FOIA Lawsuit Featuring A DC Police Whistleblower Says PD Conspired To Screw Requesters It Didn't Like

from the affidaviting-the-quiet-part-loud dept

It's no secret government agencies love to screw with FOIA requesters. This is especially true when the responding agency doesn't care for the requester's attitude or thinks the release of information might lead to future negative reporting or embarrassment.

Most agencies, however, are careful not to set up any policies -- formal or informal -- that serve to deter certain requesters. And those that do have, so far, been lucky enough to not employ a whistleblower in their FOIA departments.

That's what happened to the Washington DC Metro Police Department, according to a recently filed lawsuit. Here's Elizabeth Nolan Brown with the details for Reason:

Did D.C. cops conspire to keep damning information from people and groups critical of them? That's what criminal defense lawyer Amy Phillips alleges in a new federal lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The suit stems from a whistleblower's account of life inside the D.C. police department's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) office. The whistleblower said she was instructed to flag for higher-ups any records requests coming from certain individuals and groups, as well as requests regarding certain sensitive topics. They would then strategize about ways to discourage, delay, or deny these requests.

Those targeted by this informal policy included reporters, activists, and members of local advisory groups. This is from former DC Metro PD FOIA officer Vendette T. Parker's sworn affidavit, which is attached to the defense lawyer's lawsuit [PDF]:

Some examples are Eric Flack, WUSA9 reporter; Marina Marraco, Fox5 reporter; the ACLU; Denise Krepp ANC [Advisory Neighborhood Commission] Commissioner; Lorenzo Greene, ANC Commissioner; Benjamin Douglass, Anti-Defamation League (ADL); Emily Barth, Public Defender's Office; and Amy Phillips, Public Defender's Office; among others.

This list was compiled by Parker and Metro PD Chief Operating Officer, LeeAnn Turner. As head of the FOIA office, Parker was expected to stonewall requests from requesters on the list as well as shield the department and its Chief of Police from embarrassment.

Although Ms. Turner did not name any specific individual in this meeting, she made it clear that I should bring to her attention any request coming from a person he has previously published a negative media article about Chief Newsham or MPD, if he uses the records for litigation if he is outspoken in City Council or community meetings in a negative way toward Chief Newsham or MPD, if the requester is the subject of a high profile incident, or if he repeatedly requests records that have the potential to be detrimental to Chief Newsham or MPD, regardless is of whether or not what is currently being requested is potentially detrimental.

The list of documents that might trigger this informal policy (no matter who requested them) were requests targeting the PD's controversial Gun Recovery Unit, personnel records, emails involving the police chief, use of force records, stop and frisk records, and anything involving "recent negative high profile events."

The list of requests and requesters was forwarded to Turner and the police chief and a weekly meeting was held to discuss how best to thwart requests that satisfied the unwritten criteria established by the PD's Chief Operating Officer.

Amy Philips first suspected something might be up after attending an Adverse Action Hearing for Officer Sean Lojocano, who was accused of conducting "unnecessarily invasive genital searches" of people he stopped. Despite this meeting being attended by other members of the public (including an ACLU rep and a local journalist), the Metro PD rejected Philips' request for recordings and transcripts of the hearing. And it did so in record time.

Less than ninety minutes after Phillips submitted her Lojocano request through the District’s online FOIA portal, she received a response denying her request in full. The response came from Latrina Crumlin, who identified herself as a “Staff Assistant, FOIA” for MPD. The response read “A release of such records would constitute as a [sic] clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and is exempt from disclosure pursuant to D.C. Official Code § 2-534(a)(2) and (a)(3)(C).”  

This was wrong, and it was strange. Usually, MPD takes weeks or months to provide any substantive response to FOIA requests. And Crumlin’s position appeared to be that the records of a public hearing—one that Phillips and many others attended—were categorically excludable as invasions of someone’s privacy, which does not make any sense.

As Philips' lawsuit points out, a policy like this -- whether official or unofficial -- violates her First Amendment right to access this information. She's seeking an injunction forbidding the PD from engaging in future viewpoint and content based discrimination when handling FOIA requests.

While it's almost certain other public agencies are engaging in similar practices to thwart pesky requesters or delay public embarrassment for as long as possible, this is the first time a FOIA litigant has secured a sworn affidavit from someone who participated in FOIA keep away at the behest of their supervisors. That's going to go a long way in litigation like this and with any luck, the Metro PD won't be able to jerk people around in the future just because it doesn't like them or their requests.

Filed Under: dc metro police, foia, transparency, washington dc

Seven Years After Discovering Rogue Stingray Devices In DC, The Federal Gov't Still Doesn't Have Any Idea What To Do About It

from the tfw-when-you-love-surveillance-way-more-than-countersurveillance dept

Seven years ago, wardriving security researchers discovered rogue cell tower simulators being operated near sensitive locations in Washington, DC, presumably by foreign governments.

The company used their ultrasecure CryptoPhone 500 to search for the interceptors, which can compromise phones through baseband hardware and are believed to have a range of roughly 1 mile. ESD America‘s phones allegedly detected telltale signs of call interception in the vicinity of the White House, the Russian Embassy, the Supreme Court, the Department of Commerce, and the Russell Senate Office Building, among other landmark buildings.

Three years later, Senator Ron Wyden sent a letter to DHS Undersecretary Christopher Krebs, asking him to look into this report. The DHS was told to find out where these were located, who was running them, whether the DHS was already aware of this problem, and what, if anything, the DHS planned to do about it.

The answer -- arriving four months later -- was "not much." The DHS agreed the possible use of Stingray-type devices by foreign operatives was indeed the sort of thing it should be concerned about (what with it being in the business of securing the homeland), but didn't appear to believe it should do much about it itself. It said it had detected several devices during a 90-day operation using ESD America equipment, but had no staffing or funding to do anything more than confirm what ESD America had discovered four years earlier.

Another three years have passed and nothing has changed but the list of federal entities that are apparently unable to do anything about these obvious threats to national security. Dell Cameron has the latest on the federal government (in)activity for Gizmodo:

It has been a matter of public record for decades that phones can be tracked and calls and text messages intercepted using a device called a cell site simulator, which exploits long-standing security vulnerabilities in phones by impersonating a legitimate phone company’s cell towers,” Sen. Ron Wyden wrote Thursday in a letter to the director of national intelligence; heads of the FBI and CISA—the agency charged with defending critical systems; and the presumptive next chair of the Federal Communications Commission.

“While the threat posed by this technology has been clear for years,” Wyden wrote, “the U.S. Government has yet to meaningfully address it.”

Among other concerns in the letter, both the Departments of State and Defense have confirmed to Wyden’s office, he said, “that they lack the technical capacity to detect cell site simulators in use near their facilities.”

"For years." That's the problem here. The threat to national security has been at least implied since 2014, when security researchers discovered cell site simulators that didn't appear to be operated by US agencies. That so many were clustered around sensitive areas of Washington DC suggested surveillance by inappropriately curious, if not actually malevolent, foreign agents or operatives.

And the tech itself is no secret either. Not only are Stingray devices widely used by US government agencies, they're also widely used by foreign governments -- many of which have no legal or moral compunction preventing them from using them as more than phone-tracking devices. The devices can also intercept communications and create attack vectors for cellphone-targeting malware. This is the sort of thing that should have been more than shrugged at by federal agencies.

And it doesn't take a government to get this dirty work done. Individuals and members of extremist groups can knock together cell tower simulators on the cheap -- powerful tools that don't rely on a support team of techs or a nondescript host vehicle to engage in tracking, eavesdropping, or hacking.

Researchers in the past have assembled devices for as little as $1,000, and have been able to carry out sophisticated attacks beyond the power of those licensed by state and local agencies. In recent years, international vendors have marketed versions small enough to wear undetected, allowing them to slip into the middle of a protest, for example, without raising alarm.

While it's true the government's offensive options might be limited, as attempts to knock out unknown cell site simulators might result in cell service disruptions in the immediate area, that doesn't mean the government is unable to mount a better defense.

Wyden's letter [PDF] asks who's really in charge out there, if anyone? While there may be no perfect agency to oversee the security of phone networks, one agency needs to step up and assume some responsibility while the details are sorted out. His letter hints that the FCC may be able to assist here.

If it can't oversee the entire process, it could at least institute requirements for cell phone providers that would make phones less susceptible to tracking and interception by these devices. Wyden suggests making it easier for phone users to locate and terminate support for 2G and 3G networks, which are more easily exploited by cell site simulators.

Wyden also suggests something practical that could be implemented quickly and at a minimum of expense: encrypting all voice and text communications by federal employees, which would make interception by Stingray devices mostly worthless.

Finally, Wyden wants to know who's doing anything to protect US government employees and facilities from these attacks, whether they occur in Washington DC, or elsewhere in the world.

These questions need answers. But they also need action. It's been seven years and we've seen very little of either from federal agencies that express their strong concerns about national security when they're playing offence (engaging in broad, intrusive surveillance, violating/ignoring citizens' rights) but seem far less concerned when they're asked to actually, you know, secure the goddamn nation from known threats.

Filed Under: imsi catcher, stingray, washington dc

Police Chief Demands Holes In Encryption Because Some Cops Decided To Participate In The DC Insurrection

from the sure,-make-this-all-about-us-when-it's-really-just-about-you dept

As more evidence comes to light showing a disturbing amount of law enforcement participation in the January 6th attack on the Capitol, police departments around the nation are finally being forced to face something they've ignored for far too long.

The law enforcement officers who participated in the insurrection attacked officers attempting to defend the building, or, at the very least, did nothing to discourage the lawless actions occurring all around them. The officers that went to DC and engaged in a riot aren't an anomaly. They've been part of law enforcement for as long as law enforcement has existed: bigots with a penchant for violence and a thirst for power.

These officers are finally beginning to be rooted out, but only because they did things no one can ignore. Hundreds of participants produced hundreds of recordings, turning their own celebration of their attempted election-thwarting into the evidence needed to identify them and charge them with federal crimes. Posts made to social media platforms provided more evidence, tying incriminating statements to location data to place off-duty cops on the scene.

Now that agencies are finally confronting their in-house white supremacist/militia problem, they're asking for everyone to be made less secure so they can handle the problem that's been hiding in plain sight for years.

Houston Police Chief Art Acevedo -- who presides over an agency with more than its share of bad cops -- was asked what officials like himself are doing to confront this problem. In response, Chief Acevedo asked for Congress to do him -- and other law enforcement agencies -- a favor:

Acevedo... said anonymous online platforms on the “dark web” are making such [internal] investigations impossible, even for departments with sufficient resources. He expects the move away from public platforms like Facebook and Twitter to grow rapidly in response to the FBI arrests of those who rioted at the Capitol.

This month, Acevedo was asked by the House Oversight and Reform Committee to explain what actions police chiefs are taking, and responded by asking for help. For years, law enforcement officials have asked for passage of a federal law that would require such platforms to have a “back door” that law enforcement can access if they have “a legitimate investigative need and a court order” to gain entry.

Then he blamed social media platforms for his own inability to police his police, calling them out as the real lawbreakers here:

“Congress’s failure to act has enabled industry giants to flaunt the law and operate with impunity,” Acevedo wrote in response.

First off, if the bad cops are shifting to "dark web" platforms in response to their own opsec failures during the January 6th riot, mandating backdoors that affect "industry giants" isn't going to make it any easier to track down cops who've moved on to "darker" web services.

Second, law enforcement agencies' continuous failure to hold officers accountable or to perform rigorous background checks should not be used as leverage to make services and devices less secure for millions of Americans. Citizens have already had to watch their tax dollars pay the salaries of brutal thugs whose loyalty to each other often supersedes their sworn duties as public servants. They don't need to be punished further just so it's a little easier for cops to perform the occasional internal investigation.

Finally, the encryption offered by device makers and communications platforms also protects cops -- not just from accountability, as Acevedo implies here -- but from malicious hackers and criminals who would love access to cops' devices, communications, and sensitive files. A backdoor for bad cops is a backdoor for good cops -- and a backdoor that strips a layer of security away from everyone who uses these devices and services.

The ugliness that permeates law enforcement needs to be rooted out. But the security of millions of Americans shouldn't be weakened just because those policing the police haven't done much of this policing for decades. They've had open access to evidence for years and rarely used it. Now that their sins are too big to ignore until the next news cycle hits shouldn't be the impetus for backdoor mandates.

Filed Under: art acevedo, backdoors, encryption, going dark, insurrection, washington dc

DC Police Union Sues To Block The Release Of Names Of Officers Involved In Shootings

from the can't-be-making-info-about-public-servants-public dept

Washington DC responded to widespread protests following the killing of George Floyd with a set of police reforms that tried to address some systemic problems in the district's police department, starting with its lack of transparency and accountability.

The reform bill -- passed two weeks after George Floyd's killing -- placed new limits on deadly force deployment, banned the Metropolitan PD from acquiring military equipment through the Defense Department's 1033 program, and mandated release of body-camera footage within 72 hours of any shooting by police officers. The names of the officers involved are covered by the same mandate, ensuring it won't take a lawsuit to get the PD to disclose info about officers deploying deadly force.

But there's a lawsuit already in the mix -- one that hopes to keep the public separated from camera footage and officers' names. Unsurprisingly, it's been filed by a longtime opponent of police accountability.

The Washington, D.C., police union said on Monday it asked a court to block the mandatory release of body camera footage and names of police officers involved in shootings.

According to the union, releasing the names of officers will do bad things to the good names of cops who kill people.

“The release of the body-camera footage and names of officers will unjustly malign and permanently tarnish the reputation and good name of any officer that is later cleared of misconduct concerning the use of force,” the union said in a statement.

First off, it's almost impossible to "permanently tarnish" a cop's reputation. Even the worst cops often have little trouble resuming their law enforcement careers after engaging in egregious misconduct. They may have to shop their resumes around a little bit, but lots of PDs and Sheriffs' offices are more than willing to hire bad cops no longer welcome at their original agency.

Second, nothing about this should hinge on whether or not the force deployment was justified. If an officer is later cleared of wrongdoing, they'll be able to go back to work. If not, they'll probably still be able to go back to work -- either with the DCPD or with any other agency more interested in staffing their forces than performing due diligence.

And it's a little rich for the union to ask that officers' names be withheld on the off chance they might be found innocent. The names of people arrested or cited are public records, even if they're ultimately never convicted of a crime. Suing to get cops held to a lower standard is a terrible use of taxpayer funds. Public sector unions collect dues from paychecks and build their litigation war chests using donations from officers -- all of which can ultimately be traced back to the same public the union is trying to keep in the dark.

The lawsuit [PDF] (which inexplicably isn't included in multiple articles about the lawsuit) raises the specter of vengeful vigilantes hunting down cops who killed or maimed friends or family members.

When officers justifiably use force against a criminal suspect, the immediate public release of the officer's name and the body-worn camera footage will allow the suspect and their associates to identify the officer and potentially seek retribution against the officer and his or her family.

This is a ridiculous reason to withhold officers' names. This is Hollywood rationale -- an uninspired trope that's best left in an undeveloped screenplay. It's not that it never happens. It's that it happens so rarely it can't be raised as a plausible argument for blanket secrecy.

The lawsuit also argues -- equally implausibly -- that there's an inherent right to privacy contained in actions performed by public servants in public.

The release of the officer's name and other identifying information contained in the body-worn camera footage will further impermissibly invade the officer's fundamental right to privacy.

Doesn't seem there would be that much privacy in performing public service, especially when someone gets serviced to death by an officer's force deployment. But that's the argument the union will make to shield its fan base from public criticism. Hopefully, the DC court will route this lawsuit to its OUT box as quickly as possible so DC residents can start benefiting from the transparency the district has finally forced on its police force.

Filed Under: accountability, body cams, police, police unions, protests, transparency, washington dc

DC Legislators Push FOIA Amendment That Would Shield Government Emails From FOIA Requesters [UPDATE]

from the dirtbags-gonna-dirtbag dept

UPDATE: Alex Howard reports the DC Council has tabled this amendment so it is no longer being considered during this round of budget debates.

Buried at the bottom of Washington, D.C.'s 2020 budget report [PDF] is a gift to legislators who value opacity. The so-called "Freedom of Information Clarification Amendment" would make it much more difficult for requesters to obtain the documents they're seeking.

The amendment to the district's FOIA law would require requesters to know exactly what documents they're seeking when they request them. It's a nearly-impossible bar to hurdle -- one that turns FOIA requests into games of Battleship.

“Reasonably describing” means describing with particularity the public records requested by including the names of the sender and recipient, a timeframe for the search, and a description of the subject matter of the public record or search terms to allow a public body to conduct a search and review within the time prescribed pursuant to section 202(c).”.

What this means is requesters seeking communications would need to know both the sender and recipient of emails they've never seen or the agency can reject the request entirely. The legislator pushing this says it will stop "fishing expeditions." But requests are sometimes necessarily "fishing expeditions" because requesters are working blind. They don't have access to these communications and have no way of knowing how many parties discussed the subject at hand. If this passes, D.C. government agencies will be pressing the "reject" button with increased frequency.

If there's anything transparent here, it's the self-interest of the legislators pushing the amendment. One member of the D.C. Council -- a Democrat like the councilmember who wrote the amendment -- has been the subject of unflattering news coverage based on FOIA requests.

In March, for example, The Washington Post reported that D.C. Council Member Jack Evans (D-Ward 2) had repeatedly sent business proposals to potential employers in which he offered his connections and influence as the city’s longest-serving lawmaker and chairman of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. Evans made those pitches using his government email account, and journalists obtained them through the District’s FOIA law.

[...]

Last year, journalist Jeffrey Anderson, also using documents obtained through FOIA, reported that Evans’s son was offered an internship by a digital-sign company that would have benefited from legislation Evans advanced at the council.

Legislators' own dishonest dealings have often resulted in calls to change public records rules to provide more opacity. Claims are made about "fishing expeditions" and protecting the private lives of legislators but, in reality, the real goal is protecting government employees from the people they serve.

Filed Under: dc, dc city council, foia, transparency, washington dc

T-Mobile Still Pretending That Staying At Trump's DC Hotel Isn't An Obvious Ploy To Gain Merger Approval

from the nothing-to-see-here dept

In a letter responding to Congressional inquiry, T-Mobile has confirmed that the company dramatically ramped up its patronage of Trump's hotel in DC as it sought regulatory approval of its $26 billion merger with Sprint. A copy of the letter, obtained by the Washington Post, makes it clear that the company spent upwards of $195,000 at the property since it originally announced the telecom industry's latest megadeal last April. That was a dramatic shift from the period of time before the deal was announced:

"T-Mobile’s patronage of President Trump’s Washington hotel increased sharply after the announcement of its merger with its Sprint last April, with executives spending about $195,000 at the property since then, the company told congressional Democrats in a letter last month. Before news of the megadeal between rival companies broke on April 29, 2018, the company said, only two top officials from T-Mobile had ever stayed at Trump’s hotel, with one overnight stay each in August 2017.

T-Mobile has also hired former Trump ally Corey Lewandowski and former FCC Commissioners Robert McDowell and Mignon Clyburn to "consult" on the deal and grease the wheels of approval. T-Mobile CEO John Legere has consistently tried to play this obvious attempt at pandering to Trump as just unrelated happenstance:

Amusingly, Legere built his entire brand on being a "no bullshit" alternative to AT&T and Verizon. Yet here we are.

As Legere has attempted to sell the press, public, and regulators on the deal, he's adopted many of his competitors' worst habits. It's been clearly documented in countries like Canada or Ireland that when you reduce the total number of major wireless competitors from four to three, it results in dramatically higher rates as the incentive to compete on price is proportionally reduced. Such telecom mergers almost always result in significant layoffs as redundant positions are eliminated. Wall Street predicts T-Mobile's merger will be no different, eliminating anywhere between 10,000 and 30,000 jobs.

This is not alien territory. In US telecom, these megadeals almost uniformly make the sector worse, as your wallet can attest. Yet both Sprint and T-Mobile execs have engaged in the same old game of Charlie Brown and Lucy football, breathlessly insisting that this deal will somehow be different. At the same time, execs continue to pretend that kissing Trump's ass by staying at his DC hotel isn't an obvious lobbying strategy for the company:

"While we understand that staying at Trump properties might be viewed positively by some and negatively by others, we are confident that the relevant agencies address the questions before them on the merits," (T-Mobile) wrote.

That makes one of you. The Trump FCC has been a glorified rubber stamp for absolutely every pipe dream telecom lobbyists can cook up, be it killing popular net neutrality rules (something Legere supported) or literally weakening the definition of the word "competitive" to make life easier on the sector's biggest players. While the DOJ is less certain (though still sounding likely from what I've heard), there's zero doubt that the FCC will rubber stamp this merger, likely piggybacking on T-Mobile's (false) tailor-made claims that the deal is essential if the United States doesn't want to "fall behind" in the "race to 5G."

Once Legere gets done bullshitting his way to merger approval, he'll have to quickly pivot back again to pretending he's the "no bullshit" alternative to the other major wireless carriers. But of course as just one of three remaining competitors, history has shown us time and time again how T-Mobile will have less incentive than ever to seriously compete on price, and will, sooner or later, come to resemble AT&T and Verizon in all the wrong ways.

Filed Under: donald trump, john legere, lobbying, merger, trump hotel, washington dc
Companies: sprint, t-mobile

DHS Says Rogue Stingrays Are In Use In Washington, DC; Also Says It Hasn't Done Anything About It

from the plotting-a-course-for-too-little,-too-late dept

In 2014, security researchers discovered a number of cell tower spoofers in operation in the DC area. Some may have been linked to US government agencies, but there was a good chance some were operated by foreign entities. This discovery was published and a whole lot of nothing happened.

Three years later, Senator Ron Wyden followed up on the issue. He sent a letter to the DHS asking if it was aware of these rogue Stingray-type devices and what is was doing about it. As was noted in the letter, the FCC had opened an inquiry into the matter, but nothing had ever come of it. As the agency tasked directly with defending the security of the homeland, Wyden wanted to know if anyone at the DHS was looking into the unidentified cell tower spoofers.

The DHS has responded to Wyden's queries, as the Associated Press reports. But a response is not the same as actual answers. The DHS appears to have very few of those.

The agency’s response, obtained by The Associated Press from Wyden’s office, suggests little has been done about such equipment, known popularly as Stingrays after a brand common among U.S. police departments. The Federal Communications Commission, which regulates the nation’s airwaves, formed a task force on the subject four years ago, but it never produced a report and no longer meets regularly.

The DHS pointed out that its own investigation, which detected several devices during a 90-day trial using ESD America equipment, had dead-ended, supposedly because of a lack of funding

[Christopher] Krebs, the top official in the department’s National Protection and Programs Directorate, noted in the letter that DHS lacks the equipment and funding to detect Stingrays even though their use by foreign governments “may threaten U.S. national and economic security.”

The answers [PDF] are all of the "we saw something and said something" variety. Fine for what it is, but does nothing to move things forward. Whatever "anomalous activity" the DHS saw during its trial was passed on to other agencies, which have not forwarded anything to Wyden or numerous Congressional committees concerned with national security, airwave regulation, and oversight.

According to the AP report, security experts are pretty sure every foreign embassy has a cell tower spoofer in use. Whether they limit themselves to call data -- as our government agencies do -- is another matter. Stingray devices are capable of intercepting communications and deploying malware. Since embassies function as tiny foreign countries on host's soil, there's a good chance those deploying cell tower spoofers aren't all that concerned with following US law when putting these to use.

Unfortunately, we're no closer to solid answers than we were last winter… or, indeed, four years ago, when the initial report triggered an FCC investigation. Of course, we may never get to see the full answer. One possible reason for this lack of investigatory movement is this practice isn't limited to foreign entities in the US. We absolutely deploy the same hardware in any country we have an embassy, in addition to all the countries in which we maintain a military presence. No one wants to talk about our own actions overseas, much less possibly expose local law enforcement's routine use of Stingray devices. For now, all we have is a tepid admission that Stingrays our government doesn't own are in operation in Washington, DC. But that's all we need to know, apparently. Unfortunately, that's possibly all our national security oversight entities know either.

Filed Under: dhs, imsi catcher, ron wyden, stingray, surveillance, washington dc

Senator Wyden Asks DHS To Look Into Cell Tower Spoofer Use By Foreign Entities In Washington DC

from the why-hasn't-the-homeland-security-agency-looked-into-this-already? dept

A few years back, news broke about the apparent existence of stationary cell tower spoofers in the Washington DC area. While some could conceivably have been operated by local law enforcement, the location of the fake cell towers suggested they might be the work of foreign actors.

Continuing a sort of cross-country tour to detect phony cell towers, also known as interceptors or IMSI catchers, researchers associated with the security firm ESD America have detected 15 of the covert devices in Washington D.C., plus three more in nearby Virginia.

The company used their ultrasecure CryptoPhone 500 to search for the interceptors, which can compromise phones through baseband hardware and are believed to have a range of roughly 1 mile. ESD America's phones allegedly detected telltale signs of call interception in the vicinity of the White House, the Russian Embassy, the Supreme Court, the Department of Commerce, and the Russell Senate Office Building, among other landmark buildings.

Since then, not much has changed. Or if it has, no updates have been issued. Apparently, the fake cell towers are still there and in use, unmolested by local law enforcement or federal agencies. Ron Wyden would like someone to do something about it and has sent a letter [PDF] to DHS Under Secretary Christopher Krebs, asking the agency to look into it.

In 2014, security researchers reported that they detected a number of IMSI catchers in the National Capital Region, which they suggested may have been operated by foreign governments. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) subsequently established a task force to investigate the threat posed by foreign governments and criminals using IMSI catcher technology. Unfortunately, the FCC has yet to issue any public findings or guidance since then.

Whether foreign intelligence services and criminals are using IMSI catchers to spy on senior members of the US. government is undoubtedly a question worth answering. Foreign government surveillance of senior American political and business leaders would obviously pose a significant threat to our country's national and economic security.

Wyden would like to know if the DHS has seen any firsthand evidence of these tower spoofers and if it has provided any of this info to Congressional committees. He also wants to know if the DHS has the technology to detect and locate these IMSI catchers and, if not, wants to know what it needs to begin the hunt for foreign surveillance devices.

Certainly the DHS has the tech to do its own cell tower spoofing. A recent FOIA request by Buzzfeed found the DHS has been deploying Stingray devices about once a day for the last three years. A cell tower spoofer isn't the best tool for detecting other cell tower spoofers, but it could turn into a DC-based Spy vs. Spy operation, with the DHS running its equipment to locate competitors' foreign-owned equipment, with the inherent escalation that scenario implies.

The thing about cell tower spoofers is they can be used to intercept communications. That functionality is available, although we have yet to see (acknowledged) use of Stingray devices to eavesdrop here in the US. The tacit agreement to limit Stingray use to locating cell phones is not without its own issues, but there's no agreement, unspoken or otherwise, limiting foreign entities from intercepting phones calls and text messages with their devices. (Undoubtedly, any cell tower "listening posts" deployed by the US in other countries would be similarly unaffected by voluntary limitations on domestic deployment.)

If answers are given to Wyden, it's highly doubtful we'll see them. US agencies are still completely uncomfortable discussing their own tower spoofers. Evidence of communications interception by foreign agencies will likely be buried under black ink and discussed behind closed doors.

Filed Under: dhs, imsi catcher, ron wyden, spoofing, stingray, surveillance, washington dc

Oversight Board Report On DC Police Cameras Contradicts Earlier Report's Claims

from the by-'activate,'-do-you-mean-'not-do-a-damn-thing?' dept

Less than a month after a first report was delivered on Washington, DC police body camera use, a second one has arrived. And it seems to contradict some assertions made in the first report.

The first report was put together by an extension of DC's government called the Lab@DC. It showed body camera use doing almost nothing to curtail use of force by officers. This seemed to undercut the notion body cameras can be a tool of accountability. But they never will be -- not if the agencies using them remain uninterested in punishing officers for misconduct.

The Lab@DC report stated officers -- more than 2,000 of them -- weren't observed repeatedly or intentionally violating body camera activation policies.

Other researchers have suggested that BWCs may fail to affect outcomes because of nonadherence: officers, for a variety of reasons, may not use their assigned cameras according to departmental policy. They may fail to turn on the camera, for example. We have no indication that non-adherence was a widespread problem in this study. For 98% of the days in 2016, MPD averaged at least one video (and often many more) per call for service associated with a treatment officer. Further, even for the 2% of days in 2016 in which the number of videos uploaded was less than the number of incidents for which we would expect them, the difference is minimal, with 96% average adherence based on our measure.

The latest report, however, comes to the opposite conclusion. This one [PDF], put together by DC's police oversight board, shows plenty of nonadherence. (via FourthAmendment.com)

More than a third of cases investigated by a D.C. police oversight board after complaints were made about officers’ conduct this past year involved officers who did not properly use their body-worn cameras during those incidents, according to a report made public Tuesday.

Some officers turned the cameras on too late, others too early, the report from the Office of Police Complaints found. In 13 percent of the cases, at least one officer at a crime scene or incident failed to turn on the camera, though colleagues did.

This is causing problems with accountability. Michael G. Tobin, the director of the Office of Police Complaints, says these "failures" sometimes compromise entire internal investigations. But he's also quick to excuse the officers, citing the newness of the technology.

The "newness" may contribute to some unintentional failure to follow policy, but it's not as though the department's body camera policy is full of contradictory instructions on activations.

MPD General Order SPT-302.13 specifies that “[m]embers, including primary, secondary, and assisting members, shall start their BWC recordings as soon as a call is initiated via radio or communication from OUC [Office of Unified Communications] on their mobile data computer (MDC), or at the beginning of any self-initiated police action.”

Cameras should be rolling for pretty much any officer interaction with the public. The problem for DC police oversight -- and the public itself -- is that these activation failures compromise investigations of police misconduct. To investigators inside and outside the department, there's no discernible difference between forgetting to turn on a camera and deliberately leaving a camera off. The small upside is the 2,800 cameras in use, which lowers the chance that all responding officers will fail to produce footage.

The camera policy doesn't leave activation to officer discretion. But the hardware does, and that's an issue that needs to be addressed. Surprisingly, it's the local police union that's calling for additional accountability measures.

Police Sgt. Matthew Mahl, the chairman of the police union, said he plans to ask the department for new equipment that would automatically turn on body cameras when a gun is removed from the holster.

That will help cover cases where deadly force is threatened or deployed. But there are a lot of misconduct and excessive force complaints that will fall through the "gun out, camera on" cracks.

The combination of both reports suggests cameras still aren't fixing law enforcement. Too many officers still feel the equipment is optional, even when it's issued at the start of every shift and clipped to their chests for the next 12 hours. If there's no downturn in force deployment, it's because no one's made it clear the absence of footage should be nearly as damning as the existence of damning footage.

Filed Under: body cameras, police, police brutality, washington dc