Federal Prosecutors Use All Writs Order To Compel Suspect To Unlock Phone With His Fingerprint

from the but-it-still-may-not-have-worked dept

Law enforcement is still trying to break into iPhones and still using the All Writs Act to do so. A sex trafficking prosecution involving the ATF has resulted in a suspect being ordered to cough up his, um, fingerprint, in order to allow investigators to access the contents of his phone. Matt Drange of Forbes has more details [caution: here there be ad-blocker blocking]:

Prosecutors hoped that the search, conducted on an iPhone 5s by special agent Jennifer McCarty of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, would help them piece together evidence in an alleged sex trafficking case involving a man named Martavious Keys. Keys had the iPhone with him when he was arrested on May 19, according to recently unsealed court filings. A week later, on May 26, prosecutors asked the judge in the case to force Keys to open the device with his fingerprint, unlocking a potential trove of information including emails, text messages, contacts and photos stored on the device that could be used as evidence.

While courts generally agree that a fingerprint is non-testimonial -- despite its ability to unlock all sorts of testimonial stuff -- there aren't too many courts willing to extend that coverage to passwords. There are exceptions, of course, but items held in someone's mind are given a bit more deference than those at their literal fingertips.

And that's likely why the All Writs-compelled fingerprint access hasn't allowed the ATF inside Keys' phone. The feds can force Keys to place his finger on the iPhone screen all they want, but it likely won't unlock the device. Apple's security requires a passcode as well as a fingerprint if it's been more than 48 hours since the phone was last unlocked. The time elapsed between when the phone was seized and the order obtained for Keys' fingerprint added another layer of security to the phone -- one not so easily defeated with All Writs orders.

Keys is no one's idea of a sympathetic party. He allegedly forced two teen girls, aged 14 and 15, to have sex with men for several hours a day by drugging them into submission. Whether or not his phone contained more evidence is unknown. It's unclear from the recently unsealed documents whether federal investigators found another way into the device after the application of Keys' fingerprint failed to unlock the phone.

And that's sort of a problem. The government is using All Writs orders for a great many things these days, often during sealed cases and with little to no transparency. The fact that Congress apparently authorized this as a fill-in for things warrants couldn't necessarily reach has made the use of All Writs requests both indispensable and easily-abused. The fact that Congress authorized this in 1789 -- with no conceivable idea of the form "papers" would take over the next 200+ years -- usually seems to work in the government's favor.

A bit more transparency would go a long way to assuage concerns about abuse, but overuse/abuse of the 1789 Act is likely the reason there isn't more transparency. If the court decides it's going to compel Keys to turn over his passcode as well (assuming the phone hasn't already been cracked), at least it won't have to toss him in jail if he doesn't. Keys is already behind bars awaiting trial for his sex trafficking indictment. On one hand, that lowers the coercive value of imprisonment. On the other hand -- if he refuses and is hit with a contempt order -- he'll remain in jail indefinitely, even without having been found guilty of anything more than contempt of court.

Filed Under: all writs act, encryption, fingerprint, phones, unlock

When A Fingerprint IS The Password, Where Does The Fifth Amendment Come Into Play?

from the a-non-testimonial-appendage? dept

FBI Director James Comey is still complaining about encryption but it doesn't seem to be preventing law enforcement from accessing devices. To date, law enforcement has paid hackers to break into a phone, had an iPhone owner suddenly "remember" his password, seen a person jailed for 7 months (so far) for refusing to provide a password and, now, a law enforcement agency has used a warrant to force a suspect to unlock an iPhone using a fingerprint.

[A]uthorities obtained a search warrant compelling the girlfriend of an alleged Armenian gang member to press her finger against an iPhone that had been seized from a Glendale home. The phone contained Apple's fingerprint identification system for unlocking, and prosecutors wanted access to the data inside it.

The mostly-unanswered question is whether this violates the Fifth Amendment by forcing a person to provide evidence against themselves. (Not that due process was at the forefront of law enforcement's mind in this case. Or the magistrate judge's either. Jonathan Zdziarski points out the warrant was obtained within 45 minutes of the suspect being arrested -- not even enough time to bring in a lawyer.) While the law allows police to collect data from detained individuals -- including fingerprints -- it doesn't say much about physically applying someone's finger to their phone to unlock its contents.

The concern that fingerprint "passwords" would be less insulated against court orders and warrants was brought up here more than two years ago, shortly after Apple announced the new security feature. Biometric data isn't something anyone "knows" that could be considered "testimonial." It simply is an indicator of who you are, which courts have held isn't covered under Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination.

The additional concern is that law enforcement may have also used this Fifth Amendment workaround to obtain information on a separate suspect. The LA Times article adds these details to the general murkiness:

Why authorities wanted [Paytsar] Bkhchadzhyan to unlock the phone is unclear. The phone was seized from a Glendale residence linked to Sevak Mesrobian, who according to a probation report was Bkhchadzhyan's boyfriend and a member of the Armenian Power gang with the moniker of "40." Asst. U.S. Atty. Vicki Chou said the search was part of an ongoing probe. She declined further comment.

Bkhchadzhyan was arrested and pled no contest to one count of identity theft. But the US Attorney's comment seems to imply law enforcement was looking for more than just evidence on Bkhchadzhyan when it searched the phone. If so, it raises even further questions about the constitutionality of this particular warrant, which may have forced this suspect to provide evidence against someone else.

The only prior case to raise this issue isn't very instructive and a dataset of one is hardly an indicator of prevailing judicial winds. But the reasoning in the 2014 case draws a line between what the court considers "testimonial" and what is merely providing access.

In 2014, a judge said Baust could be compelled to provide his fingerprint to open a locked phone but could not be ordered to disclose a passcode. The judge reasoned that providing a fingerprint was akin to giving a key, while giving a passcode — stored in one's mind — entailed revealing knowledge and therefore testifying. Baust was later acquitted.

But does that line even exist? It's difficult to say it does when both fingerprints and passwords are virtually interchangeable, thanks to Apple's Touch ID system. The fingerprint is the password. The difference is detained suspects can only retain one of these "keys" in their minds. The rationale used by the court presumes vocal utterances are the only way a person can provide incriminating evidence against themselves.

It's not like withholding passwords will work in all cases either. Those who aren't jailed for contempt of court may instead find judges deciding that providing a password to law enforcement isn't a "testimonial" act on its own. The refusal to provide a password may also work against defendants by giving prosecutors a bit more ammo for their "foregone conclusion" justifications. After all, if a locked device didn't contain evidence of criminal activity, any "reasonable" person would have provided a password without hesitation.

It's a stretch of an argument though -- considering the prosecution needs to provide evidence it knows the stuff it's looking for resides on the devices, which is something extremely difficult to prove when the device is fully encrypted.

The limits of the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination are far from clearly defined when it comes to encrypted devices.. This leaves the security question in the hands of each individual user. Your choice of security method depends on who you're more worried about having access to your phone. If it's phone thieves, then a fingerprint might do. But if it's the government, use a password.

Filed Under: 5th amendment, encryption, fingerprint, fingerprint swipe, id, paytsar bkhchadzhyan, self incrimination, sevak mesrobian, touch id

DailyDirt: Breaking Bad... Passwords

from the urls-we-dig-up dept

Passwords are everywhere. They get us access to our phones, computers, email, social media accounts, cloud storage accounts, banks accounts... just about everything important (and unimportant -- which is part of the problem with passwords). You might think you're clever by choosing a 4-digit PIN that doesn't look like a birthday date or year, but if you're using 2580 and think you're smart, think again.

• The iPhone's 4-digit passcode can be broken by brute force in roughly 111 hours or less. Sure, you could use your fingerprint, but it might be better to just turn off the "simple passcode" default and use more digits. [url]
• Plenty of password alternative schemes are springing up to move people away from passwords and towards other kinds of authentication. All the big tech companies are trying out various password alternatives. Google is experimenting with a dongle/token/USB key approach. Yahoo is trying out a password-free login. Passwords still seem to be the dominant method for logins, but that could change... someday. [url]
• If you have an old wireless router and it only uses WEP passwords, should you use it? Well, even if you use a WPA password, it only takes a few hours to crack... so just stay paranoid. [url]

If you'd like to read more awesome and interesting stuff, check out this unrelated (but not entirely random!) Techdirt post via StumbleUpon.

Filed Under: dongle, fingerprint, logins, passcode, password-free, passwords, pin, security, tokens
Companies: google, yahoo

DailyDirt: Passwords? We Don't Need No Stinkin' Passwords

from the urls-we-dig-up dept

Fingerprint-based biometric security systems are everywhere now, but there are some well-known problems with using your fingerprints instead of a password. First off, you unconsciously leave copies of your fingerprints just about everywhere you go. Still, fingerprint sensors seem to be getting better and better. I'll stick to my 4-digit PIN for now, though, thanks, but if you like using your finger for your digital locks, check out these links.

• Qualcomm has an ultrasonic fingerprint sensor that captures three dimensional characteristics of a user's fingerprint by penetrating the outer layers of skin with sound. This sensor can more accurately detect fingerprint features when fingers are wet or slathered in hand lotion, but it might not be able to identify you correctly if you get a papercut or cracked, dry skin? [url]
• Vkansee has a high-resolution optical fingerprint sensor that claims to be able to detect the sweat pores of your fingertip. This sensor isn't available on any commercial smartphones, but presumably better biometric sensors are going to be embedded in more and more devices. Yay? [url]
• There are plenty of concerns about how accurate fingerprint identifications systems are -- with issues such as false positives and false rejection rates. One of the key aspects, though, is that fingerprints are not secret and not revocable. Some systems try to detect "liveness" to make sure a fingerprint is attached to a (hopefully healthy and not under duress) living person, and there are a few other approaches to guard against spoofing, but fingerprints aren't a perfect biometric. (And no perfect biometric system exists....) [url]

If you'd like to read more awesome and interesting stuff, check out this unrelated (but not entirely random!) Techdirt post via StumbleUpon.

Filed Under: biometrics, fingerprint, fingerprints, identification, passwords, pin, security, sensors
Companies: qualcomm, vkansee

Time To Change Your Fingerprints: Apple's Fingerprint Scanner Already Hacked

from the no-problem,-just-change-your...-oh-wait dept

While Apple has been touting its new TouchID fingerprint scanner as more secure, many people with experience in biometrics are quick to note that the problem with biometric security is once it's cracked, you're kind of in trouble, since you can't just change your fingerprint/retina/voice etc. And, indeed, it took almost no time at all for the biometrics hacking team of the Chaos Computer Club to crack TouchID "using everyday means." You can see a video of them getting into a new iPhone with a different finger: It appears that they've used the same basic method as has been used to hack fingerprint scanners in the past -- get a high quality image of the user's fingerprint and then:

The resulting image is then cleaned up, inverted and laser printed with 1200 dpi onto transparent sheet with a thick toner setting. Finally, pink latex milk or white woodglue is smeared into the pattern created by the toner onto the transparent sheet. After it cures, the thin latex sheet is lifted from the sheet, breathed on to make it a tiny bit moist and then placed onto the sensor to unlock the phone.

The only "difference" here is that they needed to use a higher resolution in the printing to match the higher resolution of Apple's scanner. CCC points out, as others have in the past, that this should remind people that fingerprint scanning is not very secure.

"We hope that this finally puts to rest the illusions people have about fingerprint biometrics. It is plain stupid to use something that you can't change and that you leave everywhere every day as a security token", said Frank Rieger, spokesperson of the CCC. "The public should no longer be fooled by the biometrics industry with false security claims. Biometrics is fundamentally a technology designed for oppression and control, not for securing everyday device access." Fingerprint biometrics in passports has been introduced in many countries despite the fact that by this global roll-out no security gain can be shown.

iPhone users should avoid protecting sensitive data with their precious biometric fingerprint not only because it can be easily faked, as demonstrated by the CCC team. Also, you can easily be forced to unlock your phone against your will when being arrested. Forcing you to give up your (hopefully long) passcode is much harder under most jurisdictions than just casually swiping your phone over your handcuffed hands.

It wasn't difficult to assume that this would happen. What's surprising is that Apple doesn't seem to have considered this fact.

Filed Under: biometrics, chaos computer club, fingerprint, fingerprint scanner, fingerprints, hacked, ios, iphone 5
Companies: apple

Apple's Fingerprint ID And How It May Take Away Your 5th Amendment Right To Protect Your Data

from the these-things-have-consequences dept

There was plenty of discussion about how Apple's new fingerprint ID biometric system on the new iPhones might help the NSA build a giant database of fingerprints, but others quickly pointed out how unlikely that was. Some have even argued that it could lead to greater privacy protection (though, others are reasonably concerned since you can't "change" your fingerprint if someone figures out a way to hack it -- and fingerprint readers have been hacked many times in the past).

However, there are additional concerns, such as how relying on fingerprint scans over passwords might remove your ability to use the 5th Amendment to protect your private data. As we've discussed a few times, while not all courts agree, some have ruled that you can't be forced to give up your passwords to unencrypt your data, because it could be seen as a 5th Amendment violation of self-incrimination. However, with a fingerprint, the issue is slightly different than with a password. As the EFF's Marcia Hoffman explains:

The privilege against self-incrimination is an important check on the government’s ability to collect evidence directly from a witness. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Fifth Amendment broadly applies not only during a criminal prosecution, but also to any other proceeding “civil or criminal, formal or informal,” where answers might tend to incriminate us. It’s a constitutional guarantee deeply rooted in English law dating back to the 1600s, when it was used to protect people from being tortured by inquisitors to force them to divulge information that could be used against them.

For the privilege to apply, however, the government must try to compel a person to make a “testimonial” statement that would tend to incriminate him or her. When a person has a valid privilege against self-incrimination, nobody — not even a judge — can force the witness to give that information to the government.

But a communication is “testimonial” only when it reveals the contents of your mind. We can’t invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to prevent the government from collecting biometrics like fingerprints, DNA samples, or voice exemplars. Why? Because the courts have decided that this evidence doesn’t reveal anything you know. It’s not testimonial.

It does seem odd that a simple switch from a password to a fingerprint could have constitutional implications, but welcome to the world where the law and the technology don't always match up perfectly together.

Filed Under: 5th amendment, fingerprint, fingerprint reader, iphone, passwords, privacy, security
Companies: apple

Beat-Fingerprint-Security-By-Cutting-Off-Finger Trick No Longer Viable, Thanks To Sony

from the important-research dept

It's becoming less unusual for devices like laptops, and even mobile phones, to feature fingerprint scanners for secure access. The idea is that only the owner's fingerprint can unlock the device, so if it's stolen, it will be useless to a thief. This tends to help with most of your garden-variety theft, but as anybody who's watched a few action movies knows, fingerprint-based systems don't pose a problem for the really motivated thief, who can simply cut off their victim's finger and use it to access the device or secret lair or whatever. Cue some researchers from Sony, who will have screenwriters scrambling for a rewrite: they've come up with a system doesn't use fingerprints, but rather an image of the capillaries (via Network Computing) beneath the skin of a person's finger. The pattern in the image can only be captured when blood is pumping through the finger in question, so severing it from the rest of the victim would render it useless. Of course, this does little to stop thieves from beating their victims senseless, or otherwise "motivating" them to unlock the system with their finger, but hey, at least they get to keep their digits.

Filed Under: fingerprint

HOWTO Beat Fingerprint Scanners: With Play-Doh

from the fun-with-fingers dept

While researchers are constantly trying to come up with new biometric security methods, the fingerprint scanner has established itself as a trusted piece of equipment, even making its way onto laptops and mobile phones. But a new study says that 90% of scanners can be fooled by a fingerprint made from Play-Doh. As Engadget points out, that's good news for people worried about losing their fingers to thieves. No word, however, on the effectiveness of Silly Putty.

Filed Under: fingerprint