Confused Judge Says Video Game Play Has No Copyright, Because The Work Is Not 'Fixed'

from the that's-not-what-fixed-means dept

Just last month we joked about how confused the creator of PlayerUnknown's Battlegrounds, Brendan Greene, was when he claimed that there was no intellectual property for video games. That's completely wrong, and there are many, many cases to show that it's wrong. Yet... now there's a case that bizarrely, argues that video games don't get copyright (hat tip to Rick Sanders and Owen Barcala for flagging this one). The case is one that's been dragging through the courts for years, bouncing around, concerning publicity rights of former professional football players when used in EA games like Madden NFL.

The latest issue involves EA asking for the latest iteration of the case to be dismissed based on another ruling concerning NCAA basketball players and their publicity rights. In that ruling from April of this year, the 9th Circuit ruled (among other things) that federal copyright preempted state-based publicity rights claims. I don't want to dig too deeply into what all of that means, but suffice it to say that under the 1976 Copyright Act, the law says that federal copyright law now trumps all state copyright or copyright-like laws, and you can't hide behind some state law when federal law should apply. Here, the court said that the state-based publicity rights claims were blocked because of that, as the only issue should be covered under federal copyright law, where they would fail.

So, EA asked for this other case, filed by Michael Davis, to be dismissed, citing that ruling about preemption of publicity rights claims. But the district court judge, Richard Seeborg, has denied the motion, claiming that the ruling in that earlier case does not apply here. And he does so for... the most bizarre of reasons. Basically, he claims that large parts of video games don't get copyright... because they're interactive.

Here, game play in the Madden games is dynamic, interactive, variable, and in the hands of the consumer. Plaintiffs contend the avatars allegedly representing their likenesses even have performance characteristics representing plaintiffs’ own capabilities in their time as active NFL players. While recordings of actual football games are subject to copyright notwithstanding the independent actions of players during the course of the games, such recordings satisfy the requirement of copyright that the work be “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression. See Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 814 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Although courts have recognized that the initial performance of a game is an ‘athletic event’ outside the subject matter of copyright . . . the Copyright Act specifically includes within its purview fixed recordings of such live performances.”); 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Madden games, in contrast, allow game play that is not fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and part of plaintiffs’ claims is that their identities are reflected in that game play.

So... while there's something compelling about this particular reasoning for those of us who believe copyright has been stretched way too far, I'm pretty sure this is simply... wrong. The term "fixed in a tangible medium" generally just means that the work is somehow "recorded" on some form of media. It's basically saying that ephemeral things do not get copyright, but something that is recorded on paper, film, tape or a digital hard drive or whatever is "fixed." And thus, I'm pretty sure that Judge Seeborg... is just wrong here.

There is, potentially, a different argument that might be interesting if the works are created by artificial intelligence -- at which point we'd have to remember Naruto and the fact that non-humans don't get copyright. However, assuming that the actual artistic elements in the game were created by people working for EA, and are "fixed" within the game, it's difficult to see how the judge's ruling would hold up.

The fact that the game is dynamic when playing doesn't change the fact that the elements of the game itself are fixed in a tangible medium. I wouldn't necessarily mind it if copyright did, in fact, determine that individual game play elements were not fixed, but I can't see how under the law today that's actually the case. I would imagine that EA will appeal this particular ruling, and lots of copyright holders may weigh in on problems with the ruling itself.

Filed Under: copyright, fixed, michael davis, publicity rights, richard seeborg, video games
Companies: ea

Appeals Court Doesn't Think Putting Historical Figures In Video Games Is Free Speech

from the historical-history dept

Everyone knew this was coming. With the expansion of publicity rights that is currently ongoing, and more specifically after the case between former NCAA players and Electronic Arts that effectively killed off college sports video games, it was only a matter of time before former professional players turned their sights on the Madden franchise. Now that a few former NFL players have filed a publicity rights suit against EA, we again will see the First Amendment go up against publicity rights. So far, for free speech advocates and champions of video games being art, it isn't going well.

Some background. In the NCAA case, former athletes successfully argued that the NCAA forcing them to sign away the rights to their likenesses in order to play their respective sports deprived those athletes of the ability to license their likeness to other game-makers. It's an important distinction, because in the case of former NFL players no longer affiliated with the players' union, no such signing away of rights ever occurred. Instead, this is a simple battle directly between Electronic Arts, a game producer, and former players over the rights to use their likeness. In the Madden franchise, for many years the games have included historical teams, such as championship winning or otherwise notable teams, which have included nameless and faceless but otherwise faithfully reproduced historical athletes from those teams. Gamers can play with those teams against other historical teams, creating something of a historical fiction episode of professional sports. Historical fiction, of course, is protected by the first amendment as art. According to a recent ruling by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, video games are to be treated differently.

The case against EA was brought by Michael Davis and Vince Ferragamo, both retired NFL players whose likenesses were reproduced (sans name or picture) in Madden's historical teams within the games. EA sought to have the case thrown out with an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that it would be likely to win on several grounds. Included in those grounds was that the use of historical players' likenesses was transformative, that the publication of their game was in the public interest, and that its use of likenesses was artistically relevant to the game as a whole. The court didn't buy any of those arguments, most of which I understand, although the argument that the use of historical players in the game is transformative is at least an interesting one. But it's on the final argument EA made that the court seemed to go sideways in its logic. As reported by The Hollywood Reporter:

Finally, EA argued that the avatars were merely an incidental use. If the latest case makes its mark as precedent, it might be here. The 9th Circuit weighs the value, significance, purpose and duration of the use of the former players and comes away with a sense that the players' likenesses are worth something. Judge Fisher decides that "the former players’ likenesses have unique value and contribute to the commercial value of Madden NFL" and that "the former players’ likenesses are featured prominently in a manner that is substantially related to the main purpose and subject of Madden NFL."

From the ruling:

EA advances one additional argument in this appeal – its use of former players’ likenesses is protected under the First Amendment as “incidental use.” We disagree. We hold EA’s use of the former players’ likenesses is not incidental, because it is central to EA’s main commercial purpose – to create a realistic virtual simulation of football games involving current and former NFL teams.

Except that this seems to be entirely too simplistic an approach by the court and doesn't treat the game as having artistic value. Other genres of art don't typically suffer under this kind of distinction. Historical fiction seems like the logical place to point, in which public figures of notoriety are re-imagined in fictional accounts. Why should that use be different than historical players being used to play football against teams they never played against? What makes historical fiction okay, but historical games not? In its ruling, the court never really answers this question, instead going back to the NCAA case over and over again and asserting that the questions raised by EA in this case have already been decided.

As a result, the 9th Circuit affirms the lower court's decision to deny EA's motion to strike. The opinion not only reiterates what the same appellate circuit said last year in a similar case involving college athletes — something that could be disconcerting to TV broadcasters who are now facing legal heat — but also underscores some of the ways that publicity rights can gain an edge over First Amendment rights, best illustrated up until now by No Doubt singer Gwen Stefani's victory over a game that used her avatar.

But then why should this case be different than the one brought by Manuel Noriega, where his likeness was used in Activision's Call of Duty game without his permission. In that case, in a different jurisdiction, the court ruled that the First Amendment outweighed any publicity rights Noriega may have had. If video games are art, and they most certainly are, than former NFL players objecting to the historical fiction that comes about from EA including historical teams in its games ought be outweighed as well on First Amendment grounds. The state laws are different, but the protection of the First Amendment is not. And keep in mind, the game only includes basic info about these players that are historically accurate for the time of the team represented (height, weight, age of the player at the time they were on the team). No names or pictures were included. And the court was well aware of the protection video games are supposed to have as artistic endeavors.

The plaintiffs concede that their suit arises from an act by EA in furtherance of its right of free speech under the First Amendment. Indeed, “[v]ideo games are entitled to the full protections of the First Amendment, because ‘[l]ike the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas – and even social messages.’” Keller, 724 F.3d at 1270-71

The district court denied EA’s motion, however, concluding that the plaintiffs established a reasonable probability they will prevail on their claims. “‘Reasonable probability’ . . . requires only a ‘minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability.’”

And so the court refused to dismiss the case, which will now go trial. In that trial, we will learn whether California's publicity rights law will continue to value the desires of control of public figures over their own history or matters of art.

Filed Under: 9th circuit, california, football, free speech, historical fiction, historical figures, madden football, michael davis, publicity rights, vince ferragamo
Companies: ea

Obama Administration: $1.5 Million For Sharing 24 Songs Is Perfectly Reasonable

from the out-of-touch dept

In the latest round of the fight over how much Jammie Thomas-Rasset should pay for sharing 24 songs online, we have the federal government weighing in to say that $1.5 million for those 24 songs is perfectly reasonable and Constitutional. Must help that the White House Solicitor General was previously a litigator for the RIAA in the case, huh (though, he did not write the filing)?

If you don't recall, there are statutory rates for copyright infringement, which are ridiculously high, and it seems reasonable to question if those awards, which seem totally disproportionate to any "damages," could be seen as excessive under the Constitution.

The district court judge, Michael Davis, clearly felt so. Ditto Judge Nancy Gertner in the Joel Tenenbaum case. However, the government apparently is going to argue that the statutory rate is the statutory rate and we must respect that. The argument is basically the same behind the implementation for statutory rates in the first place. To paraphrase: "man, it's freaking hard to have to show actual damages (since there might not be any) and thus we shouldn't have to do that -- but should just be able to use these crazy high numbers." This argument seems silly frankly. It's basically saying that even if you could look at damages, you should never have to. That's a big part of the problem. It leads to cases like this where people are heavily pressured to settle just to avoid the risk of crazy high statutory damages.

But where the government's argument goes off the rails, is the idea that when it comes to statutory damages, there's never a due process question over whether the rates are excessive. That makes no sense, but it's the argument being made:

Contrary to defendant’s contentions, the Due Process Clause does not require that the statutory damage award be proportional to the actual harm defendant has caused the plaintiff. Defendant attempts to derive this rule from BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). But as the district court held, Williams, not Gore, establishes the applicable framework for determining whether an award of statutory damages under the Copyright Act comports with due process.

Gore is inapposite. It imposes limitations on a jury’s authority to award punitive damages in circumstances where the legislature has not constrained the jury’s discretion. It thus requires that the jury award not be grossly disproportionate to the plaintiff’s injury or defendant’s misconduct. Absent such limitations, the Gore Court reasoned, defendants could not have fair, constitutionally sufficient notice of the magnitude of potential sanctions.

The Gore framework, however, does not apply to a statutory regime in which Congress has specified in advance the range of appropriate damages. In that circumstance, the statute itself supplies the constitutionally required notice deemed missing in Gore. Moreover, unlike jury awards of punitive damages, an award of statutory damages is based on legislative judgments that must be accorded deference by the reviewing court. Williams, not Gore, sets forth the appropriate standards for conducting such review.

To summarize this argument, it's that Congress can do whatever the hell it wants in setting statutory rates, and no one can ever question if those rates are "excessive." Effectively, it's saying that Congress doesn't have to obey the Constitution. That makes no sense. And yes, it relies on this Supreme Court ruling from 1919, which is a pretty narrow ruling, concerning conditions under which you could measure such regulatory fines against the due process clause. However, this argument really tries to make that case do a hell of a lot more than it was designed to do -- while also trying to pretend that a whole series of other cases involving excessive fines as they relate to due process don't matter.

Either way, the end result is that the administration is effectively saying that a $1.5 million award for sharing 24 songs isn't just perfectly legal and reasonable, but that it's what Congress intended. All it really does is reiterate just how out of touch the White House is to reality.

Filed Under: jammie thomas-rasset, joel tenenbaum, michael davis, nancy gertner, statutory damages
Companies: riaa