Financial Reform Killing Off Bonds By Both Requiring Ratings & Making It Impossible To Rate Bonds

from the hey-isn't-there-a-first-amendment-somewhere? dept

Ah, the unintended consequences of bad legislation. It's no surprise that many people have pinned a lot of the blame on the financial crisis on the ratings agencies (mainly Moody's and S&P). After all, they were the ones who went out there and said that collections of slices of dices of the worst mortgages around should be rated as top notch, sure-fire, investments. And there were clear conflicts of interest in how the ratings agencies did their ratings. But, in the end, the ratings agencies were really just giving an opinion -- and opinions are (last we checked) supposed to be protected by the First Amendment.

The real problem came from the government writing those agencies' ratings into the law. Basically, the government, in a really short-sighted attempt to avoid financial problems, required certain institutions had to maintain a percentage of "highly rated" or "investment quality" bonds, in order to engage in certain activities. Suddenly, these "opinions" weren't just opinions, but had important legal consequences. If a ratings agency downgraded an investment, it could legally force some holders of those bonds to have to sell them to maintain its investment ratios. With that, those ratings also took on the sheen of something objective and factual, rather than a random opinion put forth by a bunch of guys (mostly guys) who might not know what's really going on, and who have some serious conflicts of interest.

However, with the new financial reform bill in place, apparently one provision is that rating agencies can be liable for getting the rating wrong. Planet Money explains the unintended consequences this creates:

Under the new law, ratings agencies can be sued for making bad ratings decisions, if the ratings are included in formal documents that companies file with the SEC when they issue bonds.

That's making the agencies nervous. As a result, they're telling the issuers not to include their ratings in the formal documents filed with the SEC, according to the WSJ.

That's a particular problem for asset-backed securites -- bonds made up of bundles of consumer loans such as mortgages and auto loans. Federal law requires those bonds to include ratings in their formal documentation.

Because of that, the issuance of asset-backed securities has vanished. So, basically, the government requires these ratings be used on these types of financial instruments, but makes the ratings agencies liable if they make a bad guess in doing their ratings. You can understand the reasoning, but no ratings agency can be perfect. It's really making a guess, and eventually you're going to make a bad guess.

I really wonder if the part of the law making ratings agencies liable would stand up to a First Amendment challenge. But, in the meantime, asset-backed securities are on hold. Now, some may argue that this is a good thing, because "asset-backed securities" were part of the problem in the financial crisis. But that's definitely throwing out a very large baby with a little bit of bathwater. Yes, there were massive problems from asset-backed securities, but that doesn't mean the concept of asset-backed securities themselves are bad. In fact, they can be quite useful.

Filed Under: financial crisis, unintended consequences

Momentary Financial Crisis... And A Lesson In Unintended Consequences

from the watch-the-automated-trades-go-wheeeeeeeeee dept

As you may have heard, yesterday was a fun day when it came to the stock market, with something causing the Dow to go into freefall for a bit, before it then bounced back up. Initially, some thought that it was a full-on financial crisis, and then there were rumors of a "fat finger" trade, as has been seen in the past. Then there was the inevitable claims of high frequency trading systems having something to do with the mess. People are still figuring out all the details, but Bloomberg has a pretty good explanation of how things snowballed, and it appears to be a case of seriously unintended consequences. Planet Money has the shorter version of how a system designed to prevent the market going into freefall, may have actually aided the market going into freefall.

Basically, there's a system for the NY Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ, called the Liquidity Replenishment Point (LRP), which is designed to stop electronic trading on stocks in freefall. The idea, of course, is to prevent the algorithms from going nuts. But, the LRP only works on those two exchanges, and we're in a world now where there are a bunch of other, electronic exchanges, that now handle an increasing percentage of stock trades -- and electronic trading on those exchanges is not stopped when the LRP is triggered. So, now things actually get worse, because orders that used to be spread more widely concentrate on these other exchanges by automatically jumping from the NYSE and NASDAQ to those alternative routes, and it can swamp those systems, which have a lot less money available. As Bloomberg explains:

While the system is designed to restore order on the Big Board, trading is so fast during times of panic that orders routed past the exchange may swamp other venues and exhaust buy orders, said Angel at Georgetown.

That's when prices may plummet as orders execute against so-called stub quotes from market makers. Brokers can set the quotes as low as a penny a share because they're never expected to be used.

And, speaking of unintended consequences, in talking about this very thing, Felix Salmon points to a blog post by Kid Dynamite explaining why the plan to cancel many of the errant trades is monumentally stupid and likely to create more unintended consequences in forgiving people for doing stupid things, and taking away incentives for others to step in and fix things:

if buyers who step in later see their trades canceled, it removes all incentive for them to step in - and then you don't get the bounce back that we saw! Think about how much havoc it causes a trader who astutely bought cheap stock, then sold it out at a profit. He's now short! Or, he spent the entire day wondering if his order would be canceled, in a state of limbo. What's the alternative - that traders should just assume that the orders will get canceled, and NOT buy stock? Guess what - if no one buys, the stock stays cheap! SOMEONE has to buy, and that someone shouldn't be penalized in favor of remedying the ignorance of the seller who screwed up.

Ah, setting off more unintended consequences in response to other unintended consequences. Sometimes you just have to let those who made a mistake take responsibility for their mistakes.

Filed Under: financial crisis, unintended consequences

No, David Bowie Is Not Responsible For The Financial Crisis

from the ziggy-stardust-and-the-spiders-from-wall-street dept

We've talked in the past about some of the many rather innovative efforts by David Bowie to come up with new business models. He's been a huge pioneer in embracing what new technologies allow -- and also new markets and financial opportunities. Of course, most famously, many years ago he "securitized" himself with Bowie Bonds, that allowed him to cash out quickly, while letting others buy into his future earnings. It was actually quite a creatively done idea. But now, ChurchHatesTucker points us to an article by Evan Davis suggesting that David Bowie and his Bowie bonds are at the heart of the financial crisis. This is -- let's just say it -- flat out ridiculous. Financial engineering and all sorts of derivatives were already coming into fashion, and in the unlikely event that Bowie's setup inspired others to securitize mortgages, you can pretty much guarantee that someone else would have come up with the same idea before too long, anyway. Taking a future cash flow and turning it into a security isn't an inherently bad idea, either. It has many good and useful attributes. The problem wasn't securitizing the debt, but using that process (and further engineering) to hide the underlying assets and the true risk associated with the offering. That was not David Bowie's fault by a long shot. It's really too bad that an "economics editor" would confuse the basic concept of securitizing future cash flows with abusing that process to hide actual risk. And dragging David Bowie and his innovations down along with such a confusion doesn't help anyone.

Filed Under: david bowie, financial crisis, securitization

Same Economy, Different Bubble

from the and-it's-going-to-pop dept

Last year, The Onion (which has a knack for predicting the future in really scary ways) had an amusing article: Recession-Plagued Nation Demands New Bubble To Invest In. In the immortal words of Homer Simpson: "It's funny 'cause it's true." And, indeed, one of the big fears we've had since the beginning of the government's response to the financial crisis is that it hasn't been doing anything to solve the real problem of a lack of transparency. Pumping more money into the system without fixing that simply meant that we'd repeat the cycle, with the money eventually finding some bubble again.

At this point, it's worth taking a step back, and understanding why these sorts of bubbles occur. Sometimes, investment bubbles can actually be quite beneficial. In markets of true innovation, where a clear success story or business model hasn't yet been worked out, a bubble allows a lot of money to be thrown at the problem at once. From that, you get a lot of ideas tested in the marketplace very rapidly. Many of them fail once the bubble collapses, and many investors lose money, but the ideas that do work and do stick around tend to takes us forward in leaps and bounds. Bubbles in innovative technologies function as a form of speeding up the innovation process and getting lots of infrastructure built and ideas tested rapidly. It's no fun if you're caught on the wrong side of the investment, but for society, it can be a net gain.

However, that's not what happened in the last economic crash. That was built on a different sort of bubble, based not on funding innovation, but on a series of arbitrage plays where bankers actively worked to obfuscate risk, so that it could be passed on to the latest sucker. Basically, they kept taking riskier and riskier assets, and packaged them in a way that they looked less risky. Then, by making it so no one could really look at (or understand) the true risk, they could sell these super risky investments off to suckers at prices as if they were safe. And, since such a house of cards takes a while to collapse, it doesn't take long for everyone to pile in, feeling like they have to match those returns.

So, the answer to this is to increase transparency. If you could really get the information out there, such that people could look at the underlying details and properly calculate the risk, not based on random clueless rating agency employees, but in a true market, then it would be that much more difficult to pass off and misprice super risky vehicles as safe.

But that's not what's happening. Without any efforts at increasing transparency, combined with pumping a ton of new cash into the market, we're getting another bubble. The bankers are still operating the same way they did in the past -- which is looking for ways to obfuscate the risk and find new suckers to take the risk off their hands without really understanding how to price that risk. It may be securitizing life insurance or it may be in the carry trade. It doesn't really matter. The money is looking for a new bubble and a focus on short term profits over long term sustainability -- and that's enabled by allowing banks to play "hide the risk."

This is really quite worrisome. It's been over a year since the financial crisis went into panic mode (even if the actual recession and problems significantly predated that). And while the "worst case scenario" did not occur, there's been little evidence of real fixes to the economy or any attempt to really fix the factors that resulted in the original problem. Instead of creating transparency and a long term strategic focus, we're just pumping cash into the economy to try to help suckers find the next bubble.

Filed Under: bubble, economy, financial crisis, radical transparency, transparency

Did Not Understanding The Leverage Cycle Kill The Economy?

from the something-worth-exploring dept

David Warsh's latest economics column delves into the renewed interest being given to economist John Geanakoplos' paper explaining how the real issue that brought down the economy was a misunderstanding of "the leverage cycle." Basically, the argument is that everyone (mainly, the Fed) gets so focused on the interest rates, that they stop focusing on the leverage/collateral involved. It's sort of the central banker equivalent of when the mortgage broker tries to get you to ignore all the real terms in your mortgage and just gets you to focus on how much you'll be paying each month. The argument, then, is that the government could have done much more to prevent the crisis if it had simply paid more attention to the leverage situation, which had obviously grown totally out-of-hand. Basically, the argument says that in a competitive market for credit, leverage will always rise, as some parties take bigger and bigger risks, forcing others to do the same. But then everyone's way overleveraged, and when the music stops, basically everyone's left without a seat. It's an interesting theory -- one that sounds good, though on a first read I'm not entirely convinced. While the issue of how much leverage was out there is obviously a part of the problem, I'm not entirely sure that the government would realistically be able to totally control the issue. While it could put in place certain regulations, it seems like there would always be loopholes that allowed leverage to occur elsewhere. Either way, I'm going to do some more reading on the subject, but wanted to pass it along here to see what others thought of it in the meantime.

Filed Under: economy, financial crisis, leverage, leverage cycle

Making The Tough Choices To Save The Economy?

from the stop-giving-the-banks-everything-they-want dept

With the latest plan laid out last week on how to "save Wall Street" ("the Geithner plan"), there's a lot of back and forth over whether or not this is a good plan or not -- and while Planet Money had a decent "is it good or bad?" show, the folks there didn't get too deep into it (and even claimed that no one really thought the plan was all that dangerous (just that it could slow down the recovery). However, the more I read up on it, the worse and worse it seems. Simon Johnson has a long, but worthwhile writeup at The Atlantic, where he delves into how Wall Street has effectively taken over Washington DC, such that it helped both create the mess, and then set things up so that the "recovery plan" only benefits those who caused the problems in the first place. This echoes a piece by Andy Kessler last week, where he pointed out that we're effectively handing money to those who brought the collapse upon us -- and suggests that the better response is to simply stymie the plans of the hedge funds -- flooding the markets where they're looking to buy, rather than subsidizing them.

Then, there's Umair Haque, who basically makes the same points, but suggests that this is an outright looting of taxpayer money by putting most of the risk on taxpayers, and encouraging the hedge funds to make increasingly risky loans (you know, like the ones that got us into this mess in the first place). The root of all of these stories is that the government seems to think that the only way to fix the problem is to reinflate the bubble, rather than letting the bubble deflate and moving forward from there. The problem with reinflating the bubble isn't just that it puts off the inevitable (though, it does), but that the inevitable is that much worse when it comes.

It's what we've done for the past couple decades -- effectively building an even shakier house of cards, and every time the cards start to fall... we just reinforce it with another layer of shaky cards to prop it up. At some point, the cards do have to fall, and propping it up with more leverage isn't going to help that.

Even if, as Richard Posner suggests, the current plan is about the most politically feasible, it's still problematic. The politics of the situation is troubling. On one side, you have populist anger, making it difficult to do certain necessary things. On the other, you do still have the influence of the bankers, who view the world as being one where we need to keep propping up that house of cards.

Why is it that no one is talking about carefully taking down the house of cards while building a sturdy house next door?

Filed Under: bailout, financial crisis, politics, timothy geithner, wall street

Why Do We Assume No One Is Fixing The Financial Crisis?

from the things-are-happening... dept

While some keep insisting that the government needs to step in, in a big way, to fix the financial crisis, Paul Kedrosky posits an interesting and worthwhile theory, as well: lots of folks within the industry are scrambling to fix things every day, and if we just gave them a chance they might get stuff done. He's not saying this is definitely happening, but he uses the Y2K crisis as an analogy. Many people were totally freaked out about it, insisting that there was no possible way all the problems could get fixed in time. But they did. They did because a lot of people worked really hard to get things done and solve most of the problems. And he's wondering if the same sort of thing is happening today with the financial markets:

I hear too many naive projections, too many scenarios constructed via extrapolating early failures forward and assuming the same thing can happen in the same way, so systemic collapse is ahead. While that is possible, and this time is different (tm), it's at least worth wondering what if the Y2K lesson matters more than we might have thought. Government aside, independent and fiercely survival-minded actors are doing what they can throughout the economy and the financial system to mitigate the risks they face from the current depression. Credit default swaps are being netted and torn up; banks are trying to unwind swaps and other derivatives. Some financial institutions are accidentally healing, at least a little, under the flood of savings pouring into them from petrified and security-seeking citizens. There are myriad other examples, but the point is that the bell has been rung, people are acting, and communication networks are afire -- and history says these are circumstances in which people can, by protecting themselves, surprise us all with the outcome.

It's definitely a point worth thinking about. We've been told over and over again that only the government can help us out of this mess, but people seem to think that the rest of the financial world is sitting around picking their noses as the world collapses -- and there's little reason to believe that's actually true. In fact, if you listen to this week's This American Life "Act 2" (starting about 45 minutes in) covers a couple of entrepreneurial guys who are doing their part: buying up "toxic" mortgages on their own and restructuring them -- and they're making decent money doing so. While even they're a bit skeptical about that on a larger scale, as Kedrosky noted, the same was true of the individuals working on solving the Y2K crisis as well.

Filed Under: financial crisis, fixes, paul kedrosky, y2k

Garbage In... Radical Transparency Out?

from the one-hopes... dept

The latest edition of Wired Magazine has two articles that pick up on stuff we discussed last year. First up, was the question of how the various quants on Wall Street got so suckered into believing their risk models that didn't take into account the idea that mortgage defaults weren't necessarily independent events. The end result was garbage in, financial crisis out. However, Felix Salmon has a detailed look at the "garbage in" part of the equation. Apparently, much of it was based on widespread reliance on a formula by one financial engineer, who thought that you could price risk by finding correlations. While in retrospect this may look silly -- it should have looked silly at the time as well. It made a huge incorrect assumption: that correlations were static instead of variable. But... once it went into the "black box" people simply accepted the output as gospel. This is an issue that comes up all too often. Even if people know that a computer model is "just a model," it leads to situations where they just rely on the computer because the computer said so -- not taking into account it's obvious faults.

However, the good news is that, as a result of this mess, there may actually be some movement towards the solution a few of us have been suggesting for a while: radical transparency. Back in November, we suggested that public companies should be allowed to do away with quarterly reports in favor of real-time data dumps in standardized formats, that would allow anyone to build tools on top of the data to analyze it themselves. Rather than obscuring the real situation within companies, as is the case today, this would expose everything, and let anyone build tools to analyze the real underpinning fundamentals. It would also serve to get rid of the extremely damaging focus on "quarterly" returns at the expense of long-term thinking. And, finally, it would help combat the problem described above where everyone's relying on a black box to pop out risk metrics. Yes, many might adopt the same formulas, but by exposing all of the underlying data in a real-time format with a full API, anyone could structure their own system for reading the data and analyzing it. Then we wouldn't have silly situations where everyone believes that bundles of toxic mortgages have a AAA rating.

Of course, almost every discussion I've had with anyone about the subject had people saying the concept was so insane no one was actually thinking about it. Turns out that might not be entirely true. Daniel Roth discusses an almost identical plan in Wired, suggesting that the idea isn't so far-fetched after all. That doesn't mean anyone is going to implement such an idea any time soon, but at least the idea is out there and permeating and getting some attention. It may take a while, but eventually people will begin to realize that it makes much more sense than anything else going on these days. We're not going to fix a broken Wall Street by throwing extra money at the problem, but we might be able to fix it by opening up, adopting radical transparency, and then letting the market more accurately value things based on real data.

Filed Under: financial crisis, radical transparency

Is Piracy Really More Important Than The Financial Crisis And Climate Change?

from the priorities,-people dept

Reader Virginia notes that in an announcement concerning European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao meeting to talk about various issues, it seems odd that "piracy" was apparently a priority over both the financial crisis and climate change. You would think that the other issues would be much more important, but the old legacy content industry still has been able to convince politicians that piracy is some huge political problem, rather than a business model issue they could take on, if only they bothered to try.

Filed Under: china, climate change, europe, financial crisis, piracy, policy

Blaming Failure On The System Actually Does Have Some Benefits...

from the before-we-trash-everything-here... dept

A bunch of folks have sent in Daniel Gross' excellent review of the World Economic Forum in Davos last week, where he bemoans the fact that no one is willing to step up and take the blame (or even find people who should shoulder the blame) for the economic collapse we're all living through. He has a great line near the beginning:

Success is the work of Great Men and Great Women, while failure can be pinned on the system.

Indeed, in reading the article, I definitely agreed, and sometimes I find it troubling that we credit success stories to individuals who were often much more lucky than anyone cares to imagine, and when failure occurs, no one's willing to admit that they had any part in it. However, in thinking about it some more, I'm less and less sure that this is a bad thing. In many ways, it's actually an important part of creating future success stories.

If we went around blaming individuals for every failure, it creates tremendous incentives not to take on the necessary risk to create those next breakthroughs. The difference between success and failure is often such a fine line it's difficult to see. In almost every success story you hear of one or two minor things that could have brought the whole thing crashing down if things had gone differently. But in celebrating the "heroes" associated with success, we create incentives for others to experiment and take necessary risks. In not punishing the individuals behind the failures too harshly by calling them out for "blame" we don't create incentives to avoid those necessary risks. That's a good thing.

That isn't to say that we shouldn't look at what happened and why it went wrong, but it's right to look at the systems that went wrong and how to fix them, rather than calling out people to tar and feather. That's counter-productive and only makes it that much more difficult to encourage the next generation of entrepreneurs to take the necessary risks to create economic growth.

Of course, there is one additional point that needs to be made here. Despite what I said above, there is a significant problem when we interpret that initial sentence to mean we should then socialize the loss -- and pin the effects of it on taxpayers, which seems to be exactly what this country has done all too often.

Filed Under: blame, davos, financial crisis, risk, world economic forum