Belgian Court Fines Microsoft For Failing To Comply With Its Impossible Order

from the we-said-JUMP dept

You can't always get what you want. But if you try sometime, you just might fine... a company for being unable to deliver on the impossible.

Belgium has fined Skype €30,000 for failing to comply with a court request to intercept users' communications, something Skype claims was technically impossible at the time of the request.

According to Het Belang van Limburg, a Dutch-language newspaper in Belgium, the fine was delivered by the court in Mechelen because Skype had failed, in September 2012, to deliver up anything more than metadata in response to an investigation into a criminal organisation.

The court, failing to understand anything but its power to order people around, demanded that Skype turn over communications. Skype turned over the only thing it could actually obtain, explaining that its architecture didn't support the interception of calls. No dice. That only made the court angry.

The court was no more happy to have pointed out to it that Microsoft didn't actually fall under its jurisdiction. It maintains no data centers in Belgium, nor does it have anyone employed there. Microsoft suggested the court work with governments of countries where it actually maintains a presence and utilize their mutual assistance treaties.

None of these facts appear to have mattered. The court says Microsoft should be able to do the impossible because the law is the law.

Het Belang van Limburg quoted prosecutor Tim Hoogenbemt as saying: "Skype offers services in our country, so it needs to know the laws. And therefore know that the court may ask interception measures."

Sometimes the law isn't the law, though. Microsoft pointed out the law doesn't actually apply to it since it's a software provider, rather than a service provider.

And sometimes the law is an ass. The fine is still in place despite arguments of impossibility, illegality, and "not applicable" to the contrary. It may not stick. Microsoft is appealing the decision.

This isn't the first time Belgian courts have overreached. Back in 2009, Belgian officials blew off perfectly workable mutual assistance treaties, demanding user information directly from Yahoo's US headquarters. Yahoo, like Microsoft, pointed out that it has no data centers or employees in Belgium. Instead of rethinking its approach, the government took the company to criminal court. That court, like this one, decided to fine the company for doing the exact thing it was supposed to be doing: protecting its users' privacy.

And that's not the limit of Belgian exceptionalism. A "royal decree" from the Belgian government (which bypasses the Parliamentary approval process needed for actual legislation) forces ISPs to collect and store tons of info on their subscribers, including how many emails are sent, VoIP use (hello, Skype!), call metadata, etc. -- just in case law enforcement might need it. When it was pointed out this decree violated the EU's privacy directive, the government shrugged and called the agreement it signed "obsolete."

Given these decisions, it's not even useful advice to suggest just not doing business in Belgium. It quite obviously doesn't matter to the courts where the data or communications they're seeking are actually located.

Filed Under: belgium, intercept, phone calls, skype, warrant
Companies: microsoft, skype

Microsoft Agrees To Hand Over Skype User Data To Russian Police

from the laying-down-for-its-users dept

Microsoft's defense of its very close relationship with national intelligence agencies has historically been that it "complies with applicable laws." However, its "compliance" in the past seemed to have exceeded the compliance of other companies, as it offered the NSA pre-encryption access to most of its popular services as well as "working closely" with the agency to allow it to grab both audio and video from Skype, which it acquired in 2011.

The company has taken a tougher stance in recent weeks, releasing statements that decry the agency's overreach and promise better protection of users' information and data. But given this recent development, it appears the tough talk was saber-rattling for the public's benefit. Microsoft is still very compliant when it comes to working with intelligence agencies.

Microsoft Corporation that owns the Internet call service Skype is ready to keep in store its Russian users’ negotiations, correspondence and data exchange during six months and share it with the Russian police, if necessary, Microsoft’s press office told Itar-Tass.
Microsoft thus confirmed its commitment to work in full compliance with the Russian law, the way it does in all countries of its operations. If any new law is adopted, the company will comply with it as well, the press office said.

Well, I suppose there are none of the usual constitutional concerns that might (theoretically) limit Microsoft's obliging attitude towards the Russian's counter-terrorism efforts. Every Russian Skype user will have their data stored for six months and handed over to the police whenever they ask for it. If the Russian agencies decide they need more data, or want to extend the length of time the data is stored, Microsoft has already agreed to honor any future law targeting its Skype users.

The pending legislation covers a whole lot of ground, data-wise.

According to the document, an individual or a legal entity that has organised users’ contacts on the Internet are to store information about the reception, transmission, delivery and processing of voice information, texts, images, sounds or any other actions in the process of information dissemination and/or data exchange, for six months following such actions and share the mentioned information with the state authorities, if requested.

Any service that has user accounts (which would be close to 100% of them) will be required to hold tons of user data and metadata for six months at the behest of Russian authorities. This isn't that much different than the NSA's data hauls, except that some of its programs don't specifically ask for permission before grabbing data and the collections are stored onsite by the agency.

Details are presumably still being hashed out, but Microsoft has already sworn its allegiance to the Russian law in whatever form it takes after being pushed through the legislative process. Not exactly a heartening indicator of Microsoft's new-found willingness to stand up to government overreach.

Filed Under: data, russia, skype
Companies: microsoft, skype

Microsoft Fires Off Rebuttal To Latest Leak; Angry Letter To Eric Holder

from the at-this-point,-I'm-pretty-sure-no-one's-telling-the-complete-truth dept

The recent leak detailing Microsoft's extremely close work with US intelligence agencies seemed to contradict pre-leak statements made by the company concerning responses to data requests. Microsoft claimed it only did the minimum required by law, but the leaked documents portrayed the software giant as working in concert with the NSA and FBI to provide them with pre-encryption access to several services, including Outlook, SkyDrive and Skype.

Microsoft has responded to this leak via a blog post and a letter to Eric Holder. The blog post is a long refutation of every claim made in the leaked documents. Rather than give the agencies direct, pre-encryption access, as was stated in the leak, Microsoft claims it only provides metadata and content as requested -- and then only if Microsoft deems the request valid.

Microsoft does not provide any government with direct and unfettered access to our customer’s data. Microsoft only pulls and then provides the specific data mandated by the relevant legal demand.

If a government wants customer data – including for national security purposes – it needs to follow applicable legal process, meaning it must serve us with a court order for content or subpoena for account information.

We only respond to requests for specific accounts and identifiers. There is no blanket or indiscriminate access to Microsoft’s customer data. The aggregate data we have been able to publish shows clearly that only a tiny fraction – fractions of a percent – of our customers have ever been subject to a government demand related to criminal law or national security.

All of these requests are explicitly reviewed by Microsoft’s compliance team, who ensure the request are valid, reject those that are not, and make sure we only provide the data specified in the order. While we are obligated to comply, we continue to manage the compliance process by keeping track of the orders received, ensuring they are valid, and disclosing only the data covered by the order.

With this across the board denial of the leaked documents' contents, we're left with only a few possibilities. Either the document isn't accurate and Microsoft's statement is truthful or the statement is false and the document is the truth. Or, somewhere in between, there's a way both can be accurate (or "least untruthful"), which boils down to subjective definitions of certain words, most notably "access." Microsoft could have provided near real-time access while still only complying with court orders. Everything stored and turned over to the NSA and FBI was technically "pre-encryption," in the fact that Microsoft had unencrypted access to the data. As we haven't actually seen a court order or national security letter directed at Microsoft, it's tough to say how direct and how close to real time this access is.

Microsoft's rebuttal doesn't entirely refute the documents, however. There's no doubt it worked closely with these agencies to provide the access, content and data they were seeking, even if it was all strictly "by request." In terms of Skype, Microsoft doesn't even bother refuting the government had access to audio and video via its Prism connection. All it addresses is the statement that claimed video production had tripled "since a new capability was added" in July of 2012.

The reporting last week made allegations about a specific change in 2012. We continue to enhance and evolve the Skype offerings and have made a number of improvements to the technical back-end for Skype, such as the 2012 move to in-house hosting of “supernodes” and the migration of much Skype IM traffic to servers in our data centers. These changes were not made to facilitate greater government access to audio, video, messaging or other customer data.

These changes may not have been made to "facilitate greater government access," but that's not what the document claims. All it says is that this new capability tripled video production. Moving to in-house hosting and migrating traffic to Microsoft data centers could certainly aid in the "production" (read: harvesting) of Skype video calls. Whatever the intent, the end result was the same -- easier, faster access to Skpe data and content for intelligence agencies.

This back-and-forth is unlikely to result in establishing definitive guilt or innocence on the part of Microsoft. Either way, it's of negligible importance. The fact is that intelligence agencies are, by way of court orders and security letters, inserting themselves deeper and deeper into the underlying fabric of online communications, something that stretches much further than Microsoft.

Microsoft itself is hoping to address the larger, more problematic issue of our growing surveillance state. In addition to its blog post, the company sent a rather irate letter to Attorney General Eric Holder [pdf]. It dispenses with most of the usual diplomatic niceties and confronts the government with the damage it's doing to American citizens and American companies with its surveillance activities.

Since the initial leak of NSA documents, Microsoft has engaged constructively with the Department of Justice, the FBI, and other members of the Intelligence Community on the ground rules governing our ability to address these issues and the leaked documents publicly. We have appreciated the good faith in which the Government has dealt with us during this challenging period. But we’re not making adequate progress. When the Department and FBI denied our requests to share more information, we went to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) on June 19 to seek relief. Almost a month later, the Government is still considering its response to our motion.

Last week we requested official permission to publicly explain practices that are the subject of newly-leaked documents that refer to Microsoft and have now been misinterpreted in news stories around the world. This request was rejected. While we understand that various government agencies are trying to reach a decision on these issues, this has been the response for weeks.

This is no surprise to anyone who's attempted to obtain information or official responses from our intelligence agencies. The standard m.o. is to wait it out while chanting "grave damage to national security." But what Microsoft adds next serves as a slap in the face to those parties attempting to wait it out.

As I know you appreciate, the Constitution guarantees the fundamental freedom to engage in free expression unless silence is required by a narrowly tailored, compelling Government interest. It’s time to face some obvious facts. Numerous documents are now in the public domain. As a result, there is no longer a compelling Government interest in stopping those of us with knowledge from sharing more information, especially when this information is likely to help allay public concerns.

In other words, "Your secrets aren't secret anymore. Get over yourselves."

At this point, only government employees who dutifully ignore what their employer tells them to ignore aren't aware of these leaked documents and their contents. If our "national security" was suffering "exceptionally grave damage" from these leaks, you'd think at least some of that damage would be noticeable. Instead, what we have is the large scale embarrassment of government officials who are now forced to explain actions that contradict the very principles they claim this country stands for -- that they say they stand for. Refusing to allow companies to discuss activities already outed by leaks is simply the most self-serving form of damage control. The threat to officials' reputations easily exceeds the threat to the security of the American public, and continuing to deny these companies an opportunity to explain their involvement does them, and the public, a disservice.

Filed Under: eric holder, fisa rulings, free speech, nsa, nsa surveillance, skype, surveillance, warrants, wiretapping
Companies: microsoft

The Latest Leaks Contradict Claims Made In Microsoft's Own 'Law Enforcement Requests Report'

from the protecting-your-privacy-except-for-these-large-exceptions dept

The Guardian's recent revelations of Microsoft's very cozy "teamwork" with the NSA and FBI rendered many of the software giant's statements on privacy completely hollow. Among the details leaked was the surprising amount of access to Skype Microsoft provided to these agencies.

One document boasts that Prism monitoring of Skype video production has roughly tripled since a new capability was added on 14 July 2012. "The audio portions of these sessions have been processed correctly all along, but without the accompanying video. Now, analysts will have the complete 'picture'," it says.

Eight months before being bought by Microsoft, Skype joined the Prism program in February 2011.

According to the NSA documents, work had begun on smoothly integrating Skype into Prism in November 2010, but it was not until 4 February 2011 that the company was served with a directive to comply signed by the attorney general.

The NSA was able to start tasking Skype communications the following day, and collection began on 6 February. "Feedback indicated that a collected Skype call was very clear and the metadata looked complete," the document stated, praising the co-operation between NSA teams and the FBI. "Collaborative teamwork was the key to the successful addition of another provider to the Prism system."

This document seems to contradict Microsoft's statement on Skype in March of this year in its 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report.

Skype received 4,713 requests from law enforcement. Those requests impacted 15,409 accounts or other identifiers, such as a PSTN number. Skype produced no content in response to these requests, but did provide non-content data, such as a SkypeID, name, email account, billing information and call detail records if a user subscribed to the Skype In/Online service, which connects to a telephone number.

[All emphasis in the original.]

Perhaps "producing content" means something different to Microsoft than it does the NSA, or the general public for that matter. The leaked documents state "Skype video production has roughly tripled since July 2012" with the agent noting they've been collecting audio all along.

No doubt this discrepancy will be greeted with a semantic discussion, involving different ways of interpreting words like "producing" or "content." Perhaps Microsoft feels providing direct access isn't the same as "producing content." Or maybe Microsoft means it just hasn't produced content for law enforcement, and anything given to the FBI falls outside of its definition of that term. But if the FBI's requests are considered to be outside the definition of "law enforcement," Microsoft confuses the issue early in its report by referring to content disclosed to governments.

It’s insightful, I believe, to look at the governments to whom customer content was disclosed. Of the 1,558 disclosures of customer content, more than 99 percent were in response to lawful warrants from courts in the United States. In fact, there were only 14 disclosures of customer content to governments outside the United States. These were to governments in Brazil, Ireland, Canada and New Zealand.

Obviously, Microsoft isn't allowed to discuss much of its work with the NSA and the FBI, but the disclosure here makes it sound as if it's safeguarding the privacy of Skype users, when in reality it's simply holding the door open for the feds.

Filed Under: law enforcement, nsa surveillance, skype, surveillance
Companies: microsoft, skype

Clearing The Air On Skype: Most Of What You Read Was Not Accurate, But There Are Still Reasons To Worry

from the let's-dig-in dept

Over the last few days there's been something of a firestorm of people claiming that Skype was letting police listen in on your calls. We had been among those who noted that Skype was, at the very least, no longer willing to make clear statements about whether the service was able to be wire-tapped. Skype to Skype calls are a direct person-to-person connection (rather than through a central server), so most people thought that they were not particularly tappable. That's not quite true. And, of course, if you use Skype as part of a phone call to or from a regular phone line, those calls would be tappable via traditional phone wiretaps.

The "Skype may be letting law enforcement listen in on your calls" furor took off in the following few days. The Washington Post reported that Skype was making it easier for law enforcement to get text chat and user data. It's not actually clear that this is true either (but more on that later). It then kicked into high gear, when Eric Jackson at Forbes (whom we've written about before for his bizarrely uninformed take on the Yahoo/Facebook patent fight and those who reported on it) wrote a ridiculously ignorant post claiming that Microsoft can listen in on all his Skype calls, based off an incredible misreading of the original post about Skype's refusal to comment directly on the wiretapping abilities.

Jackson's more level-headed colleague, Kash Hill, pushed back on Jackson's claims, but also noted that the law (in the US) is pretty clear that there is no legal requirement for Microsoft to make Skype tappable... but there have been regular efforts made to change that. Hill spoke to legal expert Jennifer Granick who pointed out that just the uncertainty and threat that such legislation might come down the road at some point seemed to be leading companies to make development decisions that left open the possibility of surveillance:

The mere threat of regulation is driving innovation in the direction of backdoors and surveillance compliance. And US law doesn’t require that, yet.

But what's actually happening, since so much of this seems to be conjecture and speculation? Well, as the attention and questions grew, Skype itself weighed in to "clarify." It noted that it has been installing more in-house "supernodes" (in the more distant past, various Skype users would act as supernodes) to improve quality for the directory -- but that Skype to Skype calls (again, not calls that touch the public telephone network) were still encrypted person-to-person calls:

The move to in-house hosting of "supernodes" does not provide for monitoring or recording of calls. "Supernodes" help Skype clients to locate each other so that Skype calls can be made. Simply put, supernodes act as a distributed directory of Skype users. Skype to Skype calls do not flow through our data centres and the "supernodes" are not involved in passing media (audio or video) between Skype clients.

These calls continue to be established directly between participating Skype nodes (clients). In some cases, Skype has added servers to assist in the establishment, management or maintenance of calls; for example, a server is used to notify a client that a new call is being initiated to it and where the full Skype application is not running (e.g. the device is suspended, sleeping or requires notification of the incoming call), or in a group video call, where a server aggregates the media streams (video) from multiple clients and routes this to clients that might not otherwise have enough bandwidth to establish connections to all of the participants.

[....] Skype software autonomously applies encryption to Skype to Skype calls between computers, smartphones and other mobile devices with the capacity to carry a full version of Skype software as it always has done. This has not changed.

But... is there still reason to be somewhat (though not hysterically) concerned? Perhaps. Chris Soghoian has the best post by far on what's known and what's unknown, which explains how Skype's person-to-person encryption may not be as totally untappable as some people assume. He notes that while the Skype to Skype calls are encrypted, Skype has access to the encryption key (he has a full explanation for how/why this is) and then explains what this likely means:

Ok, so Skype has access to users' communications encryption keys (or can enable others to impersonate as Skype users). What does this mean for the confidentiality of Skype calls? Skype may in fact be telling the truth when it tells journalists that it does not provide CALEA-style wiretap capabilities to governments. It may not need to. If governments can intercept and record the encrypted communications of users (via assistance provided by Internet Service Providers), and have the encryption keys used by both ends of the conversation -- or can impersonate Skype users and perform man in the middle attacks on their conversations, then they can decrypt the voice communications without any further assistance from Skype.

So there's a risk there, and Soghoian notes that Skype's reticence to set the record straight on exactly how it handles encryption leaves open this possibility. That is it's entirely possible that there are ways that law enforcement can intercept Skype calls, while Skype can still talk about its encryption, leaving the false impression that the calls are immune from interception. Soghoian also notes that the talk about Skype handing over info (not call access) to law enforcement is not new and has been known for quite some time (and, honestly, doesn't appear all that different from lots of other similar setups).

So, to summarize:

• Skype did make some infrastructure changes recently, which did increase the number of self-hosted supernodes, but those changes likely were to increase the quality of the product, and had little to do with law enforcement/surveillance.
• Skype has always had a program to provide available information to law enforcement if legally required to do so, but appears not to have made any major change to that program in quite some time. That program does not appear to include the ability to listen to calls.
• Skype to phone (or phone to Skype) calls have always been tappable, because they touch the public telephone network, where they can be intercepted.
• Skype to Skype calls remain encrypted, making it more difficult to "tap" them. However, because of the way Skype likely handles encryption keys, this does not mean that governments can't intercept the calls (or impersonate certain parties via Skype).
• In the end, then, it appears that much of this discussion is a whole lot of fuss about nothing particularly new -- but it is worth noting that your Skype calls probably were never quite as secure as you thought they were, even if they're somewhat more secure than some other offerings with little or no encryption and a central server. But if you're looking for 100% secure communications, Skype isn't it -- but that's not because of any change. It's likely always been that way.

Filed Under: law enforcement, privacy, skype, wiretapping
Companies: microsoft, skype

Skype No Longer Willing To Claim That Its Calls Are Untappable By Law Enforcement

from the well-now... dept

For years, we've noted that various governments have sought to be able to wiretap Skype -- and the company has always insisted that its peer-to-peer architecture made it impossible. Last year, however, some hackers suggested that there was now a backdoor in Skype. And now when a reporter for Slate, Ryan Gallagher, is pushing the company on this issue, it refuses to make a clear statement onto the ability to wiretap Skype calls. You can draw your own conclusions.

It is, of course, possible that this is just the tighter-lipped way of Microsoft, now that the software giant owns Skype, but it certainly is raising questions for those who believed that Skype was a safe way to hold conversations away from the ears of increasingly intrusive government surveillance. It seems like there's new incentive for others to work on truly secure voice communications.

Filed Under: privacy, skype, wiretapping
Companies: microsoft, skype

Hackers Claim That German Officials Have A Backdoor Trojan For Spying On Skype... Which Is A Huge Security Risk

from the breaking-the-internet dept

For many years various governments have complained about the fact that Skype communications are encrypted, and have demanded backdoors. In the US, the FBI has been pushing hard for such backdoors. There have been some reports of applications that allow for wiretapping Skype, despite its supposed encryption, but not much in the way of details. Now the famed Chaos Computer Club (CCC) is claiming to have reverse engineered the "lawful interception" trojan being used by German law enforcement.

They got the program after a lawyer whose client was under investigation gave the CCC his client's hard drive, where the group found the code. As frequently happens with these kinds of things, the CCC found that the trojan actually introduces myriad security problems as well:

The analysis concludes, that the trojan's developers never even tried to put in technical safeguards to make sure the malware can exclusively be used for wiretapping internet telephony, as set forth by the constitution court. On the contrary, the design included functionality to clandestinely add more components over the network right from the start, making it a bridge-head to further infiltrate the computer.

"This refutes the claim that an effective separation of just wiretapping internet telephony and a full-blown trojan is possible in practice – or even desired," commented a CCC speaker. "Our analysis revealed once again that law enforcement agencies will overstep their authority if not watched carefully. In this case functions clearly intended for breaking the law were implemented in this malware: they were meant for uploading and executing arbitrary code on the targeted system."

The government malware can, unchecked by a judge, load extensions by remote control, to use the trojan for other functions, including but not limited to eavesdropping. This complete control over the infected PC – owing to the poor craftsmanship that went into this trojan – is open not just to the agency that put it there, but to everyone. It could even be used to upload falsified "evidence" against the PC's owner, or to delete files, which puts the whole rationale for this method of investigation into question.

[....]

The analysis also revealed serious security holes that the trojan is tearing into infected systems. The screenshots and audio files it sends out are encrypted in an incompetent way, the commands from the control software to the trojan are even completely unencrypted. Neither the commands to the trojan nor its replies are authenticated or have their integrity protected. Not only can unauthorized third parties assume control of the infected system, but even attackers of mediocre skill level can connect to the authorities, claim to be a specific instance of the trojan, and upload fake data. It is even conceivable that the law enforcement agencies's IT infrastructure could be attacked through this channel. The CCC has not yet performed a penetration test on the server side of the trojan infrastructure.

"We were surprised and shocked by the lack of even elementary security in the code. Any attacker could assume control of a computer infiltrated by the German law enforcement authorities", commented a speaker of the CCC. "The security level this trojan leaves the infected systems in is comparable to it setting all passwords to '1234'".

Even without the fact that more capabilities can be added, the existing software is pretty powerful. It apparently can remotely control the computers that it's on, take screenshots of what's happening on the computer, including emails and personal messages. And yet, time and time again law enforcement asks us to "trust" them when they want the power to secretly install this kind of crap on people's computers?

Filed Under: backdoor, ccc, germany, hackers, skype, trojan, wiretapping
Companies: skype

Australian Anti-Trolling Law Put To The Test After Guy Broadcasts Having Sex Via Skype

from the it's-illegal-to-be-a-jerk-online? dept

We've seen plenty of governments over the past few years trying to pass laws that effectively outlaw being a jerk online. You can recognize the emotional thinking behind this. People who are jerks are annoying. And, certainly, at some level trolling can get ridiculous. But having very broad laws with vague definitions about "causing offense," seems to open up a Pandora's box of potential problems. Reader charliebrown alerts us to the news of an "anti-trolling law" in Australia that is being put to the test in a case against two (male) cadets from the Australian Defense Academy, after one broadcast his consensual sexual encounter with a third (female) cadet to the second male cadet. The law being used is one that is apparently designed to punish "online conduct that a reasonable person would find to be menacing, harassing or causing offence."

If that seems insanely broad, you've noticed the problem. This certainly isn't to suggest that what the guy did was right or even legal. But it's dangerous to use such a broad law. The fact is, any law should be pretty specific. When it's as broad as causing offense on the internet, you've pretty much outlawed almost everything. Anyone can be offended pretty easily at almost anything they find online. The simple fact is that there are some serious jerks online (and these two guys seem to fit into that category easily). But we shouldn't outlaw being a jerk just for the sake of being a jerk.

Filed Under: australia, jerks, skype, trolling

Police Using Skype To Get Warrants While At A Crime Scene

from the virtual-courtroom dept

In this digital and connected age, many folks have discovered that the concept of a physical office is more and more outdated. Many of us can (and often do) work from anywhere. Apparently, a court in Florida is working under the same basic thought process as well. Copycense points us to the news that a judge in South Florida is working with police to let them use email and Skype while still at a crime scene to get a warrant. As one of the police officers noted: "It's like a virtual office and courtroom." So will other court functions start taking place this way soon as well? Who needs to sit around a courtroom for a trial when everyone can just login via Skype? Of course, you could (quite reasonably) argue that this is really no different than just using a phone to do the same thing...

Filed Under: crime scene, email, skype, warrants

Rupert Murdoch Suing The Sky Out Of Skype

from the good-luck-with-that dept

With Skype announcing a planned IPO this week, there didn't seem to be that much to comment on. However, people digging through the filing found one previously unknown tidbit that's generating some buzz. Apparently, the Rupert Murdoch-owned satellite broadcasting company BskyB has been involved in a long legal battle with Skype over its name. Apparently, BSkyB thinks anything using the letters "sky" infringes on its trademark. Of course, it's difficult to see how anyone could possibly be confused, but BSkyB claims to have market research that says otherwise, and apparently an EU ruling has agreed -- though Skype is planning to appeal.

Filed Under: bskyb, skype, trademark