FBI Insider Threat Program Documents Show How Little It Takes To Be Branded A Threat To The Agency

from the see-something-say-something-but-for-cubicles dept

Jason Leopold has obtained the FBI's training slides for its "insider threat" program. This would be the same program the FBI refused to discuss in detail with the Senate, walking out of the briefing when asked how the program would avoid sweeping up legitimate whistleblowers.

The federal government acts as though it's receptive to whistleblowing, but then undermines that sentiment with pretty much everything else it does. These insider threat programs have only become more severe after the Snowden leaks, asking federal government employees to treat normal, everyday behavior as inherently suspicious.

The Defense Department's insider threat program declared such innocuous things as visiting foreign countries and being in debt as warning signs. Worse, anything less than full support for US government policies was considered threatening behavior.

The FBI's presentation [PDF] isn't much better. FBI employees are encouraged to say something if they see something… and there are a lot of observable "somethings" on the list.

According to the training material, potential insider threats include federal employees who brag about what they know, work odd hours, travel overseas without a good reason, or ask their co-workers about classified information without a "need to know." Workers who consume alcohol, use drugs or have “psychological conditions” may also be insider threats, as are those facing disciplinary action or job termination.

[...]

Another slide says leaks occur because leakers are “disgruntled” and are motivated by “ego,” “financial gain,” and “divided loyalty.”

Some of these factors can be indicative of someone considering engaging in espionage. Unfortunately, a lot of these may also apply to whistleblowers. The FBI presentation spends a great deal of time comparing its lists of insider threat traits to those the government has successfully prosecuted but spends zero time discussing whistleblowers and their traits/motivations.

Considering the FBI's leaky status, especially in recent months, the document feels inconsistent at best. It feels like a good way for FBI employees to get rid of coworkers they don't like and a great way to foster an atmosphere of corrosive suspicion in FBI offices.

FBI employees will distrust each other, FBI officials will distrust nosy politicians… and, in a surprising revelation by Leopold, politicians will have even less reason to trust the FBI. As was noted earlier in this post, the FBI chose to walk out of a briefing rather than answer Sen. Chuck Grassley's question about whistleblower protections under the FBI's "insider threat" program. Thanks to the efforts of a media company (BuzzFeed) and a private citizen (Leopold), Grassley now has a copy of documents the Senator asked for months ago.

Grassley asked the FBI to send him its insider threat training material. He received a couple of videos and a brochure. But a spokesperson for Grassley told BuzzFeed News that the senator did not receive the training slides until BuzzFeed News sent a copy.

The documents released here don't answer Grassley's questions either. But recent history shows us the FBI is not a whistleblower-friendly agency. It seems to have no problem with very selective leaking, but isn't nearly as kind to those who use the official channels to report wrongdoing. An insider threat program like this doesn't help. Giving agents and employees sketchy reasons to distrust each other will only serve to deter whistleblowers before they even have a chance to experience the agency's unofficial retaliation program.

Filed Under: fbi, insider threat

FOIA Documents Show Government's Whistleblower-Punishing 'Insider Threat' Program Modeled On Chelsea Manning

from the threatened-by-accountability dept

Chelsea Manning has obtained her "Insider Threat" report from the US government through a FOIA request. It's published in full at The Guardian and it provides additional insight into this administration's war on whistleblowers. Set up in the wake of Manning's Wikileaks document dump, the "Insider Threat" program seeks to weed out future Mannings and Snowdens -- both of whom turned over documents to journalists and activists, rather than the nation's enemies. Manning, in an accompanying editorial, calls it a "blank check for surveillance." And it is.

The list of possible indicators is so broad as to cover nearly the entirety of the government's workforce -- not just those with security clearances.

(U)Insider Threat Motives

Greed or financial difficulties
Disgruntled or wants revenge
Ideology
Divided loyalties
Vulnerable to blackmail
Ego/Self-lmage
lngratiation
Family/personal issues

To be seen as a threat by the government, one only needs to experience the rigors of everyday life, like "financial difficulties" or "family issues." If a person's viewpoint is not totally aligned with the agency they work for, the person may be viewed as holding a hostile "ideology" and will likely be "disgruntled."

The document also has a list of indicators related to job functions. Any straying from the confines of the position could be viewed as threatening.

(U) Behavior Indicators

Interest in matters outside their scope of responsibilities.
lnappropriately seeks to obtain classified information on subjects not related to their work.
Downloads/transfers information without proper authorization or need via media devices or email.
Deliberate and unnecessarily copies of documents or media.
Works unusual times outside normal duty hours.
Unexplained affluences.
Engaged in suspicious personal contacts.
Unreported foreign contacts.
Overwhelmed by life crises and/or career disappointments.
Compulsive and destructive behavior.

The following page of the report shows this part of the Insider Threat program is specifically based on Chelsea Manning, as every single one of these items is listed under "PVT. Manning's Behavior Indicators." That includes the mysterious "Unexplained affluences," which continues to go unexplained in the detailing of Manning's behavior. (I would assume this refers to outward signs of wealth not supported by pay grade, but the report just tosses the ungainly wording into the list without specifying what it is, how it's determined, or how it applies to Manning.)

Somewhat comically, Manning's assigned shift is referred to as being "outside normal duty hours."

Works unusual times outside normal duty hours.

PVT Manning utilized his 12 hour shift from late evening (~7pm) until the morning (~7am) to conduct his illegal activity.

As The Guardian points out, documents obtained by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists show over 100,000 government employees have already been targeted for insider threat surveillance. The program calls it "continuous evaluation," which is the government's innocuous terminology for surveillance of all activities, including those outside of work, like financial transactions, political affiliations and activism.

In total, the report does almost nothing to allay fears that the Insider Threat program will be used to hunt down whistleblowers. Manning's report indicates the government feels advocates for transparency ("promoted the ideology that all information should be public") and people who don't fit into binary gender confines ("[Manning] struggled with his self-image as a man when he wanted to be openly accepted as a female") should be subjected to pervasive surveillance by their own government.

The bottom line is that even if an employee is otherwise satisfied with their government employment, they still need to "fit in" with fellow employees, live a life mostly free of financial or personal stress, advocate only for their employer's official/unofficial positions and hopefully identify as straight male/female. Anything outside of these confines is asking for trouble. Whistleblowers don't even stand a chance.

Filed Under: chelsea manning, foia, insider threat, whistleblowing