The White House Asks Silicon Valley What To Do To 'Disrupt' ISIS

from the not-that-kind-of-disruption... dept

As you may have heard, on Friday, a group of top White House officials, including Homeland Security director Jeh Johnson, FBI Director James Comey and NSA boss Admiral Michael Rogers, all came out to Silicon Valley to meet with tech execs to talk about how to "disrupt" groups like ISIS. On the tech side, a bunch of top execs came, including Apple CEO Tim Cook, Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg, LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman, Dropbox CEO Drew Houston and CloudFlare CEO Matthew Prince. The White House released a basic agenda publicly, though there was also apparently a more thorough briefing document that ran about 7 pages.

U.S. Government Meeting with Technology Executives on Counterterrorism

I. Introductions

II. Setting the stage

a. Purpose of Meeting

b. Unclassified background on terrorist use of technology, including encryption

III. Core Discussion Areas

a. How can we make it harder for terrorists to leveraging the internet to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence?

b. How can we help others to create, publish, and amplify alternative content that would undercut ISIL?

c. In what ways can we use technology to help disrupt paths to radicalization to violence, identify recruitment patterns, and provide metrics to help measure our efforts to counter radicalization to violence?

d. How can we make it harder for terrorists to use the internet to mobilize, facilitate, and operationalize attacks, and make it easier for law enforcement and the intelligence community to identify terrorist operatives and prevent attacks?

IV. Questions or other issues raised by Technology Companies

V. Next Steps

You will, of course, note the bit on encryption. According to some of the reports, while the meeting was really supposed to be more about anything but encryption (i.e. about figuring out ways to "counter" ISIS's supposed social media success, which likely has been overblown anyway), Comey said that he would only participate if encryption was on the agenda.

The Intercept got its hands on the more detailed briefing and revealed the part about encryption:

In addition to using technology to recruit and radicalize, terrorists are using technology to mobilize supporters to attack and to plan, move money for, coordinate, and execute attacks. The roles played by terrorist leaders and attack plotters in this activity vary, ranging from providing general direction to small groups to undertake attacks of their own design wherever they are located to offering repeated and specific guidance on how to execute attacks. To avoid law enforcement and the intelligence community detecting their activities, terrorists are using encrypted forms of communications at various stages of attack plotting and execution. We expect terrorists will continue to use technology to mobilize, facilitate, and operationalize attacks, including using encrypted communications where law enforcement cannot obtain the content of the communication even with court authorization. We would be happy to provide classified briefings in which we could share additional information.

Key Questions: We are interested in exploring all options with you for how to deal with the growing threat of terrorists and other malicious actors using technology, including encrypted technology, to threaten our national security and public safety. We understand that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to address this problem and that each of you has very different products and services that work in different ways. Are there high-level principles we could agree on for working through these problems together? And are there technologies that could make it harder for terrorists to use the internet to mobilize, facilitate, and operationalize? Or easier for us to find them when they do? What are the potential downsides or unintended consequences we should be aware of when considering these kinds of technology-based approaches to counter terrorism?

==

A number of organizations in the government, as well as some in private industry and academia, have researched techniques to detect and measure radicalization. Some have suggested that a measurement of level of radicalization could provide insights to measure levels of radicalization to violence. While it is unclear whether radicalization is measureable or could be measured, such a measurement would be extremely useful to help shape and target counter-messaging and efforts focused on countering violent extremism. This type of approach requires consideration of First Amendment protections and privacy and civil liberties concerns, additional front-end research on specific drivers of radicalization and themes among violent extremist populations, careful design of intervention tools, dedicated technical expertise, and the ability to iteratively improve the tools based on experience in deploying them. Industry certainly has a lot of expertise in measuring resonance in order to see how effective and broad a messaging campaign reaches an audience. A partnership to determine if resonance can be measured for both ISIL and counter-ISIL content in order to guide and improve and more effectively counter the ISIL narrative could be beneficial.

==

The United States recognizes the need to empower credible non-governmental voices that would speak out against ISIL and terrorism more broadly both overseas and at home. However, there is a shortage of compelling credible alternative content; and this content is often not as effectively produced or distributed as pro-ISIL content and lacks the sensational quality that can capture the media’s attention. Content creation is made difficult by ISIL’s brutal rule and near total control of communications infrastructure in its territory in Iraq and Syria, which can make it dangerous for citizens to speak out or provide video or images. Further, many of the leading and credible voices that might counter ISIL lack the content-generation and social media prowess that would be required to counter ISIL online. There is also a need for more credible positive messaging and content that provides alternatives to young people concerned about many of the grievances ISIL highlights.

In parallel with ongoing U.S. Government efforts, we invite the private sector to consider ways to increase the availability alternative content. Beyond the tech sector, we have heard from other private sector actors, including advertising executives, who are interested in helping develop and amplify compelling counter-ISIL content; and we hope there are opportunities to bring together the best in tech, media, and marketing to work with credible non-government voices to address this shared challenge.

For what it's worth, it appears (thankfully) that the majority of the meeting did not focus on the issue of encryption and (somewhat importantly) it was made clear to government officials that they're doing a hell of a lot more harm than good in continuing to suggest that undermining encryption is a reasonable approach. Tim Cook apparently said that the government needs to come out publicly in favor of strong encryption, rather than its silly statements that suggest a desire to undermine it.

The real crux of the meeting, though, was looking at if there was "some other thing" that the tech industry could do to help in the fight against terrorism. This actually seems like a perfectly reasonable question to ask. But there are still reasonable concerns. First, pretty much all of these companies already have terms of service that forbid their use in the furtherance of criminal or terrorist activities. Second, they tend to already work with the government when such activity is discovered on the service. Third, in many cases, letting terrorist organizations use these platforms freely is one of the most effective ways to enable intelligence officials to find out what they're doing.

If you look at the agenda above, it really feels as if the meeting was built on the wrong premise. It's basically all about how do we stop bad people from using technology effectively. But that's a fool's errand, because technology doesn't distinguish between good people and bad people.

Technology, for the most part, is about helping people do things better and more efficiently, not about stopping people from doing things. It's too bad there wasn't a focus on using today's technology tools to enable more people to help out in the fight against terrorism and extremism. Instead, much of the focus is on "how do we make it harder for someone to do [x]."

From the reports that came out, the discussion was pretty high level, with ideas like "could Facebook adjust its algorithm that spots potentially suicidal users to also detect potentially radicalized members." Having such discussions is fine, in theory. In fact, if anything, the oddest thing about this little "summit" is that it demonstrates just how wide the gulf has become between Silicon Valley and DC. In the past, discussions like this weren't so crazy -- and didn't need press coverage.

But here's the thing: the intelligence community totally poisoned the well here with its actions over the past decade and a half. For the past few months DC folks have been whining about how Silicon Valley is seeing this as an "us v. them" situation, but that's only true because the NSA blew everything up, hacking into systems, lying to the public, abusing the secretive powers of National Security Letters, the FISA Court and Executive Order 12333. The government treated Silicon Valley as an adversary, and is now whining that Silicon Valley doesn't want to help.

I'm quite certain that everyone in the room wants to do what they can to "stop ISIS" ("disrupt" is totally the wrong word here). And it would be great if there were ways to actually do that. But it can't involve the usual way that the intelligence and law enforcement communities have focused on in the past decade and a half: violating privacy, exploiting systems and generally treating the public's rights as collateral damage. And it can't involve stomping on freedom of expression.

It's fine if the two sides want to talk and see if they can come up with something useful, but as long as DC keeps thinking of Silicon Valley as creating "magic pixie dust" instead of innovation, it's not going to be that useful.

Filed Under: admiral mike rogers, encryption, going dark, isis, james comey, jeh johnson, tim cook, white house
Companies: apple, cloudflare, dropbox, facebook, linkedin

Secret Service Agents Dug Through Personal Info To Discredit Legislator Investigating Agency Wrongdoing

from the Secret(s)-Service dept

They get to wear nice suits, wield guns and hang around the President. They're entrusted with protecting perhaps the most important person in the world. The US Secret Service should only be staffed with the best the nation has to offer. Instead, its recent protective efforts can be generously described as "almost adequate" and it's apparently staffed with an assortment of vindictive children who can't stand the thought of having their shortcomings questioned.

Rep. Jason Chaffetz heads up the House Oversight Committee, which is tasked with investigating allegations that Secret Service agents had spent several hours drinking before (literally) crashing a "suspicious package" party being thrown in their absence on a street near the White House. Almost as soon as the hearings began, Secret Service agents began looking for some way to tear Chaffetz down.

Employees accessed Chaffetz's 2003 application for a Secret Service job starting 18 minutes after the start of a congressional hearing in March about the latest scandal involving drunken behavior by senior agents. Some forwarded the information to others. At least 45 employees viewed the file.

If this internal sharing of personal info were the extent of the wrongdoing, it would still be illegal. The US Privacy Act forbids the disclosure of these records, absent the written permission of the record's subject. Obviously, Chaffetz was never approached by the Secret Service to get his OK for using his job application against him. But this isn't the end of the agency's misconduct.

One week later, Assistant Director Ed Lowery suggested leaking embarrassing information about Chaffetz in retaliation for aggressive investigations by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee into a series of agency missteps and scandals, the report said. Days later, on April 2, the information about Chaffetz unsuccessfully applying for a job at the Secret Service was published by The Daily Beast, an Internet publication.

"Some information that he might find embarrassing needs to get out. Just to be fair," Lowery wrote March 31 in an email to fellow Assistant Director Faron Paramore.

"Just to be fair." Let's take a look at that statement. Lowery's employees embarrassed themselves, both in terms of protecting the White House and showing up for work sober. And yet, the "fair" thing to do was to discredit a politician actually performing his job: the oversight of government agencies.

Lowery says he never ordered anyone to release any information the agency had on Chaffetz. (He just heavily suggested it...) He told the Inspector General that saying the "embarrassing" information "need[ed] to get out" was only a reflection of his anger and frustration. It's not as though anger hasn't been known to push people towards regrettable actions. Obviously, Lowery regrets this now that he's been caught, but claiming "the anger made me do it" doesn't excuse his support of illegal activity being performed by his agency.

DHS head Jeh Johnson officially apologized to Rep. Chaffetz, following it with this consolation prize:

"I am confident that U.S. Secret Service Director Joe Clancy will take appropriate action to hold accountable those who violated any laws or the policies of this department," Johnson said.

This may be true. Clancy was called out of retirement to take over the agency after the previous Secret Service head was booted following the White House security breaches. But it's still the sort of "promise" no one should accept at face value. The government is routinely terrible at holding its own employees accountable for their actions, and -- recent high-profile disgraces aside -- the Secret Service is no exception.

The attempted use of personal information by agency employees to discredit someone engaged in investigating their wrongdoing is a gross abuse of power. Many government agencies have access to a wealth of personal information, especially for those who have been entrusted with security clearances or have applied for certain federal positions. Just think of what one could do with access to even greater amounts of personal information.

Oh but this would never happen with an #NSA database, don't be ridiculous. http://t.co/UDwVOnvQXq

— Jameel Jaffer (@JameelJaffer) October 1, 2015

Oh but this would never happen with an #NSA database, don't be ridiculous.

Very little stands in the way of agencies abusing their access and power. This just happens to be one of the times when someone got caught.

Filed Under: ed lowery, embarrassment, foia, house oversight, jason chaffetz, jeh johnson, joe clancy, secret service, us privacy act, vendetta

DHS Head Jeh Johnson Recognizes The Privacy/Security Tradeoff, But Seems Unlikely To Make The First Concession

from the we-all-need-to-work-on-this.-you-go-first. dept

DHS boss Jeh Johnson is still out trading fear for civil liberties. There's a cyberwar that needs fighting and his agency is looking for a position at the "information sharing" front lines. As the major systems went down left and right a couple of days ago, Johnson remained mostly unperturbed while delivering an address to CSIS.

In the context he delivered them, his remarks -- while remarkably similar to those he delivered at the RSA Conference in April -- seem to be a bit more conciliatory, rather than being just repetitive talking points from an agency seeking additional power at any cost.

Johnson acknowledged that in the war against hackers, the need to protect privacy and connectivity makes the web security a difficult operating environment.

“I can build you a perfectly safe city, but it will look like a prison,” he warned.

“Cybersecurity involves striking a balance,” he said. “I can build you a perfectly secure email system but your contact will be limited to about ten people and you would be disconnected entirely from the Internet and the outside world.”

While I still remain skeptical as to his true intentions, it is a bit refreshing to see someone in the business of securing the homeland at least cognizant of the tradeoffs inherent to these aims. He said something to the same effect three months ago, but it was in the context of pleading the government's case for encryption backdoors.

I tell audiences that I can build you a perfectly safe city on a hill, but it will constitute a prison.

I think most Americans are well aware you can't have perfect security and perfect liberty, and outside of the most extreme factions on either end, no one's clamoring for that. The important thing is that Johson recognizes this, considering he holds the tools to build the public a hilltop prison in the name of security.

But I still think Johnson wants most of the tradeoffs to come at the expense of the public. He may be totally sincere in his wishes to build a balanced cybersecurity program, with actual equitable information sharing, but his best intentions are naturally hampered by the excesses of the agency he helms. There are far too many agencies operating under the minimal control of the DHS, many of which aren't nearly as willing to cede civil liberties ground as needed.

On top of that, the government continues to be terrible at protecting its own assets. And yet, it wants the private sector to be its partner in the Great Cyberwar. Once these companies are forced to carry the cybersecurity load for the underperforming public sector, those with greater governmental control on their minds will start building these "prison" walls, and all tradeoffs will be forgotten.

The only way to keep the government honest is to force it to play by the private sector's rules. This means no willful subversion of encryption and ridiculous demands for additional intrusive access in the name of "information sharing." Once these companies are granted a little respect from their potential partners, I would imagine the us v. them posturing will relax a bit.

Johnson may recognize the tradeoff and may even be willing to make concessions. But so far, most of what's being offered by agencies like his are demands, rather than compromises.

Filed Under: dhs, jeh johnson, privacy, security

Secretary Of State: We Must Have A Secure Internet; Homeland Security Secretary: A Secure Internet Makes Us All Less Safe

from the watch-out-for-the-buts dept

Secretary of State John Kerry gave a speech in South Korea this week about the importance of an "open and secure internet." Of course, that sounds a little hypocritical coming from the very same government that is actively working to undermine encryption, so it seems worth contrasting it with comments made from Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, in which he whines about a secure internet making things better for terrorists. Kerry's speech is mostly good (with some caveats that we'll get to), in talking about the importance of not freaking out over moral panics and FUD:

Freedom. The United States believes strongly in freedom – in freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of choice. But particularly, this is important with respect to freedom of expression, and you believe in that freedom of expression here in Korea. We want that right for ourselves and we want that right for others even if we don’t agree always with the views that others express. We understand that freedom of expression is not a license to incite imminent violence. It’s not a license to commit fraud. It’s not a license to indulge in libel, or sexually exploit children. No. But we do know that some governments will use any excuse that they can find to silence their critics and that those governments have responded to the rise of the internet by stepping up their own efforts to control what people read, see, write, and say.

This is truly a point of separation in our era – now, in the 21st century. It’s a point of separation between governments that want the internet to serve their citizens and those who seek to use or restrict access to the internet in order to control their citizens.

That sounds good... until you compare it to Kerry's cabinet partner Johnson, who was doing exactly what Kerry said governments should not do:

“We are concerned that with deeper and deeper encryption, the demands of the marketplace for greater cybersecurity, deeper encryption in basic communications,” Johnson said on MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” on Friday. “It is making it harder for the FBI and state and local law enforcement to track crime, to track potential terrorist activity.”

Let's not even bother with the question of just what is "deeper and deeper encryption" or why we should have someone who clearly doesn't understand encryption in charge of Homeland Security. But it seems clear that Kerry and Johnson's views here are quite different. Kerry is saying that "governments will use any excuse they can" including bogus claims about "terrorism" and "criminals" -- and yet that's exactly what Johnson is doing.

Of course, later in his speech, Kerry starts enumerating a similar list for any country to use, should they want to control speech as well:

First, no country should conduct or knowingly support online activity that intentionally damages or impedes the use of another country’s critical infrastructure. Second, no country should seek either to prevent emergency teams from responding to a cybersecurity incident, or allow its own teams to cause harm. Third, no country should conduct or support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, trade secrets, or other confidential business information for commercial gain. Fourth, every country should mitigate malicious cyber activity emanating from its soil, and they should do so in a transparent, accountable and cooperative way. And fifth, every country should do what it can to help states that are victimized by a cyberattack.

In other words, here are the guidelines for any other countries to attack freedom of expression and openness online. Just claim it violates one of the list above and the US can't complain. We've certainly seen it happen before. DDoS attacks launched based on claims that it's in "response" to a hacking attempt. Or Russia cracking down on dissidents by arguing that they must be infringing on copyright law.

Kerry's statement is the kind of thing that very few people would argue against. It seems obvious: of course we don't want attacks on critical infrastructure (though, the government likes to define "critical infrastructure" in a manner that best serves its own needs), or corporate espionage. But Kerry defines things in such a broad manner (including the bogus use of "theft" for "intellectual property") that it leaves the US wide open to abuse. Kerry was right at the beginning in arguing that governments will use any means necessary, so why give them this kind of opening? As we've seen for years, when the US beat up on China for not respecting our patents, China eventually "turned things around" by focusing on figuring out ways to use patents to block American companies from beating local Chinese firms in its market.

This isn't arguing that cyberattacks or infringement of intellectual property are good things -- just that giving foreign nations a "open internet, but..." allows them to make use of the "but..." portion to do all sorts of horrible things that suppress dissent and free expression, and then argue that they had to do it, because the US told them to do so. And, of course, it's not just foreign governments, but as Johnson's comments make clear, those at home as well. None of this means to encourage bad or illegal behavior online -- but to recognize that pushing for internet freedom means actually pushing for internet freedom, which is difficult to do when you immediately encumber it with your own set of conditions, and your colleagues are undermining the very foundation of a secure internet.

Filed Under: encryption, jeh johnson, john kerry, open internet, south korea

DHS Opening Office In Silicon Valley To More Efficiently Complain To Tech Companies About Encryption

from the we-have-no-solutions-but-we-do-have-plenty-of-talking-points! dept

If only the endlessly-escalating West Coast cost of living could have prevented this:

Today I am pleased to announce that the Department of Homeland Security is also finalizing plans to open up a satellite office in Silicon Valley, to serve as another point of contact with our friends here. We want to strengthen critical relationships in Silicon Valley and ensure that the government and the private sector benefit from each other’s research and development.

That's Jeh Johnson addressing the crowd at the RSA Conference. Of all the news no one wanted to hear, this has to be close to the top of the list. Three-lettered government agencies are pretty much NIMBY as far as the tech world is concerned, especially after Snowden's revelations have seriously and swiftly eroded trust in the government.

No one wants a next-door neighbor who's going to constantly be dropping by for a cup of decryption.

The current course we are on, toward deeper and deeper encryption in response to the demands of the marketplace, is one that presents real challenges for those in law enforcement and national security.

Let me be clear: I understand the importance of what encryption brings to privacy. But, imagine the problems if, well after the advent of the telephone, the warrant authority of the government to investigate crime had extended only to the U.S. mail.

Our inability to access encrypted information poses public safety challenges. In fact, encryption is making it harder for your government to find criminal activity, and potential terrorist activity.

We in government know that a solution to this dilemma must take full account of the privacy rights and expectations of the American public, the state of the technology, and the cybersecurity of American businesses.

We need your help to find the solution.

"Let me be clear: I understand the importance of what doors bring to privacy. But, imagine the problems if, well after humanity moved out of caves, the warrant authority of the government to investigate crime had only extended to dwellings without doors."

Bullshit. The DHS, along with other law enforcement agencies -- is seeking is the path of least resistance. It can get warrants to search encrypted devices. It just may not be able to immediately crack them open and feast on the innards. It may also get court orders to compel decryption. This is far less assured and risks dragging the Fifth Amendment down to the Fourth's level, but it's still an option.

Then there's the option of subpoenaing third parties, like cloud storage services, to find the content that can't be accessed on the phone. So, it's not as though it's locked out forever. This may happen occasionally but it won't suddenly turn law enforcement into a wholly futile pursuit.

Silicon Valley isn't going to help the DHS "find a solution." There isn't one. The DHS may as well get some legislation going and force companies to provide a stupid "good guys only" backdoor because the tech world already knows you can't keep bad guys out with broken encryption. This should be painfully obvious and yet, the "good guy" agencies seem to think tech companies are just holding out on them.

From there, Johnson switches to his most disingenuous rhetorical device: the assertion that Americans are clamoring for an unrealistic level of safety.

I tell audiences that I can build you a perfectly safe city on a hill, but it will constitute a prison.

Who the fuck is asking you to do that? The only people pushing for "perfectly safe" are government agencies who like big budgets and increased power and the private companies that profit from this sort of fearmongering. Most Americans are far more pragmatic and they'd rather keep what's left of their privacy and civil liberties, even if it means the safety of the country is slightly less assured.

And this makes me want to vomit with contempt:

In the name of homeland security, we can build more walls, erect more screening devices, interrogate more people, and make everybody suspicious of each other, but we should not do this at the cost of who we are as a nation of people who cherish privacy and freedom to travel, celebrate our diversity, and who are not afraid.

THAT IS LITERALLY ALL YOU HAVE DONE SINCE 2001.

In the name of "homeland security," we have TSA agents groping people, breaking their luggage, humiliating people with medical issues and stealing personal belongings -- all without ever having prevented a single attempted hijacking or bombing. In the name of "national security," we have indulged every nosy do-gooder with numerous hotlines to report their neighbors' ownership of luggage or cameras or pressure cookers. In the name of the "war on terror," we have a 100-mile buffer zone around the nation's borders that nearly completely eliminates every Constitutional protection.

Jeh Johnson hasn't been in the position long, but he's already descended into inadvertent self-parody. This speech was apparently delivered with complete sincerity, which means Johnson has no idea how his agency is perceived. There are very few people who believe the DHS is some sort of civil liberties champion. Jeh Johnson is obviously one of them.

Filed Under: dhs, encryption, homeland security, jeh johnson, silicon valley

DHS Wants To Expand 'See Something, Say Something' To Retailers Selling You Pressure Cookers

from the well,-more-than-they-do-already dept

"See something, say something" continues to be the Dept. of Homeland Security's favorite words. Concerned that its sprawling reach and 100-mile, border-encompassing "Constitution-Free Zone" aren't protective enough, it has routinely called on the American people to report anything suspicious activities their fellow Americans might be participating in… like taking pictures of public structures… or using a hotel's side exits.

Now, the DHS wants to take it further. The DHS wants to turn every retail store into the haphazard debacle that is the TSA's screening process. No, store employees won't be frisking your kids or detaching medical equipment from your friends and neighbors, but they will be making uninformed decisions about your purchases. (via Ben Swann)

Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson said his department will be issuing new guidance to retailers this week giving them pointers on how to spot potential terrorists among their customers by looking at what they're buying.

While saying the government cannot prohibit sales of some everyday materials, Mr. Johnson said retailers should be trained to look for anyone who buys a lot from what he described as a "long list of materials that could be used as explosive precursors."

He said it was an extension of the "If you see something, say something" campaign launched by his predecessor, former Secretary Janet Napolitano, which tries to enlist average Americans to be aware of their immediate environment.

Since it would be impossible to train thousands of retail store employees properly, this will likely take the form of an item watchlist, one that will be constantly subject to change. It will probably also instruct employees to view perfectly normal shopping behavior as suspicious.

As has been the result of previous "see something, say something" efforts, this new directive will create another massive database of false positives for Fusion Center employees and local law enforcement to deal with. Johnson specifically cited pressure cookers (while stating the government couldn't actually forbid their sale) as one example. If so, then this directive has no chance in hell of catching terrorists and is guaranteed to serve up a lot of unsuspecting (and unsuspicious) consumers for further government examination.

Pressure cookers are a legitimate item that thousands of consumers use. Now, they're viewed as the equivalent of buying a U-Haul truck full of fertilizer. Past incidents are prompting future actions, much as they do with the TSA (shoe bomber? off with your shoes!). Constantly being one step behind the clumsiest terrorists isn't going to keep the country any safer. It's just going to make it a worse place to simply "go about your business."

Johnson says the DHS is looking for "explosive precursors," which could be nearly anything. Because retail outlets don't share customer purchase data with each other, this may result in the DHS attempting to justify the requisition of data from multiple retailers using credit/debit card numbers as a starting point. (Just business records, folks. No Fourth Amendment to see here.) And as has been common for forever now, people using cash to purchase stuff will be viewed as extra suspicious.

This is another dangerous, stupid step that won't catch terrorists but will generate tons of budget-justifying busywork for the DHS, and put more people on the government's radar who've done nothing more suspicious than buy things they need or want.

Filed Under: dhs, explosive precursors, homeland security, jeh johnson, pressure cookers, retailers, see something say something

Instead Of Nominating New DHS Boss, Obama Should Look At Disbanding DHS

from the a-mistake-whose-time-has-come dept

As you may have heard, last week President Obama nominated Jeh Johnson, the former General Counsel of the Defense Department, to be the new head of the Department of Homeland Security. While he's certainly better than some other proposed candidates, he's not exactly known as a supporter for civil liberties. He's been a point person defending the use of drone-strikes, even on US citizens. He also has defended the collection of metadata by the NSA. Oh, and in his remarks after President Obama announced the nomination, he talked all about 9/11 and how he's spent his time since then trying to act in response to that.

Of course, many have questioned his qualifications to lead an organization like DHS, noting that it's a pretty big leap from his last job:

“I think it’s a stretch because you go from administering a relatively small and homogenous staff… to administering a huge and very diverse staff, with things like law enforcement responsibility, immigration and border control responsibility,” says one former Obama Justice department official who worked with Johnson. “It’s just a very diverse set of issues and set of people to manage, and he has no experience with managing any of them.”

But, really, there's a bigger issue here: why do we still have a Department of Homeland Security in the first place? It seems like the whole thing is a massive bureaucratic disaster. Over the years, we've covered how the crowning jewel of DHS, its so-called "fusion centers" that tried to bring together various groups for anti-terror purposes -- the very reason that DHS was put together in the first place -- were a colossal failure. They were incredibly wasteful of taxpayer funds, created no useful intelligence at all in the fight on terror, and were regularly cited for violating civil liberties. More recently, we've noted how Customs and Border Patrol has basically become a rogue agency that can do whatever it wants with what appears to be no oversight or consequences. We've similarly seen how Immigration and Customs Enforcement (another sub-agency within DHS) was involved in illegal censorship and questionable seizures of blogs, just because the RIAA complained.

And there's plenty more. Apparently, DHS only just figured out how to actually track its finances. And this is after it spent heavily on massive tech projects that didn't work.

Maurer says that the department has only just begun to keep adequate financial books. Several big DHS projects have been expensive failures. Billions of dollars were spent on technology to secure the southern border and screen cargo containers for radioactive materials. In both cases, the tech just didn’t work.

DHS was created in the hysteria following 9/11. It officially was created in 2003, and has now been in existence for a decade. In that time, it appears to have failed at a variety of key things, and it's entirely unclear if it's created any benefit at all. Matt Yglesias pointed out last week that rather than nominating a new boss, we should be admitting that creating DHS was a mistake. It seems like that would be a much more productive step at this point.

Filed Under: barack obama, bureaucracy, department of homeland security, dhs, homeland security, jeh johnson