Court Tells Family Services Worker 'I Don't Approve Of Your Lifestyle' Isn't A Valid Warrant Exception

from the seize,-search,-judge... dept

A very interesting (read: wtf) case from Texas [PDF] -- one that resulted in criminal charges of official oppression against a Dept. of Family and Protective Services employee -- posits that there may be yet another warrant exemption: the "I don't approve of your lifestyle and/or choices" exception.

This "exception" has often been used by actual parents when searching rooms/electronic devices of their children, but private searches usually don't violate the Fourth Amendment. Searches using the same moral prerogative, when performed by agents of the state, do.

The case involves a warrantless search of a 15-year-old's cellphone by Natalie Reynolds, a Department supervisor. The Sheriff's Department located the runaway teen (referred to only as "A.K." throughout the decision) and turned her over to Reynolds. Reynolds confiscated A.K.'s personal belongings, including her cellphone, which she then decided to search for a number of stated reasons -- none of which was allowable under state case law, much less the Supreme Court's Riley decision.

The Riley decision is only referenced in a footnote, as the illegal searches were performed in 2012, roughly two years before the Supreme Court arrived at its conclusion. But that didn't prevent the court from finding state precedent that upheld Reynold's conviction.

Reynolds' coworkers provided plenty of testimony against her, rebutting her assertion that her search and seizure of the teen's cellphone was somehow related to finding A.K. somewhere to live.

Kenny Stillwagoner, formerly with the Department, testified that he believed Reynolds, Ross, or both of them, took possession of A.K.’s cell phone without her consent. He also testified that Reynolds remained in possession of the cell phone because she believed it contained contact information for drug dealers. In addition, Edie Diane Fletcher, also formerly with the Department, testified that, when she contacted Reynolds about the situation regarding A.K.’s cell phone, Reynolds explained to her that she could not return the phone to A.K. because she believed A.K.’s cell phone contained contact information relating to drug dealers and that “they” needed to “finish their investigation.”

A.K. testified that she became very upset when Ross and Reynolds refused to return her cell phone and that both Ross and Reynolds looked through her cell phone. Further, A.K. testified that Ross and Reynolds retrieved information from her cell phone relating to Steve Lamb and Michael Watts, and there was no evidence presented that either of these men was considered as a potential placement option for A.K. In fact, A.K. had little, if any, information as to why she was questioned about her relationship to either man.

Reynolds tried to argue that her warrantless search of the cellphone was also somehow related to "exigent circumstances" -- that there was an "emergency regarding A.K.'s physical and emotional wellbeing." The state itself disagreed with Reynold's assertion.

The State maintains that Reynolds, as a representative of the Department, cannot claim that she acted in loco parentis or as A.K.’s de facto parent because she was “not acting as a ‘parent’ when she was searching [A.K.’s] phone. Instead, she was clearly acting as an investigator attempting to build a case for either herself or law enforcement.” The State points to Reynolds’ affidavit, arguing that it “reads like a veteran police detective interrogating a criminal suspect.”

Rather than show her purported concern for A.K.'s wellbeing, Reynolds spent most of her time with A.K. questioning her about drug use, drug paraphernalia, and drug sales. Also, contrary to her stated concerns about A.K. having no place to go, the state points out that a placement facility had already been found at the point Reynolds decided to take A.K.'s phone and search it for "drug evidence."

The court notes that there are a wealth of warrant exceptions available to state agents when performing searches. Reynold's opinion of A.K.'s lifestyle, however, isn't one that's been recognized by any court -- or anyone possessing a modicum of common sense, actually.

Based on precedent and this record, we conclude that A.K. had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her cell phone. Reynolds seems to claim, however, that, because A.K. had been known to use drugs and was allegedly having inappropriate relationships with adult men, that somehow changed A.K.’s expectation of privacy in her phone.

That's not how the Fourth Amendment works. And Reynolds' narrative about the phone's search somehow being related to caring for A.K.'s wellbeing doesn't hold up when compared to the facts.

Based on A.K.’s alleged behavior and lack of any known placement options at the time, Reynolds contends that she had an urgent responsibility to find A.K. a place to reside until the Department took custody of her and that she believed A.K.’s phone contained useful information that could assist her in that endeavor.

[...]

Had Reynolds wanted the cell phone for the purpose she claims, she would have had no reason to continue in possession of the phone once a placement facility for A.K. had been located. A.K.’s cell phone was not seized pursuant to an arrest, and there is no evidence of any warrant, court order, or consent to seize or search A.K.’s cell phone. Reynolds’ claim of exigent circumstances is not compelled by the evidence. For these reasons, we find that Reynolds’ actions were not authorized.

The conviction for official oppression is upheld. Oddly, as is pointed out at FourthAmendment.com, this sort of behavior by law enforcement officers usually only results in suppression of evidence, rather than official oppression charges. Lots of wrongful arrests and warrantless searches would seem to fit the language of the statute once the officer's immunity has been stripped.

A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he:

(1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful…

And yet, this charge is almost never brought, much less successfully prosecuted -- yet another way law enforcement operates at a lower level of culpability than the rest of the government. And far, far lower than what is expected of the citizens they serve.

Filed Under: exceptions, family services, texas, warrants

UK Goes Full Orwell: Government To Take Children Away From Parents If They Might Become Radicalized

from the ministry-of-love dept

If there are two edicts I try to follow whenever I'm writing, they are, first, write what is true and, second, avoid cliche at all costs. I bring that up only as a preface before saying the following: the UK is walking down an Orwellian path. It's nearly the cliche of cliches to say something like this, and yet it happens that the cliche is true. While there is most certainly a real thing known as a threat from Islamic terrorism, there is also such a thing as overreaction. What started as the British government's attempt to ban extremist thought from social media and television (under the notion that some thoughts are too dangerous to enjoy the freedom that other thoughts deserve) then devolved into the conscripting of teachers that were to be on the lookout for children that might become radicalized. To assist them with this, the government helpfully provided spy-software to use against students. Spy-software which itself was found to be exploitable in the most laughably easy of ways. This employed two of the most horrifying aspects of Orwell's Oceania: the concept of thought-crime and the employ of citizens to fearfully surveil one another.

And now it seems the UK is going even further, adopting Oceania's reputation for the swallowing up of citizens should they be found suspect of thought-crime by those watchful citizens. Specifically, the Family Division of the Judiciary has put out a memo declaring exactly how it will remove children from the homes of anyone it suspects might radicalize those children. Here's a snippet.

Recent months have seen increasing numbers of children cases coming before the Family Division and the Family Court where there are allegations or suspicions: that children, with their parents or on their own, are planning or attempting or being groomed with a view to travel to parts of Syria controlled by the so-called Islamic State; that children have been or are at risk of being radicalised; or that children have been or at are at risk of being involved in terrorist activities either in this country or abroad.

Only a local authority can start care proceedings (see section 31(1) of the Children Act 1989 – the police powers are set out in section 46). However, any person with a proper interest in the welfare of a child can start proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction or apply to make a child a ward of court.2 Usually, in cases falling within the description in paragraph 1 above, it will be the local authority which starts proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction or applies to make a child a ward of court, and the court would not expect the police (who have other priorities and responsibilities) to do so. There is, however, no reason why in a case where it seems to the police to be necessary to do so, the police should not start such proceedings for the purposes, for example, of making a child a ward of court, obtaining an injunction to prevent the child travelling abroad, obtaining a passport order, or obtaining a Tipstaff location or collection order. Given the complexities of these cases, I have decided that, for the time being at least, all cases falling within the description in paragraph 1 above are to be heard by High Court Judges of the Family Division.

In other words, the High Court Judges within the Family Division are now tasked with determining whether children will be made wards of the state based solely on suspicions of possible radicalization. Children torn from mothers and fathers in Muslim homes will be subject to the whims and inherently flawed watch of the larger citizenry. A citizenry, mind you, that has had its vigilance unduly ramped up by the government's past actions and requests. It's hard to imagine a better recipe for the unfair targeting of Muslim families than this. Unfortunately for all concerned, this same memo imagined just such a recipe, making things even worse.

Judges hearing cases falling within the description in paragraph 1 above will wish to be alert to: (a) the need to protect the Article 6 rights of all the parties;4 (b) the fact that much of the information gathered by the police and other agencies will not be relevant to the issues before the court; (c) the fact that some of the information gathered by the police and other agencies is highly sensitive and such that its disclosure may damage the public interest or even put lives at risk; (d) the need to avoid inappropriately wide or inadequately defined requests for disclosure of information or documents by the police or other agencies; (e) the need to avoid seeking disclosure from the police or other agencies of information or material which may be subject to PII, or the disclosure of which might compromise ongoing investigations, damage the public interest or put lives at risk, unless the judge is satisfied that such disclosure is “necessary to enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly” within the meaning given to those words when used in, for example, sections 32(5) and 38(7A) of the Children Act 1989 and section 13(6) of the Children and Families Act 2014; (f) the need to safeguard the custody of, and in appropriate cases limit access to, any sensitive materials provided to the court5 by the police or other agencies;6...

It goes on from there, essentially giving courts and law enforcement an absolute free pass to deny the court open access and review of the very intelligence that landed the case before it in the first place. This is a memo designed to create a court system by which Muslim parents will lose their children and won't even be told why, or have the opportunity to rebut evidence against them, as no evidence need be presented. This isn't just overreaction, it's terrifyingly provocative action designed with one target in mind and built on the back of a process designed to be flawed in favor of a government that apparently can't get its head on straight.

Nobody means to suggest that there is no threat that the UK might face from Islamic terrorists and/or extremists. But you simply don't adopt the tactics of Orwell to combat that threat. Not if you want to claim your own people remain free, that is.

Filed Under: children, courts, families, family services, radicalization, thought police, uk