Apple Responds To DOJ's Attempt To Get Into Drug Dealer's Phone: Why You So Dishonest?

from the and-off-we-go dept

As we've discussed at length, there are multiple cases going on right now in which the US Justice Department is looking to compel Apple to help access encrypted information on iPhones. There was lots of attention paid to the one in San Bernardino, around Syed Farook's work iPhone, but that case is now over. The one getting almost but not quite as much attention is the one happening across the country in NY, where magistrate judge James Orenstein ruled against the DOJ a little over a month ago, with a very detailed explanation for why the All Writs Act clearly did not apply. The DOJ, not surprisingly, appealed that ruling (technically made a "renewed application" rather than an appeal) to an Article III judge and the case was assigned to judge Margo Brodie.

Apple has now filed its argument against the DOJ, making a variety of points, but hitting hard on the idea that the DOJ is flat out lying in now claiming that Apple's assistance in unlocking this phone is "necessary." As we've noted, the end result of the San Bernardino case, where the FBI eventually "figured out" how to get into the phone, raises questions about whether it truly exhausted all possibilities in this case -- which involves a newer phone, but an older operating system.

... the record is devoid of evidence that Apple’s assistance is necessary—and remains so even after a similar claim of necessity was proven untrue in a recent proceeding in California. Indeed, in its original application to Judge Orenstein, the government acknowledged that it sought Apple’s help to spare the government from having to expend “significant resources.”...

[....]

The government has made no showing that it has exhausted alternative means for extracting data from the iPhone at issue here, either by making a serious attempt to obtain the passcode from the individual defendant who set it in the first place—nor to obtain passcode hints or other helpful information from the defendant—or by consulting other government agencies and third parties known to the government. Indeed, the government has gone so far as to claim that it has no obligation to do so... notwithstanding media reports that suggest that companies already offer commercial solutions capable of accessing data from phones running iOS 7, which is nearly three years old.

And, of course, Apple suggests (as it has all along) that the DOJ is totally misreading and/or misrepresenting the All Writs Act:

The government would have this Court believe that the All Writs Act, first enacted in 1789, is a boundless grant of authority that permits courts to enter any order the government seeks—including orders conscripting private third parties into providing whatever assistance law enforcement deems appropriate—as long as Congress has not expressly prohibited its issuance. DE 30 at 18. But that characterization of the All Writs Act turns our system of limited government on its head. It simply is not the case that federal courts can issue any order the executive branch dreams up unless and until Congress expressly prohibits it. That construction of the All Writs Act has it exactly backwards. If the government’s view is correct, Congress would never need to pass permissive legislation in the law enforcement context because everything would be on the table until explicitly prohibited. That may be what the government prefers, but it is not the legal system in which it operates.

The company also questions whether or not it's really necessary for the government to get into this phone, given that the defendant in the case, Jun Feng, has already pled guilty and the phone hasn't been used in years. Also, the government didn't even seek a warrant to get into the phone for over a year after seizing it.

Apple also raises some procedural concerns. As noted above, the government just asked for a new judge to review, rather than doing an official appeal, and Apple points out that it's doing this to try to avoid certain standards:

In its papers, the government takes great pains to characterize its brief as a renewed application rather than an appeal from Judge Orenstein’s order, presumably to bolster its contention that Judge Orenstein’s order should be reviewed de novo.... In doing so, the government attempts to obscure the fact that this matter was extensively briefed, a hearing was held, supplemental briefing was provided, and Judge Orenstein issued a 50-page order. Moreover, the government’s insistence that it is entitled to a do-over is belied by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59 and Section 636 of the Federal Magistrates Act.

One of the key points made by the DOJ in its filing in this case was that Apple had been fine with previous such All Writs Act orders on phones running iOS 7, where it does have more access to information. But Apple notes that the details of this case are different in important ways: this is the first case where the judge specifically brought Apple into court, rather than ruling without Apple being involved at all (i.e. "ex parte").

To be sure, courts have previously issued ex parte orders directing Apple to “assist in extracting data from an Apple device through bypassing the passcode in order to execute a search warrant.” But the government’s cited orders were issued ex parte, without Apple’s participation, without the benefit of adversarial briefing on the scope of the All Writs Act, and with no supporting analysis. Apple also was not a party in United States v. Blake, No. 13-CR-80054 (S.D. Fl. July 14, 2014), in which the court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence gathered from an iPhone that Apple helped unlock. Accordingly, such cases are not even persuasive authority on the scope of the All Writs Act, let alone precedential; certainly such ex parte orders issued with little analysis should carry less weight than Judge Orenstein’s lengthy and reasoned opinion.

Most of the other arguments cover things discussed earlier, around why the All Writs Act doesn't apply and why CALEA covers this situation and does not require Apple to assist.

So, while the San Bernardino case may be over, the NY case is still raging. I imagine the DOJ's next filing will be... interesting as well.

Filed Under: all writs act, doj, encryption, james orenstein, jun feng, margo brodie
Companies: apple

If FBI Can Get Into A Device Running iOS 9, Why Does It Say It Still Needs Apple's Help To Get Into One Running iOS 7?

from the questions,-questions dept

The questions raised by the DOJ announcing that it was, in fact, able to get in to Syed Farook's work iPhone continue to grow. The latest is that, if it could get into that phone, running the fairly secure iOS 9, why is it still fighting the case in NY where it's trying to get into a drug dealer's phone running iOS 7? As you may recall, the case in NY has been going on for longer than the San Bernardino one. It started back in October when the DOJ demanded Apple's help in getting into the iPhone of Jun Feng (a drug dealer who admitted guilt, but who claims he forgot the passcode) and magistrate judge James Orenstein stepped in to ask Apple if this was a reasonable request.

Then, earlier this month, Orenstein wrote a pretty thorough dismantling of the Justice Department's position over the All Writs Act. The DOJ then appealed that ruling, which is now sitting in front of a non-magistrate judge, Margo Brodie. Part of the DOJ's argument made in the appeal was that this case is very different from the San Bernardino case, because in this case the phone is using iOS 7, which means that Apple already has the key to get in, and it doesn't require any further "burden" in terms of writing new code. As we noted at the time, this seemed to make the DOJ's case a little stronger.

However, now that the FBI has broken into the iOS 9 device (even if it claims the hack only works on some phones), it seems to argue in the exact other direction. Getting into an iOS 7 device is comparatively quite easy according to a bunch of folks. Apple really only ratcheted up the security in iOS with default encryption in iOS 8 -- meaning that any decent forensics team should be able to get into the iOS 7 device without much difficulty. Remember, a key part of the (somewhat made up) test that the DOJ insists must be used in All Writs Act cases like this is whether or not the third party's help is "necessary."

And in this case, the DOJ insisted that it had no way into this phone without Apple's help: If you can't read that, it's from the appeal, and it directly claims that the government "has explored the possibility of using third-party technologies" but says that it can't do so safely. That's difficult to believe in the wake of the DOJ's claims that it successfully got into Syed Farook's much more secure iPhone.

And yet... the NY case moves forward, with the DOJ making a new filing today giving Apple more time to respond to the government's application. It is, of course, possible, that the DOJ will eventually drop this case as well, but its argument that it absolutely needs Apple's help here seems to be yet another misleading, or simply false, statement from the Justice Department.

Filed Under: all writs act, doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, ios 7, ios 9, iphone, james orenstein, jun feng, margo brodie, necessity
Companies: apple