It's one thing to take a stand against questionable copyright trolling, but it's another thing to be a really bad defendant. We had this with both of the RIAA's lawsuits against Jammie Thomas and Joel Tenenbaum. In both cases, they were bad defendants who clearly broke the law and then tried to play cute in defending themselves. In both cases we pointed out that they should have settled, and that fighting on when they had no case was a really bad idea. Yes, there are all sorts of ridiculous things about many of these cases, and there are all sorts of legal questions raised about them. But if you're caught dead to rights infringing on the works of others, pretending that some magical fantasy world is going to open up in the back of the closet is just silly. Even worse: bad defendants create really bad case law that allows copyright trolls to use those cases to shake down lots of other people, many of which probably have much stronger cases.
Unfortunately, it looks like we have another example of this. Uber copyright troll/porn producer Malibu Media has won an easy lawsuit against a defendant who tried to blame everything on the fact that he used Kickass Torrents to download Malibu Media movies. 57 of them. That kind of blaming the middleman is never going to work. In fact, others have tried it in the past, and it doesn't work. As the judge in the case noted:
Defendant has some quarrels with the details of how BitTorrent works, but nothing that the Court sees as a fundamental or material issue of fact. Even as Defendant describes the facts, using BitTorrent technology, he ultimately winds up with 57 unauthorized copies of Plaintiff’s works—copies that did not exist until Defendant himself engaged the technology to create new and unauthorized copies with a swarm of other users. True enough, the process is not identical to the peer-to-peer file sharing program in Grokster. It is, however, functionally indistinguishable from the perspective of both the copyright holder and the ultimate consumer of the infringed work. In both situations, the end user participates in creating a new and unauthorized digital copy of a protected work. It makes no difference from a copyright perspective whether the infringing copy is created in a single wholesale file transfer using a peer-to-peer protocol or in a swarm of fragmented transfers that are eventually reassembled into the new infringing copy.
Of course, one could make a reasonable argument that the fragmented transfers raise issues concerning the distribution right of copyright, but not the reproduction right. On the reproduction right, the defendant, Don Bui, is clearly cooked. And he and his lawyer should have recognized that much earlier. Instead, they get this ruling that, because of the bad defendant, makes a bunch of broad statements that go beyond just Bui's immediate case and may create problems elsewhere. For example, the judge, Robert Jonker, cites the Aereo ruling to support this -- even though that's a dangerous way to read the Aereo ruling. Jonker seems to accept the "don't look in the black box, just look at the end results" aspect of Aereo. But, under such a system, lots of things that aren't infringement might now be judged infringing. It's basically a shortcut to avoid careful analysis, and that's what happens when you have bad defendants who clearly infringed.
Bui's lawyer also tried the "poor immigrant who doesn't understand English very well" argument and saw that shot down as well. Deservedly so. There are plenty of reasons to challenge questionable lawsuits. And plenty of reasons for some folks to legally attack the underpinnings of copyright trolling -- including things like honeypots and abusing the judicial system to shake down people -- but taking a bad defendant all the way through the legal process is a bad idea. And the end result is going to be that Malibu Media not only claims vindication for its activities, but waves them around to every reporter, judge and (most importantly) future targets of its shakedown game.
Back in 2009, Kevin Cogill, who was given two months house arrest for uploading a pre-release version of Guns 'N Roses' album, was also required to create a propaganda video for the RIAA about how terrible infringement is. Instead, he didn't do that, and started doing interviews explaining how the RIAA "f**** people in the a**." Amusingly, the RIAA then claimed that it was its own decision not to have Cogill create the propaganda video, because there would be "unnecessarily high production costs."
Given that experience, it seems a bit bizarre that the RIAA has suggested that it would accept a lower payment than the $222,000 verdict (the one of a few verdicts that is now the final verdict) requires if Jammie Thomas were to do the same sort of propaganda. She, however, has made it clear that she has no interest in doing that. As she told Dave Kravets at Wired:
However, the 36-year-old mother of four and the nation's first file-sharer to challenge a Recording Industry Association of America lawsuit, said she would rather go bankrupt.
"I'm not doing it," the Minnesota woman said in a telephone interview today.
Of course, bankruptcy declared after the court ruling may not be that helpful, as I don't think she can get out from the amount owed that way (a bankruptcy lawyer recently explained that it is possible, in some situations, to get out of such rewards by declaring bankruptcy before the case is final, but once it's final... not so much). Of course, the RIAA isn't that interested in the money anyway. The focus here has always been on making "an example" of Jammie Thomas and others, in the mistaken belief that it would scare people away from file sharing. That, obviously, would be the same goal of any propaganda video, and it would almost certainly fail.
The issue is that the RIAA and other maximalists still think this is an "education" issue, rather than an issue about how people want to access and share content. The "education" doesn't stop infringement, and it never has. Putting someone that was put through the wringer by the RIAA legal machine in front of a camera would just be even more ridiculous, because pretty much everyone would realize that a forced statement was not sincere, and that propaganda made in response to a required payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars really would just do more to highlight what an incredible bully the RIAA really is.
We didn't think that the Supreme Court would grant cert to hear the appeal in Jammie Thomas' case and now it's been confirmed. As we've said for a while, neither Jammie Thomas's case nor Joel Tenenbaum's case,were ideal cases to take to trial, and both people mounted questionable defenses, which massively harmed their credibility. There are serious issues that could have and should have been covered in these kinds of cases, including the Constitutionality of certain levels of statutory damages. However, the way they went about this case made sure that it was doomed from the start. And, unfortunately, now it's just more bad precedent out there.
You may recall that, in the case of Joel Tenenbaum -- who is in a legal battle with some major lbels for file sharing -- a jury awarded the labels $675,000 for the sharing of just a few songs. The judge, Nancy Gertner, pointed out that this seemed unconstitutionally excessive and reduced the award to $67,500 -- knocking 90% off the jury's award. The appeals court in the case reinstated the original $675,000 on procedural grounds. It said that Judge Gertner jumped the gun in leaping to the constitutional question, rather than using remittitur, as had been done in the Jammie Thomas case. Remittitur would allow the RIAA to have the case happen all over again with a new jury. In the Jammie Thomas case there have already been three trials.
Tenenbaum, led by famed lawyer/law professor Charles Nesson, challenged the appeals court on all of this, but had that quickly rejected. As we noted at the time, Nesson seemed to (as he's done in the past) argue points unrelated to the specific legal questions at issue. This seemed like a bad way to go about things in a court of law, even if it may help in the court of public opinion.
The latest is that Tenenbaum/Nesson have filed to raise the issue with the Supreme Court. At least the argument here is a bit more focused on the requirement for remittitur, with Tenenbaum's team arguing that the statutory damages for non-commercial use is clearly a major Constitutional issue, and by forcing it through the remittitur process, all the courts are doing is pressuring people like Tenenbaum to settle, rather than ever allowing it to be judged on constitutionality. And that has consequences -- namely in enabling copyright trolls to shake people down, without ever allowing them to challenge the constitutionality of massive statutory damages.
I actually think this is a much more persuasive argument than I've seen from Team Tenenbaum in the past, but it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will actually take the case on. I hope I'm wrong (and then, if I am wrong on that, I hope I'm wrong in my guess as to how it will come out, because this version of the Supreme Court doesn't appear to understand the issues around copyright law). Either way, we should find out soon enough.
I do think it's interesting that Nesson is using the copyright troll issue as part of the argument. Eventually, this or an issue like it will get to the Supreme Court, and hopefully the Justices realize just how damaging such practices can be:
They use the asymmetric cost of litigation to make defense by the individual economically irrational.
This Court should do everything it can to remedy this misuse of process. Its effects are not ended because the RIAA has ceased suing individuals. Others are using the legal structure and litigation tactics they have put in place.4 The weight of federal litigation is not a tool appropriately used to suppress legal challenge. The absence of cases pending in the federal courts highlights the problem: a deeply misshapen judicial architecture has been set in place. Without review, it is unfixable. The suppression of ability to challenge a process that is repeatedly producing appalling results, not circuit splits, is exactly why this case is worthy of this Court's present attention.
It's an interesting argument to get around the lack of a circuit split (conflicting rulings in different circuits, which is one of the key reasons why the Supreme Court agrees to hear certain cases). However, I just don't think the Court will think it's a big enough deal to jump on it, perhaps figuring that it can bounce back up eventually. Of course, that only underlines the point: for that to happen, it means years more of Tenenbaum's time wasted with this case. That seems unfortunate.
The RIAA's war against reasonableness continues. As totally and completely expected after Judge Michael David reduced the jury award against Jammie Thomas-Rasset from $80,000 per song shared to a still ridiculous $2,250 per song shared, the RIAA has now appealed the case to the Eighth Circuit appeals court. Now is when the case finally starts to get more interesting. The RIAA is actually challenging three parts from the three prior trials (as you may recall, the first two were tossed out). Specifically, the RIAA is asking:
Whether the District Court erred by concluding that making a copyrighted work available for download on an online file-sharing network is insufficient to constitute a 'distribution' under 106(3) of the Copyright Act, and therefore refusing to enjoin Defendant from making Plaintiffs' copyrighted sound recordings available to the public.
Whether the District Court erred by concluding that it had committed an error in instructing the jury that making a copyrighted work available for download on a online file-sharing network constitutes a "distribution' under 106(3) of the copyright Act and therefor vacating the jury's verdict and ordering a new trial.
Whether the District Court erred by holding that the jury's award of statutory damages for defendant's willful copyright infringement violated the due process clause even though it was well within the range of damages awards authorized by 504(c) of the Copyright Act.
All three are interesting legal questions. The last one may be the biggest, but the hardest to succeed on. The reasoning used so far by two different judges in dropping jury awards is that the jury awards were so out of line with reality that they violated due process. The RIAA is scared to death that any sort of reasonable awards be associated with copyright law, because they're still under the ridiculously misguided belief that absolutely insane judgments for millions of dollars will scare people into no longer sharing files. The thing is, it's likely they have this misjudged in a big, bad way. The awards in the millions of dollars for just a few songs seem so incredible and so unfathomable, that most people simply think it's impossible. I honestly believe that they'd have a lot more luck if the fines were seen as much lower and much more within the grasp of the average file sharer. But the RIAA is not known for thinking logically.
The first two issues are actually important as well, though they'll get less attention. It's a key fighting point by the RIAA: which is whether or not a copyright holder needs to prove actual distribution to show an infringement of the distribution right under copyright law... or if merely "making available" constitutes distribution. This has been a major point of contention. The RIAA relies on a case about library books to say that merely "making available" is a violation of the distribution right, but other rulings and basic common sense on what constitutes distribution, suggest that merely making available is not, in fact, distribution by itself.
Check out Judge Michael Davis. After the second Jammie Thomas-Rasset case had a jury return an award of $1.92 million for her sharing of 24 songs, the judge reduced the award from $80,000 per song to three times the statutory minimum of $2,250 per song. Of course, this resulted in a wild freakout by the RIAA... and a third trial. In the third trial (just on the award amount), the jury went with $62,500 per song shared, or $1.5 million total. Considering the massive freakout last time, you might think that Judge Davis would just be done with this, but instead, he's sticking to his guns, once again reducing the award to the same $2,250 per song. This really makes it the third time he's overturned the jury (though, the first time was because he felt he gave improper jury instructions).
Of course, the RIAA will once again freak out and this will be appealed. The judge's ruling, though, is well worth reading, calling the jury award of $1.5 million "appalling":
The Court concludes that an award of $1.5 million for stealing and distributing 24 songs for personal use is appalling. Such an award is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable. In this particular case, involving a first-time willful, consumer infringer of limited means who committed illegal song file-sharing for her own personal use, an award of $2,250 per song, for a total award of $54,000, is the maximum award consistent with due process.
This reduced award is punitive and substantial. It acts as a potent deterrent. It is a higher award than the Court might have chosen to impose in its sole discretion, but the decision was not for this Court to make. The Court has merely reduced the jury’s award to the maximum amount permitted under our Constitution.
He notes that, given the past experiences with this dispute, he's "loath" to do this again, but "the Constitution and justice compel the Court to act."
Judge Davis is clearly aware that the RIAA would freak out about this, and lays out, in great detail, his arguments for why the original awards are unconstitutional (as a violation of due process) and why the maximum fine he believes is allowed under the Constitution would be the $2,250 per song he changed the award to.
The RIAA, of course, will continue to claim that the ridiculous million dollar plus awards for sharing 24-songs are perfectly appropriate. They'll claim, as they have in the past, that the fact that multiple juries came up with this amount shows that the public agrees such ridiculous fines are normal. As per usual with the RIAA, they're being misleading. The reason that juries reach such disproportionate awards is because of the way the choices are framed to the jury. There are all sorts of studies on how framing influences a jury, and how juries don't actually consider the proportional response of the offense to the punishment.
There's one other interesting bit in the ruling that won't get much attention. That is that the RIAA asked for an injunction barring Thomas-Rasset from infringing any further, and the court grants it... in part. It's the part that it doesn't grant, which is interesting. The RIAA asked for the court to say Thomas-Rasset should be barred from "making available" any copyrighted works via file sharing programs, but the court, correctly (despite the RIAA's long-term effort to pretend otherwise), points out that there is no "making available" right within copyright law. The Court is short and sweet on that point:
Plaintiffs further request that the Court include language in the injunction barring Defendant from making any of Plaintiffs’ sound recordings available for distribution to the public. Plaintiffs argue that, if Thomas-Rasset makes Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works available on a peer-to-peer network, she will have completed all of the steps necessary for her to engage in the same illegal distribution of Plaintiffs’ works for which she has already been found liable. Because the Court has held that the Copyright Act does not provide a making-available right, it will not enjoin Thomas-Rasset from making the copyrighted sound recordings available to the public.
While there's nothing really new here, it's nice to see that point reinforced once again. Making available, by itself, is not copyright infringement, despite the industry's attempts to portray it as such.
With the latest jury in the never-ending series of trials for Jammie Thomas-Rasset, awarding $1.5 million, or $62,500 per song, many were wondering how the jury comes up with such numbers that seem so ridiculously out of line with any actual damages. The real problem isn't the jury, but the law. Copyright law has ridiculous statutory damages, which by definition have no basis in actual damages. This leads to purposely nonsensical results like being fined $1.5 million for sharing 24 songs you liked. So why is the jury still picking those numbers? Well, it's all about the framing. If you read the jury instructions to the latest jury, you can see why the jury more or less picked the number it did. Just take this key section:
You are hereby instructed that a jury in a previous trial has already determined that the defendant's infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights was willful. In this case, there is no issue as to the defendant's liability for willful copyright infringement. As a result, your sole responsibility is to determine the amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs for the defendant's willful infringement of the plaintiffs' copyrights.
In this case, each plaintiff has elected to recover "statutory damages" instead of actual damages and profits. A copyright holder may recover statutory damages even if it did not submit evidence regarding actual damages. Under the Copyright Act, each plaintiff is entitled to a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 per act of infringement (that is, per sound recording downloaded or distributed without license). Because the defendant's conduct was willful, then each plaintiff is entitled to a sum of up to $150,000 per act of infringement (that is, per sound recording downloaded or distributed without license), as you consider just.
There's nothing specifically wrong with the jury instructions. They're exactly what the law basically says the judge should say. But, if you're the average person in the jury box, these instructions effectively say "pick a number higher than $30,000 and less than $150,000." That's basically it. The numbers are framed right there, and the jury just has to pick. So, the last two juries picked $80,000 and now $62,500. If you're on the jury, you're not really thinking about what this actually means, or if the punishment fits the actions. You're told, by law, you should pick a ridiculously high number, and then you just sorta pick one within that frame, which has already been set for you. If you're told that they can be fined $150,000 per song shared, and you assume that the law must make sense (because who would pass a nonsensical law?), then at no point do you ever consider the reasonableness of such an award. That seems like a pretty bad judicial system, because it encourages frivolous results that very few people can respect.
The farce that is the Jammie Thomas-Rasset legal battle with the RIAA continues. In the third in a series of jury decisions, Thomas-Rasset has been hit with a $1.5 million verdict for sharing the same 24 songs, or $62,500 for each song. That is just slightly less than the last time around. From very early on, we had believed that Jammie Thomas' case was always a bad test case, and one where she likely would have been better off settling. There are important legal questions in these fights, but Thomas-Rasset's own actions greatly weakened her own case and served to distract from the important issues. However, she pushed forward. In the first trial, the jury awarded the RIAA (technically Capitol Records) $222,000, or $9,250 per song.
The judge then realized that he had made a mistake in issuing instructions to the jury and declared a mistrial. The second trial, apparently with proper jury instructions but lots more problems for Thomas-Rasset, resulted in a whopping $1.92 million verdict, or $80,000 per song. The judge then made the somewhat surprising move of unilaterally lowering the verdict down to (a still extreme) $2,250 per song. Neither side was particularly happy about this, and now the third trial is over and the jury has come close to that last award anyway. So, now what? One assumes the judge will reduce the award for the same reason he did last time and the case will finally move up a level for appeal.
The RIAA will, once again, gloat about this ruling, falsely implying that this is more evidence that "ordinary people" find such actions reprehensible, but that, again, is pure spin and ignores the reality of the situation. To be honest, this particular trial has become such a farce, that it's really not worth paying much attention to it until we get to dig into the real issues at the appeals court.
Last Friday, we quickly covered the news that Judge Nancy Gertner had declared the original jury award of $675,000 against Joel Tenenbaum for downloading and sharing some songs unconstitutionally excessive. Over the weekend, however, I had some more time to read the full ruling (posted by Eric Goldman) and get a sense of what Gertner's full argument meant. You can read the ruling here, and I highly recommend taking the time to read the whole thing:
In it, she clearly explains why the Constitutional analysis was necessary (she could have just reduced the award using the remittitur process, but noted that the RIAA made it clear they would challenge such a ruling, and thus it would eventually come around to the Constitutional questions no matter what.
So with that in mind, she clearly gave a lot of thought to the Constitutional questions, and goes back to the key point, that if the punishment is seriously out of line with any sort of "harm" caused, then it's unconstitutional. She notes that she must give deference to Congress' intent with the statutory rates it set for copyright infringement, as well as to the jury's verdict. But, even so, she suggests that the jury's award was way out of line with reasonable awards in other copyright lawsuits... and (more importantly) way out of line with Congress' intent of using statutory rates to deter infringement:
This award is far greater than necessary to serve the government's
legitimate interests in compensating copyright owners and deterring infringement. In fact, it
bears no meaningful relationship to these objectives.
In attacking the Constitutional questions, Judge Gertner spent a lot of time highlighting the case law on the Due Process Clause, noting many, many cases where the Supreme Court has made it clear that there are limits to what should be considered Constitutional when it comes to jury awards -- even in the case of statutory awards (even if the courts often seem to rule that in the cases they're looking at, the line has not been crossed).
Defenders of both the original Jammie Thomas award and the Joel Tenenbaum award have frequently claimed that the case law (mainly the BMW v. Gore case) doesn't apply since that was not for statutory damages, where the rates are clear and already set. That's going to be a key point made in the inevitable challenge to this ruling. But Gertner aptly explains why it's reasonable to explore whether or not the award is unconstitutionally excessive, even when it's within the statutory rates, and even suggests that both the government and the RIAA are misreading other precedents -- with the key one being the Williams case, which found a damages award acceptable because it fell within statutory rates. Gertner points out that the RIAA and the government are taking that ruling out of context, and only looking at the result, rather than the actual reasoning.
At their root, the standards articulated in Williams, BMW,
and State Farm all aim at providing defendants with some protection against arbitrary government
action in the form of damages awards that are grossly excessive in relation to the objectives that
the awards are designed to achieve. Indeed, early twentieth century cases such as Williams were
the seedlings from which the Supreme Court's recent punitive damages jurisprudence sprouted.
She also notes that even in the Congressional record in efforts to increase the statutory rates, Congressional members suggested that courts would make sure the actual awards were reasonable and not excessive:
In fact, Senator Orrin Hatch, a sponsor of the Digital
Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, which increased section
504(c)'s statutory damages ranges to their current levels, stated in remarks regarding a
predecessor of that bill, "In most cases, courts attempt to do justice by fixing the statutory
damages at a level that approximates actual damages and defendant's profits."
That line right there might be pretty damaging to the RIAA's typical claim that courts are just supposed to assume that Congress knows best in setting the rates, and shouldn't try to approximate actual damages with statutory rates.
From there, Judge Gertner applies the test found in the BMW case, and points out that (contrary to some of the silliest claims from copyright system defenders), Congress clearly did not expect lawsuits against individuals sharing files for personal use when it set such high rates:
Later statements by Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy, two sponsors of
the Digital Theft Deterrence Act, strongly suggest that Tenenbaum is correct; they did not
anticipate that individuals such as Tenenbaum who engaged in noncommercial file-sharing
would be subjected to liability for statutory damages under section 504(c). Hatch and Leahy
presided over a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing titled "Music on the Internet: Is There an
Upside to Downloading?" on July 11, 2000.... During the
hearing, the committee members demonstrated how the peer-to-peer system Gnutella is used by
downloading and then playing a song by the band Creed. ... As the committee was
downloading the Creed song, Senator Leahy proudly proclaimed that he was doing some of his
own downloading on his laptop. ... When one of the developers of Gnutella pointed
out to the committee members that they might be engaging in copyright infringement, Senator
Hatch responded that their downloading and public performance of the Creed song qualified as
"fair use" since it was carried out for "educational and governmental purposes." ...
Nevertheless, the senators' willingness to download copyrighted sound recordings through a
peer-to-peer network during a committee hearing suggests, at the very least, that they did not
view such downloading as particularly reprehensible.
And this inference from the senators' conduct is largely confirmed by their words. Although Senator Hatch noted that peer-to-peer technology had the capacity, "if misused, to rob [artists] of their livelihood," ... he also praised the development of Gnutella as "quite an
accomplishment," ... And Senator Leahy added:
[W]hen I go on college campuses, as many of us do, to talk and
everybody is talking about what they have downloaded, how they
share, and so on, and when my kids pick up a "Black Muddy
River," which happens to be one of my favorites of the Dead, and
send it to me -- they have heard a new version -- and I log on in the
morning while I am having my breakfast and there it is, I mean this
is a whole different world, and I think we have to recognize that on
where we go.
Senator Hatch's tolerance of, if not admiration for, peer-to-peer networks was even more
on display at a special Judiciary Committee hearing held on October 9, 2000, at Brigham Young
University ("BYU"). ...
Shawn Fanning, the founder of Napster, was the star witness at this hearing, and Senator Hatch
repeatedly praised Fanning, expressing how "proud" he was of Fanning and even suggesting that
Fanning should become a professor at BYU or run for political office. ...
Obviously, Senator Hatch's comments should be taken with a large grain of salt... But his comments nevertheless suggest that he did
not anticipate that the statutory damages scheme over which his committee had jurisdiction
would be applied to users of Napster and other peer-to-peer networks.
I have to admit that I was unaware of these quotes from Senators Hatch and Leahy -- both of whom are normally seen as being very strongly in favor of strict copyright laws (Hatch, famously, once suggested coming up with a way to destroy the computers of file sharers).
On top of that, Judge Gertner compares the fines for Tenenbaum with restaurants and bars that have not paid their licenses, noting that those are clear cases of infringement for commercial reasons, yet the fines are a small multiple of the cost of a license. She points out that this seems like a much more egregious case, yet the awards are much lower:
The jury's award in this case also appears egregious in light of the damages typically
imposed on restaurants, bars, and other businesses that play copyrighted songs in their
establishments without first acquiring the appropriate licenses. These defendants are arguably
more culpable than Tenenbaum. Unlike Tenenbaum, who did not receive any direct pecuniary
gain from his file-sharing, defendants in these cases play copyrighted music to create a more
pleasurable atmosphere for their customers, thus generating more business and, consequently,
more revenue.... In addition, defendants accused of unlicensed public performances
often receive several notices that their conduct is unlawful before they are sued. Thus, like
Tenenbaum's file-sharing, their infringing conduct is generally willful. .... Nevertheless, the awards in such cases are generally no more than "two to six times the license fees defendants 'saved' by not obeying the Copyright Act"--a ratio of
statutory to actual damages far lower than the ratio present in this case.
Clearly, this case is nowhere close to over, but it is still interesting to read through the details of the ruling. Obviously, Gertner knows this is going to be appealed, and she put a lot of effort into making the case for why this ruling was excessive, in hopes of having her reasoning help carry the later appeals.
It seems like the Joel Tenenbaum case is simply an echo on the Jammie Thomas case. Both lawsuits involved very flawed defendants who probably shouldn't have gone through with their fights against the RIAA. In both cases, juries awarded huge statutory damages awards to the record labels. In Thomas' case it was $1.92 million or $80,000 per song. In the Tenenbaum case, it was $675,000 or $22,500 per song. Even though both cases were what I considered to be "bad" cases (too much evidence that both Thomas and Tenenbaum were actually heavily involved in file sharing), both have used the rulings to challenge the statutory damages awards as being unconstitutional.. and now the judges in both cases have agreed.
As you probably recall, the judge in the Thomas case reduced the $1.92 million award to $54,000 (or $2,250 per song) and today comes the news that Judge Gertner in the Tenenbaum case has declared the original damages award to be "unconstitutionally excessive" and slashed the total by 90% down to $67,500. In both cases, the judges actually set the per song damages award down to $2,250. There were lots of questions when Judge Davis did this in the Jammie Thomas case if a judge could actually do that, and that's still being fought to some extent. It seems likely that, as with the Thomas case, the RIAA will appeal this particular ruling because it most certainly does not want a precedent on the books that can lower the statutory damages rate for copyright.
This could start to get very interesting. Both judges are clearly taking a stand that the actual statutory rates set by Congress are ridiculously high and totally out of proportion with the actions done by the defendants. There is definitely some precedent for ridiculously high damages awards being thrown out as unconstitutionally excessive... but not when it comes to statutory rates, where the courts have generally said Congress has great leeway to determine what is and what is not excessive. However, with two judges pointing out that a number within the range provided by Congress is excessive, it's setting up a potentially very important legal battle about the statutory damages associated with copyright.
The industry has always pushed for higher and higher damages, somehow believing that will act as a disincentive for infringing. Yet, there doesn't appear to be any evidence at all that it's working. Instead, such high damages have actually done the opposite. They've convinced many, many people of just how ridiculously unfair and out of touch copyright laws are. The general public can recognize that sharing a single file shouldn't lead to a fine of tens of thousands of dollars. It's so out of proportion with reality that they begin to question the overall setup of copyright law itself. The industry's focus on higher and higher copyright damages has been a major strategic mistake that has backfired. These rulings -- which the industry will fight tooth and nail -- might actually be a blessing in disguise for the industry. If the actual damages weren't so ridiculous, people probably wouldn't be so up in arms over copyright issues.
