DailyDirt: Correlation Is Not Causation

from the urls-we-dig-up dept

Big data is a term that's been getting some buzz as the next thing that's going to change everyone's lives (for better or worse, depending on how you look at it). Having a lot of data doesn't necessarily mean you also have a lot of useful knowledge. Garbage in, garbage out, so they say. And making correlations is easy compared to finding a direct causal relationship. However, that hasn't stopped (so-called) journalists from writing misleading headlines. If you hate correlations being mistaken for causation, submit examples you've seen in the comments below. Here are just a few to start off.

• Likes for curly fries on Facebook might correlate with high IQ scores, but don't click that like button just yet. Maybe there are more social experiments being performed on Facebook users than can be accurately counted. [url]
• Former high school athletes seem to get higher paying jobs (at least for the self-reporting men in this study). A lot of skills correlate with various forms of success. Perhaps enjoying the things you do (learned skill or not) is a reward unto itself. [url]
• Measuring the size of brain features can correlate with all kinds of activities, and people have been trying to measure brain sizes for a long time... because there are instruments that can measure the size of various brain parts. The interpretation of these measurements can lead to a lot of faulty conclusions. However, you won't often see the headline: "Watching moderate amounts of porn won’t hurt your brain." [url]

If you'd like to read more awesome and interesting stuff, check out this unrelated (but not entirely random!) Techdirt post via StumbleUpon.

Filed Under: big data, brain, causation, correlation, gigo, iq, journalism, pet peeves, success
Companies: facebook

US Chamber Of Commerce: Bollywood Is So Successful Without Strong Copyrights That It Will Fail Unless India Strengthens Its Copyrights

from the wtf? dept

The US Chamber of Commerce, the giant lobbying organization who led the fight for SOPA/PIPA, is apparently so invested in "must have stronger copyright laws" that it doesn't even bother making sense any more. It's released a bizarre statement claiming that India needs stronger copyright laws, because Bollywood is so successful. Right upfront, it notes how successful things have been:

Boasting the largest film industry in the world, the creative sector lies at the heart of the Indian culture and economy. As one of India’s largest employment sectors, an endless array of local professionals from technical, theatrical, and creative backgrounds are helping churn out 1,000 films in more than 20 languages annually.

You'd think those are signs that copyright law was working (largest film industry in the world, largest employment sectors, over 1,000 films produced annually -- about double Hollywood) and that this would imply that whatever level of copyright there is in India -- which is supposed to be an incentive to creativity -- was doing a decent job. But, no, apparently it's all broken.

The government, however, must improve national intellectual property (IP) laws and enforcement if it is going to seize on this opportunity and gain recognition in the global market and further empower local creators.

Hmm. Wait, you just said that it's the world's largest film industry and an unqualified success. So, why does it need to improve those laws and enforcement?

Specifically, Indian copyright law is unclear with the 2012 Copyright Act amendments further complicating and contradicting previous rule of law. Furthermore, the 2012 Act provides for broad exceptions that are incompatible with international norms. Also measuring relatively loware enforcement efforts, which are weak in application and don’t provide widely available civil and procedural remedies for copyright infringement.

And, yet, this laxity incentivized the creation of nearly double the films that Hollywood produces. Perhaps -- and I'm just suggesting things here -- the "international norms" and the higher levels of enforcement are holding back the industries elsewhere. If anything, this report seems to suggest that other countries should move towards broad exceptions, since it appears to have been quite successful in India.

Furthermore, much of the paper seems to suggest that India needs to fix its copyright laws to embrace the international opportunity for its films -- but that (again) makes no sense. India's IP laws don't apply outside of India, so they have no impact on the international opportunities, which are governed by other IP laws. And, again, if the industry is doing great in India (with little enforcement and greater exceptions), doesn't this indicate that India should push for the same elsewhere to better embrace that international opportunity?

It's quite a world in which the US Chamber of Commerce seems to be arguing that an example of a success story should lead to that successful model emulating less successful markets. I don't know how much money the MPAA pays the US Chamber of Commerce for these kinds of pieces, but it's not getting its money's worth.

Filed Under: bollywood, copyright, india, success
Companies: chamber of commerce

NYT Paywall Working Better Than People Expected, But That Doesn't Mean It's Working

from the treading-water dept

Over the past few days, there's been a lot of talk about the NY Times "paywall" and whether or not it's "working." It was kicked off by a Bloomberg piece arguing that things were going amazingly well with the paywall, proving the doubters wrong. I've actually had a surprising number of people contact me about that article, asking for my take on it -- so let's make a couple of upfront statements and then explore it:

1. First off, I agree that the performance of the NY Times paywall greatly exceeded my own expectations for it. I was quite harsh in predicting it would be a complete flop. I was wrong. It wasn't a flop. I explore why below.
2. That said, I don't think that it's been nearly as big a "success" as some are making it out to be, and I still think that it wasn't the best play that the NYT could have or should have made -- and it's doubtful that anyone else following in the NYT's footsteps would find similar results. And that's a pretty big problem, because even if you think the NYT's paywall should be judged a "success" it doesn't change the fact that its revenue continues to drop (and not just its print revenue -- digital revenue is struggling too). Perhaps the paywall may have limited the revenue collapse, but it has done little to create a new and sustainable business model.

Separately, it should be noted that the success "numbers" are based on an outside estimate from an analyst, and could be wildly off-base (in either direction). So, some grain of salt should be taken with the claims that the paywall made as much as it did. Now, let's do a bit of exploration.

Why has the paywall done better than expected:

• It's not really a paywall! This was a point we realized soon after the details were released, when it became clear that the paywall was so porous that no one would ever have to pay. Ever. As we noted, it's really the Emperor's New Paywall, in that it's completely invisible. If you don't want to pay, you just don't use javascript, or you remove the text after the ? at the end of the URL, or you open another browser, or you delete your cookies, or one of the half dozen or so other tricks that means you'll never ever face the paywall. In effect, the NYT's paywall is a donation system made to look like a paywall -- sort of like some museums with their "recommended donations" at the entrance. You never actually have to pay, but many people do out of convenience.
• They don't count links/earned media: This one is big. Since so much traffic comes via links these days, one of the major problems with paywalls is that they hurt this kind of traffic. For example, we try not to link to paywalled sites whenever possible -- but we will link to the NY Times, knowing that they let in any linked traffic, and it doesn't count against your "paywall meter." That at least meant that they weren't killing off important new sources of traffic, unlike many (if not most) other paywalls out there.
• The NY Times smartly figured out a way to get a ton of people signed up for free, to boost their early numbers. They did an ad deal with Lincoln, such that right as the paywall launched, anyone could get a free subscription by test driving a Lincoln. Who knows how many people actually took this up, but it bootstrapped the early numbers, and now everyone completely forgets about this (seriously, it's difficult to find any article that mentions this point any more).
• In the end, it appears that the NY Times is a paper that many people think is indispensable, and because they haven't bothered to look around and find out that you never actually have to pay, a lot of people have just paid up for the hell of it.

And... for why this still wasn't a particularly smart solution or the best possible move for the NY Times to make:

• As mentioned, overall results still suck. That's a pretty big deal. While the article claims that new subscriptions have finally started to outpace ad revenue declines, it seems unlikely that this will continue.
• Despite not blocking linked traffic, overall traffic hasn't been good. It's certainly not increasing.
• Proponents of paywalls insist that one key reason for a paywall is that it allows newspapers to charge advertisers more, since they better know their audience and can charge advertisers higher rates. It turns out that this is hogwash, and the NY Times has admitted that the paywall has had no impact on the rates they can charge for advertisements.
• And part of that may be because advertisers often tend to value scale and "mindshare" over targeting. Sure, they all claim to want premium audiences backed by data, but having dealt with way too many advertisers in my life, they always always always eventually go back to the scale question. And a paywall -- even a fake one like the NYT's -- tends to limit your ability to scale.
• And then there's my biggest issue in all of this. It's been entirely based on fooling users into thinking they need to pay, but not about adding more value for the users. As we've argued for years, there are plenty of opportunities to get users to pay, but it has to be about adding additional value beyond the content. It's why we've done things like providing additional scarce value for folks who choose to pay us. We don't block our content with a paywall, but we give people reasons to buy that provide them extra value (and feel free to do so, if you'd like).

Here's the crux of it: A solution based on giving people the same thing for a new, higher price only opens you up to disruption. A solution based on providing more value for your users that keeps them loyal to you is going to last a lot longer. The NY Times is, at the very least, in a unique position, in that many believe it provides coverage that can't be matched elsewhere. So they pay. But that's hard to say about almost any other newspaper (and for many, it's not even true of the NYT). We've been hearing more and more reports about other newspapers rushing into the paywall fold, only to find that almost no one signs up, and then they're left dealing with the aftermath of locked up content that only a few dozen people read. That's a disaster.

There are ways forward, but newspapers have to get beyond thinking there are only two choices: advertising and paywalls. The NY Times paywall has been more successful than many of us expected, but that hardly means it qualifies as a true "success story."

Filed Under: journalism, paywall, success, surprises
Companies: ny times

DailyDirt: Are Our Minds Made Up?

from the urls-we-dig-up dept

There are all sorts of correlations to be made between various personality aspects with success or enviable skill. No one discounts the hard work and roughly 10,000 hours needed to achieve some degree of mastery at a task, but on top of the blood, sweat and tears, there's always the nagging concern that a special gene or innate trait is necessary to achieve the greatest rewards. Determinism oftentimes creeps into our interpretations of scientific studies, and here are just a few examples to ponder.

• The Marshmallow Test is flawed in a way -- a single test of a toddler's ability to delay gratification doesn't predict as much as people may have thought. A simple change to the original 'Marshmallow Test' can significantly change how long a toddler is willing to wait for his/her sugary treat. [url]
• A test for "game intelligence" could predict successful soccer players -- but the conclusion is based on just 57 elite soccer players from Sweden who happen to do better on a standardized test for executive functions. These cognitive tests could be useful as a tool for developing better soccer players -- or they could create players who are just good at taking tests. [url]
• Novelty-seeking personalities have been correlated with some aspects of long term well-being. Neophilia also correlates with attention deficit disorder, compulsive spending and gambling... so a balance of personality traits seems to be optimal as usual. [url]

If you'd like to read more awesome and interesting stuff, check out this unrelated (but not entirely random!) Techdirt post.

Filed Under: game intelligence, marshmallow test, neophilia, personality traits, success

A Question For SOPA Supporters: How Will You Gauge SOPA's Success?

from the quid-pro-quo dept

With all the discussion of what SOPA will or won't do in terms of breaking the internet or violating the first and fourth amendments, what I have yet to see discussed in depth is how supporters will measure the success of SOPA, if passed.

So, I'd like to take this chance to ask supporters of SOPA directly: how will you gauge the success of SOPA? What I'm interested in hearing is if any sort of metric has been defined.

I'll lay out my case briefly: 

Like a lot of people, I'm of the belief that infringement can't be stopped. Even with this legislation in place, it's not difficult to imagine the same sort of whack-a-mole game that has plagued the content industries in the past will continue, only on a worldwide scale with the government's blessing. While this may increase the number of sites shut down or cut off from funding, I feel that it's overall impact will be minimal. I could be completely wrong about this, but I feel that those who still want to get something for free will still find a way, and find it much easier than those seeking to shut it down would imagine. The internet moves faster than 100+ year old industries and the government.

As collateral damage from this legislation mounts (and even the content industry's lawyer admits there will be some), there will be backlash from those affected. This has the possibility of encouraging more users to "stick it to the man," such as it were, increasing the amount of infringing activity.

If the intention of this legislation is to provide enforcement for copyright, my belief is that there should be some sort of metric or guideline to gauge its success. Without some sort of measurement in place, the very real possibility is that the enforcement efforts will continue to expand in scope and cause more and more collateral damage.

So, in all honesty, I'd like to open this thread to supporters of SOPA. I'd like to know how you'd measure the success of this legislation. Will it be based on the number of sites shuttered? Is it an increase in sales? If so, is there a certain percentage or dollar amount that would demonstrate the effectiveness of this bill? Is it something more vague or has someone out there run any sort of numbers on what a desirable outcome would be?

I'm not looking to get hung up on semantics ("piracy" vs. "infringement," "theft" vs. "sharing," etc.) or looking to rehash any arguments about infinite goods, piracy leading to sales, industry studies or anything that distracts from this question. I'm also not interested in hearing "we just want our rights and intellectual property respected/protected." This legislation goes far beyond anything that simplistic, especially something as unquantifiable as "respect." I'd like the discussion to stay focused on what SOPA proponents feel this legislation will accomplish.

How do you, as a supporter of SOPA, gauge SOPA's success?

Filed Under: copyright, metrics, sopa, success

RIAA Defends Lawsuit Spending... But Reminds Everyone How It Helps Screw Over Musicians

from the who's-rationalizing-now? dept

A few weeks ago, there was a lot of attention paid to the story of how the RIAA had spent $17 million and got back $391,000 in settlements. The RIAA is now defending its legal strategy by claiming that the lawsuits had other benefits, such as injunctions against certain sites and (my favorite) to "foster a respect for the rights of creators." It's difficult to see how that's working, as the legal strategy has not only mobilized many music fans against the RIAA and ridiculous copyright laws, but has even gotten top musicians to speak out against the RIAA and its views on copyright. On top of that, given the continued increase in file sharing usage, the whole claim is a joke.

Separately, though, the RIAA says that the numbers are misleading because "sometimes recoveries go directly to record label plaintiffs."

But that raises a different question. If the labels are getting this money... has any of it been passed on to artists? In the discussion on the original story, we had one commenter, who works as an auditor in the music licensing field, who pointed this out and noted that this money isn't going to artists or songwriters at all. We had pointed this out back in 2006, when part of the Google buyout of YouTube involved paying off the big record labels... and that deal was structured in a way that those labels didn't have to share that money with artists.

We've already seen how record label accounting is used to screw over musicians, but this is an important point as well. The RIAA positions itself as defending artists' rights. It talks about how these lawsuits are carried out to protect musicians and help those musicians earn a living. But it's becoming increasingly clear that of the money that actually comes in from these lawsuits, very little of it ever is seen by the artists the labels claim they're protecting.

Filed Under: lawsuits, riaa, success
Companies: riaa

Defining Success: Were The RIAA's Lawsuits A Success Or Not?

from the you-can't-handle-the-truth dept

Over the last few weeks, we've noticed that a series of folks who regularly portray "the loyal opposition" in our comments have been trying to make the case that the RIAA's legal strategy for much of the past decade was not, in fact, a dismal failure. They're posting editorials insisting that the lawsuit campaign was what was necessary to force laws to change in the RIAA's favor, for one thing. And then, one of our regular "anonymous" commenters submitted the following story, insisting that we would never publish it because "Techdirt never publishes the truth," as well as claiming that the following is proof that the RIAA's lawsuits against music fans was a "carefully crafted legal action that has produced results." The specific story is a story from Ars Technica about US Copyright Group's lawsuit campaign (which we've been covering as well), but which includes the following aside about the RIAA's lawsuits:

As the RIAA lawsuits showed us, most people will settle. Data from the recording industry lawsuits, revealed in a court case, showed that 11,000 of the 18,000 Does settled immediately or had their cases dropped by the labels. Seven thousand either refused to settle or never responded to the settlement letter, but after the RIAA subpoenaed their identities and filed "named" lawsuits against them, nearly every one settled.

After years of litigation, the number of people who have pursued a trial all the way to a verdict can be counted on one hand.

This, it appears, is the evidence that the RIAA's lawsuit campaign was a whopping success. Of course, some of us might define success in different ways. The RIAA set off this legal strategy, back in 2003, by claiming that this was part of its "education" campaign to get people to stop using file sharing networks, and go back to buying music directly. How has that worked? Oh, it hasn't. The number of people using file sharing networks to access unauthorized works has continued to grow at a rather rapid clip. And, of course, the real point of all of this was the bottom line: it was to try to help save the big five (at the time) record labels. Except that hasn't worked either. The big five became the big four and the big four are pretty damn close to becoming the big three, once everyone sorts out what to do with EMI. And all of them have a lot less money than they did before.

As for how successful the lawsuits have been for those big record labels? So successful that EMI threatened to leave both the RIAA and IFPI if it didn't back away from these lawsuits. So successful that Sony execs referred to the lawsuits as a "money pit" that have cost the industry millions without bringing back anything near that much in settlement fees.

The fact that lots of people paid up to settle extortion-like fees didn't stop people from using file sharing networks to access unauthorized materials. It didn't get more people to buy. It didn't help the bottom line. It hasn't helped the record labels sell more product. It certainly hasn't helped the big labels stay in business. Hell, it hasn't even helped the RIAA. Towards the end of the legal campaign, the RIAA ended up having massive layoffs of its own staff. And, let's not even get into discussing what the average music fan thinks of the RIAA and the big labels these days...

Success? If that's what you consider a success story, then you're doing it wrong. How you measure a success is everything, and if your metrics are that you got a large percentage of people to pay up for extortion-like lawsuits, pretty much guaranteeing they'd never buy from you again, while the rest of your business burned to the ground, I'm sorry if I have to question your definition of "success."

Filed Under: lawsuits, riaa, success
Companies: riaa