After Eight Years And Three Reviews Of The Case, Indiana Supreme Court Rules Police Must Return Seized Car To Its Owner

from the thousands-of-dollars-spent-fighting-against-the-public's-interests dept

It's now been eight years since Indiana law enforcement seized Tyson Timbs' Land Rover following his arrest for distributing drugs. In eight years, this case has made multiple visits to the state trial court, the state court of appeals, the state's Supreme Court, and the nation's Supreme Court.

This isn't just due to Timbs' tenacity and his desire to have his car returned. His only car -- worth $35,000 when it was seized -- has been sitting in an impound lot for most of decade, all because of criminal charges that netted Timbs $1,200 in fines and one year of home detention.

No, these multiple trips are due to the state of Indiana attempting to prevent precedent from being set that would prevent it from seizing whatever it wants whenever it wants. Previous rulings found excessive fines -- in this case taking the form of a $35,000 vehicle seizure over $400 of heroin sold to undercover officers -- violate the Eighth Amendment. And these rulings also reminded the state that it had incorporated that part of the US Constitution years ago and couldn't try to ignore it now just because it still wants to avail itself of Benjamins when ringing up people on nickel-and-dime charges.

So, for the third time, the Indiana state Supreme Court is forced to handle the Timbs case because the state has refused to accept every previous ruling that has gone against it, including the one handed down by the US Supreme Court. The opening of the ruling [PDF] expresses some of the court's exasperation with the state's stubbornness.

We chronicle and confront, for the third time, the State’s quest to forfeit Tyson Timbs’s now-famous white Land Rover. And, again, the same overarching question looms: would the forfeiture be constitutional?

Reminiscent of Captain Ahab’s chase of the white whale Moby Dick, this case has wound its way from the trial court all the way to the United States Supreme Court and back again. During the voyage, several points have come to light. First, the vehicle’s forfeiture, due to its punitive nature, is subject to the Eighth Amendment’s protection against excessive fines. Next, to stay within the limits of the Excessive Fines Clause, the forfeiture of Timbs’s vehicle must meet two requirements: instrumentality and proportionality. And, finally, the forfeiture falls within the instrumentality limit because the vehicle was the actual means by which Timbs committed the underlying drug offense.

All of these questions have been capably handled at each step of this long, laborious process. The problem is the state doesn't like the answers it's been getting. And the state Supreme Court doesn't appear to like the state's refusal to listen. There are some facts to consider, but as far as the state's top court is concerned, they were answered amply by the lower court.

[U]ntil now, the proportionality inquiry remained unresolved—that is, was the harshness of the Land Rover’s forfeiture grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Timbs’s dealing crime and his culpability for the vehicle’s misuse? The State not only urges us to answer that question in the negative, but it also requests that we wholly abandon the proportionality framework from State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 35–39 (Ind. 2019). Today, we reject the State’s request to overturn precedent, as there is no compelling reason to deviate from stare decisis and the law of the case; and we conclude that Timbs met his burden to show gross disproportionality, rendering the Land Rover’s forfeiture unconstitutional.

The key is the excessive fines part of the Eighth Amendment. The courts must decide whether the seizure was proportionate. The lower court -- after hearing from witnesses on Timbs' behalf (the state decided not to call any of its own) -- made the right call by weighing the cost against the crime. The seizure of Timbs' only vehicle didn't serve any greater public interest. All it did was enrich the state at Timbs' expense.

[C]ontrary to the State’s position, we conclude that the $35,000 market value of the vehicle and the other sanctions imposed on Timbs point to the punitive, rather than remedial, nature of the forfeiture. As Timbs II explained, it’s appropriate to evaluate the market value of the forfeiture relative to the owner’s economic means—because “taking away the same piece of property from a billionaire and from someone who owns nothing” do not reflect equal punishments. 134 N.E.3d at 36. And, here, taking away a $35,000 asset from someone who owned nothing else was significantly punitive. Likewise, imposing the forfeiture on top of other sanctions—sanctions that included six years of restricted liberty as well as $1,200 in fees and costs -- shows that the vehicle's seizure was not for remedial purposes.

Finally this comes to an end, years after it should have been obvious seizing Timbs' car violated the Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive fines.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court; and the seven-plus-year pursuit for the white Land Rover comes to an end.

The state and its law enforcement agencies are now subject to a proportionality test that weighs the severity of the crime against the value of the items seized. If this test stands during criminal asset forfeiture -- the seizures accompanying actual criminal charges -- it needs to be applied to cases where law enforcement can't even be bothered to affect an arrest, much less pursue criminal charges when seizing property. This is good news for Indiana residents. And it has the potential to disrupt forfeiture efforts nationwide.

Filed Under: 8th amendment, asset forfeiture, civil asset forfeiture, due process, illinois, tyson timbs

Supreme Court Says Civil Asset Forfeiture Violates Constitutional Protections Against Excessive Fines

from the time-to-start-breaking-up-the-blue-line-cartel dept

Great news on the asset forfeiture front, courtesy of the highest court in the land. The Supreme Court has ruled that forfeitures can violate the Eighth Amendment's protections against excessive fines.

The case the Supreme Court ruled on deals with Indiana native Tyson Timbs. Timbs sold $260 worth of heroin to undercover officers. He pled guilty to criminal charges. The state decided to forfeit his $42,000 Land Rover via civil asset forfeiture, routing around the criminal system to make it easier for cops to make off with his vehicle. Timbs challenged this forfeiture as an excessive fine, given that the max fine for his criminal charges was $10,000.

This case made its way to the state's Supreme Court, which overturned the lower court's decision finding in favor of Timbs and the US Constitution, which Indiana had incorporated. The state's highest court stated that this clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil asset forfeiture. This was a bizarre position to take, as the Supreme Court pointed out during oral arguments.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, whatever the Excessive Fine Clause guarantees, we can argue, again, about its scope and in rem and in personam, but whatever it, in fact, is, it applies against the states, right?

MR. FISHER: Well, again, that depends.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I mean, most -- most of the incorporation cases took place in like the 1940s.

MR. FISHER: Right.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And here we are in 2018 -­

MR. FISHER: Right.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- still litigating incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Really? Come on, General.

The Supreme Court's decision [PDF] makes it clear the US Constitution protects citizens from excessive fines, even if those fines are meted out at the state level. If the Constitution has been incorporated by the states (and it has!), the protections apply.

Held: The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Pp. 2–9. (a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates and renders applicable to the States Bill of Rights protections “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 767 (alterations omitted). If a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.

The state tried to argue the protections only covered in personam (vs. a person) forfeiture -- the kind normally seen in criminal cases where property is seized as compensation for fines or as direct, provable ill-gotten goods obtained as the result of criminal activity.

In rem forfeiture -- the civil route -- lowers the evidentiary bar law enforcement must meet to take property away from citizens. In most cases, there are no criminal charges involved -- only accusations of criminal origin that force citizens to prove a negative to reclaim their seized property.

Here's where this decision has the chance to disrupt a majority of states' civil asset forfeiture programs: the Supreme Court says these incorporated protections also apply to in rem seizures.

As a fallback, Indiana argues that the Excessive Fines Clause cannot be incorporated if it applies to civil in rem forfeitures. We disagree. In considering whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a protection contained in the Bill of Rights, we ask whether the right guaranteed—not each and every particular application of that right—is fundamental or deeply rooted.

Indiana’s suggestion to the contrary is inconsistent with the approach we have taken in cases concerning novel applications of rights already deemed incorporated. For example, in Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), we held that a North Carolina statute prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing certain commonplace social media websites violated the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause was “applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 1). We did not, however, inquire whether the Free Speech Clause’s application specifically to social media websites was fundamental or deeply rooted. See also, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373 (2014) (holding, without separately considering incorporation, that States’ warrantless search of digital information stored on cell phones ordinarily violates the Fourth Amendment). Similarly here, regardless of whether application of the Excessive Fines Clause to civil in rem forfeitures is itself fundamental or deeply rooted, our conclusion that the Clause is incorporated remains unchanged.

So, the rhetorical question posed by this decision is one that's going to be asked of hundreds of state-level civil asset forfeiture programs: if there are no criminal charges, wouldn't ANY seizure of property be "excessive?" It certainly appears a lack of criminal charges would be fatal to in rem seizures, which almost always happen without accompanying charges. This case may not have been specifically about civil asset forfeiture, given Tyson Timbs' guilty plea, but the state made it about it by refusing to acknowledge its incorporation of the Bill of Rights.

This may start a scramble by law enforcement to suss out just how much of the Bill of Rights their particular state has incorporated. Given the Supreme Court's disdain for arguments to the contrary, pushing legal challenges to forfeiture programs uphill is a non-starter. This case was a 9-0 rout in favor of protecting Americans from excessive fines and fees -- in this case taking the form of civil asset forfeiture. This hopefully will be the starting point for nationwide reform of these abusive programs.

Filed Under: 8th amendment, asset forfeiture, civil asset forfeiture, excessive fines, excessive punishment, incorporation, indiana, scotus, states rights, supreme court, trevor timbs

Supreme Court Appears Inclined To Apply The Eighth Amendment To Civil Asset Forfeiture

from the on-the-road-to-recovery? dept

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments recently in a case that may result in some involuntary reforms to state civil asset forfeiture laws. The case involves Tyson Timbs, an Indiana resident who had his $42,000 Land Rover seized by law enforcement after selling $260 worth of heroin to undercover cops.

Despite securing a conviction, law enforcement chose to forfeit Timbs' vehicle in civil court. This may have been to keep Timbs from challenging the seizure as excessive, given the crime he was charged with maxxed out at a $10,000 fine. This is how Timbs is challenging this forfeiture, however. That's how this case has ended up in the top court in the land.

A lower court in Indiana found in his favor, finding the seizure to be a violation of Timbs' Eighth Amendment protections against excessive fines. The state's top court overturned this ruling, prompting the appeal to the US Supreme Court. The state argues the Eighth Amendment's protections do not apply to civil asset forfeiture. This is a curious position, because it's basically stating Indiana's government gets to pick and choose what guaranteed rights its residents have access to.

From the oral arguments [PDF], it sounds like the court is going to rule in Timbs' favor and find that these Eighth Amendment protections apply to state-level forfeitures -- civil or criminal. The state's Solicitor General, Thomas Fisher, failed to impress the court at almost every turn.

It all starts with Justice Gorsuch trying to set the ground level for discussion: that it's undisputed fact the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause applies in Indiana.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: General, before we get to the in rem argument and its application to this case, can we just get one thing off the table? We all agree that the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the states. Whether this particular fine qualifies because it's an in rem forfeiture, another question.

But can we at least get the -- the theoretical question off the table, whether you want to do it through the Due Process Clause and look at history and tradition, you know, gosh, excessive fines, guarantees against them go back to Magna Carta and 1225, the English Bill of Rights, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, pretty deep history, or whether one wants to look at privileges and immunities you might come to the same conclusion. Can we at least -- can we at least agree on that?

MR. FISHER: I have two responses to that. First -­

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, I -- I think -- I think a "yes" or "no" would probably be a good starting place.

As Fisher tried to argue around that by claiming it really should only apply to cases of criminal forfeiture ("in personam" [against a person] rather than "in rem" [against property] forfeitures), Gorsuch again shut him down, showing a bit of exasperation while doing so.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, whatever the Excessive Fine Clause guarantees, we can argue, again, about its scope and in rem and in personam, but whatever it, in fact, is, it applies against the states, right?

MR. FISHER: Well, again, that depends.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I mean, most -- most of the incorporation cases took place in like the 1940s.

MR. FISHER: Right.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And here we are in 2018 -­

MR. FISHER: Right.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- still litigating incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Really? Come on, General.

This was followed by new installation Brett Kavanaugh trying to get the state's lawyer to admit the state had adopted the Eighth Amendment and its clauses -- which includes protections against excessive fines, no matter what form they take.

The state's lawyer believes the Court should leave the state court ruling alone, and allow Indiana to go on claiming the Eighth Amendment doesn't apply to civil forfeiture. To do so, the state basically argues people have rights but their possessions don't. This led to Justice Ginsburg reminding the government's lawyer that property belongs to people who have rights.

So, whether you label it in rem or in personam, let's remember that it's -- things don't have rights or obligations in and of themselves. It's people that have rights or obligations with respect to things.

The state's insistence that the excessive fines clause does not apply to civil asset forfeiture allows Justice Breyer to strike at the heart of this form of forfeiture and the abuse it encourages because it's so often unchecked by local laws.

JUSTICE BREYER: Well, in your view, an in rem civil forfeiture is not an excessive fine, is that right?

MR. FISHER: Yes, that is -- that is true.

JUSTICE BREYER: So what is to happen if a state needing revenue says anyone who speeds has to forfeit the Bugatti, Mercedes, or a special Ferrari or even jalopy? (Laughter.)

MR. FISHER: There -- no, there is no -- there is no excessive fines issue there. I -- what I will say and what I think is important to -- to remember is that there is a constitutional limit, which is the proof of instrumentality, the need to prove nexus.

JUSTICE BREYER: That isn't a problem because it was the Bugatti in which he was speeding. (Laughter.)

MR. FISHER: Right.

JUSTICE BREYER: So -- so there is all the nexus.

MR. FISHER: Historically -­

JUSTICE BREYER: Now I just wonder, what -- what is it? What is it? Is that just permissible under the Constitution?

MR. FISHER: To forfeit the Bugatti for speeding?

JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah, and, by the way, it was only five miles an hour -­

MR. FISHER: Yeah.

JUSTICE BREYER: -- above the speed limit.

MR. FISHER: Well, you know, the answer is yes. And I would call your attention to the -­

JUSTICE BREYER: Is it yes?

MR. FISHER: Yes, it's forfeitable.

Not a single justice who spoke was on the state's side. If the ruling comes down in favor of Timbs, it still may be a narrow ruling, which will mute its impact. If all SCOTUS wants to do is say the Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause applies in Indiana, but not specifically to civil forfeitures, the state can continue with forfeiture business as usual. But if it applies that clause to civil forfeiture, the state is going to have a hard time justifying taking expensive stuff from people they've charged with minimal violations or haven't charged at all.

The biggest effect will be felt by those who've had their property seized by the government via this process. They'll actually have something far better than the minimal protections afforded them. As it stands now in many states, trying to reclaim property is an expensive, labyrinthine process that heavily favors the government. Being able to challenge a seizure on Constitutional grounds means the government has to prove far more than the property could imaginably be tied to criminal activity. It would also have to demonstrate the punishment doesn't outweigh the crime.

The potential downside is this: prosecutors may stack charges until they roughly equal the value of whatever's been seized. This could result in a lot of defendants having the book thrown at them while the state processes their property through civil proceedings.

Even with this downside, it's heartening to see the nation's highest court recognizes the perverse incentives of civil forfeiture and the damage it does to citizens and their inherent rights. Hopefully, this will make the court more receptive of future forfeiture cases where broader precedent may be set that will stem the flow of abuse resulting from this highly-questionable law enforcement practice.

Filed Under: 8th amendment, civil asset forfeiture, excessive fines, incorporation, indiana, neil gorsuch, sonia sotomayor, stephen breyer, supreme court, tyson timbs

Supreme Court Agrees To Take Petition Asking Whether Eighth Amendment Protections Apply To Asset Forfeiture

from the chance-to-reshape-forfeiture-programs-from-the-bench dept

The Supreme Court has agreed to take a case that may alter how states run their asset forfeiture programs. As it stands now, there's nothing unifying forfeiture policies across the nation and, under Jeff Sessions, the DOJ has reopened the federal forfeiture pressure valve, allowing state agencies to bypass recently-passed reforms.

But there's still something at the federal level that possibly affects state-level forfeitures. The question for the Supreme Court is whether or not a Constitutional protection overrides state laws. The case centers on the seizure of an Indiana resident's Land Rover after a drug bust. Tyson Timbs had purchased the $42,000 vehicle with funds from his father's life insurance. So, the vehicle was legally obtained with funds not even remotely linked to Timbs' drug dealing.

The state took it because Timbs used it to transport drugs on one of the controlled buys cops performed. It processed it as a civil asset forfeiture (rather than a criminal asset forfeiture) to get around the fact the fines and sentence didn't justify the criminal seizure of a $42,000 vehicle. A drug sale of $225 netted Timbs a year of house arrest and $1200 in legal fees. Then the state decided to take his car because why not.

That's what Timbs is challenging. The Eighth Amendment contains an Excessive Fines Clause. Timbs is hoping to have the court find the seizure of a $42,000 vehicle over $225 worth of drugs a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Considering the state levies a maximum $10,000 fine for the offense Timbs was charged with, a $40,000 seizure would appear to be excessive. But Timbs only batted .500 in Indiana courts.

[T]he trial court ruled against the government. Because taking Tyson’s car would be “grossly disproportional” to his offense—for which Tyson had already been punished—the trial court held that the forfeiture would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed. Tyson suffered from drug addiction, the court noted, but his only record of dealing was selling a small amount of drugs to undercover police. The court also noted the “financial burdens” that Tyson had already faced when he pleaded guilty. Taking his car on top of all that would violate the Eighth Amendment.

Then the Indiana Supreme Court stepped in. Breaking with at least 14 other state high courts, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment provides no protection at all against fines and forfeitures imposed by the states. Until the U.S. Supreme Court intervenes, the Indiana Supreme Court said, “We will not impose federal obligations on the State that the federal government itself has not mandated.”

As Timbs notes in his Supreme Court brief [PDF], the court needs to take action to resolve splits not only at the federal level, but across the many state courts. There's no unified judicial theory of Eighth Amendment protections against civil asset forfeiture and this is only allowing states where forfeiture abuse is prevalent to become more abusive. The DOJ's escape hatch certainly isn't helping. A decision in Timbs' favor won't be a drastic alteration but it will provide another avenue of attack for those seeking to challenge forfeitures.

It may also force law enforcement agencies to do what they say they do, rather than what they actually do. They claim forfeiture is an essential tool for crippling huge criminal organizations and drug cartels. In reality, it's usually just a convenient way for agencies to enrich themselves at the expense of low-level dealers like Timbs and, worse, people who are never criminally charged.

Filed Under: 8th amendment, asset forfeiture, civil asset forfeiture, doj, indiana, legality, supreme court, tyson timbs

Do The Statutory Damages Rates For Copyright Infringement Violate The Eighth Amendment?

from the questions,-questions dept

While we often discuss the rather large conflict between the First Amendment and copyright law in the US, Stephan Kinsella is also wondering if the current statutory damages rates in copyright also violate the Eight Amendment and its prohibition on "excessive fines." I somewhat wonder if that issue will come up in the Jammie Thomas appeal, which will focus heavily on whether or not an award within the statutory damages rates was too high, but I believe the focus there will be more on the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether or not it was a violation of due process. In fact, it seems like most of the Constitutional discussions on statutory rates focuses on the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth. I'm certainly not a Constitutional scholar (and would love for legal scholars to chime in here), but I believe this is because the courts historically treat these two amendments as related, and effectively argue that the 8th Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment is applied via the 14th Amendment on due process when it involves state laws. So I'm not entirely clear why it's also being used on a federal copyright issue -- but I'm sure someone out there will help explain it to us in the comments shortly!

Filed Under: 8th amendment, constitution, copyright, punishment