Bill Introduced To Create A Warrant Requirement For Border Device Searches

from the 4th-amendment-matters dept

With a great deal of luck, we may finally get a bit more respect for Constitutional rights at the border. The Supreme Court may have ruled that searches of cellphones require warrants, but that ruling doesn't apply within 100 miles of any US border (that includes international airports). Warrantless device searches happen regularly and with increasing frequency.

So far, courts have been hesitant to push back against the government's assertions that border security is more important than the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. And if the courts do feel something should be done to protect US citizens and foreign visitors, they feel it should be done by Congress, not by them.

So, it's good to see Congress may actually do something about this. Jack Corrigan of Nextgov has the details:

Sens. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., and Rand Paul, R-Ky., on Wednesday introduced legislation that would increase digital privacy protections for U.S. residents crossing the border and limit the situations in which agents could legally seize their devices. If enacted, the Protecting Data at the Border Act would curb law enforcement’s extensive authority over electronic information at the border.

Rep. Ted Lieu, D-Calif., introduced a companion bill in the House.

The bill [PDF] would institute a warrant requirement for border device searches, which is a really weird sentence to type considering the Supreme Court of the United States of America instituted a warrant requirement for device searches five years ago. But there it is: an attempt to codify a SCOTUS decision so it's respected by US government agencies.

It also prevents border agents from denying entry to anyone refusing to disclose passwords or unlock devices during screening. It also blocks them from detaining anyone for more than four hours in hopes of turning denials into consensual searches.

Unfortunately, there are some loopholes. And one of those is sizable. "Emergency situations" allow border agents to bypass the Constitutional niceties. One of those is an old -- and super-vague -- favorite:

[c]onspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest of the United States

That's the catch-22. The law can't pass without this exception and it's this exception that will be abused the most. But the institution of a warrant requirement will force the government to put a little more effort into its "national security" hand-waving if it hopes to use evidence pulled from devices in court.

Also important is the institution of documentation procedures for consent searches. It won't be enough for officers to claim detainees volunteered passwords or otherwise agreed to have their devices searched. They'll need to have the whole thing documented and the form signed by the detainee. Every device search must be documented as well, whether or not a forensic search was performed.

It's a good bill, national security exception notwithstanding. But it's being lobbed into an unwelcoming political arena. President Trump is still demanding a wall and has declared a national emergency simply because he wants to discourage immigrants from coming to this country. Border security is national security, according to this administration, even when there's little evidence showing immigrants are more likely to commit acts of terrorism, never mind regular crime. This administration and those backing it (and they are many) are more than happy to suspend the Bill of Rights at the border for as long as they're in power. That's the reality of the situation.

While this bill would bring border agencies into alignment with Supreme Court precedent, it's highly unlikely this won't be rejected by the President if it even manages to make it that far.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, border, border search, cbp, device searches, warrants

7th Circuit Punts On Border Smartphone Searches; Says Riley Decision Doesn't Affect Anything

from the thanks-for-all-the-help,-judicial-system dept

The "border search" exception again trumps the Constitution. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has determined [PDF] that the Supreme Court's Riley decision that implemented a warrant requirement for phone searches does not apply at our hypersensitive border areas. In this case, the border area affected is [squints at ruling] Chicago's O'Hare Airport.

Anyway, CBP and DHS investigators had their eyes on a man returning from a suspicious trip to the Philippines. Suspecting the man was engaged in sex tourism, he was stopped by CBP officers upon his return. Lots of things didn't add up so the CBP asked for permission to search his phone. The officers made it clear this request was simply them being polite. They were going to search his devices anyway.

After completing this check of [Donald] Wanjiku’s bags, [Officer] Toler turned his attention to the cell phone. The phone was password-protected, and Toler began by asking Wanjiku to unlock the phone. Wanjiku initially resisted but relented when Toler told him that everything was searchable at the border and that the phone would be seized, unlocked by a “lab,” and examined whether or not Wanjiku unlocked it.

A cursory examination uncovered a couple of photos that may or may not have been child porn. (The officer said he couldn't determine the subject's age and the district court found this testimony credible.) A hard drive the suspect had in his bag was subjected to a "forensic preview" that only scanned allocated space for files, rather than mirror the drive in its entirety. A similar preview was performed on the man's Samsung phone. In both cases, child pornography was discovered by agents. Further searches were performed the next day.

The defendant challenged the evidence, pointing out that the Supreme Court's Riley decision requires the use of warrants for phone searches. The government argued that it needed nothing at all to perform invasive searches of travelers' devices. The court says neither of these polar opposites are correct. It also says it really doesn't care who's right, who's wrong, or where the line should be drawn in relation to border searches and the Riley decision.

The primary positions staked out by the parties could not be more starkly contrasted. The defendant argues that nothing less than a warrant authorizes a search of electronic devices at the border. The government asserts that it may conduct these searches without any particularized suspicion at all. In the end, though, we need not adopt either of these positions, and indeed may avoid entirely the thorny issue of the appropriate level of suspicion required. Instead, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress because these agents acted in good faith when they searched the devices with reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being committed, at a time when no court had ever required more than reasonable suspicion for any search at the border.

Love to watch courts avoid thorny issues affecting the privacy of millions of travelers.

The appeals court says the Supreme Court only requires reasonable suspicion for border searches. This apparently still stands despite the extra protections extended to electronic devices by the Riley decision. The appeals court cites a 1985 Supreme Court decision in defense of its unwillingness to examine the issues raised in the year of our lord two-thousand nineteen. As the Seventh Circuit sees it, the government's interest in securing the borders will always be able to undermine Fourth Amendment protections -- even when this interest encompasses things that don't actually threaten the nation's security.

The final position the court takes -- at least in this case -- is that nothing more than reasonable suspicion is needed to perform any search at the border. And that's even if the "border" is an international airport, rather than a point of entry actually located on a border. It relies on the inaction of several other appeals courts to come to this conclusion, ensuring the zero-privacy status quo will live on for at least a few more years, falling well behind the advance of portable technology.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, border search, cbp, dhs, privacy

Appeals Court Says A Person Driving A Registered Vehicle On A Public Road Is Not 'Reasonably Suspicious'

from the nothing-more-inherently-criminal-than-driving-a-car dept

Well, let's see what government agents are claiming is reasonably suspicious these days. Ah, here it is: driving a registered vehicle on a public road. The streets are clogged with scofflaws, apparently. Thanks to the skill set of one Carlos Perez of the US Border Patrol, we can finally start putting these people away.

This ultra-ridiculous assertion comes courtesy of an appealed motion to suppress that has made its way to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The government is the party doing the appealing, having come out of the losing end of Jeffrey Freeman's request to have evidence obtained during two stops by the Border Patrol tossed out.

The suppression of the first stop isn't at issue as the government isn't challenging that particular suppression. But it wants to keep the evidence obtained in the second stop. The problem is Agent Perez's definition of "reasonable suspicion" isn't anywhere in the neighborhood of "reasonable." According to Perez, he stopped Freeman because he turned onto a public road that happened to bypass a Border Patrol checkpoint near Freer, Texas. Freer is 50 miles inland from the border, but the government has declared anything within 100 miles is under the control of the Border Patrol.

But the road Freeman turned onto (FM 2050) is more than a detour around BP checkpoints. According to Perez's own testimony, a dozen homes and a handful of businesses can be accessed via FM 2050, making it far more than a way to avoid being hassled by the Border Patrol. Still, Perez insisted the road was only used by those transporting illegal immigrants or contraband, turning residents and business owners (along with their employees) into criminals that just haven't been caught yet.

According to Perez, the BP stops almost every vehicle that turns onto FM 2050, reasoning that the very act of driving a public road is suspicious enough to justify a stop. Even Perez's own experience contradicts the narrative he's pushing. From the opinion [PDF]:

Agent Perez estimated the Border Patrol made approximately ten to twenty roving stops per week on FM 2050. He estimated that he had only conducted approximately twenty to thirty stops throughout his eight years there, and only two or three of those stops resulted in seizures.

During the stop, Agent Perez discovered Freeman's passenger was not a legal resident of the US. Freeman moved to suppress. The lower court found Perez's assertions about suspicious behavior ridiculous and stated his stop of Freeman was nothing more than a "fishing expedition."

The Appeals Court is no more impressed with Perez's claims, even when the Wild West aspects of the "Constitution-Free Zone" are taken into account.

At this point, we are left with the following facts to be viewed from Agent Perez’s limited experience in detecting illegal activity: Freeman’s truck, a type commonly found in the area, was seen less than 50 miles from the border, it turned right onto a road known for smuggling, and his truck was registered to an individual. We conclude that these facts, without more, are not enough to support reasonable suspicion, especially when viewed through the eyes of an agent with minimal experience detecting illegal activity. Courts that have found reasonable suspicion, even in cases in close proximity to the border, have generally required more.

Suspicion isn't "reasonable" when it has the ability to sweep up almost every driver on the road.

If the facts of this case constituted reasonable suspicion, virtually anyone who drove a car registered to an individual and turned right onto FM 2050, a public road, would be subject to being stopped by Border Patrol agents. As the district court pointed out, had Agent Perez waited a little longer, he may have been able to develop reasonable suspicion; he did not.

Agent Perez said his extensive experience led to him drawing these unreasonable suspicion conclusions. The Appeals Court points out the opposite is true: Perez may have eight years experience as a Border Patrol officer, but he only participated in 20-30 stops on the road where he stopped Freeman. And he was only successful about 10% of the time. The only thing Perez can sufficiently claim expertise in is fishing expeditions. Even with all the leeway granted to border enforcement, he still only managed to rack up three wins. This isn't someone who knows the ins and outs of observing human behavior to spot immigration violations. This is someone hopping from traffic stop to traffic stop hoping to get lucky.

Filed Under: border search, carlos perez, cbp, jeffrey freeman, public road, reasonable suspicion

Report: CBP's Border Device Search Program Is An Undersupervised Catastrophe

from the scattershot-security dept

The CBP is searching more devices than ever and ramping up an "extreme vetting" program that includes biometric scans, demands for social media account passwords, and more intrusive searches across the board. As the number of device searches continues to increase, the agency's technical chops and and internal oversight aren't keeping pace.

That's according to recently-released Inspector General's report [PDF], which finds little to like about the CBP's search processes and policies, other than they occasionally manage to catch criminals attempting to enter the US. The CBP's Office of Field Operations is supposed to be taking charge of device searches, ensuring they're done effectively and intelligently. So far, it appears the OFO has taken a hands-off approach to management, resulting in bad practices and worse security.

[B]ecause of inadequate supervision to ensure OFO officers properly documented searches, OFO cannot maintain accurate quantitative data or identify and address performance problems related to these searches. In addition, OFO officers did not consistently disconnect electronic devices, specifically cell phones, from networks before searching them because headquarters provided inconsistent guidance to the ports of entry on disabling data connections on electronic devices. OFO also did not adequately manage technology to effectively support search operations and ensure the security of data.

Here's the kicker: the OFO is so laid back it still hasn't begun to address a problem raised by the Inspector General more than a decade ago.

Finally, OFO has not yet developed performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of a pilot program, begun in 2007, to conduct advanced searches, including copying electronic data from searched devices to law enforcement databases.

Considering the pace of technology development, the OFO has managed to put the CBP more than a decade behind. Playing catch up now will probably bring them to five years behind schedule sometime within the next couple of years and ahead of the office's baseline expectations sometime around never.

These device searches can be intrusive. In some cases, devices are held for months as the agency performs forensic searches and analyzes the data. These intrusions need to be justified, but the IG found CBP officers can hardly be bothered to do the paperwork.

We reviewed 194 EMRs [Electronic Media Reports] and identified 130 (67 percent) that featured one or more problems, which totaled 147 overall.

The DHS's own search policies say device searches will be limited to data at rest, unless a deeper search can be justified. The OIG says none of the 154 EMRs compiled before the DHS reiterated this rule in April 2017 contained any evidence data connections were disabled before searches were performed.

This lack of care undercuts one of the arguments the DOJ offered when fighting against a warrant requirement for phone searches: that criminals could destroy evidence on a seized device using remotely-triggered software. The CBP either doesn't think this is a possibility or it sincerely doesn't care if it's jeopardizing its own searches. Either way, it does nothing to give the government's overdramatic assertions any more credibility.

The list of bad news goes on and on. The CBP failed to renew licenses for forensic software, resulting in the inability to perform advanced searches for period of months. It also ignored retention policies, allowing data copied from people's devices to sit around on external storage devices indefinitely. As the OIG points out, this isn't just a policy violation. It's also a security issue. Agents could peruse communications and data they have no business looking at and the theft of a storage device could result in unauthorized disclosures of travelers' data.

If there's a silver lining, it's that the CBP concurs with the IG's determination that it sucks. There's been no pushback from the agency -- only vows to make the needed improvements. But that's tempered by the fact the CBP still hasn't begun to address issues raised by the OIG in 2007. These recommendations will likely put the agency even further behind the technological curve, raising the chance of criminals and terrorists escaping detention and increasing the risks posed to travelers that their data might be abused by the CBP, or worse, some rando who happens to walk off with an unguarded USB stick.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, border search, dbp, device search, ofo, search

Court Shuts Down Feds' Attempt To Expand The 'Border Search' Exception To Cover Inland GPS Monitoring

from the short-gov't:-everything-with-the-borders-should-be-subject-to-the-border-exc dept

Cyrus Farivar of Ars Technica has put together a hell of a read from a suppression order obtained by defendants in a drug case. It involves a truckload of cheese danishes, cocaine trafficking, and the US government's attempt to apply the "border exception" everywhere in the United States.

At the heart of it is a GPS tracking device. The government installed it on a truck driven by suspected drug smugglers when it crossed the Canadian border into the US. It then used that device to track the truck as it traveled down to California. The resulting bust only uncovered some bags of sugar, but a previous stop of the same truck had turned up 194 kilos of cocaine.

The defendants in the case have had the evidence suppressed. The ruling [PDF] was handed down late last month. It points to the Supreme Court's 2012 Jones decision, which held that placing GPS devices on vehicles was a search under the Fourth Amendment. Warrants are needed to place the devices. Long-term tracking is also out of the question if warrants aren't obtained.

The government argued it didn't need a warrant because it placed the device on the truck at the Canadian border. This would be the "border exception" to the Fourth Amendment -- one carved out by the courts which allows all kinds of warrantless searches to be performed in the name of border security.

But the judge doesn't buy this attempt to salvage ill-gotten evidence. The government cites a number of cases involving searches of vehicles performed at the border -- some more invasive than others -- where warrants weren't needed. The court finds these citations unavailing because they don't actually address what happened here: the placement of a GPS device at the border which was subsequently used to track a vehicle as it traveled far beyond the Canadian border.

The Court doubts that an analysis dependent on the physical aspects of the search is appropriate here where the search extends beyond the initial installation of the device.

And, having taken the Jones decision into account, the court definitely isn't going to allow the government to effectively expand the border search exception to cover searches performed well within the nation's borders.

[T]his Court is hesitant to mechanically apply the border search doctrine where the search stretches far beyond the conduct at the border to create a "precise comprehensive record of a person's movements." [...] Ultimately, the Court concludes the placement of a GPS device on a vehicle at the border, combined with the subsequent tracking of data over a prolonged period away from it, cannot be justified by the border search exception.

Wait, says the government, what about the extended border search doctrine, where we can perform warrantless searches so long as someone or something came across the border recently and we think something criminal is going on? The court says continuous monitoring isn't the same thing as a search dependent on two separate, but linked, predicates. This was a search that began at the border and never stopped.

While the initial placement of the GPS devices on Defendants' truck occurred at the border, the subsequent monitoring of the data over the almost 48 hours constitutes a continuous search… [I[t is this unceasing search over that period that precludes application of the extended border search doctrine.

The court also shuts down the government's request for other exceptions to be applied. The government tried to explain the discovery would have been "inevitable" based on its prior reconnaissance of the truck's route, but the court points out the same route wasn't taken this time and the FBI didn't actually know for a fact where it would eventually end up. It made assumptions but didn't have supportable facts.

As for the good faith exception, the court points out the only controlling case came from the Supreme Court, and it's pretty difficult to imagine well-trained federal agents with all their expertise would not be aware of the warrant requirement. Furthermore, there have been no opinions since Jones that explicitly carve out a "border exception" for GPS tracking device usage. It appears the government did nothing to ensure its actions were legal or Constitutional before engaging in this extended search.

The Court is not persuaded the good faith exception stretches to encompass the government's reasoning for its application. There is no evidence the agents were advised by an attorney that they need not obtain a warrant. Nor has the government been able to point the Court to any precedent that could have served as a basis for the purported 48-hour rule or its looser application to semi-trucks.

The evidence is gone -- what there was of it. The government isn't abandoning its prosecution and it may ask the Ninth Circuit to allow it to apply the border search exception anywhere it wants to. But for now, it's been told the exception doesn't cover hours of inland monitoring, which is a conclusion federal agents should have been able to reach on their own -- long before engaging in 48 hours of continuous rights violations.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, border exception, border search, exemption, gps, illegal search, supreme court, tracking

Australian Gov't Likes Intrusive Border Device Searches Just As Much As The US Does

from the privacy-continues-to-be-the-biggest-victim-of-terrorist-attacks dept

Australians will be thrilled to discover they won't have to visit the United States to have their electronic devices brutalized and mercilessly probed in the name of security. Why spend all that money flying halfway around the world when you can experience the same intrusive discomfort at home?

A British-Australian citizen travelling through Sydney airport has had his devices seized, and believes his laptop password cracked and his digital files inspected by Border Force officers, in what privacy groups say is a worrying development.

Nathan Hague, a 46-year-old software developer, was detained apparently at random for 90 minutes while the officers took his phone and password-protected laptop into a back room.

Hague had no reason to be treated with extra suspicion, but extra suspicion was there all the same, simply because the random selection process told border officers to be as intrusive as possible. He asked officers a reasonable question -- if you search my other belongings in public because I'm a randomly selected "threat," why can't you search my devices out in the open. There was, of course, no response.

Other questions about the Border Force's handling of the contents of Hague's devices also went unanswered. Officers refused to say whether data would be copied and/or retained, as well as refusing to explain what they were looking for.

Why did the Border Force perform this intrusive search? Because it can.

“Officers may question travellers and examine goods if they suspect the person may be of interest for immigration, customs, biosecurity, health, law-enforcement or national security reasons,” said a spokesperson for the ABF.

So, for any reason or no reason, so long as the word "security" is chanted during the proceedings. Who could limit the Border Force's intrusive, suspicionless searches? Only the people who've already decided they're not going to.

Under the Customs Act, officers have the right to examine travellers’ personal items, including accessing electronic devices and making copies of their files. The Customs Act imposes no legal threshold or requirement that officers need to meet in order to use this power

The Border Force offered quasi-reasons in defense of its handling of Hague and his devices. The law itself doesn't even compel a quasi-rationalization.

And the law might get worse. Proposed changes would give citizens with password-protected devices two choices: hand over the password or spend 5-10 years in prison. At this point, Hague was free to refuse the request, but that likely would have meant not seeing those devices again for weeks or months. The Border Force has extended an invitation to the software developer to file a complaint with its redress black hole, just in case Hague wants to spend more time being jerked around by the Australian government.

This is status quo in the so-called free world: suspicionless, highly-intrusive searches requiring minimal, if any, justification… all done in the name of national security. While citizens may realize a security/freedom tradeoff is necessary in some extreme cases, their governments have already determined the exchange rate and made it clear the freedom side will continue to lose value indefinitely.

Filed Under: australia, border search, confiscated, devices, laptops, nathan hague, phones, privacy, random search, surveillance

American Muslim Challenges Warrantless Border Device Search From An Unexpected Legal Angle

from the may-not-work,-but-definitely-worth-a-try dept

There's more than one way to skin the Fourth Amendment cat. A person who feels her rights were violated by the seizure and search of phone data at the border is sidestepping the expected civil rights lawsuit to expedite the deletion of the seized phone contents. Cyrus Farivar of Ars Technica has more details:

An American Muslim woman has formally asked a federal judge to force border officials to delete data copied from her iPhone 6S Plus, months after it was seized from her when she landed at Newark International Airport in February 2018 while returning from a trip abroad.

However, attorneys for the woman, Rejhane Lazoja, have taken the unusual step of not bringing a run-of-the-mill civil lawsuit.

Instead, in federal court in New Jersey on Wednesday, her attorneys filed what’s called a Rule 41(g) Motion, otherwise known as a "Motion to Return Property."

This motion is normally used in criminal cases to argue for the return of property seized by the government. Lazoja was never accused of a crime, nor was she given any justification for the phone search. Her phone was returned to her intact 130 days[!] after it was seized, so she technically has her property back already. But with the help of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (last seen challenging the TSA's suspicionless surveillance program "Quiet Skies"), Lazoja is hoping to force the federal government to delete any of her data it still has in its possession.

The motion [PDF] details Lazoja's experience with US customs officials, who took her into a room and demanded she unlock her phone for them. She refused, so the CBP seized it, giving her a receipt for her phone and sent her on her way without her personal property. Lazoja alleges a number of Constitutional violations and cites recent phone-related Supreme Court decisions, but it's unlikely these arguments will be availing, what with the courts' deference to the government's assertions that border security trumps individual rights.

What may find a legal foothold is Lazoja's arguments centering on seizure law and the CBP's policies, which say it must state a reason for holding onto personal data it has pulled from searched devices.

Pursuant to CBP’s own policies, if Defendants, their agents and employees do not assert probable cause to seize a device or the information it contains, “any copies of the information held by CBP must be destroyed.” Ex. 3 at § 5.4.1.2. “Upon this determination, the copy of the information will be destroyed as expeditiously as possible, but no later than seven (7) days after such determination unless circumstances require additional time, which must be approved by a supervisor and documented in an appropriate CBP system and which must be no later than twenty-one (21) days after such determination.”

With the phone not being returned for more than three months, it's safe to assume the data the CBP pulled from it was around for at least that long, if it still doesn't reside on a government hard drive somewhere. The government has no plausible reason to retain this data, but if there's no pressure to delete it, it might hang onto it indefinitely.

The CBP is performing more forensic searches of devices at the border than ever before. Growth has been exponential over the past couple of years, suggesting the new normal is demands for passwords, seized devices, and data dumps. If her motion is successful, it may act as a deterrent against future expansion of invasive searches, if only because the CBP will be forced to provide the court with some articulable reason for holding onto the data.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, border search, devices, motion to return property, rejhane lazoja, warrantless search

Bipartisan Bill Would Require A Warrant To Search Americans' Devices At The Border

from the would-be-a-start dept

As we've discussed for many years, Homeland Security and the Justice Department have convinced too many courts that there is some sort of 4th Amendment "exception" at the border, whereby Customs and Border Patrol agents (CBP) are somehow allowed to search through your laptops, phones, tablets and more just because, fuck it, they can. Now bipartisan pairs in both the Senate and the House have introduced a new bill that would require that CBP get a warrant to search the devices of Americans at the border. On the Senate side, the bill is sponsored by Senators Ron Wyden and Rand Paul, and in the House, it's Reps. Blake Farenthold and Jared Polis. Honestly, it's absolutely ridiculous that this kind of bill is even needed in the first place, because the 4th Amendment should just take care of it. But with DHS and the courts not properly appreciating the 4th Amendment's requirment for a warrant to do a search, here we are. Here's a short summary of the bill as well, that notes:

The government has asserted broad authority to search or seize digital devices at the border without any level of suspicion due to legal precedent referred to as the “border search exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement for probable cause or a warrant.

Until 2014, the government claimed it did not need a warrant to search a device if a person had been arrested. In a landmark unanimous decision, the Supreme Court (in Riley v. California) ruled that digital data is different and that law enforcement needed a warrant to search an electronic device when a person has been arrested.

This bill recognizes the principles from that decision extend to searches of digital devices at the border. In addition, this bill requires that U.S. persons are aware of their rights before they consent to giving up online account information (like social media account names or passwords) or before they consent to give law enforcement access to their devices.

That last part is especially important, given how eager Homeland Security has been to start demanding social media passwords as you deplane. Unfortunately, the bill as written only applies to "US Persons" as defined here, meaning that it may not be of much help for a new DHS proposal, also revealed this week, to more aggressively pursue phone and social media searches of foreigners. This is a bad idea for a whole host of reasons we've already discussed, but the short version is that it's bad for security, it's bad for tourism, it's bad for Americans' safety (because other countries will reciprocate). It's just a bad, bad idea.

At the very least, this new bill would block this from happening for American citizens or otherwise legal aliens, but it should go much further. And, of course, who knows if this bill will get any traction, or get signed by the President.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, blake farenthold, border search, border search exception, devices, jared polis, rand paul, ron wyden

Should You Have Any 4th Amendment Rights In An Airport?

from the seems-kind-of-important dept

For many years, we've written about the craziness of the so-called "border search exception" to the 4th Amendment, in which the US government has insisted that the 4th Amendment doesn't apply at the border, and thus it's allowed to search people at the border. The initial reasoning was -- more or less -- that at the border, you're not yet in the country, and thus the 4th Amendment doesn't apply yet. But that's expanded over time -- especially in the digital age. Perhaps, back when people just had clothes/books/whatever in their luggage, you could understand the rationale for allowing a search, but today, when people carry laptops and handheld electronic devices that basically store their whole lives, the situation is a lot scarier. Unfortunately, (with just a few small exceptions) the courts have simply taken the historical ability to search luggage at the border and expanded it to cover electronic devices. Then, things got even more ridiculous, when Homeland Security decided that anywhere that's within 100 miles of the border could be "close enough" to count as a "border search," making the "border search exception" apply. That's... messed up.

There's now a case in the 4th Circuit that shows how this is expanding even further, and on Monday we joined with the Cause of Action Institute and the Committee for Justice to file an amicus brief in the case of Hamza Kolsuz (the ACLU has also filed an amicus brief). Kolsuz had his phone searched under a "border search exception" -- but here's the thing: He was in the process of leaving the country, not entering it. A regular bag search turned up handgun parts in his checked luggage, for which he was arrested. After that, his iPhone was seized and searched without a warrant. Remember, just a few years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that you need a warrant to search a mobile phone in the Riley case. But here there was none.

Law enforcement tried to get around this by claiming that since Kolsuz was at the airport, the search of his phone should count as a border search exception. But that's crazy. Unfortunately, the district court accepted this reasoning -- and now the case is on appeal. We signed onto this amicus brief for a variety of reasons, but a big one is that, as journalists, protecting sources and documents is important. We shouldn't be subject to warrantless searches of our work every time we just happen to be in an airport. As the brief notes:

The District Court erred in denying Mr. Kolsuz's Motion to Suppress and this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial. First, while the border search doctrine constitutes a narrow exception to the otherwise unequivocal Fourth Amendment requirement that the government obtain a warrant to conduct a search, the governmental interests that justify this narrow border search exception were not in play when the Defendant's smartphone was searched incident to his arrest, and this exception therefore cannot be used to justify the search here. The fact that Mr. Kolsuz was arrested and his phone seized at an airport--the equivalent of a border--does not change this case from one that fits squarely within Riley v. California... to one that is suddenly part of a narrow exception of cases justified by the sovereign's customs enforcement rules.

The Court should see this search for what it was: a month-long, detailed, forensic search to gather evidence against Mr. Kolsuz for use in a trial on the very charges for which he was arrested. Since the search here was not actually a border search, the border search exception cannot save it.

Second, the United States essentially seeks a mechanical application of a Fourth Amendment exception even where the interests that justify the exception were not implicated in this case. The dangers of such a mechanical application are readily apparent. People traveling into and out of the United States routinely cross with smartphones or computers that contain the equivalent of "every piece of mail... every picture... [and] every book" a person has.... These individuals include journalists, lawyers, and business travelers with confidential information typically safeguarded under American jurisprudence. Nevertheless, customs agents purport to have unfettered access to the contents of electronic devices carried by such individuals, without any reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a crime, simply by the fact that the individual wishes to leave or enter the United States. This is not the application of the border search exception that the Supreme Court had in mind when it outlined its narrow purview.

Of course, many of us still find the very idea of a "border search exception" to be nonsensical in the first place. But if it's there, the idea that it could be abused in this manner is even more problematic and concerning. Hopefully the 4th Circuit corrects this injustice. We're proud to sign onto this brief, and hope the court listens.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, airports, border search, border search exception, hamza kolsuz, privacy, warrants

DOJ Dismisses Case After Court Explains That Feds Can't Just Grab Someone's Laptop At The Border

from the tail-tucked dept

Remember the 4th Amendment? We hear it's making a comeback. Back in May, we had a story about another court explaining to the government that, contrary to popular belief within Homeland Security, the 4th Amendment does still apply at the border, and thus Border Patrol can't just take someone's laptop without a warrant.

The case involved a guy named Jae Shik Kim, who the government suspected was shipping items to China that were then being forwarded to Iran. Because of that, DHS grabbed his laptop as he was leaving the US (on a flight to Korea). The DOJ argued that the laptop was a "container" subject to search at the border. The court disabused the DOJ of this notion:

After considering all of the facts and authorities set forth above, then, the Court finds, under the totality of the unique circumstances of this case, that the imaging and search of the entire contents of Kim’s laptop, aided by specialized forensic software, for a period of unlimited duration and an examination of unlimited scope, for the purpose of gathering evidence in a pre-existing investigation, was supported by so little suspicion of ongoing or imminent criminal activity, and was so invasive of Kim’s privacy and so disconnected from not only the considerations underlying the breadth of the government’s authority to search at the border, but also the border itself, that it was unreasonable.

Given an opportunity to respond, the DOJ has dropped the entire case.

The United States, by and through its attorney, the Acting United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the Indictment against the defendants. As grounds for this motion, the government states the following: in a Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed on May 8, 2015, the Court granted the defendants’ motion to suppress evidence, and the government has decided not to pursue an appeal of that decision. Accordingly, the government is unable to continue prosecuting this matter, and we therefore move the Court to dismiss the Indictment pending against the defendants.

Yup. Next time, maybe don't violate the 4th Amendment.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, border search, doj, jae shik kim, laptops