ground to provide coordinates for shelling:

"Just imagine that you take a map of some territory from Google Maps, and then your drone flies over the territory to take a picture. Artillery teams need exact coordinates from enemy positions shown on those images. Our software will help them get it instantly."

That's an indication that these crowdfunded drones are not just digital toys for the combatants, but designed to cause serious casualties in the real world. Indeed, they already have -- on the Ukrainian side, during attempts to construct drones that could drop bombs on the Russians. According to the Guardian report, some of the engineers were killed as they worked on this project:

Firstly, these were essentially homemade and potentially faulty bombs. Secondly, the fact that they were launching drones multiple times from the same position quickly exposed their location. From what I'd been told, a mortar or sniper attack was guaranteed at this point.

Those risks are unlikely to dissuade engineers from using these up-to-the-minute means to counter the huge disparity between the opposing forces, since the Ukrainians don't really have many other options.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

Filed Under: crowdfunding, drones, russia, ukraine

The CIA Will Keep Killing Civilians With Drone Strikes Because The 'Rules' For Drone Strikes Aren't Actually Rules

from the more-like-a-list-of-'it-would-be-nice-if...'-requests dept

Extrajudicial killing by pilotless air strikes is just something our government does now. Weaponized drones are sent out to eliminate enemies of the United States, supposedly under the guidance of the Dept. of Justice and some presidential policy directives. But the rules aren't rules. They appear to be set in stone when the legal authority behind these drone strikes is questioned. But they're much more fluid when they "need" to be... like, say, after a drone strike takes out more than its intended target. [h/t Chris Soghoian]

Last week, the U.S. officials disclosed that two Western hostages, U.S. and Italian aid workers Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto, were killed on Jan. 15 by a U.S. drone strike aimed at al Qaeda militants in Pakistan…

Last week, Mr. Obama apologized for the killings and took personal responsibility for the mistake. He called the operation “fully consistent with the guidelines under which we conduct counterterrorism efforts in the region...”

But what guidelines? Certainly not those that supposedly govern these strikes. According to those guidelines, the target must be determined to be an "imminent threat" before the strike can be authorized. EXCEPT:

President Barack Obama tightened rules for the U.S. drone program in 2013, but he secretly approved a waiver giving the Central Intelligence Agency more flexibility in Pakistan than anywhere else to strike suspected militants, according to current and former U.S. officials.

These rules were in place to prevent exactly what occurred in this drone strike: civilian casualties. In Pakistan, this condition does not apply. So, rather than have the CIA hold off until it had gathered more intelligence, the strike was carried out at the agency's discretion.

Obama apparently issued a Presidential Policy Directive on drone strikes in 2013. Whatever it changed in the existing policies has yet to be implemented. It certainly didn't revoke the CIA's Pakistan pass. Rules don't apply in that country's borders. And there's no way of telling if the similar waiver exempting Iraq and Syria has been withdrawn.

The DOJ's drone strike memo says targets must present a "continued" and "imminent" threat. This wording alone ensures only minimal investigative standards need to be met before authorizing a drone strike in any country the US currently has a military presence. (Or adjacent to that country…) Because troops may be targeted by terrorist groups, any suspected terrorists in the area can be considered "imminent threats" simply because of their proximity -- not their actions.

This language -- along with multiple administrative waivers -- has turned drone strikes into something performed almost exclusively at the CIA's discretion. Sure, there's some oversight of the program, but like a majority of US intelligence oversight, it's mainly words rather than deeds.

Here's what drone killing oversight looks like:

About once a month, staff members of the congressional intelligence committees drive across the Potomac River to C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., and watch videos of people being blown up.

As part of the macabre ritual the staff members look at the footage of drone strikes in Pakistan and other countries and a sampling of the intelligence buttressing each strike, but not the internal C.I.A. cables discussing the attacks and their aftermath.

So, the CIA holds a monthly snuff filmfest for intelligence oversight committees. Figuring moving pictures are worth thousands of words, it then withholds the thousands of words justifying its decision to carry out a strike. Despite this process being clearly aimed at minimizing objections and questions, intelligence committee heads still offer their support of the program and the agency running it, even when they clearly don't trust the CIA on other issues.

When Ms. Feinstein was asked in a meeting with reporters in 2013 why she was so sure she was getting the truth about the drone program while she accused the C.I.A. of lying to her about torture, she seemed surprised.

“That’s a good question, actually,” she said.

Cognitive dissonance has long been a feature of intelligence committee leadership. Sen. Feinstein has now done this twice -- the other time being her outrage over the CIA spying on her staffers, while simultaneously offering her support for NSA programs that performed similar functions.

The CIA holds an extreme amount of power, one that can be used carelessly and/or thoroughly abused. And no one -- at any level of government -- has done anything more than encourage it to handle drone strikes as it sees fit. And all the while, the rules continue to shift, molding themselves to each situation, often applying retroactive forgiveness for legally-questionable strikes.

Filed Under: cia, drones, pakistan, rules

DOJ Inspector General: ATF, FBI's Drones Worthless, Expensive And Completely Mismanaged

from the so-lousy-they-can't-even-violate-your-privacy dept

The DOJ's most infamous drone deployments involve justifications for extrajudicial killings. But its agencies also have fleets of (nonlethal) drones, something these agencies tend to avoid discussing until sued into doing so.

The Office of the Inspector General has taken another look at the drones deployed by DOJ agencies and found that, while plenty of money has been spent acquiring and maintaining drones/operators, very little deployment is actually occurring.

Our September 2013 interim report found that between 2004 and 2013, the FBI spent approximately $3 million to acquire small UAS it deployed to support its investigations. As of August 2014, the FBI had acquired 34 UAS vehicles and associated control stations, of which it considered 17 vehicles and a smaller number of control stations to be operational.

$3 million spent on drones, with only half currently considered "operational." In eight years (2006-2014), the drones have only been deployed to assist in 13 investigations, with nine of those occurring in the last four years. This may be good news for those concerned about extensive domestic surveillance, but it's not good news for those interested in how their tax dollars are being spent.

The FBI may have the desire for more unchecked surveillance and the drones needed to do the job, but it apparently lacks the manpower…

During the time of our review, the FBI maintained its UAS at one location in the United States and had only one team composed of two pilots on staff who were adequately trained to operate its UAS.

...or Fourth Amendment concerns…

The FBI told us that that it determined it did not need to obtain search warrants for any of its UAS operations.

That's the nice thing about making your own in-house "determinations": they'll rarely be challenged.

As for the half-functional 34-drone fleet "manned" by the FBI's two pilots, it couldn't be more unlike the agency's earlier assertions.

This approach differs from the decentralized deployment approach that FBI officials told us they employ for the FBI’s manned aircraft.

If you're wondering where more of your tax dollars are being misspent, it's right there in the following paragraphs. Because the FBI has only two drone pilots, these operators are driven or flown to locations where the drones are needed, sometimes arriving more than a day after the request for assistance was made. The FBI, despite being a national law enforcement agency, houses both its pilots and its drones at the same location.

Considering the FBI claims the drones have been used in potentially life-threatening situations (search-and-rescue efforts, suspected kidnappings), spending a day shipping drones and pilots where needed seems like the sort of thing that would result in unnecessary deaths/injuries. In response, the OIG has asked the FBI to handle its drone fleet less stupidly.

The ATF also has a few drones of its own. (The US Marshals Service and DEA were queried by the OIG, but both claimed to have no drones in their possession, which is true, but misleading. [More on that below.]) And, like the FBI, the drones are expensive, underutilized and, far too often, not worth the money that's been spent on them.

One UAS program manager told us ATF found that one of its smaller UAS models, which cost nearly $90,000, was too difficult to use reliably in operations. Furthermore, the TOB discovered that a gas-powered UAS model, which cost approximately $315,000 and was specified to fly for up to 2 hours, was never operable due to multiple technical defects.

The lack of functioning flying eyeballs resulted in the Special Operations Division shutting down the ATF's drone fleet in June 2014. Those drones were transferred to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service "at no cost" -- a fair price for non-functioning drones. With its drones and drone program dead, the ATF did the logical thing: bought more drones.

Less than a week after ATF’s Special Operations Division suspended its UAS program, ATF’s National Response Team (NRT) purchased five small, commercially available UAS at a total cost of about $15,000.

These new drones were deployed exactly once. At that point, the ATF determined it would need to permission from the FAA before deploying its drones in the future. With that, the ATF's drone program returned to its briefly interrupted hibernation.

For those agencies claiming they have no drones (US Marshals Service, DEA), that's only true if limited to direct ownership. Every major DOJ agency has availed itself to the DHS's fleet of drones, a majority of which belong to the CBP.

Specifically, four DOJ law enforcement components – the FBI, ATF, DEA, and USMS – have received UAS support from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which operates a fleet of Predator-B UAS. In response to our request, the CBP provided to us evidence indicating it operated UAS at least 95 times on missions that involved DOJ components in some way. Of these flights, the CBP identified that DEA was involved in 73, the FBI in 13, ATF in 4, the USMS in 3, and 2 for multiple DOJ components.

So, when the DEA says it has no drones, it's technically correct. But the drones it doesn't own have flown more times than the 34 drones the FBI actually owns. The CBP's drone fleet seems to have enough drones for everyone, and this division of labor (so to speak) allows the DEA and other DOJ agencies to minimize their drone paper trails. But more drones doesn't mean useful drones. The CBP's drone fleet may perform well in other agencies' hands, but it's next to useless when deployed by Customs itself.

While the investigation generally points to limited drone usage -- which is a good thing -- the discovery that the DOJ's drone fleets are expensive, mismanaged and almost completely worthless isn't.

Filed Under: atf, doj, drones, fbi, inspector general

ICE Rejects FOIA Request Over Drones Because ICE Has Determined It's Not 'Newsworthy'

from the i-sense-a-conflict dept

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, ICE, has a bit of a reputation around these parts. When it's not dealing with serious morale problems internally, it's censoring websites on no legal basis, holding questionable panty raids and grabbing people out of movies because the MPAA doesn't like their choice in eyewear. ICE also has a history of issuing really questionable FOIA denials (for what it's worth, ICE still won't respond to that FOIA request, many months later...).

Shawn Musgrave, over at Muckrock, recently sought some ICE documents via a FOIA request, specifically looking at "Operation Safeguard," a two-week program that ICE ran using Predator drones to police the US-Mexico border back in 2003. Musgrave sought ICE documents about Operation Safeguard, but ICE said that Musgrave didn't qualify as a journalist, thus limiting the power of his request (and allowing ICE to ask for more money to complete the request). Musgrave pointed to many of his published stories, but in response was told his request was still being rejected because the information is not about "current events or that would be of current interest to the public." ICE is trying to play games with the definition of "news" in that response. The issue is most certainly "current interest to the public," and for ICE to self-decide otherwise is preposterous. Letting ICE FOIA officials determine what is and what is not newsworthy seems like opening up a huge loophole for ICE to create all sorts of problems on the FOIA front -- something that it seems particularly interested in doing.

ICE also claimed that there was enough info out there already about Operation Safeguard, so no need to release any more: As Musgrave notes, this is incredibly misleading:

Having conducted my own online search ahead of submitting the FOIA request, I know foremost that studies from the Congressional Research Service refer to Operation Safeguard primarily in footnotes. Such CRS reports are conveniently posted on the Federation of American Scientists website.

What’s more, Senator Cantwell pressed for drones along the northern border in 2006 by vaguely citing Operation Safeguard’s findings.

But the Center for International Policy came to the most critical finding of all in surveying domestic drones in April 2013: “Unfortunately, Congress never reviewed the results of Operation Safeguard pilot project.”

Such a bounty is enviable, but is no substitute for the documents themselves. And while ICE may not see much news value in the origins of a program currently under intense scrutiny, someone somewhere just might.

It really does seem like operations like ICE really are just looking for excuses to reject FOIA requests these days...

Filed Under: dhs, drones, exemptions, foia, ice, newsworthy, operation safeguard

EU Releases Its Regulatory Approach For Drones; US Puts Out 'Request For Comments' On Commercial And Private Use

from the don't-get-left-behind dept

As Techdirt has reported, the FAA is being strangely unhelpful when it comes to authorizing commercial drone use. In that article, Mike warned that this might lead to other countries moving ahead in this fast-developing area, and he was right: the EU body for air safety, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), has now presented its regulatory approach for drones. It is based on three categories of operations and their associated regulatory regime: open, specific and certified (pdf):

The Open operation category of drones, should not require an authorisation by an Aviation Authority for the flight but stay within defined boundaries for the operation (e.g. distance from aerodromes, from people, etc). The "specific" operation category will require a risk assessment that will lead to an Operations Authorisation with specific limitations adapted to the operation. The "certified" operations will be required for operations with a higher associated risk or might be requested on a voluntary basis by organisations providing services such as remote piloting or equipment such as "detect and avoid".

As the EASA paper quoted above points out, in addition to safety, privacy and data protection are other important areas that need to be addressed. The new EU framework envisages this being dealt with by legislation at a national, rather than European, level. The paper has some suggestions for how this might be done:

The risk regarding privacy (data protection) could be mitigated through the operators self-registration in a web based application maintained by the local authorities. Another solution would be to install chips/Sim cards in drones. Such a web based application or chip/Sim cards could also contribute mitigating the security risk.

The paper also has some interesting thoughts on imminent challenges:

While today flying a single drone in non-segregated airspace with cooperative aircraft can be done with appropriate coordination and special procedures, operation of several of them possibly with non-cooperative aircraft will be much more complicated and will require additional measures. The concept of operations will need to be further developed to address the issues related to operations of fleet of drones in the non-segregated airspace. These operations of fleet of drones will pose new challenges not yet explored with manned aircraft operations.

Meanwhile, in the US, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration has put out a "Request for Comments on Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability Regarding Commercial and Private Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems," with a closing date of April 20, 2015. Let's hope it doesn't take too long to move from words to action.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

Filed Under: drones, eu, faa, regulations, us

FBI Claims Drone Impact Assessment That Was Redacted In Full Six Months Ago Suddenly Can't Be Located

from the federal-bureau-of-(deliberate)-ineptitude dept

The FBI's assessment of its drones' impact on the privacy of Americans has never been made public. It's been nearly a decade since it first deployed drones, and the agency has yet to provide anything on the subject. FOIA requests (there are several out there) have been greeted with nothing -- every single page withheld under the government's go-to exception, b(5).

Now, it's telling FOIA clearinghouse MuckRock that its obfuscatory efforts have buried the documents so deep even the FBI doesn't know where its Privacy Impact Assessment is.

Six months ago, the Federal Bureau of Investigation refused to release its plans to tackle privacy risks posed by drone surveillance. Now the agency claims it can’t track them down at all. So does the one Justice Department office responsible for making sure such reports get filed in the first place.

As Shawn Musgrave of MuckRock points out, the FBI's continued secrecy runs contrary to both the FOIA and its own obligations to the general public in terms of its surveillance programs' impact on the American public.

By design... PIA reports are meant for public consumption. They are supposed to candidly outline potential privacy risks for a given piece of software, data collection initiative or other technology, as well as the steps taken to address such risks. And unless an agency presents a good case otherwise, PIAs are supposed to be published online.

MuckRock refiled its previously-rebuffed FOIA request, adding a demand for any internal memos regarding the FBI's decision to not only withhold this impact assessement in full, but its refusal to post its PIAs online per standard operating procedure. It sent the same request to the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties -- the oversight agency tasked with ensuring agencies like the FBI don't cut the public out of the loop by withholding required impact assessments. The OPCL also had no idea where this document -- that it is charged with obtaining and holding -- might have gone.

Last week, the Justice Department confirmed that neither the FBI nor OPCL had been able to find anything despite “an adequate, reasonable search for such records.”

So… did the FBI toss the troublesome document into the nearest shredder (as if it isn't stored online somewhere within its internal network)? Or is it simply uninterested with fulfilling the minimal requirements of its accountability to the public? The latter appears to be the likeliest answer. In an update to MuckRock's original post about the MIA PIA, Shawn Musgrave reports that the DOJ has issued a statement suggesting MuckRock go fuck itself try the same thing that resulted in zero released pages six months ago.

Two hours after publication and in the wake of three FOIA requests, the Justice Department declined to clarify whether the FBI has analyzed potential privacy risks posed by its drones. “The questions you raised are best addressed through FOIA,” wrote Peter Carr, a Justice Department public affairs specialist, in reply to an email asking if the FBI had filed drone privacy impact assessments, “and it is my understanding that you sought similar information already through our FOIA office.”

The Justice Department’s privacy office thus dodged a yes-or-no matter — has the FBI has completed the legally mandated privacy analysis process? — by referring to previous, unclear FOIA responses. “Should you seek further information, please submit another request,” suggested Mr. Carr in conclusion.

"Unclear" is being generous. The original FOIA response looked like this:


And the most that could be determined from this "response" is that the FBI's drone impact assessment contains at least 26 pages and, at one point, was somewhere where the feds could actually locate it.

EPIC, which is currently suing the FBI over its refusal to publish its privacy impact assessments, is completely baffled by the collective shrug offered by these two agencies -- one which is supposed to craft and publish its assessments and that's supposed to provide (obviously needed) oversight. Both seem equally uninterested in fulfilling the requirements of their jobs.

EPIC lawyers are stumped by the Justice Department’s response to FOIA requests for its drone reports, and particularly the OPCL’s claim not to have any PIA documents.

“They review the privacy impact assessment—that’s part of their responsibility within the Justice Department,” says Ginger McCall, who heads EPIC’s Open Government Project.

Well, transparency and accountability are both part of the three involved agencies' jobs, but none of them seem interested in even creating the appearance of paying lip service to those crucial aspects of their responsibilities to the public. Instead, we get a list of pages the FBI won't let us read, followed by the declaration that the document is missing entirely.

Filed Under: doj, drone impact assessment, drones, fbi, foia, hiding, office of privacy and civil liberties, opcl

You Don't Own What You Bought: Drone Maker Updates Firmware On All Drones To Stop Any Flights In DC

from the well-that's-not-very-nice dept

You may have heard the news recently about how a drunk employee of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (can't make this crap up) accidentally flew a DJI Phantom II drone onto White House property, leading to a general collective freakout over the security implications of these personal helicopters. In response to this, President Obama has called for more drone regulations -- which may or may not make sense -- but it needs to be remembered that the FAA has been refusing to actually release any rules for quite some time.

But beyond the call for regulations, the drone's maker, DJI has decided to do a little self-regulation in the form of automatically pushing out some new firmware that blocks the drone from flying in downtown DC:

"The updated firmware (V3.10) will be released in coming days and adds a No-Fly Zone centered on downtown Washington, DC and extends for a 25 kilometer (15.5 mile) radius in all directions. Phantom pilots in this area will not be able to take off from or fly into this airspace."

Even if you think it's perfectly reasonable to ban drone flights in downtown DC (a different discussion for a different day...), it should be very concerning that the company you bought your product from can magically make it that much less useful on demand without you being able to do a damn thing about it. What if you happen to live in that no-fly zone, and you bought it to use for personal reasons at a local park. You're completely out of luck because an overreaction resulted in the company breaking something you thought you bought.

Sometimes, the fact that devices you buy can be updated on the fly has benefits -- like the stories of Tesla upgrading its cars to make them better even long after people bought them. That's neat. But, it still seems immensely troubling that something you bought can be turned into a paperweight (in certain areas) by the company you bought it from.

Filed Under: control, drm, drones, firmware, no fly zone, ownership, washington dc
Companies: dji