We already knew that Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner was getting ready to release a major new anti-NSA spying bill called the USA Freedom Act, and Derek Khanna has just revealed many of the details of the bill, scheduled to be introduced in both houses of Congress this coming Tuesday. It will be backed by Sensenbrenner in the House and Pat Leahy in the Senate, and will have plenty of co-sponsors (already about 50 have signed up) including some who had initially voted against the Amash Amendment back in July. In other words, this bill has a very high likelihood of actually passing, though I imagine that the intelligence community, and potentially the White House, will push back on it. For Congress, gathering up a veto-proof majority may be a more difficult task.
The bill appears to do a number of good things, focusing on limiting the NSA's ability to do dragnet collections, rather than specific and targeted data collection, while also significantly increasing transparency of the activities of the NSA as well as the FISA court when it comes to rulings that interpret the law.
End bulk data collection under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. This is the program that collects metadata on every phone call based on a twisted interpretation of the law and a thorough revisionist dictionary for words like "targeted," "relevance," "search" and "surveillance." Sensenbrenner, who crafted much of the original PATRIOT Act insists that when he wrote it, it was intended to already ban this kind of dragnet. The new bill will make that explicit. Similarly, it appears that the bill will require the intelligence community to be much more proactive in filtering out unnecessary information and deleting information collected incidentally.
Fixing the FISC: As many have recommended, the law would make sure that a public advocate can be present to be an adversarial presence, arguing in favor of protecting Americans' privacy. There will be a special Office of the Special Advocate (OSA) created for this role. Somewhat surprisingly, the OSA will even be allowed to appeal decisions that the FISA court makes if it believes they stray from the law or the Constitution. That could be a very big deal.
Separately, the DOJ will be required to declassify all FISC decisions from the past decade that involve "a significant construction or interpretation of the law." That is, no more secret law-making by the FISC.
Greater transparency for companies on the receiving end of demands for information. This would make it so companies that get orders to hand over information can reveal numbers of requests, effectively stopping the existing gag orders which prevent us from knowing how often the NSA is demanding info from internet companies.
This legislation doesn't solve all the problems, but it does clearly attack the most egregious actions by the NSA and the wider intelligence community. I imagine those in that community will fight back hard on this. We'll be hearing outrageous claims about how people will die if they can't spy on all of us. But, in the end, if the NSA hadn't continued to expand its spying efforts, we wouldn't be in this mess to begin with.
Paul Rosenzweig, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at Homeland Security, was supposed to testify for the House Intelligence Committee about NSA surveillance. The hearing was postponed and Rosenzweig can't make the new date, but he's posted the testimony he intended to give, in which he makes this incredible claim:
Transparency is good. Too much transparency defeats the very purpose of democracy.
The details of this claim are, obviously, a lot more nuanced, but it seems like it's built on a false premise: that people are seeking absolute and complete transparency in everything that the government does. While that may be true in some cases, it's a very extreme minority. Most people are merely arguing that there are specific things that the government does in our name, which (often by law or Constitution) require significantly more transparency. But, Rosenzweig sets up this strawman to suggest that those arguing for greater transparency don't recognize that there can be any secrecy.
Madison understood that transparency was not a supreme value that trumped all other concerns. He also participated in the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787, the secrecy of whose proceedings was the key to its success. While governments may hide behind closed doors, U.S. democracy was also born behind them.
Right, but at the end of that process, it was made very, very public. Not so with NSA surveillance. So this is a total red herring. Imagine if the US Constitution were not just written in secret, but then kept that way? Furthermore, in retrospect, it's difficult to see why it even made sense for the Constitutional Convention to have been secret in the first place. There's really no reason why the negotiations and debates couldn't have been done publicly.
In the new domain of dataveillance, the form of oversight should vary depending upon the extent to which transparency and opacity are necessary to the new powers authorized. Allowing some form of surveillance is vital to assure the protection of American interests. Conversely, allowing full public disclosure of our sources and methods is dangerous – identifying publicly how we conduct surveillance risks use of that information by terrorists and, in turn, draws a roadmap of which threats are not known. Thus, complete transparency will defeat the very purpose of disclosure and may even make us less secure.
This is the only place where Rosenzweig seems to come close to actually defending his initial statement that "too much transparency defeats the very purpose of democracy," and it's a very, very weak sell. If his initial premise is true, then he appears to be arguing that "the purpose of democracy" is to "protect us from terrorists." That's not true. It's a fundamental error in his analysis. In fact, it can be very strongly argued that the opposite is true: we've long agreed that trading lives for freedom is part of the American Way. Patrick Henry argued "give me liberty or give me death." He didn't argue that we needed to give up liberties to protect him from death.
Furthermore, it's patently and obviously false that public disclosure of how surveillance is conducted makes those surveillance methods useless. For decades it has been public knowledge that law enforcement can wiretap phone lines. And yet it remains a useful surveillance tool. Yes, some terrorists will figure out ways around it, but (as many people noted), most terrorists were already well aware that any electronic communication could and would be tracked, and they were careful to use other means when possible. Furthermore, the goal of a free society should not be to stop terrorists from any possible way of communicating in secret, but to recognize that this is going to happen no matter what, and to focus on alternative means of policing, intelligence and law enforcement to do our best to protect against it.
In the end, I have to think that Patrick Henry's rallying cry of "give me liberty or give me death" is a hell of a lot more American that Rosenzweig's surveillance state apologism of "too much transparency undermines democracy." We should be living in a country that stands behind the first statement and rejects, wholeheartedly, the cowardice and shamefulness of the latter.
As noted by Politco, General Alexander isn't a fan of journalists doing anything about these documents:
"I think it’s wrong that that newspaper reporters have all these documents, the 50,000—whatever they have and are selling them and giving them out as if these—you know it just doesn’t make sense," Alexander said in an interview with the Defense Department's "Armed With Science" blog.
"We ought to come up with a way of stopping it. I don’t know how to do that. That’s more of the courts and the policymakers but, from my perspective, it’s wrong to allow this to go on," the NSA director declared.
It's not the policymakers and the courts. It's the Constitution, and it says there's freedom of the press.
Other parts of the interview continue to show Alexander spewing things that have already been debunked:
“When you look at the 9/11 commission, it faulted the intelligence community for not connecting the dots. We didn’t have the tools. These [programs we have now] are tools that help us connect the dots. We have learned that lesson once. We all vowed this would never happen again. We should commit to that course of action.”
That's not true. The 9/11 commission argued, indeed, that the intelligence service failed to connect the dots, but it wasn't because they lacked the information. It's just that it wasn't properly shared. The way to fix that is not to collect more information and make it even harder to connect the dots. And yet that's been General Alexander's strategy all along.
Elsewhere in the interview, Alexander laughably tries to pretend that US Cyber Command, which he also controls, is focused on protecting "intellectual property." But that's also not true. As has been clearly stated and confirmed, it's focused on offensive attacks, which it does more than any other country (even as the US government tries to scold countries like China and Iran for their online attacks).
And then, I guess he figures that if he's going to lie about, well, everything, why not go all in, and just claim that these programs aren't "spying."
“They aren’t spying programs,” he says directly. “One is called the Business Records FISA Program, or Section 215, and the other is called the FISA Amendment Act 702 or PRISM.”
The business records program, or Section 215, is probably the most misunderstood of the two programs. The metadata program takes information and puts it in a data repository. Metadata is the phone number, the date, time, group, and duration of the call.
“That’s all we have,” Gen. Alexander explains. “We don’t have any names or any content.”
Except that having that metadata is incredibly revealing and absolutely is a form of spying. If it's not, why won't General Alexander release his phone numbers, date, time, group and duration of all of his calls from the past year? Why not? Because he thinks that's private information. Because it is. And because General Alexander is a hypocrite.
“The oversight and compliance on these programs is greater than any other program in our government.”
Hahahahah. No. This is also a lie. It's been shown that the courts and Congress have admitted they're limited by what the NSA tells them -- and the NSA goes out of its way to avoid telling Congress very much.
Alexander also mocks the recent claims about spying on French phone calls, using the exact same dodge as his boss, James Clapper. Both pretend that the news reports said that 70 million calls were recorded. Alexander mocks this by pointing out it would be impossible to have so many calls listened to, and to find enough translators to understand them. But the reports were about mostly metadata, and just some recordings. Pretending that the press said something that it didn't doesn't make Alexander look trustworthy. It makes it look like he's lying.
Not surprisingly, though hilariously, the blogger for the Defense Department's "Armed With Science," Jessica Tozer doesn't appear to challenge any of Alexander's claims. Instead, she repeats all the statements and mocks anyone who might challenge them:
Some people would rather believe a dramatic, convenient lie than a real, uncomplicated truth. Don’t be that person.
I'd argue that right back at Tozer and Alexander, because Alexander is flat out lying in the interview, based on confirmed facts.
Don’t give credence to speculation, rumor, or hyperbole. Simply put, don’t give into the hype. When it comes down it, a nation without the NSA would be a nation left undefended.
And that, dear readers, is no lie.
Um. It's absolutely a challengeable statement, but the Defense Department, obviously, isn't here for reasoned discussion on this issues.
"Today, no telephone in America makes a call without leaving a record with the NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters or leaves America without passing through the NSA's hands," Snowden said in a statement Thursday.
"Our representatives in Congress tell us this is not surveillance. They're wrong."
Why is it not surveillance? Feinstein claimed, in direct contradiction to someone who's seen most of the inner workings of the agency's programs, that because it doesn't sweep up communications or names, it isn't surveillance. Also, she pointed out that surveillance or not, it's legal. So there.
Maybe Feinstein considers the term "surveillance" to mean something closer to the old school interpretation -- shadowy figures in unmarked vans wearing headphones and peering through binoculars.
Of course, this kind of surveillance contained many elements completely eliminated by the combination of the PATRIOT Act, the FISA Amendments Act, and a very charitable reading of the Third Party Doctrine. You know, the sort of stuff those shadowy men used to utilize: warrants, targeted investigations, reasonable suspicion, a grudging working relationship with the Fourth Amendment…
That's all gone now. The courts have declared that sweeping up business records on millions of Americans is no more a violation of the Fourth Amendment than gathering metadata on a single person. The NSA has warped the definition of "surveillance" just as surely as they've warped the definition of "relevant." The wholesale, untargeted gathering of millions of "transactions" from internet and phone activity doesn't seem to resemble what anyone might historically think of as "surveillance," but it's surveillance nonetheless.
Sure, the NSA may not look at everything it gathers, but it has the capability to do so and it shows no interest in letting any of its dragnets be taken out of commission. The NSA's defenders downplay the agency's many intrusions by first playing the "legal" and "oversight" cards and, when those fail to impress, belittle their critics by trotting out condescending statements like, "The NSA isn't interested in Grandma's birthday phone call or the cat videos you email to your friends."
Well, no shit. We're hardly interested in that, either. We're not worried about the NSA looking through tons of inane interactions. We know it doesn't have the time or inclination to do so. We're more concerned it's looking at the stuff it finds interesting and amassing databases full of "suspicious" persons by relying on algorithms and keywords -- a fallible process that robs everything of context and turns slightly pointed hay into the needles it so desperately needs to justify its existence.
What makes this even more frightening is that the agency then hands this unfiltered, untargeted, massive collection of data off to other agencies, not only in the US but in other countries, subjecting innocent Americans' data to new algorithms, keywords and mentalities, increasing the possibility of false positives.
But what we're mainly concerned about is the fact that an agency that claims its doing this to combat terrorism can't seem to come up with much evidence that its programs are working. The NSA has deprived us of civil liberties while delivering next to nothing in terms of security. Americans have been sold out to a data-hungry beast, and even if it's not officially "surveillance," it's still completely unacceptable.
Michael Hayden, former NSA and CIA boss, who famously argued that the only people complaining about NSA surveillance were internet shut-ins who couldn't get laid, apparently never learned that when you're in a public place, someone might overhear your phone calls. Entrepreneur and former MoveOn.org director Tom Matzzie just so happened to be on the Acela express train from DC to NY when he (1) spotted Hayden sitting behind him and (2) started overhearing a series of "off the record" phone calls with press about the story of the week: the revelations of the NSA spying on foreign leaders. Matzzie did what any self-respecting American would do: live-tweet the calls. During the calls Hayden apparently slammed the Obama administration, while insisting he only be quoted as a "former senior administration official."
I'm sure Hayden will be happy about this. After all, as I'm sure he'd be the first to argue, he had no expectation of privacy in such a situation, right? In the end, it appears someone in his office spotted the tweets, and alerted Hayden who ended up taking a photo with Matzzie and having a short conversation with him.
A bunch of the tweets are below:
Former NSA spy boss Michael Hayden on Acela behind me blabbing "on background as a former senior admin official" Sounds defensive.
For all the talk from the NSA folks how revealing how we collect phone information will lead terrorists to use other means... the fact that an ex-NSA boss would give such calls in a public place like this makes it pretty clear that even if you know if others eavesdrop on you, and you're supposedly an "expert" on this stuff, sometimes people just take a chance anyway. And sometimes it doesn't work so well.
Of course, Hayden's response to all of this is to blame "liberal activists" for this "bullshit" story, while insisting that Matzzie's statements about what the calls were about were "terribly wrong." As if anyone's going to believe that.
If you haven't been following, a very large coalition of folks worried about NSA surveillance activities have put together the Stop Watching Us Rally, taking place on this Saturday in DC. As folks prepare for the rally, it appears to be gaining a lot of steam and support, including via an excellent new video featuring a combination of politicians, actors, activists and whistleblowers talking about the importance of our privacy.
The NSA's supporters keep acting like this is no big deal and it will all blow over, but that seems less and less likely.
The latest Snowden leak story published by the Guardian focuses on the claim that the NSA supposedly monitored the calls of 35 world leaders, but really that seems like a secondary point. The "35 world leaders" claim is based on a memo noting that a single US official shared his rolodex with the NSA, and that helped them track those world leaders, some of whom it was already tracking. But the key point here is that this was just one official, and it's clear that the NSA was seeking similar access from other officials. You can read the details here:
The key lines:
In one recent case, a US official provided NSA with 200 phone numbers to 35 world leaders. S2 Operations Staff immediately supplied this information to the S2 Production Centers (PCs). Despite the fact that the majority is probably available via open source, the PCs have noted 43 previously unknown phone numbers. These numbers plus several others have been tasked to OCTAVE.
OCTAVE is an NSA tool for metadata, so it would appear that they were collecting the (still important) metadata on those calls, but not necessarily recording them or listening to them (caveat: "... under this program...").
But, the memo also notes that the NSA is encouraging other US officials to basically share their rolodexes at every opportunity. Perhaps that's not a surprise -- US officials are likely to do that sort of thing, but it certainly will make foreign leaders a lot more careful about exactly which phone lines they share with US colleagues.
This success leads S2 to wonder if there are NSA liaisons whose supported customers may be willing to share their rolodexes or phone lists with NSA as potential sources of intelligence. S2 welcomes such information!
Two weeks after Edward Snowden's first revelations about sweeping government surveillance, President Obama shot back. "We know of at least 50 threats that have been averted because of this information not just in the United States, but, in some cases, threats here in Germany," Obama said during a visit to Berlin in June. "So lives have been saved."
In the months since, intelligence officials, media outlets, and members of Congress from both parties all repeated versions of the claim that NSA surveillance has stopped more than 50 terrorist attacks. The figure has become a key talking point in the debate around the spying programs.
"Fifty-four times this and the other program stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here and in Europe -- saving real lives," Rep. Mike Rogers, a Michigan Republican who chairs the House Intelligence Committee, said on the House floor in July, referring to programs authorized by a pair of post-9/11 laws. "This isn't a game. This is real."
But there's no evidence that the oft-cited figure is accurate.
The NSA itself has been inconsistent on how many plots it has helped prevent and what role the surveillance programs played. The agency has often made hedged statements that avoid any sweeping assertions about attacks thwarted.
A chart declassified by the agency in July, for example, says that intelligence from the programs on 54 occasions "has contributed to the [U.S. government's] understanding of terrorism activities and, in many cases, has enabled the disruption of potential terrorist events at home and abroad" -- a much different claim than asserting that the programs have been responsible for thwarting 54 attacks.
NSA officials have mostly repeated versions of this wording.
When NSA chief Gen. Keith Alexander spoke at a Las Vegas security conference in July, for instance, he referred to "54 different terrorist-related activities," 42 of which were plots and 12 of which were cases in which individuals provided "material support" to terrorism.
But the NSA has not always been so careful.
During Alexander's speech in Las Vegas, a slide in an accompanying slideshow read simply "54 ATTACKS THWARTED."
And in a recent letter to NSA employees, Alexander and John Inglis, the NSA's deputy director, wrote that the agency has "contributed to keeping the U.S. and its allies safe from 54 terrorist plots." (The letter was obtained by reporter Kevin Gosztola from a source with ties to the intelligence community. The NSA did not respond when asked to authenticate it.)
Asked for clarification of the surveillance programs' record, the NSA declined to comment.
Earlier this month, Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., pressed Alexander on the issue at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing.
"Would you agree that the 54 cases that keep getting cited by the administration were not all plots, and of the 54, only 13 had some nexus to the U.S.?" Leahy said at the hearing. "Would you agree with that, yes or no?"
"Yes," Alexander replied, without elaborating.
It's impossible to assess the role NSA surveillance played in the 54 cases because, while the agency has provided a full list to Congress, it remains classified.
Officials have openly discussed only a few of the cases (see below), and the agency has identified only one -- involving a San Diego man convicted of sending $8,500 to Somalia to support the militant group Al Shabab -- in which NSA surveillance played a dominant role.
The surveillance programs at issue fall into two categories: The collection of metadata on all American phone calls under the Patriot Act, and the snooping of electronic communications targeted at foreigners under a 2007 surveillance law. Alexander has said that surveillance authorized by the latter law provided "the initial tip" in roughly half of the 54 cases. The NSA has not released examples of such cases.
After reading the full classified list, Leahy concluded the NSA's surveillance has some value but still questioned the agency's figures.
"We've heard over and over again the assertion that 54 terrorist plots were thwarted" by the two programs, Leahy told Alexander at the Judiciary Committee hearing this month. "That's plainly wrong, but we still get it in letters to members of Congress, we get it in statements. These weren't all plots and they weren't all thwarted. The American people are getting left with the inaccurate impression of the effectiveness of NSA programs."
The origins of the "54" figure go back to a House Intelligence Committee hearing on June 18, less than two weeks after the Guardian's publication of the first story based on documents leaked by Snowden.
At that hearing, Alexander said, "The information gathered from these programs provided the U.S. government with critical leads to help prevent over 50 potential terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the world." He didn't specify what "events" meant. Pressed by Rep. Jim Himes, D-Conn., Alexander said the NSA would send a more detailed breakdown to the committee.
Speaking in Baltimore the next week, Alexander gave an exact figure: 54 cases "in which these programs contributed to our understanding, and in many cases, helped enable the disruption of terrorist plots in the U.S. and in over 20 countries throughout the world."
But members of Congress have repeatedly ignored the distinctions and hedges.
The websites of the Republicans and Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee include pages titled, "54 Attacks in 20 Countries Thwarted By NSA Collection."
And individual congressmen have frequently cited the figure in debates around NSA surveillance.
Rep. Lynn Westmoreland, R-Ga., who is also on the House Intelligence Committee, released a statement in July referring to "54 terrorist plots that have been foiled by the NSA programs." Asked about the figure, Westmoreland spokeswoman Leslie Shedd told ProPublica that "he was citing declassified information directly from the National Security Agency."
Rep. Brad Wenstrup, R-Ohio, issued a statement in July saying "the programs in question have thwarted 54 specific plots, many targeting Americans on American soil."
Rep. Joe Heck, R-Nev., issued his own statement the next day: "The Amash amendment would have eliminated Section 215 of the Patriot Act which we know has thwarted 54 terrorist plots against the US (and counting)." (The amendment, which aimed to bar collection of Americans' phone records, was narrowly defeated in the House.)
Mike Rogers, the Intelligence Committee chairman who credited the surveillance programs with thwarting 54 attacks on the House floor, repeated the claim to Bob Schieffer on CBS' "Face the Nation" in July."You just heard what he said, senator," Schieffer said, turning to Sen. Mark Udall, D-Colo., an NSA critic. "Fifty-six terror plots here and abroad have been thwarted by the NSA program. So what's wrong with it, then, if it's managed to stop 56 terrorist attacks? That sounds like a pretty good record." Asked about Rogers' remarks, House Intelligence Committee spokeswoman Susan Phalen said in a statement: "In 54 specific cases provided by the NSA, the programs stopped actual plots or put terrorists in jail before they could effectuate further terrorist plotting. These programs save lives by disrupting attacks. Sometimes the information is found early in the planning, and sometimes very late in the planning. But in all those cases these people intended to kill innocent men and women through the use of terror."
Rep. James Lankford, R-Okla., went even further in a town hall meeting in August. Responding to a question about the NSA vacuuming up Americans' phone records, he said the program had "been used 54 times to be able to interrupt 54 different terrorist plots here in the United States that had originated from overseas in the past eight years. That's documented."
The same day, Rep. Jim Langevin, D-R.I., who sits on the Intelligence Committee, defended the NSA at a town hall meeting with constituents in Cranston, R.I. "I know that these programs have been directly effective in thwarting and derailing 54 terrorist attacks," he said. Asked about Langevin's comments, spokeswoman Meg Fraser said in an email, "The committee was given information from NSA on August 1 that clearly indicated they considered the programs in question to have been used to help disrupt 54 terrorist events. That is the information the Congressman relied on when characterizing the programs at his town hall."
Wenstrup, Heck and Lankford did not respond to requests for comment.
The claims have also appeared in the media. ABC News, CNN and the New York Times have all repeated versions of the claim that more than 50 plots have been thwarted by the programs.
The case of Basaaly Moalin, the San Diego man convicted of sending $8,500 to Somalia to support Al Shabab, the terrorist group that has taken responsibility for the attack on a Kenyan mall last month. The NSA has said its collection of American phone records allowed it to determine that a U.S. phone was in contact with a Shabab figure, which in turn led them to Moalin. NSA critic Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., has argued that the NSA could have gotten a court order to get the phone records in question and that the case does not justify the bulk collection of Americans' phone records.
The case of Najibullah Zazi, who in 2009 plotted to bomb the New York subway system. The NSA has said that an email it intercepted to an account of a known Al Qaeda figure in Pakistan allowed authorities to identify and ultimately capture Zazi. But an Associated Press examination of the case concluded that, again, the NSA's account of the case did not show the need for the new warrantless powers at issue in the current debate. "Even before the surveillance laws of 2007 and 2008, the FBI had the authority to -- and did, regularly -- monitor email accounts linked to terrorists," the AP reported.
A case involving David Coleman Headley, the Chicago man who helped plan the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack. Intelligence officials have said that NSA surveillance helped thwart a subsequent plot involving Headley to attack a Danish newspaper. A ProPublica examination of that episode concluded that it was a tip from British intelligence, rather than NSA surveillance, that led authorities to Headley.
A case involving a purported plot to attack the New York Stock Exchange. This convoluted episode involves three Americans, including Khalid Ouazzani of Kansas City, Mo., who pleaded guilty in 2010 to bank fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy to provide material support to Al Qaeda. An FBI official said in June that NSA surveillance helped in the case "to detect a nascent plotting to bomb the New York Stock Exchange." But no one has been charged with crimes related to that or any other planned attack. (Ouazzani was sentenced to 14 years last month.) The Kansas City Star reported that one of the men in the case had "pulled together a short report with the kind of public information easily available from Google Earth, tourist maps and brochures" and that his contact in Yemen "tore up the report, 'threw it in the street' and never showed it to anyone." Court records also suggest that the men in Yemen that Ouazzani sent over $20,000 to may have been scamming him and spent some of the money on personal expenses.
For more from ProPublica on the NSA, read about the agency's campaign to crack Internet security, a look at the surveillance reforms Obama supported before he was president, and a fact-check on claims about the NSA and Sept. 11.
Another day, another foreign country realizing that the NSA is spying on its leadership. This time around, it's Germany, where Chancellor Angela Merkel, alerted to the possibility by reporters working on Snowden documents for Spiegel, called President Obama to confront him about evidence that the NSA was monitoring her mobile phone calls.
During her conversation with Obama, Merkel expressed her expectation that "US authorities would provide an explanation about the possible extent of such surveillance practices, and thus answer questions that the German government already posed months ago," Seibert said.
"As a close ally of the United States of America, the German government expects a clear contractual agreement on the activities of the agencies and their cooperation," he added.
Of course, as with similar revelations recently concerning Brazil, France and Mexico, none of this should really be all that surprising. Spying agencies spy on top elected officials and bureaucrats in other countries all the time. It's what they do. A lot of the reaction to getting caught is just political theater. It's embarrassing, but not nearly as big a deal as governments spying on citizens. That said, the amusing bit is this:
"The President assured the Chancellor that the United States is not monitoring and will not monitor the communications of Chancellor Merkel."
Oh, and this:
The spokeswoman did not wish to specify whether this statement applied to the past.
[the] NSA, asked [about the White House's] statement wording, officially says it has nothing to add [about] whether Merkel was targeted in the past
Yup. Genius move by the White House spin doctors there. Say we're not monitoring and won't in the future, calling that much more attention to the question of "in the past" and then refuse to make any statements about that.
James Clapper has finally officially responded to the recent leak published by French newspaper Le Monde, which indicated the NSA had gathered data on 70 million phone calls and intercepted an untold number of them. While his statement is preferable to his office's first response ("blah blah completely legal blah blah subject to rigorous oversight"), it really does nothing more than affirm the intelligence community's fondness for word games.
Recent articles published in the French newspaper Le Monde contain inaccurate and misleading information regarding U.S. foreign intelligence activities. The allegation that the National Security Agency collected more than 70 million “recordings of French citizens’ telephone data” is false.
While we are not going to discuss the details of our activities, we have repeatedly made it clear that the United States gathers intelligence of the type gathered by all nations. The U.S. collects intelligence to protect the nation, its interests, and its allies from, among other things, threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
It's all semantics, whether the NSA's defenders are discussing abilities vs. authority or whether or not a collection occurred "under this program." In this case, Clapper takes a convoluted statement ("recordings… of telephone data") and chooses to present both allegations (collected phone data/recorded calls) as completely false by cherry-picking a single badly written (or translated) sentence.
When the story first broke, there was some confusion as to whether the NSA had recorded 70 million calls or simply collected metadata, in part due to the wording used by Le Monde. The Washington Post clarified this by pointing out that the NSA collected metadata on 70 million phone calls and intercepted certain calls to certain phone numbers. Even Le Monde itself broke this down further, highlighting the fact that the NSA utilized a handful of collection processes.
"The agency has several collection methods," Le Monde said. "When certain French phone numbers are dialled, a signal is activated that triggers the automatic recording of certain conversations. This surveillance also recovers SMS and content based on keywords."
Clapper addresses none of these activities and simply focuses on the one sentence that gives him plausible (and convoluted) deniability.
In essence, the foreign collection (although, in the NSA's hivemind, a collection doesn't actually occur until an agent searches the, uh, collected data) is almost identical to the NSA's Section 215 collections. Vast amounts of metadata grabbed simply because there's no legal basis preventing it.
The rest of his statement is mostly true -- almost every country spies on other countries. This has been the status quo for years, and while the French government has made lots of noise about this recent leak, it seems to be largely using this as an opportunity to reroute outrage and criticism away from its own domestic spying.
The constant refrain of "terrorism" and "WMDs" is to be expected as well, but it hardly explains the repeatedly surfacing evidence that the agency also spies on foreign corporations, something that sounds more like industrial espionage than ensuring national security.
Clapper winds things up by telling readers France and America are still best friends and, somewhat chillingly, "we will continue to cooperate on security and intelligence matters going forward." I know this is probably meant to sound like a cheery "we'll give you a head's up if we need your citizens' phone data," but given the cozy relationship the NSA has with the UK's GCHQ and others, it sounds more like "we'll show you ours if you'll show us yours." Nations cooperating on security matters seems like a good idea, but when a government begins sharing the unfiltered results of its domestic surveillance with foreign nations while requiring little more than a "gentleman's agreement" that the data won't be abused, it's time to start worrying again.
