Laura Loomer Owes $124k In Legal Fees After Losing Lawsuit Over Having Her Twitter Account Reported And Banned

from the $124,000-more-expensive-than-just-letting-the-ban-ride dept

Alt-right "personality" (I guess?) Laura Loomer keeps filing lawsuits and losing them. Loomer seems to believe it's legally actionable to be moderated by social media services. No court has agreed with her. Between Section 230 and the First Amendment, Loomer doesn't have a case. Oblique approaches -- like claiming getting kicked off Twitter is tortious interference in a (nonexistent) business relationship (Loomer and Twitter, according to Loomer, but definitely not according to Twitter) -- haven't been any more successful.

Grasping at straws and switching attorneys in midstream hasn't helped matters. This case involved Loomer trying to sue CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relationships) and Twitter in Florida, claiming CAIR's reporting of her Twitter account tortiously interfered with Loomer's get-rich-quick plan of being extremely extremist online. It only took six pages for a federal judge to dismiss Loomer's baseless claims.

By the time that dismissal happened, it was too late for Loomer. Seven months after the lawsuit was filed (in October 2019), CAIR approached Loomer and suggested a settlement under Florida state law -- one that would have been much cheaper for Loomer. Loomer refused. That has turned out to be a very expensive decision. (h/t Techdirt reader Thad)

The court [PDF] says the offer of judgment complied with Florida law and could have provided Loomer a quicker, cheaper way to step away from her doomed litigation. Loomer argued the offer wasn't proper because she was seeking injunctive relief in addition to monetary damages. A judgment offer would obviously have short-circuited injunctive relief. But the court points out Loomer only mentioned an injunction in the complaint and never bothered to follow up on seeking this particular form of relief.

I find that the true relief sought against the CAIR Defendants in the Amended Complaint was only monetary damages and that the Amended Complaint makes only a “passing reference” to equitable relief. The only equitable relief directly mentioned in Plaintiffs’ complaint is a summary request for “preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent defendants from continuing their unlawful conduct.” ECF No. 1-2, at 41. During the 8 1/2 month period between the filing of the Amended Complaint (March 3, 2019) and the District Court’s dismissal order (November 19, 2019), Plaintiffs never filed a motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. This evidence circumstantially shows that Plaintiffs were not actually pursuing equitable relief. And, in addition to Plaintiffs not seeking an injunction, the Amended Complaint is framed in terms of monetary damage; it repeatedly and exclusively alleges economic harm to Plaintiffs “in an amount to be proved at trial.”

Monetary it is! But not the way Loomer hoped. After doing some back-of-the-filing-envelope math bringing hourly rates down from their DC levels (where CAIR is HQed) to Florida levels (where the lawsuit was originally filed), the court has some bad news for a plaintiff who arguably doesn't have enough cash on hand to buy new tires.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs shall reimburse Defendants:

Attorneys’ Fees: $123,761.65 allocated as follows:

CAIR Foundation, Inc. $117,297.90

CAIR Florida, Inc. $6,463.75

Costs: $661.72

That's how much being this wrong costs someone who's so sure they're right they blow off a cheaper offer made months before the attorneys' fees really started racking up. I don't know how many people are still interested in Loomers' windmill tilts, but I have to imagine an eighth of a million puts a pretty good dent in her legal warchest.

Filed Under: content moderation, fees, florida, laura loomer, legal fees
Companies: cair, twitter

DC Appeals Court Dumps Lawsuit Claiming Multiple Tech Companies Are Engaged In An Anti-Conservative Conspiracy

from the come-back-with-something-actionable dept

Early last year, a federal court dumped a lawsuit filed by alt-right figureheads Laura Loomer and Freedom Watch (Larry Klayman's organization) alleging multiple online platforms were engaging in a government-enabled conspiracy to silence them. Mixing and matching liberally from precedent that didn't say what the plaintiffs thought it said, the lawsuit tried to skirt around things like Section 230 immunity by pretending this was about being unconstitutionally blocked from entering public spaces.

The lawsuit has now been rejected twice. The DC Circuit Appeals Court decision [PDF] sums up the action at the lower level, noting that it's affirming the call made by the district court.

FreedomWatch and LauraLoomer (collectively, “FreedomWatch”) brought this suit against Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Apple (the “Platforms”) alleging that they conspired to suppress conservative political views and violated the First Amendment, the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Freedom Watch had standing to sue but failed to allege colorable legal claims.

The platforms being sued aren't happy standing was even granted to Freedom Watch. But that hardly matters because standing or not, there are no actionable claims in the lawsuit. The Appeals Court points out the obvious to the plaintiffs.

Freedom Watch’s First Amendment claim fails because it does not adequately allege that the Platforms can violate the First Amendment. In general, the First Amendment “prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019). Freedom Watch contends that, because the Platforms provide an important forum for speech, they are engaged in state action. But, under Halleck, “a private entity who provides a forum for speech is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor.” Freedom Watch fails to point to additional facts indicating that these Platforms are engaged in state action and thus fails to state a viable First Amendment claim.

The court also says there's no evidence of a conspiracy between the platforms that might engage antitrust law. Freedom Watch speculated some platforms are willing to lose money to shed themselves of "conservative" users to align their user base with the developers' and owners' political views. The court points out similar conduct by multiple platforms is not enough to substantiate a conspiracy claim.

Freedom Watch does not explain why either factor tends to show an unlawful conspiracy, rather than lawful independent action by the different Platforms.

The same goes for the plaintiffs' anticompetitive practices claim.

The only anticompetitive conduct that Freedom Watch alleges (without supporting factual allegations) is that the Platforms conspired against it to suppress conservative content, but not that the Platforms conspired to acquire or maintain monopoly power. A § 2 claim requires the latter allegation.

And, like the lower court, the Appeals Court isn't willing to stretch the District of Columbia's Human Rights Act to read more like the Americans With Disabilities Act, which has seen successful claims brought against websites. But being banned from a platform isn't the same as being discriminated against by a lack of equal access. More to the point for this case, precedent in the district has not equated social media platforms to physical public spaces.

Freedom Watch argues that we should interpret this local statute more broadly to make it consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act. That Act also contains a provision concerning places of “public accommodation,” and several federal courts have concluded that clause sweeps wider than just physical places. See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994). But as the district court noted, other federal courts have reached the opposite conclusion and held that only physical places qualify as places of public accommodation under the ADA. See Freedom Watch, 368 F.Supp.3d at 39. Moreover, the D.C. Court of Appeals is the arbiter of D.C. law and the definitions of “public accommodation” in the two laws are different from one another.

It's not over yet, though. The plaintiffs can still attempt to waste the time of the DC Appeals Court by asking for a rehearing. Or they can take it to the top level by petitioning the Supreme Court to examine a bunch of baseless claims that couldn't survive a motion to dismiss at the lowest level of the federal court system. Freedom Watch and Laura Loomer are free to spend their litigation money however they want. But we're the ones on the hook for paying federal judges to peruse garbage takes masquerading as causes of action. And that's kind of irritating.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, anti-conservative bias, antitrust, bias, content moderation, dc circuit, free speech, freedom watch, laura loomer, section 230
Companies: apple, facebook, google, twitter

Court Says It's Not Tortious Interference To Report Your Account Or Ask Twitter To Ban You

from the 230-wins-again dept

Laura Loomer, professional troll, these days seems most well known for all the internet platforms that have banned her:

Loomer is banned from Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Medium, Paypal, Venmo, GoFundMe, Uber and Lyft for violating their terms of service, in many cases by using hateful and Islamophobic speech.

That is a pretty impressive list right there. She's apparently trying to run for Congress to use that as an argument for why she should be let back onto these platforms, but so far that's not working either. She's also been suing companies for kicking her off the platform, which seems like a good way to get many lessons in how Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act works. In one such lawsuit, she also sued CAIR, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, arguing that CAIR's "reporting" of her Twitter account to Twitter violated all sorts of laws.

Spoiler alert: it did not. It does not violate any law whatsoever to report an account to Twitter.

The court dismissed a variety of claims for procedural reasons, leaving just a claim of "tortious interference of a business relationship," but that has also been dismissed for a bunch of reasons. First: the lack of any actual business relationship that CAIR could have possibly interfered with. Loomer and her lawyer argued that there was a business relationship between Loomer and her followers, and, separately, between Loomer and Twitter, but the Court was quick to issue a big fat "nope" to both ideas. First, the "business relationship" between Loomer and her followers:

With respect to the relationship between Loomer and her Twitter followers, the Court finds that Loomer has failed to establish an actual business relationship with identifiable customers.... As the Florida Supreme Court has made clear time and again, an action for tortious interference with a business relationship does not lie where the business relationship alleged is one with the “community at large” as opposed to one with identifiable customers.... Here, Plaintiffs fail to identify discernable customers and instead allege a business relationship with Loomer’s Twitter community at large.

Specifically, Loomer contends that Defendant tortiously interfered with the business relationship between Loomer and her Twitter followers by convincing Twitter to ban Loomer from its platform. While the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true, Loomer’s relationship with her Twitter followers—no matter how economically beneficial such a relationship may have been—is a relationship with the community at large, not with identifiable customers.... Given that Loomer’s alleged business relationship with her followers does not sufficiently identify customers, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first prong of a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship.

What about her "business relationship" with Twitter? That, too, does not actually exist:

Similarly, with respect to Loomer’s alleged business relationship with Twitter, Plaintiffs have pleaded nothing to suggest Loomer and Twitter had a business relationship as “evidenced by an actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which in all probability would have been completed if the defendant had not interfered.”... For starters, Count II of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations suggesting the existence of a business relationship between Loomer and Twitter. Still, at the Hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that Defendant interfered with Loomer’s right to use Twitter as a platform. However, when pressed to identify the nature of the business relationship between Loomer and Twitter, and Plaintiffs’ corresponding legal rights pursuant to that relationship, Plaintiffs could not do so. Put simply, no business relationship can be inferred merely from Loomer’s decision to use Twitter, and Defendant cannot be found liable for tortious interference with a business relationship where no business relationship has been established.

The court then goes even further and points out that even if Loomer could demonstrate a business relationship with Twitter (which she could not), it wouldn't matter anyway, thanks to CDA 230:

Moreover, even if Plaintiffs had established a business relationship between Loomer and Twitter, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2), insulates internet providers, such as Twitter, from exactly the kind of liability Loomer now seeks to impose upon Defendant. Under the CDA, Twitter cannot be held liable for its decision to exercise traditional editorial functions, such as moderating content on its platform. Mezey v. Twitter, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-21069-KMM, 2018 WL 5306769, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2018). Here, Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant liable for just that.

At the Hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that by urging Twitter to ban Loomer, Defendant had interfered in Loomer and Twitter’s business relationship. However, even accepting as true Plaintiffs’ proposition that Defendant reported Loomer’s account and convinced Twitter to ban Loomer, doing so does not create a cause of action for tortious interference with a business relationship. Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the mere reporting of a Twitter user—however insistent such reporting may be—is sufficient to constitute tortious interference in a business relationship between Twitter and the targeted user is, to put it mildly, nonsensical. A cause of action for tortious interference simply cannot exist each time an individual reports another Twitter user. And at the Hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel could not overcome this line-drawing problem. Put simply, Plaintiffs cannot use a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship as an end-run around the CDA’s explicit prohibition that Twitter cannot be held liable for its decision to moderate content on its platform.

Why, yes, the argument is nonsensical, and that's probably why the court needed just six quick pages to dismiss the lawsuit.

Filed Under: cda 230, content moderation, laura loomer, section 230, tortious interference
Companies: cair, twitter

Laura Loomer Files Defamation Suit Against Facebook For Calling Her 'Dangerous' When Booting Her From The Platform

from the [makes-popcorn-but-not-a-whole-lot-of-it] dept

Having failed to convince a federal court that multiple social media services are engaged in a First Amendment-thwarting conspiracy against far right sideshows like Laura Loomer, Larry Klayman is back with another federal lawsuit featuring his new favorite plaintiff. It's a defamation lawsuit that attempts to portray moderation explanations by Facebook as malicious statements meant to destroy Loomer's reputation.

Perhaps the best way to explain this lawsuit is to let Larry Klayman explain it in his own words:

Today, Larry Klayman, the founder of Freedom Watch and a former federal prosecutor announced the filing of a defamation lawsuit by conservative investigative journalist Laura Loomer against Facebook. The complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Case No. 9:19-cv-80893), alleges that Facebook and its wholly owned sister company Instagram, in banning Ms. Loomer from the social media sites, maliciously defamed her by publishing that she is a "dangerous individual" and a domestic Jewish terrorist.

Seems pretty straightforward, although it's difficult to see anything anyone says about Laura Loomer damaging her reputation. Klayman's press release says he's demanding 5% of Facebook's net worth for his client -- bringing the theoretical payday to over $3 billion. Saying this is "standard" for calculating punitive damages doesn't make this a standard damages request.

But there's more. Klayman is not content to let the facts do the talking. His press release offers plenty of speculation as well. And it's not just regular speculation. It's speculation riddled with spelling and grammatical errors. Never write angry, folks.

Loomer has been a strong advocate not just for conservative causes, but also to stem the growing anti-Semitism in Congress and threat of Islamic terrorism. In this regard, she was banned by Facebook and Instagram by simply revealing the truth. Facebook and its CEO and founder Jeff Zuckerberg is a self-hating leftist Jew sympathetic of Islamic extremism. Klayman sued Zuckerberg and Facebook years ago for allegedly furthering a Palestinian Infitada calling for and which resulted in the death of Jews.

Have fun with that paragraph, commenters. It has since been corrected on Klayman's site, but those errors will live on forever at every website that publishes unaltered press releases as "news."

Anyway, the lawsuit is standard Klayman stuff, complete with an unsympathetic plaintiff. Unsympathetic plaintiffs need their rights defended and their grievances addressed, but it's tough to claim reputational damage when you're a self-sabotaging font of ignorance and bigotry.

The filing [PDF] claims Facebook defamed Loomer when it banned her from the platform. The initial statement by Facebook isn't defamatory and is merely an expression of its opinion of her dubious contributions to the public discourse.

In a statement released and published widely to the public in this district, nationally and internationally, Defendant Facebook explained their purported and false justification behind Ms. Loomer's ban:

We've always banned individuals or organizations that promote or engage in violence and hate, regardless of ideology. The process for evaluating potential violators is extensive and it is what led us to our decision to remove these accounts today.

In other words, Facebook moderators believe Laura Loomer is a promoter or perpetrator of violence and/or hate and had violated Facebook's rules once too often. Therefore, her accounts were banned. This is a statement of opinion that Klayman is attempting to portray as an unjustified and deliberate misrepresentation of Loomer and her posts.

In issuing the ban against Ms. Loomer, Defendant Facebook and its sister publication Instagram publicly designated her as “dangerous,” which publication was widely disseminated in this district, nationally and internationally.

Facebook offered more clarification on this moderation decision, which is also presented as defamatory, even though it isn't.

A spokesperson for Defendant Facebook represented and published that:

… such factors [for designating an individual as “dangerous”] include whether the person or organization has ever called for violence against individuals based on race, ethnicity, or national origin; whether the person has been identified with a hateful ideology; whether they use hate speech or slurs in their about section on their social media profiles; and whether they have had pages or groups removed from Facebook for violating hate speech rules.

While this statement appears pretty straightforward, Klayman clouds the issue by digging into Facebook's Community Standards. In doing so, Klayman attempts to put words into Facebook's mouth.

According to Defendant Facebook’s own posted Community Standards, “Dangerous Individuals and Organizations” are defined as “organizations or individuals involved in the following: Terrorist activity, Organized hate, Mass or serial murder, Human trafficking, [or] Organized violence or criminal activity.”

Ms. Loomer does not fall, or come close to falling, within any of the defined groups set forth by Defendant Facebook.

Facebook did not say Loomer was a dangerous individual as defined by the Community Standards. It only stated why it had banned her from the platform, and gave its reasons for doing so -- none of which included portraying Loomer as a violent criminal.

In defense of Loomer and to counter Facebook's appraisal of Loomer, Klayman mysteriously offers up a random tweet by his client.

In fact, Ms. Loomer uses social media to call out anti-Semitism, Islamic terrorism, political violence, and violence against homosexuals, as just one example once having tweeted:

Ilhan is pro Sharia Ilhan is pro- FGM Under Sharia homosexuals are oppressed & killed. Women are abused & forced to wear the hijab. Ilhan is anti Jewish.

Ok then. Because of this assessment and banning, Facebook has apparently done $3 billion in damage to Loomer's otherwise unsullied reputation.

Plaintiff Loomer has been severely harmed and damaged by these and other false and misleading statements by Defendant Facebook, because they subjected her to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, and disgrace, and the threat of severe bodily injury or death by those who are now lead to believe that she is dangerous and a domestic terrorist against Muslims in particular. Muslims and other extremists thus are now prone to retaliate against her and her life is in mortal danger.

Plaintiff Loomer has been severely damaged by these false and misleading statements because they damaged Plaintiff Loomer’s reputation and good will and severely harmed financially in her profession and business as a conservative investigative journalist, as well as personally.

While I don't doubt that Loomer being banned from Facebook and Instagram had a negative effect on Loomer's various schemes and self-promotion, it's a stretch to say it caused $3 billion in damage to her reputation and her livelihood. The lawsuit says Loomer's been subjected to "hatred, distrust, ridicule, content, and disgrace" since Facebook booted her, but come on: Loomer was being "subjected" to all of that long before Facebook pulled the plug.

Facebook is free to make whatever moderation decisions it wants. At least that's not what's being sued over this time. But trying to construe statements accompanying moderation decisions as defamation is going to be a tough sell. It needs a good salesperson to pitch it to federal judges. Unfortunately, Larry Klayman is the kind of salesperson who tends to get uninvited long before the product demonstration can even begin.

Filed Under: content moderation, defamation, jeff zuckerberg, larry klayman, laura loomer, mark zuckerberg, section 230
Companies: facebook

Court Dismissed Lawsuit Brought Against Social Media Companies Alleging An Anti-Conservative Conspiracy

from the lawsuits-are-the-new-tinfoil dept

Alt-right sideshows Laura Loomer and Larry Klayman sued Twitter, Facebook, Google, and Apple for [checks filing] participating in a government-enabled conspiracy to deplatform Freedom Watch/Loomer in order to further a leftist agenda, etc. etc. ad nauseum. Their complaint alleged violations of the Sherman Act, DC's public accommodation law, and the First Amendment. In support of these allegations, the plaintiffs offered vague theories about "public platforms" and some misreadings of pertinent court precedent. (via Eric Goldman)

After a round of motions, the court has ruled in favor of everyone being sued. The decision [PDF] makes it clear none of the arguments made by the plaintiffs hold water, much less achieve complete coherence. The only thing the court agrees with is that Loomer and Freedom Watch have standing to bring the suit. But standing is only worth something when your arguments have merit.

While they have established standing, the Plaintiffs have failed to state viable legal claims. Consider first their Sherman Act arguments. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 7 several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. “Independent action is not prescribed” by § 1. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760 (1984). So a valid claim must allege that the Platforms “had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.” Id. at 764. The Plaintiffs’ claim fails to do this.

True, the Amended Complaint repeatedly states that the Platforms have engaged in a conspiracy or illegal agreement. See, e.g., Am. Compl. 4, 5, 12, 17. But it offers only these conclusory statements to suggest the existence of such an agreement. It includes no allegations, for example, that any of the Platforms met or otherwise communicated an intent to collectively suppress conservative content.

A conspiracy requires the participation of conspirators. But some of the alleged conspirators still played ball with the plaintiffs, which undercuts the conspiracy needed to sufficiently allege antitrust violations.

The Plaintiffs also suggest that the Platforms “have engaged in ‘conscious parallelism’ and in concert mimicked each others’ refusal to deal with Freedom Watch and Ms. Loomer.” Am. Compl. 21. But Freedom Watch admits that it “has and still does pay Google and YouTube, Facebook and the other Defendants for services.” Id. at 11. This admission contradicts assertions of a coordinated “refusal to deal” with the Plaintiffs.

The complaint fares no better when dealing with the second antitrust allegation -- the supposed "monopoly" power of the [checks notes] four defendants being sued. As the court points out, the plaintiffs could have brought some data to their legal fight. Instead, they chose to bring conclusory statements and assertions about "leftist agendas."

[T]he Plaintiffs offer no market share data for any of the Platforms in either the local or worldwide markets for media and news publications. Instead, they make claims about the “social network global market,” the “social networking advertising revenue” market, the “digital ad revenues” market, and the “mobile ad market.” Am. Compl. 18. And though the Amended Complaint states that “59% of Twitter users get their news through the Twitter platform” and that “48% of all American adults [get] their news from Facebook,” it offers no support for the notion that either firm has achieved or tried to achieve monopolization of the nationwide media and news publications market.

The allegations claiming that kicking Loomer/Freedom Watch violated DC's Human Rights Act is just as ridiculous. The court points out the law refers only to physical public spaces and it's not willing to re-litigate a DC circuit opinion and/or rewrite local law on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Finally, the court addresses the most ridiculous of all the lawsuit's assertion: that moderation decisions by social media services somehow violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs cite the Packingham decision by the Supreme Court, completely misreading that decision's findings. In that case, the court said the government couldn't prevent people from accessing internet services. Loomer and Klayman pretend it actually said platforms can't ban people from accessing their platforms. The district court points out the distinction the plaintiffs are ignoring.

True, in Packingham, the Supreme Court recognized that Facebook and Twitter are among the “most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views” in society today. 137 S. Ct. at 1735. But the case involved a challenge to a state law that limited the speech rights of certain criminals on these platforms. Id. at 1738. It did not create a new cause of action against a private entity for an alleged First Amendment violation.

The second citation from the plaintiffs isn't any better, and the court again restates the obvious: moderation decisions by private companies are not actions taken by government entities, no matter how many users the platforms accommodate.

[T]he Plaintiffs here allege no nexus between the Platforms’ actions and a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state. Nor do they contend that the Platforms were designated by the state to perform a governmental operation. Instead, the Amended Complaint focuses on the Platforms’ alleged suppression of conservative political content. It details, for instance, the seemingly disparate treatment of conservative news publishers on Facebook and of conservative commentators on Twitter. Am. Compl. 4-5. But while selective censorship of the kind alleged by the Plaintiffs may be antithetical to the American tradition of freedom of speech, it is not actionable under the First Amendment unless perpetrated by a state actor. Thus, their claim must be dismissed.

This will surely be appealed. But the outcome will be the same. Actions by private companies can't violate rights and the existence of multiple social media platforms simultaneously preemptively defeats most antitrust allegations.

Some conservatives are convinced there's a leftist agenda being played out in social media. But rather than fight it with more speech, they're trying to bring the government in to fix these perceived problems. Whatever floats your speech boat, but remember, any "fixes" you get will remain in place for years -- even if the perceived pendulum swings the other way. The rules that "level the playing field" will come back to bite these agitators in their asses if they ever manage to talk a court or a bunch of legislators into taking their bad ideas seriously.

Filed Under: antitrust, bias, conservative bias, first amendment, free speech, larry klayman, laura loomer, monopoly, social media
Companies: apple, facebook, google, twitter