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Filed Under: first amendment, fourth amendment, gear

Appeals Court Says It's OK For Cops To Steal Stuff From Citizens

from the surprisingly,-this-isn't-about-asset-forfeiture dept

Qualified immunity isn't a codified defense. Congress never passed a law granting public employees this exception to Constitutional protections. This exception -- one that allows public servants to avoid being directly sued by the public whose rights they've violated -- was crafted by the Supreme Court. The theory is it's too hard for the government to fully comprehend the rights it's supposed to be guaranteeing, so there needs to be an escape hatch for government employees.

This escape hatch has allowed an amazing amount of abuse to go unpunished. As long as the government employees were the first to engage in egregious Constitutional violations, they're given a free pass. The free pass runs indefinitely if courts refuse to draw a bright line in published opinions. It doesn't seem like it would be that difficult to comply with the Constitution, but here we are.

Qualified immunity has again been extended in a case where the behavior the government engaged in was not only unconstitutional, but criminal. (h/t Clark Neily)

In this case, an illegal gambling investigation led to the search of property owned by the plaintiffs. The search warrant authorized the seizure of cash, gambling machines, and anything else the government determined was derived from illegal activity. So, the government did some seizing. But the inventory sheet didn't match up with what was taken. From the decision [PDF]:

Following the search, the City Officers gave Appellants an inventory sheet stating that they seized approximately $50,000 from the properties. Appellants allege, however, that the officers actually seized $151,380 in cash and another $125,000 in rare coins. Appellants claim that the City Officers stole the difference between the amount listed on the inventory sheet and the amount that was actually seized from the properties.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals says there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the officers were authorized to seize this property. As for the theft, the court says it won't even examine the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment implications of the alleged misconduct because it must consider the defendants' qualified immunity defense first. That leads directly to this jaw-dropping statement from the court:

The panel determined that at the time of the incident, there was no clearly established law holding that officers violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment when they steal property that is seized pursuant to a warrant.

This dismaying conclusion was reached by examining similar caselaw from other circuits. The Ninth Circuit isn't the only circuit saying rights aren't violated when the government steals citizens' property… so long as the theft is accompanied by a warrant.

At the time of the incident, the five circuits that had addressed that question, or the similar question of whether the government’s refusal to return lawfully seized property violates the Fourth Amendment, had reached different results.

Four of the five circuits have stated the Constitution does not protect against theft by the government provided the initial seizure was legal. The only holdout is the Fourth Circuit, which stated theft of property (obviously) interferes with citizens' interest in the property they no longer have.

Worse, the Ninth Circuit is unwilling to establish this right and put the government on notice that similar theft in the future will be considered a Constitutional violation.

The allegation of any theft by police officers—most certainly the theft of over $225,000—is undoubtedly deeply disturbing. Whether that conduct violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, however, is not obvious. The split in authority on the issue leads us to conclude so.

Given that law enforcement is still allowed to steal property when executing search warrants, the court's final words to the plaintiffs are the appellate equivalent of "thoughts and prayers."

We sympathize with Appellants. They allege the theft of their personal property by police officers sworn to uphold the law. [...] But not all conduct that is improper or morally wrong violates the Constitution.

Sure, but we expect our government to engage in proper and moral behavior. Qualified immunity allows the government to do the opposite of that, and to violate Constitutional rights on top of it, all without having to answer for its misdeeds.

Filed Under: fourth amendment, ninth circuit, qualified immunity

Court To Law Enforcement: You Can't Seize A House For 15 Hours Before Obtaining A Warrant

from the because-reasons...-a-lot-of-them dept

When you violate the Fourth Amendment so hard it practically becomes the Third Amendment. (via FourthAmendment.com)

Local law enforcement seized Defendant’s home around 7:00 a.m. Defendant spent the next two and a half hours at the police station speaking with Investigator Cooke and others. About 9:30 a.m., Defendant signed a limited consent to search form outside his home authorizing Investigator Cooke to enter the home and retrieve Candice’s medication. Cooke completed his search of Defendant’s home around 10:00 a.m. By 11:30 a.m. Cooke possessed sufficient knowledge to procure a search warrant. He knew Defendant was a convicted felon and had ammunition in his bedroom closet. Cooke did not seek a search warrant, however, until the early evening hours. The only event of sufficient note during the period between the establishment of probable cause that morning and the process of procuring a search warrant that evening was Candice’s autopsy which began at 1:30 p.m. and concluded around 3:30 p.m. A federal magistrate judge issued the warrant at 10:00 p.m. Three federal agents together with Investigator Cooke and another officer executed the warrant beginning at 11:18 p.m. or twelve hours after probable cause arose. Their search concluded at 1:20 a.m.

The Third Amendment says you can't be forced to quarter troops in your house. What about around your house? Here agents of the government took over a man's residence for over 18 hours -- 15 of them without a warrant -- refusing to even allow him to enter his own home for accompanied bathroom breaks.

The timeline above, taken from the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals decision [PDF], followed the discovery of the defendant's wife dead in his home around 5:00 a.m. The defendant, Walter Shrum, was the one who discovered her and it was he who called law enforcement. Three hours later, after being forbidden to enter his home, Shrum signed a limited consent form allowing a Sheriff's Office investigator to enter the home to retrieve his wife's medication prior to an autopsy. The investigator saw a bullet in a closet. Later, the same investigator recalled Schrum was a convicted felon.

It was still several hours before a warrant was secured. During that entire time, Shrum's house was controlled by law enforcement. They may not have been inside, but they prevented the house's owner from re-entering his own residence. He was "interviewed" for three hours by the investigator, who may not have actually gotten consent from Shrum to sign a search consent form. This footnote suggests a request for legal representation by Shrum may have been ignored.

At the suppression hearing, Investigator Cooke testified that after Defendant mentioned he wanted an attorney to review the consent form, Defendant “in what was a joking manner to me initially was, quote, ‘Shit, I’m just kidding,’ and we moved on.” Defendant’s reported statement is inaudible on the interview tape.

The court notes there's no question the Sheriff's department seized Shrum's home. This immediately implicated Shrum's Fourth Amendment rights. Denying him access to his own house for over 18 hours seals the deal, no matter how the government tries to portray it.

We see little difference between a perimeter stakeout and internal securing of a home from the standpoint of a Fourth Amendment seizure. Both interfere to the same extent with the possessory interests of those entitled to occupy the dwelling. The Government cannot reasonably dispute that the “securing” of Defendant’s home during the early morning hours of March 11, 2015 infringed not only on his possessory interest in the home but also on his liberty interest in free movement. The police deprived Defendant of his ability to access his home for his own purposes, in his own way, on his own time, and at a location where concerned friends and well-wishers would surely come calling.

"A man's house is his castle," as multiple court decisions have paraphrased, including ones issued by the Supreme Court. Once this illegal seizure commenced, it tainted everything that came after it, including the supposed "consent" of Shrum.

While the court agrees it is sometimes reasonable to very temporarily secure a suspected crime scene, the 15-hour delay between the home's seizure and the issuance of a search warrant is anything but. And the court drives a significant nail into the government's argumentative coffin: the warrant exception so many law enforcement officers believe exists doesn't actually exist.

[T]he Government has never suggested that probable cause (or any form of articulable suspicion for that matter) justified the initial seizure of Defendant’s home. And we have news for the Government. No such thing as a “crime scene exception,” let alone an “unexplained death scene exception,” to the Fourth Amendment exists.

When the initial seizure is bad, the search is bad, even if limited consent was obtained. As the court points out, without Shrum being denied access to his home, there would be no reason for the investigator to enter to retrieve the medication needed for the autopsy. And if the investigator never enters the home, the bullet is never seen and the search warrant isn't obtained and executed, producing even more evidence of criminal activity.

And the investigator himself steered Shrum towards compliance, leaning on him heavily when it appeared he wouldn't let law enforcement into the house he was forbidden from entering.

By all appearances, Investigator Cooke consciously designed the circumstances under which Defendant provided his consent to convince him that he had no choice but to accede to the investigator’s wishes. When a police officer claims authority to seize your home because your wife died unexpectedly, and tells you the coroner needs medication from the home to perform an autopsy but you cannot go inside the home to retrieve the medication, what choice do you have? Must you allow law enforcement to seize your home indefinitely? Defendant’s lack of choice once again is well illustrated by his statement to Investigator Cooke, “I know you have to,” and Cooke’s subsequent reminder, “I’ll just tell you I can’t let you go in the house, but if you’ll tell me where the stuff is.” Nothing between the time of law enforcement’s illegal seizure of Defendant’s home and Investigator Cooke’s search of the home broke the causal chain. Because Defendant’s consent was tainted, Cooke’s search pursuant to that consent also was tainted.

The taint travels down the line to the late-arriving warrant, resulting in the suppression of every bit of evidence the government used to convict Shrum. The government simply can't do what it did -- turn someone's house into occupied territory for several hours without probable cause  -- and expect its evidence to survive.

Filed Under: fourth amendment, police, seizure, third amendment

Court Says Probation Violations By Teen Don't Justify On-Demand Warrantless Searches Of His Electronics

from the little-bit-of-4th-and-1st-implications-all-tied-up-together dept

It's assumed (wrongly) that minors have few, if any, Constitutional rights. The error is easy to make because they're just kids. They can't drink, smoke, vote, or even serve their country/secure these own valuable freedoms by [checks sources] aiding in the increase of opium production in foreign countries. "Hundreds of government officials can't be wrong!" someone is sure to exclaim, being just as wrong as the hundreds half-assedly cited in their stinging rebuttal.

Minors do have rights. They're subject to more limitations but they're far from nonexistent. But that doesn't stop prosecutors, cops, and school officials from pretending "limited" equals "zero." A case highlighted by FourthAmendment.com shows a court pushing back against this assumption, which took the form of an overly-invasive probation condition slapped on a minor following a search of the student which uncovered a small knife, rolling papers, and a lighter.

The incident leading to the search began when the student fell asleep during class, which is possibly one of the most ordinary things a student can do. The student admitted he had smoked marijuana the night before (also possibly one of the most normal things a high school student can do), but hadn't smoked any that day or on school property. He was asked to consent to a search and he volunteered he had a knife in his possession. The search uncovered the rest of the "contraband." The 15-year-old was then arrested, detained, and placed on home detention.

Had that been the end of it, there would have been nothing to write about. But the dispositional order dealing with probation conditions added a whole bunch of unnecessary stipulations given the violation. This occurred when the minor violated his probation conditions by using marijuana and Xanax. Subsequent violations occurred -- all of them drug-related. A few months later, the minor appeared to be back on the road to the state's good graces. He was doing well in school and had landed a job. For whatever reason, the state decided to punish the minor for getting his life back together. This hearing added stipulations that appear to be far more vindictive than curative, and they're certainly anything but Constitutional. From the decision [PDF]:

In the report submitted for the September 7, 2016 dispositional hearing, without explanation, the probation officer recommended adding an electronics search condition.

[...]

Later the same day, the juvenile court judge issued a signed written disposition order, describing the electronic search condition in greater detail, using the following text, which probation had recommended: “[Minor must] submit all electronic devices under [his] control to search and seizure by the probation officer at any time of the day or night with or without a search warrant, arrest warrant, or reasonable suspicion, including all logs, text and voicemail messages, photographs, emails, and social media account contents contained on any device or cloud or internet connected storage owned, operated, or controlled by [Minor], including but not limited to cell phones, computers, computer hard drives, laptops, gaming consoles, mobile devices, tablets, storage media devices, thumb drives, Micro SD cards, external hard drives, or any other electronic storage devices. [Minor] shall also disclose any and all passwords, passcodes, password patterns, fingerprints, or other information required to gain access into any of the aforementioned devices or social media accounts as requested by any probation officer . . . .”

The minor challenged this order on constitutional grounds, citing its needless violation of his privacy. Given the state's unwillingness to specify which of the offenses these conditions addressed, the court finds the minor has a solid point.

We agree with Minor that the electronics search condition imposed here is unconstitutionally overbroad because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve its ostensible purpose or to meet Minor’s needs. [...] Any connection between Minor’s offenses and his usage of electronic devices is speculative and, absent such evidence, the electronics search condition is not tailored to meet Minor’s specific needs.

As the court points out, there are less intrusive ways of achieving the same ends and it's highly unlikely blanket search permission for every single electronic device owned by the minor is the least intrusive option. It's also unlikely blanket search permission would somehow prevent the minor from obtaining drugs or alcohol.

Not only that, but the state's arguments for this supposed necessity ignored evidence showing more probation stipulations weren't needed to keep the minor from engaging in criminal activity.

In an interview with probation before the September 2016 dispositional hearing, Minor acknowledged having made poor decisions in the past, but stated he had new motivation to complete treatment and probation going forward, and that he had a new job, which was making a positive impact on his life.

Minor’s statements about his mindset were supported by his school’s report that it had no concerns with Minor’s behavior, that Minor arrived on time, completed all of his work, was “doing great,” and was “exhibiting a positive attitude.” Minor’s mother and his treatment program provided similar accounts. This information does not support the conclusion that only by subjecting Minor to a new, exhaustive, and invasive search condition—allowing probation to review every electronic device under his control, including any “gaming consoles, mobile devices, tablets, storage media devices, thumb drives, Micro SD cards, [and] external hard drives” and to access all of his “passwords, passcodes, password patterns, fingerprints, or other [similar] information”—could Minor be deterred from future use of controlled substances.

That strikes these conditions from the minor's probationary terms, restoring the privacy the state tried to take from him. The state insisted on defending this Constitutional violation despite having zero precedential support to cite. The closest it could come to a prior case in its favor involved a gang member who promoted his gang and its activity on social media when not using those platforms to issue threats to police officers and their families. That's not even close to the same level of severity in observed behavior. As the minor notes in his case, the state AG didn't even provide evidence the minor owned any of the devices the state decided it needed access to. But when you're playing Constitutional poker with someone else's money, why not take a flier on bullshit probation orders?

Filed Under: electronics, fifth amendment, fourth amendment, probation, probation violations, teens, warrantless searches

Court: TSA Agents Can Be Shielded From Certain Civil Rights Lawsuits Because They're Too Important

from the doing-God's-work...-poorly dept

A First and Fourth Amendment lawsuit filed against a TSA agent and a handful of Philadelphia police officers has reached the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals. Unfortunately, the court has decided the work TSA agents do, however incompetently, is too important to be in any way stifled by the threat of First Amendment lawsuits. [h/t Brad Heath]

Roger Vanderklok was attempting to fly from Philadelphia to Miami to participate in a half-marathon. He packed his heart monitor and watch inside something certain to be flagged by TSA agents 5-7% of the time: a PVC pipe with both ends taped shut.

In this case, a TSA employee did flag the "device" and had some questions about Vanderklok's PVC-and-wires package. Agent Charles Kieser engaged in a conversation with Vanderklok about the pipe, ultimately resulting in the TSA employee having Vanderklok arrested for threatening to smuggle a bomb onto a plane.

The details of this encounter diverge a bit, depending on who you ask. But they do not diverge nearly as much as Agent Kieser believes they do. The court notes in its decision [PDF] that Kieser's description of the incident does not align with that of a far more impartial observer.

Kieser testified on direct examination that Vanderklok was agitated and waved his arms in the air repeatedly during the secondary screening. On cross examination, he further elaborated on his assertion that Vanderklok was physically disruptive at the checkpoint. Surveillance video of almost the entire interaction was played during the cross examination of Officer Pinkney and Kieser’s testimony was shown to be largely inconsistent with the video.

Vanderklok's version of the story more closely aligns with the video. According to the traveler, he was cooperative throughout the incident and Kieser basically lied in order to have him arrested.

Vanderklok maintains that at all times he was patient and not agitated during the secondary screening but that Kieser was agitated and argumentative throughout. Kieser asserts essentially the opposite: that Vanderklok was belligerent during the secondary search. In Kieser’s telling, Vanderklok said, “I could bring a bomb through here any day I want and you’ll never find it.” (JA 8.) Vanderklok denies making that or any similar statement. He says that Kieser fabricated the statement after Vanderklok asked for a complaint form and stated his intention to report Kieser’s behavior. There were no other known witnesses to Vanderklok’s alleged statement.

After the screening was over, Vanderklok repacked his bag, thinking he was going to be boarding his flight. He requested a complaint form and headed for his plane where he was greeted by Philadelphia police officers. They arrested him for disorderly conduct and for threatening to place a bomb on a plane.

The lawsuit followed. In it, Vanderklok alleges a variety of First and Fourth Amendment violations. Most of those were dismissed at the lower level. Vanderklok only appealed his First Amendment retaliatory prosecution and Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims. Unfortunately for him, neither has been upheld. Jurisdictional issues prevent the interlocutory appeal of the Fourth Amendment dismissal, leaving Vanderklok with only the First Amendment claim to litigate at this level.

After a long discussion of the underlying issues and precedent, the Appeals Court arrives at the conclusion Agent Kieser can't be sued for violating Vanderklok's First Amendment rights with a retaliatory arrest. More unfortunately, the court decides to take a stance of this issue, setting precedent for all other cases to arise in its jurisdiction.

[A]s the role of the TSA has become prevalent in the lives of the traveling populace, disputes involving airport screening personnel may come up with some frequency, and the existence of a Bivens action for First Amendment retaliation is no longer something that we should assume without deciding. Today we hold that Bivens does not afford a remedy against airport security screeners who allegedly retaliate against a traveler who exercises First Amendment rights.

This leaves Bivens exactly where it was when it was decided: limited to Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment claims. The First Amendment isn't going to be allowed to join this small party. It also notes that its decision leaves people like Vanderklok somewhat screwed. The United States can substitute itself for certain federal employees facing lawsuits, rendering the litigation pointless by claiming sovereign immunity. Whether or not the government chooses to intercede in this case is irrelevant. The possibility that it might forces plaintiffs to plead these cases in state court.

So, although in such cases the United States would retain its sovereign immunity, state law tort claims against the individual could proceed. That would provide an alternative remedy for an airline passenger who suffers as a result of a TSA screener’s actionable conduct outside the scope of his employment. In instances where the TSA screener has acted within the scope of his employment, it is possible that no judicial remedy will exist if a Bivens action is not implied because the United States could substitute itself for the screener and claim sovereign immunity. But that is by design.

In Vanderklok's case, there's really nothing left for him now that the Appeals Court has shot him down.

Based on the District Court’s orders as they now stand, however, there are no alternative judicial remedies available to Vanderklok, because the District Court concluded that Kieser was not an investigative or law enforcement officer and there was no challenge as to whether Kieser acted within the scope of his employment.

Even though the court recognize it might be creating a situation where plaintiffs have zero legal options (beyond the useless TSA complaint form) when rights appear to be violated by TSA staffers, the court decides it's worth it because safety and security are more important than individual rights and remedies.

Here, Vanderklok asks us to imply a Bivens action for damages against a TSA agent. TSA employees like Kieser are tasked with assisting in a critical aspect of national security – securing our nation’s airports and air traffic. The threat of damages liability could indeed increase the probability that a TSA agent would hesitate in making split-second decisions about suspicious passengers. In light of Supreme Court precedent, past and very recent, that is surely a special factor that gives us pause.

[...]

Ultimately, the role of the TSA in securing public safety is so significant that we ought not create a damages remedy in this context.

And here's the final attempt to balance the decision, which does nothing more than "suggest" TSA agents not act like Agent Keiser did.

We, of course, do not suggest that TSA screeners should act with disdain for passenger rights or that they can escape all the consequences of their bad behavior. Discipline by the government should be swift and certain, when its employees’ actions warrant it.

The government does a terrible job disciplining itself, as any number of critical reports on TSA agents clearly illustrates. There's across-the-board incompetence coupled with routine abuse of passengers. Add to this a certain amount of theft, longheld beliefs in behavioral junk science, and a pizza box recruiting system, and you have a walking disaster that contributes little to travel or safety. The court here says adding a Bivens remedy would "create a cure worse than the disease." But have they taken a close look at the "disease" lately?

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 4th amendment, bivens, charles kieser, civil rights, first amendment, fourth amendment, roger vanderklok, tsa

State Supreme Court Says Digital Cameras Can't Be Searched Without A Warrant

from the more-privacy-protections-(MA-residents-only) dept

Some more good news on the Fourth Amendment front, even if it's somewhat jurisdictionally limited: the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has (sort of) decided [PDF] the Supreme Court's Riley decision isn't just for cellphones. (via FourthAmendment.com)

In this case, the search of a robbery suspect's backpack while he was being questioned yielded a ring, a digital camera, and other items. The police warrantlessly searched the digital phone, discovering a photo of the suspect next to a firearm later determined to have been stolen. This led to two convictions: one for the stolen property and one for carrying a firearm without a license.

The defendant challenged all of the evidence resulting from the warrantless search of the backpack, but the state got to keep most of what it found, along with the conviction for theft. But it didn't get to keep the firearm conviction, as the court here sees digital cameras to be almost no different than cellphones when it comes to warrantless searches and the Riley decision. From the opinion:

The Commonwealth counters that Riley does not apply because digital cameras, lacking the ability to function as computers, are not analogous to cell phones for Fourth Amendment purposes. We decline to address the constitutionality of the search of the digital camera on Fourth Amendment grounds, but we apply the reasoning in Riley in holding that the search of the camera violated art. 14 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights].

As the court points out, there's nothing in the law that allows officers to warrantlessly search something if that something poses no risk to officer safety or the preservation of evidence. Searching the backpack is fine, because it may have contained a weapon. But searching the camera isn't because a camera isn't a weapon (the US Supreme Court made the same observation about cellphones) and the possibility of evidence destruction even lower in a device with limited or zero network connectivity.

This reasoning presents a compelling basis to exclude digital cameras from the reach of the search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Like the cell phone, the twin threats of "harm to officers and destruction of evidence" are not present with regard to the data on a digital camera. See id. Once the camera has been secured and potential threats eliminated, "data on the [camera] can endanger no one." Id. at 2485 (officers free to "examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon" [emphasis supplied]). Likewise, the risk of destruction of incriminating data is also mitigated once the camera has been secured. Although the concern regarding the destruction of cell phone data via remote wiping and data encryption was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court, see id. at 2486, this issue poses even less of a risk with respect to digital cameras, which, like the camera at issue here, may lack Internet or network connectivity.

The court also finds digital cameras to be just as filled with private information as cellphones, at least in terms of opening them up to search warrant exceptions. Cellphones contain far more personal information to be sure, but that doesn't make digital cameras any less of a privacy concern.

Although digital cameras do not allow storage of information as diverse and far ranging as a cell phone, they nevertheless possess the capacity to store enormous quantities of photograph and often video recordings, dating over periods of months and even years, which can reveal intimate details of an individual's life. As the United States Supreme Court aptly recognized, "an individual's private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet," Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489, and "the fact that a search in the predigital era could have turned up a photograph or two in a wallet does not justify a search of thousands of photos in a digital gallery." Id. at 2493.

But for all the Riley decision quotes, the state Supreme Court doesn't go so far as to apply Riley to digital cameras. It notes the US Supreme Court did not explicitly address digital cameras, so it's not interested in setting precedent beyond its jurisdiction. Instead, the court finds the warrantless search a violation of the state's version of the Bill of Rights.

Instead, we decide the issue based on our State Constitution, bearing in mind that "art. 14 . . . does, or may, afford more substantive protection to individuals than that which prevails under the Constitution of the United States." Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 68 n.9 (1987). We hold, for the same reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in Riley and as set forth above, that digital cameras may be seized incident to arrest, but that the search of data contained in digital cameras falls outside the scope of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.

[...]

Indeed, with the twin threats justifying the search incident to arrest exception mitigated here because the camera was secure in the custody of the police, the officers had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant.

As other electronic devices are subjected to warrantless searches, I expect more courts will find Riley covers those as well, even if not explicitly named in the 2014 decision. When officers have "ample opportunity" to seek a warrant for a seized item, "but it's not a phone" is a relatively worthless argument.

Filed Under: fourth amendment, massachusetts, privacy

Border Device Searches Continue To Increase, Threatening More Than Just The 4th Amendment

from the nothing-to-hide,-everything-to-fear dept

This administration has made it clear "securing" the borders is one of our nation's top priorities. In all honesty, the administration probably couldn't care less about the Canadian border. Almost all of its attention is focused on the southern border, but it also wants to make sure visitors/immigrants from certain countries are hassled extensively no matter where they first set foot in this country.

The nation's borders have long been a place where certain rights become privileges. Legislators and courts have done little to roll this back, usually favoring national security over individual rights. Border searches of electronic devices were already on the rise before Trump took office, jumping from 5,000 in 2015 to nearly 20,000 in 2016.

2016's gaudy record numbers will soon be overwritten, though. And we're barely three-quarters of the way through 2017.

On April 11, 2017 the CBP announced in a press release that they'd searched 14,993 electronic devices being carried by international travelers (they don't say how many were American citizens). In all of 2016 CBP says they searched 19,033 devices. In 2015, reports say they searched about 5,000.

At the rate reported, visitors and US citizens will have been on the receiving end of nearly 60,000 devices searches by the end of the year. And that's only if the last reported numbers remain steady. But there's every reason to believe these numbers will increase exponentially. The administration has actively encouraged more intrusiveness at the borders, something that has bled into potential rights violations even at our northern border, where things were generally more relaxed.

The DHS is fine with this wholesale write-off of Fourth Amendment protections. It frequently points to a 2009 Privacy Impact Assessment which bluntly states plenty of privacy will be impacted and the CBP is more than welcome to generate probable cause after the fact.

CBP will contact you by telephone when the examination of the electronic device(s) is complete, to notify you that you may pick-up the item(s) during regular business hours from the location where the item(s) was detained. If it is impractical for you to pick up the device, CBP can make arrangements to ship the device to you at our expense. CBP may retain documents or information relating to immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters only if such retention is consistent with the privacy and data protection standards of the system in which such information is retained. Otherwise, if there is no probable cause to seize information after review, CBP will not retain any copies.

But this increased focus on searching as many electronic devices as possible has the potential to do damage to rights beyond those enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. Frank Miniter of The American Conservative points out so-called "routine" searches cause problems for the First Amendment.

While doing research for my novel Kill Big Brother I had off-the-record conversations with men and women from U.S. intelligence agencies. I also interviewed Dark Web types who insisted they stay on background. None of these individuals told me about secret government programs or anything at all that would make an interesting scene in a Jason Bourne movie. All I got was background and perspective—invaluable things to a journalist who wants to get things right. But recordings of some of those conversations are on my iPhone. Other sources are there, too. So I’ve password protected the encrypted data. It will automatically erase all the texts, audio and more if someone tries to guess their way into my phone.

That’s my reason for being concerned that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the power to disregard my Fourth Amendment rights and to demand I give them access to my digital devices if I fly internationally or even decide to drive to Montreal.

I’m a journalist and I must protect my sources, but I also don’t think my private photos, my social media, my texts and more are the government’s business.

A couple pieces of legislation aimed at creating a border search warrant requirement have been introduced, but will be facing more opposition than usual. The DOJ and DHS have never welcomed new warrant requirements and, given the directives issued during the first few months of the Trump presidency, will certainly feel any such requirement would undermine their ability to carry out the president's orders.

Filed Under: cbp, dhs, fourth amendment, homeland security, privacy

Court Says Gov't Needs More Than The Assumption Someone Owns A Cellphone To Justify A Search

from the ALMOST-everyone-is-NOT-everyone dept

The DC Court of Appeals has shot some holes [PDF] in a favorite law enforcement assertion: that cellphones are automatically containers of criminal evidence just because suspected criminals -- like nearly everyone else in the nation -- have cellphones. A criminal case involving a suspected getaway driver for a year-old homicide somehow led to police seeking a warrant to seize and search all electronics found at the suspect's current residence.

The details of the case are as follows: defendant Ezra Griffith talked to a couple of people about law enforcement's interest in his vehicle, which was apparently caught on surveillance cameras near the homicide crime scene. He had these discussions while incarcerated for something else, acting as his own tipster by discussing the car on jail phones. (ALL CALLS ARE RECORDED, etc.)

After being released, Griffith moved in with his girlfriend. Police sought a warrant to search this residence as part of its ongoing homicide investigation. The 22-year law enforcement veteran who obtained the warrant made the following declaration in his affidavit:

Based upon your affiant’s professional training and experience and your affiant’s work with other veteran police officers and detectives, I know that gang/crew members involved in criminal activity maintain regular contact with each other, even when they are arrested or incarcerated, and that they often stay advised and share intelligence about their activities through cell phones and other electronic communication devices and the Internet, to include Facebook, Twitter and E-mail accounts.

Based upon the aforementioned facts and circumstances, and your affiant’s experience and training, there is probable cause to believe that secreted inside of [Lewis’s apartment] is evidence relating to the homicide discussed above.

What wasn't mentioned was anything indicating a) Griffith owned a cellphone or b) evidence related to last year's homicide would be found on it. Obviously, the cop swearing out the warrant didn't have much confidence in this assertion either, as he broadened it to cover all electronics located in an apartment that, until very recently, had only been lived in by Griffith's girlfriend.

As the Appeals Court points out, there's not enough in the warrant to support these assertions.

The government’s argument in support of probable cause to search the apartment rests on the prospect of finding one specific item there: a cell phone owned by Griffith. Yet the affidavit supporting the warrant application provided virtually no reason to suspect that Griffith in fact owned a cell phone, let alone that any phone belonging to him and containing incriminating information would be found in the residence. At the same time, the warrant authorized the wholesale seizure of all electronic devices discovered in the apartment, including items owned by third parties. In those circumstances, we conclude that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause and unduly broad in its reach.

It's not that the warrant was short on probable cause. It's that it was the wrong kind of warrant for the assertions made.

Here, the lion’s share of the affidavit supporting the warrant application is devoted to establishing Griffith’s suspected involvement as the getaway driver in a homicide. That information might have established probable cause to arrest Griffith for his participation in the crime. The warrant application, though, was for a search warrant, not an arrest warrant. And to obtain a warrant to search for and seize a suspect’s possessions or property, the government must do more than show probable cause to arrest him. The government failed to make the requisite showing in this case.

As the court notes, the warrant asked for all kinds of things it had no business asking for, not with the dearth of supporting probable cause for a search. It allowed the police to seize any electronic device found in the residence, along with any other documents, newspapers clippings, photographs, etc. related to the homicide.

The court also says the officer made a logical leap he shouldn't have. While it is indisputable cellphones are ubiquitous, there's nothing in the affidavit supporting the officer's conclusion Griffith owned one.

There was no observation of Griffith’s using a cell phone, no information about anyone having received a cell phone call or text message from him, no record of officers recovering any cell phone in his possession at the time of his previous arrest (and confinement) on unrelated charges, and no indication otherwise of his ownership of a cell phone at any time. To the contrary, the circumstances suggested Griffith might have been less likely than others to own a phone around the time of the search: he had recently completed a ten-month period of confinement, during which he of course had no ongoing access to a cell phone; and at least one person in his circle—his potential coconspirator, Carl Oliphant—was known not to have a cell phone.

The court points out the government could have avoided this mess. It had enough for an arrest warrant. With that, it could have arrested Griffith and searched him for any belongings, which likely would have included a cellphone. But it chose to go with an amazingly broad search warrant instead -- one that allowed it to seize all electronics before determining if any belonged to the suspect.

The court allows suppression of the evidence. The warrant was invalid upon issuance, thanks to the lack of probable cause. Even good faith can't save it.

We conclude that the affidavit in this case fell short to an extent precluding good-faith reliance on the warrant. As explained, the government’s theory of probable cause to search the apartment runs as follows: (i) Griffith might own a cell phone; (ii) if so, his phone might be found in the residence; and (iii) if so, the phone might retain incriminating communications or other information about a crime committed more than one year earlier. Whatever may be the reasonableness of any of those inferences standing on its own, demonstrating probable cause required adequately establishing all three in combination. The affidavit did not approach doing so. It provided no explanation at all of whether Griffith might own a phone or whether any such phone might be in his home. And with regard to whether any phone would retain any incriminating information about a shooting occurring more than one year beforehand, it observed only that gang members often stay in contact about their activities.

In this case, it's nothing found on the devices being suppressed, but the gun tossed out the window by Griffith when police knocked on his girlfriend's door. Along with the suppression comes the reversal of Griffith's conviction.

The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Janice Brown, is positively overwrought in its fear of what this decision will do to "good" police officers who are used to relying on broad assertions and compliant magistrates.

This result is directly contrary to the purpose of the exclusionary rule and Supreme Court precedent that reserves suppression only for the most serious police misconduct. If courts are going to impose a remedy as extreme as excluding evidence that is probative, reliable, and often determinative of a defendant’s guilt, we have a duty to protect officers who are doing their best to stay within the bounds of our ever-evolving jurisprudence. We live in a society where virtually every action an officer takes is now being heavily-scrutinized. Thus, the need for vindication when law enforcement officers behave in an exemplary fashion is more critical than ever. Unfortunately, the officers in this case are not going to get the vindication they deserve. Furthermore, I have no doubt this case will be used in future cases to further undermine the good faith exception until either this Court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court steps in to cure today’s grievous error.

This is a bit much, considering the good faith exception is pretty much the rule everywhere and the government routinely survives suppression motions in all but the most egregious of cases. Asking cops to provide probable cause before seizing and searching electronics is just following the word (and spirit) of the Supreme Court's Riley decision, which makes cellphones (and other electronic devices) every bit as sacrosanct as the homes and lives they vicariously represent.

Filed Under: dc, fourth amendment, law enforcement, privacy