Congress Now Pushing 'Bring Back The Patent Trolls' Bill

from the oh-come-on dept

Back in April we warned about a truly terrible plan by some in Congress to obliterate the last few years of the Supreme Court fixing our broken patent system, and flinging the doors wide open to patenting genes, medical diagnostics, and software (all of which the Supreme Court has mostly rejected as abusive and monopolizing nature). One had hoped that after having explained to them how disastrous such a bill would be, that its backers might think carefully in crafting the final bill. Instead, Senators Tom Tillis and Chris Coons, along with Reps. Hank Johnson and Steve Sivers instead decided to double down with a bill that would massively stifle innovation.

They claim it's to "restore predictability and stability" in our patent system, but that's laughable. It is to massively increase the universe of patent-eligibility to include a wide range of things that almost anyone who understands innovation would consider it insane to allow patents to restrict. It would literally obliterate the three key Supreme Court cases that rejected patents on genes, medical diagnostics, and most software, and open the door to patenting "laws of nature," "abstract ideas" and "natural phenomenon." Really. It specifically says that:

No implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject matter eligibility, including “abstract ideas,” “laws of nature,” or “natural phenomena,” shall be used to determine patent eligibility under section 101, and all cases establishing or interpreting those exceptions to eligibility are hereby abrogated.

It would also bring us back to a world in which the default is everything is patentable:

The provisions of section 101 shall be construed in favor of eligibility.

No one doing actual innovation would support this. The only people who could possibly support this are patent lawyers and patent trolls. It will reopen the floodgates of bad patents and patent trolling, flooding the courts with bogus lawsuits on broad and vague patents against actual innovators. It is a dangerous bill that Congress must reject. We lived through nearly two decades of patent trolls destroying innovation while Congress twiddled its thumbs and did almost nothing to stop it. The Supreme Court finally stepped in (again and again and again) to stop the nonsense -- and now these elected officials want to bring us back to such a world?

Filed Under: chris coons, gene patents, hank johnson, inventions, medical diagnostics, originality, patent trolls, patents, section 101, software patents, steve sivers, supreme court, tom tillis

Federal Court Says Warrants Are Needed To Grab GPS Data From Third-Party Tracking Services

from the seems-like-an-obvious-extension-of-Carpenter dept

In 2012, the Supreme Court decided that GPS tracking devices require warrants. Notably, this wasn't because the GPS data was deserving of Fourth Amendment protections but because officers had to trespass on private property (a car parked in a driveway) to attach the device.

That left law enforcement with a lot a gray area in which to operate. Since there was no distinct finding that GPS data was protected, it could theoretically be harvested from third-party devices without a warrant. The Supreme Court's decision in the Carpenter case, however, appeared to extend protections to the records themselves. It declared the acquisition of cell site location info requires the use of the warrant, extending Fourth Amendment protections to third party records of people's movements. It could be argued this decision covers GPS data pulled from third party services, since it's basically the same thing: gathering records of a person's movements.

In a recent federal case [PDF], both of these Supreme Court decisions are in play. It appears law enforcement thought it had found a way to route around the Jones decision. Investigating a robbery, detectives approached the dealership that had sold the vehicle spotted at the scene of the crime. The dealership had installed a tracking device to make the car easier to find in case of a repo. This was the data detectives obtained without a warrant.

On March 29, 2017, Hinsdale detectives issued an alert “on multiple databases” seeking information about the Lexus. Id. at 3. On April 4, 2017, a Headers employee told one of the detectives that the Lexus was equipped with a GPS tracking device serviced by Air Assault Asset Track GPS Systems. The Headers employee gave the detective her login credentials for Air Assault’s website and authorized him to access “all the GPS records associated with the Devinn Adams/Lexus RX account.” The GPS records included historical data tracking the Lexus’s “movement and global position.”

Without first obtaining a warrant, the detective downloaded a spreadsheet containing GPS data for the period from March 1, 2017 through April 4, 2017. The spreadsheet sets forth time-stamped entries giving the Lexus’s approximate street address (usually at the block level, such as “5701-5799 S Campbell Ave, Chicago, IL, 60629”) each time it was turned on, approximately every five minutes while it was being driven, and each time it was parked. According to the detective, “[g]reater detail” beyond those approximate street addresses “c[ould] be extracted from the map points” using “the software program that manages the GPS data,” which allowed the detective to “narrow[]” each recorded location “to specific latitude and longitude way points.”

Tobias Diggs, the alleged driver, moved to suppress the evidence, stating that both the Jones and Carpenter decisions prohibited this information being obtained without a warrant. The government argued that neither decision mattered.

The government responds that acquiring the data was not a Fourth Amendment search because: (1) unlike in Jones, the police made no physical intrusion on the Lexus, Doc. 55 at 10-12; and (2) under the third-party doctrine, Diggs lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data because he voluntarily provided it to the third party (Headers) from which the police obtained it, id. at 5-10.

Wrong, says the court. This is exactly what's covered by these two decisions.

The GPS data at issue here fits squarely within the scope of the reasonable expectation of privacy identified by the Jones concurrences and reaffirmed in Carpenter. The GPS data provide “a precise, comprehensive record of [Diggs’s] public movements” over the course of a month.

It goes on to point out the data collected here is pretty much indistinguishable from the data at the heart of the Carpenter decision.

Applying the third-party doctrine to the GPS data here would require essentially the same extension of the doctrine that the Court rejected in Carpenter. Carpenter understood CSLI to present “many of the qualities of the GPS monitoring … considered in Jones”—both are “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled”; both “provide[] an intimate window into a person’s life”; and, in the context of historical information, both provide a “tracking capacity [that] runs against everyone” without any need for the police to “know in advance whether they want to follow a particular individual, or when.” Indeed, at the time of the search in Carpenter, CSLI was still “less precise than GPS information.” Accordingly, Carpenter compels the conclusion that, given the privacy concerns implicated by the “detailed and comprehensive record of [Diggs’s] movements” captured by the Lexus’s GPS tracker, “the fact that the [police] obtained the information from a third party does not overcome [Diggs’s] claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”

The government also tried to get the good faith exception applied. Given that this search occurred prior to the Carpenter decision, the government says the detectives had no reason to believe a warrant was needed. The court disagrees. The government can point to no prior cases specifically authorizing this sort of warrantless search. But more importantly, it reiterates that the Carpenter decision can -- and should -- be applied retroactively.

The Supreme Court could have described what it was doing in Carpenter, not as declining to extend the third-party doctrine to a context not addressed in Smith and Miller, but as partially scaling back the once-categorical doctrine to account for “the seismic shifts in digital technology” that gave rise to widespread, long-term location tracking. 138 S. Ct. at 2219. Had it done so, the Davis good-faith exception might very well have applied here. [...] But instead, the Court said that the third-party doctrine was never broad enough to encompass technology-enabled long-term location tracking in the first place.

[...]

Carpenter thus teaches that general statements of the third-party doctrine uttered in pre-Carpenter decisions not only do not cover CSLI, but never did. And as noted above, what Carpenter said about the third-party doctrine as to CSLI applies with full force to GPS data. It follows that for the Davis good-faith exception to apply to the GPS search here, the government needs more than general statements of the third-party doctrine in a binding appellate decision issued before the search; rather, the government must point to binding appellate precedent applying the doctrine to long-term historical GPS data or its equivalent.

The government loses the GPS data evidence. And it may lose even more than that if any of its other evidence was derived from this unlawful acquisition of data, which possibly includes DNA samples and social media records.

Not every court has read the Carpenter decision as retroactive, but this court's opinion makes really good points about why it should be read that way in all instances. The Third Party Doctrine was altered significantly by this decision, even if it only dealt with cell site location info. It has changed the contours of what can be considered a "reasonable" search of records held by third parties. Location info is only the beginning. The court's extension of this protection to third-party GPS records sends a message to law enforcement that the stuff they did for the last 40 years (thanks to Smith v. Maryland) may no longer survive a suppression challenge.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, carpenter, gps, jones, supreme court, third party doctrine, warrants

Supreme Court Says iPhone Users Can Pursue Antitrust Claims Against Apple Over App Store

from the could-get-intereseting dept

Earlier today, the Supreme Court ruled (mostly as expected, though with some caveats) in Apple v. Pepper, a case concerning whether or not iPhone users could sue Apple for antitrust concerning how it controls pricing in the iOS App Store. Most of the news on this focuses either on how this could have a big impact on Apple and other marketplaces, or on how this case (somewhat oddly) split between the two Justices appointed by President Trump, with Justice Kavanaugh writing the majority opinion (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor) and the dissent written by Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas and Alito).

It will be interesting to see how this plays out, but my first impression is that this case may not prove to be that big of a deal long term. It is not saying anything, really, concerning whether or not Apple's practices are an antitrust violation. It is merely letting a case go forward. And, to some extent, I think that Justice Gorsuch may be correct that all that this case will end up doing in the long run is getting Apple and other platforms to change their contracts in terms of how the money flow officially goes.

The key in this case is that Apple sought to have the antitrust case tossed, saying that iPhone owners were not the "direct purchasers" from Apple, and thus had no standing to sue. An earlier case, Illinois Brick v. Illinois, said that only direct purchasers could sue for antitrust violations, rather than those further down the supply chain. Here, the majority said that Illinois Brick doesn't exclude iPhone users, because they did, in fact, make the purchase from Apple, and thus were "direct purchasers."

The plaintiffs purchased apps directly from Apple and therefore are direct purchasers under Illinois Brick. At this early pleadings stage of the litigation, we do not assess the merits of the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims against Apple, nor do we consider any other defenses Apple might have. We merely hold that the Illinois Brick direct-purchaser rule does not bar these plaintiffs from suing Apple under the antitrust laws.

This does seem fairly straightforward, but Apple's counter-argument was that, as the market controller, it is merely setting the percentage fee that goes back to Apple, and not the actual price of the app:

Apple’s theory is that Illinois Brick allows consumers to sue only the party who sets the retail price, whether or not that party sells the good or service directly to the complaining party. Apple says that its theory accords with the economics of the transaction. Here, Apple argues that the app developers, not Apple, set the retail price charged to consumers, which according to Apple means that the consumers may not sue Apple.

The majority rejects this ruling, saying that it is not actually supported by the law (which says that injured parties can sue), that Apple is stretching the meaning of the Illinois Brick ruling from one about "direct purchasers" to one about "who sets the price," and finally that under Apple's interpretation of the rule, any market operator could strategically structure their market to avoid being liable to any antitrust effort:

...if accepted, Apple’s theory would provide a roadmap for monopolistic retailers to structure transactions with manufacturers or suppliers so as to evade antitrust claims by consumers and thereby thwart effective antitrust enforcement.

The dissent, by Gorsuch, more or less suggests that this ruling, as opposed to the reverse, is actually what will allow market operators to avoid antitrust, just by strategically structuring deals in a different way:

To evade the Court’s test, all Apple must do is amend its contracts. Instead of collecting payments for apps sold in the App Store and remitting the balance (less its commission) to developers, Apple can simply specify that consumers’ payments will flow the other way: directly to the developers, who will then remit commissions to Apple. No antitrust reason exists to treat these contractual arrangements differently, and doing so will only induce firms to abandon their preferred—and presumably more efficient—distribution arrangements in favor of less efficient ones, all so they might avoid an arbitrary legal rule.

This is why, frankly, I'm not convinced this case is that big of a deal, despite some general concerns that people have raised about the ruling. As a gut reaction, it does seem to make sense that those injured by supposedly monopolistic behavior should have the right to sue over that harm, but this ruling seems more technical than anything else, and is fairly early on in the process of what appears to be a very long case that has no end in sight. Apple, and other large companies, would obviously have liked to have seen it go the other way, and to face less of a threat of antitrust lawsuits from the users of the markets they set up, but that, alone, isn't a sensible reason for blocking these cases.

For what it's worth, if I were Apple, I would preempt this issue entirely by no longer requiring that the App Store be the only way to get apps on the phone. Google allows competing marketplaces on Android, but they really don't get much usage -- in part because Google (correctly) notes that you're likely to have better security by going through the official Google Play store, rather than alternatives. However, it has still allowed alternatives, and a few of them (including Amazon's) have been able to build up a niche in the market.

Filed Under: antitrust, app store, brett kavanaugh, direct purchaser, ios, neil gorsuch, standing, supreme court
Companies: apple

Supreme Court Asks White House To Weigh In On Copyrightability Of APIs

from the anyone-confident-that-this-white-house-understands-the-issue? dept

Back during an earlier round of the never-ending legal dispute between Oracle and Google concerning whether or not APIs can be covered by copyright the Supreme Court requested that the White House weigh in on its opinion -- leading then Solicitor General Donald Verrilli (formerly a top lawyer for the MPAA) to weigh in with what we argued was a painfully clueless brief. The underlying issue here, from the very beginning, revolves almost entirely around the simple point: do you actually understand what an API is? If you do -- and recognize that it's fundamentally different from executing software code -- then this is an easy case. An API is simply an instruction set -- a recipe of sorts -- for being able to interface with a particular program. And US copyright law is clear that copyright cannot apply to any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery."

An API is easily covered by that designation, but because you have non-technical lawyers who can't understand the difference between software operating code (which is copyrightable) and an API (which is not) they argue that the two are virtually identical, and thus APIs should be covered by copyright. Tragically, that argument worked at the appeals court (it didn't work at the district court, where Judge Alsup already had some coding history and famously taught himself how to program in Java to better understand the facts of the case).

Now that the case is back on appeal to the Supreme Court, looking specifically at questions of fair use around the reuse of an API, the Supreme Court has (somewhat oddly) asked the White House to weigh in again. As part of its Monday orders it invited the White House to give its opinion on whether or not it should even hear the case (not yet on the actual merits of either side's case):

The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.

Of course, there's a very different White House with a very different Solicitor General. Of course, I have no idea if the current Solicitor General's office knows anything about coding or knows why an API is not operating code, and it seems like a total crapshoot to expect the Solicitor General to have an informed opinion on this matter. So it's not entirely clear why the Supreme Court expects it will -- but now that it's asked, we should probably expect something from the White House on this issue. As has been noted in the past, when the Supreme Court does ask the Solicitor General to weigh in, it often has an impact on the case -- especially when the question is simply on whether or not the Supreme Court should hear the case in the first place. Given that, one hopes that the Solicitor General will support the petition to hear the case and revisit the CAFC's ongoing confusion over copyright law.

Filed Under: apis, copyright, interfaces, software, solicitor general, supreme court
Companies: google, oracle

Both Sides Want The Supreme Court To Review Decision Denying Copyright In Georgia's Law. How About You?

from the public-resource dept

Last year the Eleventh Circuit held that the Georgia statutory code, including annotations, was not protected by copyright. It was an important decision, not just for Carl Malamud's PublicResource.org, which had been sued for publishing Georgia's operative statutory law, including the annotations, but for any member of the public who necessarily needs to be able to freely access the law that governs them.

Georgia has now petitioned the US Supreme Court to review the Eleventh Circuit's decision. But more significantly, Public Resource is also planning to file a brief encouraging that review. Not because Public Resource wants the decision reversed, of course. But because it wants the decision to be affirmed.

Here's the situation. If the Supreme Court declines to review the decision, it will stand. That's a good thing, because it means there would be no risk of infringing copyright in publishing the Georgia state code. Given the decision's reasoning, it would also be difficult for any other state within the Eleventh Circuit to assert copyright in its statutory code either. But for any other state outside the Eleventh Circuit the question of whether statutory law could be copyrighted would remain unsettled. The Eleventh Circuit's decision is persuasive authority that courts elsewhere may defer to, but it's not binding authority, so they don't have to. What the Eleventh Circuit got right they could still get wrong.

Also, even if other courts were to ultimately follow in the Eleventh Circuit's footsteps, it is arduous and expensive to have to litigate in each state and circuit in order to get to that point. Meanwhile plenty of publicly-beneficial uses will remain chilled by the fear of potential litigation and liability as we wait for all these courts to eventually rule that this public access, unrestrained by copyright, is OK.

It would be much more efficient if the Supreme Court could just cut to the chase now and affirm that the Eleventh Circuit's holding is the law of the land. The case is ready and ripe for review, with especially cogent reasoning, so taking up this one would be much more expedient than having to wait for any other case to finally reach the petition stage. After all, the public's need to access the law that governs it is just as critical now as it will be later.

An amicus brief is being put together on behalf of law students, legal educators, and lawyers who are solo practitioners or in small firms to remind the court of this fact. All of these constituencies need access to the law, and not just superficial access, but meaningful access that will allow for the analysis necessary to teach, learn, and practice the law as clients, current and future, need. Yet neither are economically in the position to be able to easily afford the subscription fees they have to pay the commercial databases which are able to monopolize access to the law when states can get away with demanding paid licenses for it. Small law firms and solo practitioners are at a distinct disadvantage to large firms who, with generally wealthier clients, are better able to absorb these costs. And all are at a disadvantage to their peers in Georgia, who no longer need to pay to get access to what the Eleventh Circuit recognized was "intrinsically public domain material, belonging to the People."

If you are a solo or small firm lawyer, or are a law student, and would like to sign on as an amicus to encourage this Supreme Court review, click through the link above to the brief, where there is a form through which you may add your name before midnight on May 2.

Disclosure: I've contributed to the drafting of this brief.

Filed Under: code, copyright, georgia, law, supreme court

More Copyright Policy Should Be As Boring As This Supreme Court Decision

from the make-copyright-boring-again dept

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously last Monday in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, a copyright case that hinged on whether the "registration" of a work—which, by statute, must precede most kinds of infringement lawsuits—happens when the author sends in their application, or whether it happens when the Copyright Office makes a determination and sends back a certificate. There was a circuit split on the issue, in which some courts had gone with the "application approach," and others had gone with the "registration approach," and legal experts were divided on the question.

As of last Monday it is resolved. The Supreme Court went with the "registration approach" and said that unless you're subject to one of the handful of statutory carve-outs you must wait until the Copyright Office does its thing before you can sue.

The Supreme Court decided correctly, for what it's worth -- as Mike wrote about earlier. But, as even a dedicated copyright nerd like your humble author must admit, it's a pretty boring question. Copyright law is a field where small changes can have profound effects on people's lives, where de facto speech policies can be shaped, and where new technologies and media can be formally blessed or condemned to utter oblivion. But it's also a field of industrial regulation, cobbled together in large part by technocrats with domain expertise figuring out what works for all the parties in the room. To its credit, Fourth Estate is a case that limits its impact largely to that latter area.

But the fact that one body of law must do both things is the source of a lot of headache and heartache. Writing effective policy is hard, even when you're not trying to write a single rule that governs both billion dollar studio contracts and comments on a blog. The consequences can be extreme, as Cory Doctorow once explained: "A funny thing happened on the way to the 21st century: copyright policy ceased to exist. Because every copyright policy that we make has a seismic effect on the Internet, and because you can’t regulate copying without regulating the Internet." And of course, "as we make the transition from a world where everything we do includes an online component to a world where everything we do requires an online component, it’s becoming the case that there’s no such thing as 'Internet policy' – there’s just policy."

But it's neither inevitable nor accidental that copyright touches every part of our lives. It's helpful to really break it down here: copyright is an enumerated bundle of restrictions that apply to things called "works."

Doctorow's argument is about the first half of that expression. He elaborated in another column: because everything we do with computers (and especially networked computers) involves observable acts of making copies, copyright touches nearly every use of a work. Uses that once went unregulated are now swept up in the bundle of rights because they involve a copy. There are big commercial examples of this, like how video rental used to be an act of moving a cartridge or a disc from place to place and now it's a licensed act of making copies. But there are also a million little examples of this we encounter every day, from checking out books at the library to sharing a funny picture with friends to listening to our favorite music.

So that's how the first half of the expression went awry; what was once a limited set of exclusive rights is now a mechanism to regulate all sorts of uses of things called "works." That would be bad enough. But the real problem lies in the second half, in terms of what gets called a "work."

That too used to be an enumerated list. The first U.S. copyright law covered maps, charts, and books. Over the years more and more categories were added, but the real shift was more fundamental. It happened, at least in the U.S., in 1976, when the overhauled law changed copyright from a system that was opt-in to one where participation was mandatory. Works were previously only subject to copyright restrictions if the author went through "formalities,"—namely, putting a copyright notice on the work and sending in a registration to the Copyright Office. The 1976 Act removed that hurdle. Overnight, that changed the character of copyright from a regulatory system that applied to a handful of professionals consciously participating in it, to one that controlled nearly every utterance and scribble that got fixed in a tangible medium.

That's the one-two punch. First, through law: applying copyright coverage to basically everything. Then, through technology: expanding the regulated uses to basically all of them.

It's a bad situation, and it's that part that motivates people like Doctorow to take pursue a life of activism. With few exceptions, most people passionate about copyright reform care most about the consequences of copyright as an everything policy, and less so about the nitty-gritty of copyright as industrial regulation.

Which is part of the reason why, to bring it back to Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, the Supreme Court decision is both correct and (mostly) boring. Correct, in part, because actual litigation is something that does not and should not apply to most human beings interacting with copyrighted works, and so it's good for that to be conditioned on opt-in registration. Boring, in part, because it is (mostly) not about the side of copyright that affects blog comments, but instead the side that underpins billion dollar contracts.

Copyright policy has, for decades now, labored under the fiction that there’s no distinction between the boring parts and the scary parts of the law. It’s a good thing to remember there’s a difference.

Filed Under: boring, copyright, impact, innovation, policy, registration, scotus, supreme court
Companies: fourth estate, wall-street.com

Supreme Court Says Of Course You Need To Register Your Copyright Before You Can Sue; Copyright Trolls & Hollywood Freak Out

from the oh,-poor-souls dept

17 USC 411(a) (part of US Copyright law) states the following:

...no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.

This is pretty clear. It also becomes important in a surprising number of situations and cases, including quite a few we've discussed just recently, such as the various copyright lawsuits over dances in Fortnite, where it appears that none of the "dances" were actually registered with the Copyright Office. Copyright trolls, also, are somewhat notorious for threatening lawsuits over works without any copyright registration at all.

So it's a bit bizarre that the Supreme Court even needed to weigh in on this, but there was a bit of technical confusion between a bunch of circuits as to whether or not you could sue as soon as you submitted a registration application, or if you had to wait until the Copyright Office issues the actual certificate of registration. While getting a registered copyright is mostly (though not entirely) a rubber stamp process by the Copyright Office, it still takes about six to seven months right now, though the Copyright Office has been upgrading its technology (after some earlier hiccups under the previous regime), and insists that before long the timing will be one of weeks, rather than months.

In a unanimous ruling, surprisingly written by Justice Ginsburg, the court ruled that the law is pretty clear and you have to wait until registration is complete and the certificate has been issued by the Copyright Office. It comes down to the Justices just reading what the law actually says and saying "um, that's pretty clear." Indeed, the ruling basically says the wording of the law wouldn't make any sense if it meant you just had to submit the application to be able to sue:

If application alone sufficed to “ma[ke]” registration, §411(a)’s second sentence—allowing suit upon refusal of registration—would be superfluous. What utility would that allowance have if a copyright claimant could sue for infringement immediately after applying for registration without awaiting the Register’s decision on her application? Proponents of the application approach urge that §411(a)’s second sentence serves merely to require a copyright claimant to serve “notice [of an infringement suit] . . . on the Register.” See Brief for Petitioner 29–32. This reading, however, requires the implausible assumption that Congress gave “registration” different meanings in consecutive, related sentences within a single statutory provision. In §411(a)’s first sentence, “registration” would mean the claimant’s act of filing an application, while in the section’s second sentence, “registration” would entail the Register’s review of an application. We resist this improbable construction.

As for the claims that by requiring a copyright holder to wait infringement can go on for a while, the Court points out that the law still lets them go after all that past infringement after getting the registration:

If infringement occurs before a copyright owner applies for registration, that owner may eventually recover damages for the past infringement, as well as the infringer’s profits. §504. She must simply apply for registration and receive the Copyright Office’s decision on her application before instituting suit. Once the Register grants or refuses registration, the copyright owner may also seek an injunction barring the infringer from continued violation of her exclusive rights and an order requiring the infringer to destroy infringing materials.

The court also takes a dim view on the idea that it takes too long to get the registration, and this could impact the statute of limitations on suing (three years):

Fourth Estate raises the specter that a copyright owner may lose the ability to enforce her rights if the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations runs out before the Copyright Office acts on her application for registration. Brief for Petitioner 41. Fourth Estate’s fear is overstated, as the average processing time for registration applications is currently seven months, leaving ample time to sue after the Register’s decision, even for infringement that began before submission of an application

Furthermore, Ginsburg notes that even if it's taking the Copyright Office a long time, that's an issue for Congress to deal with rather than the courts:

True, the statutory scheme has not worked as Congress likely envisioned. Registration processing times have increased from one or two weeks in 1956 to many months today. See GAO, Improving Productivity in Copyright Registration 3 (GAO–AFMD–83–13 1982); Registration Processing Times. Delays in Copyright Office processing of applications, it appears, are attributable, in large measure, to staffing and budgetary shortages that Congress can alleviate, but courts cannot cure.

The surprising aspect of this is that Ginsburg wrote the decision. Historically, Justice Ginsburg has never seen a copyright case where she wouldn't support the more Hollywood-friendly interpretation. Whether you agree with Ginsburg on other issues or not, she's generally... awful on copyright with the infamous Eldred ruling being a key example (if you want to read a good half-book long rant about just how badly Ginsburg messed up nearly every aspect of the Eldred ruling, I highly recommend the book No Law, which has some choice words for that particular decision).

Still, this decision was a pretty straightforward reading of the statute, and in some ways builds on the basis that Ginsburg set forth in Eldred, in which she more or less says "hey, Congress can do what Congress wants regarding copyright." And here, Congress has said you need to register to sue.

What's amusing, though, is that this fairly minor step has Hollwyood and its friends completely flipping out about how much more difficult it's going to be to stop piracy. But this makes no sense. Once a work is out there, it's out there. It's not like being able to sue a few months earlier is going to stop works from leaking or being available. And suing is usually not the most efficient way to stop the spread of something anyway (the DMCA takedown process still works...).

Of course, those who should really be worried are the copyright trolls who got kind of complacent about these things over the past few years. As Fight Copyright Trolls first noticed, prolific copyright trolling operation Malibu Media, has already been hit with an Order to Show Cause in response to this case for suing over works where no registration had been made:

It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff show cause in writing by March 12, 2019, why its complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted — specifically, for failure to allege that registration or preregistration of the copyright claims at issue had “been made” prior to the filing of this action. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); see Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, No. 17-571, 2019 WL 1005829 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2019). If Plaintiff fails to show good cause, or does not file anything by that date, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice to Plaintiff.

Anything that causes more problems for copyright trolls has to be a good thing.

Filed Under: applications, copyright, copyright office, copyright registration, copyright trolls, litgiation, registration, ruth bader ginsburg, supreme court
Companies: fourth estate, wall-street.com

Seventh Circuit Ignores Two Supreme Court Decisions To Hand Out Bad Precedent On Cell Site Location Info

from the doing-nothing-would-have-been-more-useful dept

The Seventh Circuit Appeals Court has issued a dubious ruling [PDF] on cell tower dumps -- one that appears to ignore the Supreme Court's decision declaring warrants are needed to obtain cell site location info. The criminal conduct leading to this questionable finding clearly shows robbing cellphone stores is a particularly bad idea. (h/t Orin Kerr)

[Lawrence] Adkinson and others, in July 2015, robbed a T-Mobile phone store in Clarksville, Indiana, and then a Verizon store in Kentucky the next day. With handguns drawn, they stole approximately 100 cell phones and other items. They later robbed nine additional stores, including three more T-Mobile stores.

T-Mobile investigated the first robberies. As part of its investigation, T-Mobile conducted “tower dumps”: it pulled data from cell sites near the first two victim stores to identify which phones had connected to them—and thus were close to the crimes. From these dumps, T-Mobile determined that only one T-Mobile phone was near both robberies and that Adkinson was an authorized user on that phone’s account.

T-Mobile shared this information with law enforcement, leading to Adkinson's arrest and conviction. Adkinson sought to suppress the evidence law enforcement obtained from T-Mobile, citing the Carpenter decision. If the appeals court had simply pointed out the Carpenter decision does not apply retroactively and moved on, it would have avoided the number of issues it has created with this published opinion, which will set precedent for the circuit.

The least troubling holding is this: T-Mobile did not act as a government agent when it forwarded the results of its internal investigation to law enforcement.

The government responds that the Fourth Amendment was not violated, and we agree for three primary reasons. First, T-Mobile is a private party, and Adkinson has not shown that it was the government’s agent. “A search or seizure by a private party does not implicate the Fourth Amendment” unless the private party “is acting as an instrument or agent of the government.” United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted). To demonstrate agency, Adkinson must establish either that T-Mobile agreed to act on the government’s behalf and to be subject to its control or that the government ratified T-Mobile’s conduct as its own. United States v. Aldridge, 642 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 4.01 (2006)). T-Mobile, however, acted in its own interest to prevent more robberies of its stores and recover its property when the company furnished data to the government; there is no evidence that it expected to receive any benefit from the government. Providing that data did not transform T-Mobile into an agent of the state.

When a private party hands info to the government, the government doesn't need a warrant to look at whatever has been provided. As long as the government isn't actively encouraging this sharing of information with promises of payments or perks, the Fourth Amendment won't be violated.

But the court goes further than that, suggesting the Carpenter decision doesn't cover tower dumps.

The case did not invalidate warrantless tower dumps (which identified phones near one location (the victim stores) at one time (during the robberies)) because the Supreme Court declined to rule that these dumps were searches requiring warrants. 138 S. Ct. at 2220. Adkinson also relies on policy guidance from the Department of Justice about cell-site data. But that policy guidance, by its own terms, “is not intended to and does not create any right, benefit, trust, or responsibility.”

But that's not what the Supreme Court said. The court said cell site location info is protected by the Fourth Amendment. It did not stick a time limit on historical cell site data, declaring collections over x amount of days to be a search under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it simply noted the obvious: cellphones are tracking devices people carry with them everywhere they go. This vast amount of precise location info should not be only a subpoena away from the government's possession.

[W]e hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.

There was no carve-out for tower dumps in the Supreme Court's decision. There's one now in the Seventh Circuit.

More troubling is the court's declaration that -- contrary to the Supreme Court's finding -- clicking OK on a EULA somehow waives the privacy protections the Supreme Court extended to cell site location info.

Adkinson’s Fourth Amendment rights were still not violated because Adkinson consented to T-Mobile collecting and sharing his cell-site information. A defendant can voluntarily consent in advance to a search as a condition of receiving contracted services. See Medlock v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 738 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2013). As a condition of using a phone serviced by T-Mobile, Adkinson agreed to T-Mobile’s policy that T-Mobile could disclose information when reasonably necessary to protect its rights, interests, property, or safety, or that of others. And T-Mobile, in accordance with its policy, shared information with law enforcement after one of its stores was robbed at gunpoint.

If this is what the court wants to believe, then the Carpenter decision no longer exists in the Seventh Circuit. Every cellphone owner agrees to have information collected when they purchase a phone and use the provider's phone service. They may agree this information can be handed over to law enforcement, but the Supreme Court clearly said this does not negate their privacy interest in the information shared with service providers.

As Orin Kerr points out, this ruling also ignores precedent set by another recent Supreme Court ruling. In Byrd, the court held that people who rent cars have a privacy interest in the rented vehicle, one that isn't overcome by the driver not being "authorized" by the rental agreement. In both cases, the court stated that contractual agreements with private companies are not enough to eliminate citizens' Fourth Amendment protections.

What could have been an open-and-shut case reaffirming two obvious conclusions -- the lack of inherent retroactivity in the Carpenter decision and the inability of private searches (T-Mobile's investigation) to violate Fourth Amendment protections -- is instead a mess of precedential hot takes that directly contradict two recent Supreme Court decisions. Citizens residing in this circuit have just been informed their Fourth Amendment isn't worth as much as it is elsewhere in the country.

Filed Under: 7th circuit, cell site, csli, location info, privacy, supreme court

Supreme Court Says Civil Asset Forfeiture Violates Constitutional Protections Against Excessive Fines

from the time-to-start-breaking-up-the-blue-line-cartel dept

Great news on the asset forfeiture front, courtesy of the highest court in the land. The Supreme Court has ruled that forfeitures can violate the Eighth Amendment's protections against excessive fines.

The case the Supreme Court ruled on deals with Indiana native Tyson Timbs. Timbs sold $260 worth of heroin to undercover officers. He pled guilty to criminal charges. The state decided to forfeit his $42,000 Land Rover via civil asset forfeiture, routing around the criminal system to make it easier for cops to make off with his vehicle. Timbs challenged this forfeiture as an excessive fine, given that the max fine for his criminal charges was $10,000.

This case made its way to the state's Supreme Court, which overturned the lower court's decision finding in favor of Timbs and the US Constitution, which Indiana had incorporated. The state's highest court stated that this clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil asset forfeiture. This was a bizarre position to take, as the Supreme Court pointed out during oral arguments.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, whatever the Excessive Fine Clause guarantees, we can argue, again, about its scope and in rem and in personam, but whatever it, in fact, is, it applies against the states, right?

MR. FISHER: Well, again, that depends.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I mean, most -- most of the incorporation cases took place in like the 1940s.

MR. FISHER: Right.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And here we are in 2018 -­

MR. FISHER: Right.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- still litigating incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Really? Come on, General.

The Supreme Court's decision [PDF] makes it clear the US Constitution protects citizens from excessive fines, even if those fines are meted out at the state level. If the Constitution has been incorporated by the states (and it has!), the protections apply.

Held: The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Pp. 2–9. (a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates and renders applicable to the States Bill of Rights protections “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 767 (alterations omitted). If a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.

The state tried to argue the protections only covered in personam (vs. a person) forfeiture -- the kind normally seen in criminal cases where property is seized as compensation for fines or as direct, provable ill-gotten goods obtained as the result of criminal activity.

In rem forfeiture -- the civil route -- lowers the evidentiary bar law enforcement must meet to take property away from citizens. In most cases, there are no criminal charges involved -- only accusations of criminal origin that force citizens to prove a negative to reclaim their seized property.

Here's where this decision has the chance to disrupt a majority of states' civil asset forfeiture programs: the Supreme Court says these incorporated protections also apply to in rem seizures.

As a fallback, Indiana argues that the Excessive Fines Clause cannot be incorporated if it applies to civil in rem forfeitures. We disagree. In considering whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a protection contained in the Bill of Rights, we ask whether the right guaranteed—not each and every particular application of that right—is fundamental or deeply rooted.

Indiana’s suggestion to the contrary is inconsistent with the approach we have taken in cases concerning novel applications of rights already deemed incorporated. For example, in Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), we held that a North Carolina statute prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing certain commonplace social media websites violated the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause was “applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 1). We did not, however, inquire whether the Free Speech Clause’s application specifically to social media websites was fundamental or deeply rooted. See also, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373 (2014) (holding, without separately considering incorporation, that States’ warrantless search of digital information stored on cell phones ordinarily violates the Fourth Amendment). Similarly here, regardless of whether application of the Excessive Fines Clause to civil in rem forfeitures is itself fundamental or deeply rooted, our conclusion that the Clause is incorporated remains unchanged.

So, the rhetorical question posed by this decision is one that's going to be asked of hundreds of state-level civil asset forfeiture programs: if there are no criminal charges, wouldn't ANY seizure of property be "excessive?" It certainly appears a lack of criminal charges would be fatal to in rem seizures, which almost always happen without accompanying charges. This case may not have been specifically about civil asset forfeiture, given Tyson Timbs' guilty plea, but the state made it about it by refusing to acknowledge its incorporation of the Bill of Rights.

This may start a scramble by law enforcement to suss out just how much of the Bill of Rights their particular state has incorporated. Given the Supreme Court's disdain for arguments to the contrary, pushing legal challenges to forfeiture programs uphill is a non-starter. This case was a 9-0 rout in favor of protecting Americans from excessive fines and fees -- in this case taking the form of civil asset forfeiture. This hopefully will be the starting point for nationwide reform of these abusive programs.

Filed Under: 8th amendment, asset forfeiture, civil asset forfeiture, excessive fines, excessive punishment, incorporation, indiana, scotus, states rights, supreme court, trevor timbs