A year ago, there was a legal ruling in the US that said an individual could not be forced to hand over their encryption key to encrypted data on a computer, since it violates the 5th amendment against self-incrimination. Over in the UK, they apparently also have protections against self-incrimination, but apparently it doesn't cover handing over your encryption key (thanks to JJ for sending over the link). Basically, the ruling is pretty close to the opposite of the US ruling. Basically, it found that an encryption key isn't speech but an independent "thing" that can be required to be turned over to authorities.
Earlier this year, India demanded that RIM allow it to easily snoop on any email messages sent via Blackberry devices. The company explained that since the end user sets the encryption key, there's simply no way to provide a backdoor to snoop on the messages. However, now the government is proudly claiming that it's cracked the code and can now monitor Blackberry messages on various mobile operator networks. The details are quite vague, especially an offhand comment about how this is "wholly for non-enterprise solutions." That would suggest, then, that enterprise Blackberry messages may remain secure. It also raises questions about whether or not the mobile operators in question are simply providing access to their mail servers. Either way, the whole thing seems weird -- including the government's effort to publicize the fact that it's spying on Blackberry messages.
Ben Adida calls out Apple for the poor security of its MobileMe web applications and AppleInsider for its misguided defense of Apple's design. Most users know that a special "lock" icon in the corner of their browser is a signal that the contents of the current website is encrypted in transit, protecting it from third-party eavesdropping. Evidently, users of MobileMe have been alarmed that MobileMe applications don't take advantage of this feature, even when sensitive information is being transmitted. Appleinsider says this is no big deal because Apple uses "authenticated handling of JSON data exchanges" to ensure security, and as a result SSL is unnecessary. Moreover, "if Apple applied SSL encryption in the browser, it would only slow down every data exchange without really improving security, and instead only provide pundits with a false sense of security that distracts from real security threats."
As Adida points out, this is way off base. A malicious individual may discover a security hole in the unencrypted part of the site that Apple's engineers didn't think of. Encrypting the entire session, rather than just the parts that Apple thinks are security-sensitive, provides an important extra layer of protection. There's also a more fundamental problem with AppleInsider's argument: without SSL, the user has no real assurances that he's talking to Apple, rather than a third party executing a man-in-the-middle attack (perhaps using a poisoned DNS cache). SSL requires servers to present a certificate signed by a recognized certificate authority in order to prove that it's the website it claims to be. That makes it difficult for a third party to masquerade as a legitimate SSL-encrypted website.
The scheme works because the authentication algorithm is baked into the browser and can't be changed by the website being visited. In contrast, if the authentication is performed by JavaScript code that was supplied by the server you're trying to authenticate, the "authentication" process is completely useless. A man-in-the-middle attacker can simply substitute his own bogus authentication script for the real one, and no one will notice the difference. So even if you have complete faith in Apple's ability to write secure authentication algorithms, you can't trust a non-SSL website purporting to be from Apple because there's no way to be sure it's actually an Apple server.
Training ordinary users to follow good security practices is notoriously difficult. Widespread user understanding and acceptance of the "lock" icon in their browsers is arguably the most significant improvement in web security since the web was created. It's extremely counterproductive to undermine use confidence in SSL by telling users to put their faith in Apple's magical homebrew crypto algorithms instead.
For years, we've been pointing out that as the entertainment industry, telcos and the government increase efforts to spy on the activities of users (for various reasons, good or bad), all it's going to do is speed the adoption of encryption technologies. Well, that appears to be happening. Thanks to governments increasing the ability to spy on citizens combined with ISPs capitulating to entertainment industry and government demands to start acting as copyright cops, monitoring usage, more and more people are getting interested in encrypting their internet activity. While it's unclear if it will go anywhere (and some argue it's guaranteed to fail), the folks behind the Pirate Bay are the latest to jump into the game, promising a system that will "encrypt the entire internet."
Whether accomplished by The Pirate Bay or others, this is the near inevitable end result of this cat and mouse game. Even if you believe the entertainment industry, broadband providers and the government have both the best of intentions and the absolute right to do these kinds of monitoring activity, the fact that encryption will make it so those who don't want to monitored can hide means that it's only going to become more popular. And, at that point, it only makes the efforts by the entertainment industry, the broadband providers and the government that much more useless -- because all that monitoring they've pushed to do will not only be nearly impossible, but they've also lost the trust and respect of all those users/customers/constituents. It's a true lesson in the unintended consequences of getting what you wished for.
A few months back, we noted that the Indian government was demanding that RIM let government officials snoop on emails sent via Blackberry devices, or they would be banned in India. I'm not sure why it took so long for RIM to point this out, but it finally has explained to the government the nature of its encryption scheme which means that RIM itself cannot decrypt messages sent via the network, since they're based on an encryption key set up by the end user. It's not clear how India is going to respond, though the article notes the two sides are "talking."
It's certainly no secret that governments like to snoop on various forms of communication whenever possible, but they're usually not quite so blatant about the specifics. Endgadget points us to the news that Indian security officials have demanded that RIM open up a backdoor to unencrypt all messages sent via the Blackberry network or face being shutdown in India. With approximately 400,000 Crackberry users in India, that's likely to upset quite a few people. At this point, though, do people doing things likely to attract the attention of the feds not know to seek out more secure means of communication?
Ed Felten, and the various grad students who work for him at Princeton, have done plenty to contribute to the computer security field (and make quite a name for themselves), from breaking the old SDMI encryption that the recording industry insisted was unbeatable (which nearly got Felten sued) to showing just how vulnerable e-voting machines are. However, he may have just broken his biggest story yet. Felten and a group of colleagues have now shown that hard disk encryption is incredibly easy to beat. This should be a huge concern, considering how many people and organizations rely on data encryption to protect important data. In fact, with many of the "lost" hard drive stories over the past few years, many organizations have insisted the risk was minimal, since the data was all encrypted. Yet, as Felten's team shows in this video below, not only is it quite easy to defeat the encryption using a simple can of compressed air, in some cases, there isn't much that can be done to protect against this. As the video notes, this won't work on some systems if the computer is turned completely off and the encryption package opens up before the operating system boots -- but otherwise, most systems are vulnerable.
Basically, they've figured out that, despite what many believe, data held in RAM does not disappear immediately when the power is cut. And, if you freeze the chip, you can make the data last a very long time. This is important, because for disk encryption, the key to unlocking the data resides in the RAM. If someone can access that key in the RAM and make a copy of it, then they can unencrypt all of the data without knowing your password.
It's no secret that every time ISPs look to filter or degrade the performance of a certain kind of traffic, it only increases attempts to encrypt the traffic, which actually makes things worse for the ISPs. So now that Comcast is standing by its BitTorrent traffic shaping efforts, a group of different BitTorrent developers are working together to build in encryption that gets around the Comcast traffic shaping system. That encryption will, of course, add somewhat to the overhead that Comcast needs to deal with, and will become more expensive if they have to keep looking for new systems to degrade traffic. Perhaps they'll just follow the lead of some other ISPs in simply degrading all encrypted traffic -- though, considering how much legitimate traffic is encrypted, that's going to cause some problems. Of course, rather than spending so much fighting all of this, they could focus on building out their systems to better handle the traffic. But why would they do that?
The Wikileaks project is starting to bear fruit, with documents leaked to the site beginning to get a lot of attention. The latest example is correspondence between the German government and a vendor (via Slashdot) that apparently makes software for intercepting Skype calls. Interestingly, the interception technology appears to be pretty primitive and rather expensive. The software has to be installed on the Skype client, and the vendor suggests that this can be accomplished by attaching a trojan to an e-mail or physically entering the premises to install the software on the target machine. And, evidently, only Windows 2000 and XP are supported; Vista support is still in the works. The company charges thousands of euros per target computer. This suggests that Skype's encryption technology is secure against at least the eavesdropping techniques available to the German government. Apparently they haven't found a way to decode encrypted Skype traffic off the wire, so they're forced to resort to these fairly cumbersome attacks on Skype clients -- attacks that are no more convenient for law enforcement than simply bugging the target's office. That suggests that the risk of comprehensive government surveillance of online telephony is still a fair ways off. If you encrypt your online activities, they're probably pretty secure. Of course, it's entirely possible that other government agencies, such as the NSA, have more sophisticated eavesdropping technology that they haven't shared with the Germans. My guess is that any government agencies possessing really sophisticated eavesdropping tools are also less likely to have their private documents show up on Wikileaks.
AT&T announced last summer that it was going to start filtering traffic for copyrighted content -- so we're still not entirely sure why many in the press seem to think it was something new when discussed at CES a few weeks ago. However, this new burst of attention has many more people pointing out all the reasons this is bad for AT&T itself. As we said, this seems to make no sense at all, unless it's some bizarre attempt to come up with an excuse to get rid of net neutrality. In that post, we noted that any filtering would likely open up additional liabilities for AT&T, potentially losing its safe harbors from being a service provider (safe harbors that AT&T itself spent a lot of effort lobbying to have put into the law). Tim Wu has a lot more detail on that aspect of this plan (which he calls "corporate seppuku"). However, there are many other problems for AT&T as well. For example, it won't take long for someone to accuse AT&T of violating wiretap laws, a charge which may be accurate. But the biggest point is that this won't even do what they hope it will do. It won't stop unauthorized transfers from happening and it won't reduce network traffic. As we've discussed in the past, every move to do this kind of filtering will only drive up the market for encryption technologies, and that encryption actually adds more overhead to internet traffic. The PC World article linked above notes that 20% of all bittorrent traffic is encrypted, and if that number goes up, as it will under a filtering regime, the network load will only increase. So, if AT&T actually thinks (as it sometimes claims) that filtering will decrease the burden on the network, it's likely very mistaken.
