Imagine If Everything Were Priced Like Cable Service

from the you'd-have-a-little-something-like-this... dept

The cable and internet worlds are not exactly known for being all that innovative, but that's misleading. Those giant conglomerates can be really innovative in figuring out ways to totally screw you over with their billing and customer service practices. For over a decade, we've pointed out how ridiculous it is to see telcos sneak all sorts of crap below the line by adding additional fees that sometimes can make up more than half of the total actual bill. Even all the way back then, we wondered what other businesses would be like if they used the same "hidden fee" system. What about a pizza, for example? You could announce an advertised price of $3, but then toss in a "Heating element recovery fee" of $1.50, a "crust browning surcharge" of $2, a "service fee" of $4, a "universal pizza fund" charge for $1.20, and a $2.18 "cleanup fee." Plus tax.

And, let's not even get started with the whole "bundling" business by cable. Or, rather, let's. That's what Funny or Die did with this amusing new video starring Dave Koechner imagining a world where everything was priced the way cable bundles are priced: Sounds about right. Either way, this one ranks up there with the wonderful video from a couple of years ago about the first truly honest cable company: Or, maybe this honest Comcast ad (also by Funny or Die): You know, considering how many such videos there are, you might think that the giant cable/telco companies might finally realize that it's time to act differently, right? But, I guess, as all the videos here show, they really just don't give a fuck because they don't have to.

Filed Under: bundles, cable company, customer service, pricing, tv service

FBI's 'We're From The Cable Company' Ruse Not Convincing To Magistrate Judge

from the we-can't-fix-the-problem-but-we-can-look-through-all-your-stuff dept

The FBI's decision to impersonate repair technicians in order to perform a warrantless search is backfiring. Last July, FBI agents investigating an illegal gambling operation worked with Caesars Palace Casino to cut the internet connection to three villas it believed were the operation's ad hoc headquarters. It then sent agents disguised as repairmen to "fix" the problem. Once inside, these agents took photos, recorded video and otherwise observed what they believed to be an illegal bookmaking operation.

Shortly after this warrantless search, the FBI decided it was time to get a search warrant. In its warrant request, it conveniently left out the part where it cut the DSL connection and sent in agents dressed as repairmen. Because of this "fatally flawed" application, a Nevada magistrate judge is recommending the federal district court toss the warrant and suppress the evidence. [Decision pdf link]

Magistrate Judge Peggy Leen ruled that the failure to mention that the original case was born from the "ruse" meant the judge who signed a search warrant this summer didn't have all of the facts. Nowhere in the search warrant request, however, did the authorities mention that they allegedly saw illegal wagering on computers after posing as technicians who in reality briefly disconnected the DSL.

"The investigators' suspicions that Phua was engaged in illegal sports betting at Caesars Palace may be borne out by the evidence recovered in the execution of the warrant," Magistrate Judge Peggy Leen ruled "However, a search warrant is never validated by what its execution recovers."

The material omission of the probable cause's origin (a warrantless search using agents posing as repairmen) should have been enough to get this warrant tossed. The FBI, of course, claimed it omitted this information because it was "law enforcement sensitive." One would think a magistrate judge should have access to sensitive material because it's part of the "law enforcement" field, but the FBI apparently felt otherwise.

Beyond that, there were several flaws in the application -- flaws Judge Leen says weren't intentional but "reckless." The FBI skewed the minimal amount of information it had collected from its illegal entry to make it seem as though it had actually acquired much more damning evidence.

The affidavit was written in a way to suggest investigators had much more information linking Phua to an illegal sports betting operation or wire room connected with the occupants of villa 8888. The affidavit’s repeated use of the phrase “Phua’s and his associates” or “Phua’s associates” or “at the behest of Phua or one of his associates” suggests that Phua was making requests and engaging in conduct which he was not.

And that's only one small part of the affidavit. According to Judge Leen, nearly everything the FBI stated in support of its warrant request completely misrepresented what was actually happening at the Caesar's Palace villas. (Keep the following in mind the next time you visit Las Vegas. In an FBI agent's vivid imagination, your normal, lawful gambling can easily acquire very sinister connotations.)

The application failed to disclose to the issuing magistrate judge that Wood and SA Lopez defied the butler’s instruction to remain in the butler’s pantry and entered the villa in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The application also falsely stated that Wood was fearful for his safety and was too afraid to accompany SA Lopez on a subsequent entry into villa 8882. A video of Wood’s interaction with the butler taken on July 4, 2014, and produced by the government in discovery reveals this claim is false.

[...]

The affidavit falsely stated that an unidentified “associates” of Paul Phua reserved all three villas and that the residents of the villas arrived close in time to each other. In fact, the principal resident of villa 8888, Hui Tang, made his own arrangements with Caesars and arrived several days later than the warrant application claims…

[...]

The application is grossly misleading in claiming that eight separate internet lines were installed, and by omitting the fact that the only unusual amount of computer equipment was in villa 8888 and was installed at the request of that villa’s occupants. Caesars installed a single line in each of the six villas in the building, including three villas whose occupants were unrelated to this case.

[...]

The agents were working with Caesars’ DSL contractor, Wood TMS, and knew by July 4, 2014, that Caesars had decided to install DSL internet service in each villa as an alternative means of internet access because of pervasive problems with the internet service provided by Cox Communications. The installation of a single DSL line in 8882 did not signify any unusually large amount of internet traffic, and there was no evidence that the residents of 8882 made any unusual requests for equipment or technical support.

[...]

The affidavit described deposits to Caesars and transactions between Phua and his associates through Caesars which grossly distorted the nature of those transactions…[T]here is nothing suspicious about gamblers transferring money to their casino accounts. “Front money” deposits are common, and the casino frequently requires a deposit to extend credit. The application omitted references to these facts and attempted to characterize the deposits as suspicious.

[...]

The application represents that Phua transferred $3 million to Gyouye Huang. Huang was a guest in villa 8882. Caesars’ record actually indicates “signed marker MKR for $3Mil trans to 4266598 [Huang Caesars player number] Chen Husan per MG/Bing.” The search warrant application omitted reference to the fact that that it is common for gamblers to share credit lines and that specific individuals involved in this investigation had done so in prior years on prior gambling trips. Even assuming the agents were “confused,” confusion is not probable cause, and the credit line was not fairly characterized to the issuing magistrate judge.

And then there's the testimony of Special Agent Minh Pham, which contains an interesting statement caught by Marcy Wheeler of Emptywheel.

After Pham submitted and obtained the search warrant, he learned the affidavit contained errors. Specifically, it stated that Paul Phua wired $4 million into a Caesars account to secure a credit line. Pham later discovered it was actually Seng Chen “Richard” Yong that requested the wire to secure both their lines of credit. However, at the time Pham submitted the search warrant affidavit, he believed it was correct that Paul Phua had initiated this transfer.

The affidavit also stated Paul Phua had transferred approximately $900,000 from a casino in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to the Caesars account. However, Pham later learned that Paul Phua had been only one of the individuals who signed the consent to have that money wire-transferred into Yong’s account. At the time Pham submitted the affidavit, he believed the statement was true based on documents from Caesars concerning monetary transfers that he had received. Pham referred to the spreadsheet contained in government’s Exhibit 2F as a document he relied upon to support his statement in the affidavit. The font size was very small and difficult to read.

He also discovered another error in the affidavit days later. There were transfers for $3 million between individuals in the villas. He looked at the spreadsheet, and it was off by one or two lines,” which caused him to associate the wrong name with the transfer.

As Wheeler notes, the FBI seems to have a malleable baseline when it comes to font sizes. What Caesars turned over voluntarily was "very small and difficult to read." But the agents used it without demanding something more legible. Compare that to the high-profile government takedown of encrypted email developer Ladar Levison.

You’ll recall that when the FBI went after Lavabit to get its crypto key, Lavar Levison tried to comply by providing a printout of the key. But the government complained it was illegible, and got Levison held in contempt.

So, Levison's 4-point printout of his encryption key was too small for the FBI, which complained to the court until it got its way. In this case, a "too small" printout was used without complaint, ultimately resulting in several flawed assertions being made in a warrant affidavit. "Too small" must be another part of the FBI's double standards -- one that makes concessions to third parties more amenable to the agency's aims.

A district court judge will make the final decision as to whether this warrant remains tossed. The saddest part about this is that the FBI gave itself an (illegal) head start and still managed to hand in a warrant request loaded with bad detective work and worse conjecture.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, cable company, cutting internet access, doj, fbi, hotel, paul phua, peggy leen, warrant
Companies: caesers

As Expected, Aereo Pleads Its Case For Survival

from the cable-company dept

Aereo is back in a district court trying its "okay, fine, you say we look like a duck, we'll act like a duck" explanation so that it can stay in business and pay the statutory rates for a cable company. As you hopefully know by now, this is in response to the Supreme Court's "you're a cable company!" ruling. The broadcasters, of course, just want Aereo to die, so they claim that even if the Supreme Court declared it a cable company, the company still can't pay statutory rates. Aereo tried to skip the district court and go straight to the appeals court, but that attempt was (probably rightfully) rejected recently, so now it's back at the district court, once again making the case for it being a cable company.

Its key argument is, basically that, during oral arguments, Justice Sotomayor more or less said if the Court finds Aereo to be a cable company, then it could just pay Section 111 statutory fees and be legal.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: . . . But I look at the definition of a cable company, and it seems to fit. . . . [Aereo] [m]akes secondary transmissions by wires, cables, or other communication channels. It seems to me that a little antenna with a dime fits that definition. To subscribing members of the public who pay for such service. I mean, I read it and I say, why aren't they a cable company?

MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Sotomayor, a couple of things. First of all, I mean, I think if you're—if you’re already at that point, you’ve probably understood that just like a cable company, they’re public—they’re publicly performing and maybe they qualify as a cable company and maybe they could qualify for the compulsory license that's available to cable companies under Section 111 of the statute.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But it just gets it mixed up. Do we have to go to all of those other questions if we find that they’re a cable company? We say they’re a c[]able company, they get the compulsory license.

At the time, most folks kinda wondered why Sotomayor was going off on this tangent, rather than on the key issues related to the case, concerning the public performance right. What people didn't expect was that the Court would come up with its wacky "looks like a duck" test. But since it did, it certainly seemed to imply that Aereo could just get the compulsory license -- which it's now seeking to do. The company further argues that Justice Breyer, who authored the majority decision, fretted during oral arguments that it would be problematic if Aereo were not allowed to get a compulsory license:

JUSTICE BREYER: Once you take them out of the compulsory licensing system, they're going to have to find copyright owners, who owns James Agee's pictures? Who owns something that was written by—like a French silent film in 1915? I mean, the problem is that they might want to have perfectly good things that people want to watch and they can't find out how to get permission. That is a problem that worries me and it worries me again once you kick them out of the other systems.

Aereo also counters the broadcasters argument that the ivi ruling says that online streaming services can't qualify as cable companies for statutory rates doesn't apply here. Earlier, Aereo argued that the Supreme Court ruling effectively overturned the ivi ruling -- an argument that makes a lot of sense. But here, Aereo goes even further, noting some key differences between ivi and Aereo, including a pretty big one: ivi was "geographically unbounded." That was a key part of why ivi lost, and Aereo notes that its service is different, in that it offered a geographically-specific service.

First, the technology at issue in ivi involved geographically unbounded transmissions, which the Second Circuit noted was “vastly different” from the technology in Fortnightly and Teleprompter.... By contrast, the Supreme Court found that, with respect to “Watch Now,” Aereo is “overwhelming[ly] like[]” and “highly similar” to the technology in Fortnightly and Teleprompter.... As a result, this case is factually distinguishable from ivi on the very point that drove the Second Circuit’s decision. Indeed, the unrestricted nature of ivi’s transmissions was the determinative fact for the Second Circuit, which noted that Section 111’s compulsory license scheme was intended to support local market—rather than national market—systems.... As a result, the court found that ivi’s nationwide retransmission did not seek to address the important issues of availability of local over-the-air television signals, and it was therefore not the type of service Congress intended the compulsory license to cover.... Because Aereo’s “Watch Now” technology does not give its subscribers access to broadcasts outside of their home DMA, and instead gives only geographically-restricted access (with and through corresponding local physical antenna facilities), and because (as the Supreme Court found) the technology is “virtually identical” to the technology Congress addressed in the 1976 Amendments, Aereo’s “Watch Now” technology is not governed by ivi.

Aereo makes another interesting argument for survival as well. Even if it doesn't qualify for Section 111 compulsory rates, it should still be allowed to keep its "Watch Now" feature working, because of the DMCA. Basically, it's saying that even if the DVR functionality is deemed infringing, it has a stronger argument around the live streaming, based on the DMCA. All the parenthetical quotes supporting this are from the Supreme Court's ruling...

If the Court concludes that Aereo is not entitled to a Section 111 license, a preliminary injunction should still not enter because Aereo is entitled to the 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) [DMCA] safe harbor because its “Watch Now” function is a “transitory digital network communication.” Each of the Section 512(a) elements is satisfied and undisputed. First, the transmissions of the material are initiated by or at the direction of a person other than Aereo.... (“Aereo’s system remains inert until a subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program.”). Second, the transmission, routing, and storage of material are carried out through an automatic process, without selection of the material by Aereo.... (“in automatic response to the subscriber’s request”); ... (agreeing with dissent that Aereo does not “select” the content). Third, Aereo does not select the recipients of the material, except as an automated response to the user.... (“When an Aereo subscriber selects a program to watch, Aereo streams the program over the Internet to that subscriber.”). Fourth, no copy of the material transmitted is made accessible to anyone but the user who made it, and no “Watch Now” copy is kept for a longer period than is reasonably necessary.... (“It streams the content of the copy to the same subscriber and to no one else.”); ... (“If the user does not press ‘Record’ before the program ends, the copy of the program created for and used to transmit the program to the user is automatically deleted when it has finished playing.”);... (“The file saved to the hard disk using the ‘Watch [Now]’ function is not automatically retained unless the user clicks ‘Record’ while the show is still open on the user’s web browser.”). Fifth, the material is transmitted without modification of its content....

As a result of satisfying this safe harbor provision, Aereo cannot be liable for the claimed “public performance” of Plaintiffs’ claimed copyrighted works. And, Plaintiffs’ requested preliminary injunction cannot be entered because it is outside the scope of a permitted injunction under the DMCA.

That could lead to some interesting legal questions going forward.

Finally, Aereo argues that no injunction is necessary, because there's no evidence of "irreparable harm." Here it probably hurts that CBS and other networks more or less admitted that even if Aereo had won the "harm" would be minimal.

The Section 111 arguments about whether or not it's a cable company will continue to make the headlines, but the DMCA argument here may be the most interesting one of all (and one that the broadcasters will most freak out about).

Filed Under: broadcast tv, cable company, copyright, dmca, dvr, networks, section 111, streaming
Companies: abc, aereo, cbs

Aereo: Okay, Fine, If You Say We Look Like A Duck, We'll Quack Like A Duck

from the let's-pay-up dept

In the wake of the Aereo ruling, I'd been meaning to do a post questioning whether or not the ruling had effectively overturned the ruling in the ivi case from a few years earlier. We had seen some people in our comments point out that, following the Aereo ruling, Aereo had an easy solution: just start paying retransmission fees. Except... that's exactly what ivi had tried to do, and the court had shut them down, using almost the opposite reasoning as the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Second Circuit appeals court (the same that had decided in Aereo's favor) ruled that internet services were not cable companies under the law, and couldn't just pay retrans fees:

Congress did not, however, intend for Section 111's compulsory license to extend to Internet transmissions. Indeed, the legislative history indicates that if Congress had intended to extend Section 111's compulsory license to Internet retransmissions, it would have done so expressly -- either through the language of Section 111 as it did for microwave retransmissions or by codifying a separate statutory provision as it did for satellite carriers. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119.

Extending Section 111's compulsory license to Internet retransmissions, moreover, would not fulfill or further Congress's statutory purpose. Internet retransmission services are not seeking to address issues of reception and remote access to over-the-air television signals. They provide not a local but a nationwide (arguably international) service.

Accordingly, we conclude that Congress did not intend for Section 111's compulsory license to extend to Internet retransmissions.

So, uh, which is it? Aereo has now decided that if the Supreme Court is going to call it a duck for looking like a duck, it's damn well going to quack like a duck too. It has told the lower court that it intends to pay retransmission fees under Section 111, more or less claiming directly that the Supreme Court overruled the ivi ruling. For what it's worth, Aereo's "wacky" (but seriously questionable) "competitor" FilmOn, already made a similar declaration of being a cable company, though as we've learned with FilmOn, you should take almost every claim it makes with a huge grain of salt.

Of course, this is a big problem with the Supreme Court's ruling. By coming up with this wacky "looks like a duck" test, it's encouraging companies like Aereo to use that test in a variety of ways, even though copyright law has never worked that way. Lots of things that "look like" each other face different rules: think of terrestrial radio and internet radio stations. Under the "looks like a duck" test, internet radio stations should be able to declare themselves the same as terrestrial radio stations and stop having to pay performance fees to musicians.

And, of course, the networks themselves don't like Aereo embracing the duck, even though the company is only doing so because of the network's own lawsuit.

On July 1, however, its counsel suggested that Aereo has rethought its entire legal strategy and will raise before this Court a brand new defense based on Section 111 of the Copyright Act. Aereo never before pled (much less litigated) Section 111 as an affirmative defense. Whatever Aereo may say about its rationale for raising it now, it is astonishing for Aereo to contend the Supreme Court’s decision automatically transformed Aereo into a “cable system” under Section 111 given its prior statements to this Court and the Supreme Court.

But it's not Aereo that made that decision. It's pretty clearly the Supreme Court and its stupid "looks like a duck" test. The entertainment industry might want to be careful what it wishes for. It applauded the dreadful looks like a duck test, and now it's freaking out when Aereo actually tries to apply it.

Filed Under: cable company, cable tv, copyright, retransmission fees, section 111, supreme court
Companies: aereo, filmon, ivi