Slow Down TSA Lynch Mob: That Naked Scanner Expose Video Is Exaggerated & Old News
from the be-real dept
So, a video made by a TSA-critic and blogger named Jonathan Corbett has been making the viral video rounds, supposedly showing how "anyone can get anything past the TSA's scanners." Now, I've been a huge critic of the TSA's scanners and the TSA itself. I think the entire security process is a joke and a form of security theater. I think the naked scanners are a huge waste of taxpayer money and potentially dangerous. But... I'm somewhat surprised at how quickly people just believed what was said in Corbett's video. You can watch the video here:The images are very sensitive to the presence of large pieces of high Z material, e. g., iron, but unless the spatial resolution is good, thin wires will be missed because of partial volume effects. It is also easy to see that an object such as a wire or a box- cutter blade, taped to the side of the body, or even a small gun in the same location, will be invisible. While there are technical means to mildly increase the conspicuity of a thick object in air, they are ineffective for thin objects such as blades when they are aligned close to the beam direction.In other words, strap a knife to your side, and perhaps the machine won't spot it. We heard that years ago. So, nothing new here.
Plus, I'm pretty sure that the machines now take images from multiple angles, which would rule out this vulnerability. On top of that, Corbett bases his claim on a couple of sample images that are black and white -- and uses that to claim that a black object on your side will not show up against the black background. Once again, I'm pretty sure his info is now completely out of date. The TSA has been upgrading the scanners so they no longer show the "nude" picture. Just last month we showed an image of what the new machines show:
Now, it is true that Corbett was able to get through the machines with a metallic box in his side pocket, and that's his proof. He does this twice. While, again, I'm not impressed by the machines, I don't think this is "proof" in the sense that Corbett believes. First of all, official tests show that there's a ridiculously high error rate with these machines -- they let through "bad stuff" all the time. So, I agree with Corbett that the machines are a complete waste and should be done away with, but I don't think one guy going through the scanners twice without getting stopped for a little metallic box in his pocket... is absolute proof that anyone can get through without getting stopped.
Of course, it seems worth pointing out that a metal box is not a dangerous object, and the point of the machines (so we're told) is to stop threatening objects from getting through -- not just metallic objects. So it's possible that the TSA agents saw this thing in his pocket and immediately saw that it wasn't something dangerous. Corbett's test was whether or not the scanners detect metal. But they're not metal detectors, so the test itself is flawed.
So, while I don't agree with the TSA's response to this video in which "Blogger Bob" somewhat angrily snaps back about how important TSA scanning is, I don't think Corbett's claims are that convincing and I'm surprised at how much press it's been generating. Yes, the scanners are probably pointless, and it's all security theater, but that doesn't mean we should all stop thinking through the details on videos that potentially show some weaknesses in these machines.
Thank you for reading this Techdirt post. With so many things competing for everyone’s attention these days, we really appreciate you giving us your time. We work hard every day to put quality content out there for our community.
Techdirt is one of the few remaining truly independent media outlets. We do not have a giant corporation behind us, and we rely heavily on our community to support us, in an age when advertisers are increasingly uninterested in sponsoring small, independent sites — especially a site like ours that is unwilling to pull punches in its reporting and analysis.
While other websites have resorted to paywalls, registration requirements, and increasingly annoying/intrusive advertising, we have always kept Techdirt open and available to anyone. But in order to continue doing so, we need your support. We offer a variety of ways for our readers to support us, from direct donations to special subscriptions and cool merchandise — and every little bit helps. Thank you.
–The Techdirt Team
Filed Under: defeat, jonathan corbett, naked, scanner, security, security theater, tsa
Reader Comments
Subscribe: RSS
View by: Time | Thread
It wasn't the sewing kit...
The sewing kit was just what he bought to supply his "nefarious plot", what he used to sew the extra pocket to the side of this shirt. The "dangerous object" was the metal box he smuggled through security.
Although I had much the same reaction: let him try sneaking a gun, knife, or cupcake in his side pocket and see how far he gets.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: It wasn't the sewing kit...
Oops.. fixing.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
I doubt a would-be terrorist would be bold enough to try to exploit this vulnerability
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: I doubt a would-be terrorist would be bold enough to try to exploit this vulnerability
You ever look around when in these lines? Hundreds of people standing packed in like sardines waiting to pass through this security bottleneck. If a terrorist really wanted to do something they could just put bomb in a carry on bag and set it off when they are midway though the line with everyone else all packed up tight waiting to get through.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Re: I doubt a would-be terrorist would be bold enough to try to exploit this vulnerability
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
The problematic part is to trick the unicorns in TSA backstage. They'll smell dangerous cupcakes miles away.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
You give the TSA far too much credit. lol
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Re:
I suspect if depriving somebody of an item represents a loss of dignity of any sort, then the item represents a "terrorist" threat and must be confiscated.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
False. Imaging doesn't work this way. Not.at.all.
You may notice a 3-D rendering of the MMW images, now masked by the "gumby" software.
However, imaging can only take pictures in planes, and then render a 3-D image. Look closely at the 3-D images from MMW scanners, the sides are black. It's a trick of the eye.
The sides of an individual are invisible to all of these machines. All of them.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
A single image doesn't. Multiple images is what I was talking about.
However, imaging can only take pictures in planes, and then render a 3-D image. Look closely at the 3-D images from MMW scanners, the sides are black. It's a trick of the eye.
I'm not arguing that a single scan does it. I'm saying that it takes multiple images from different angles.
The sides of an individual are invisible to all of these machines. All of them.
I really don't think that's true.
I'm sure the machines can be fooled, but I don't think you'll have much luck if you think this trick will always work.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Re:
Physics says otherwise.
Both varieties, backscatter and MMW, take their views from the front and back plane of the subject. Even on the MMW with its fancy swing around arms, only goes to approximately 45-degrees past the subject. Watch any of these machines in motion. The sides are not captured, and therefore cannot be analyzed.
I don't "think" it to be true, I work with imaging every day. I know it to be scientific fact.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Re: Physics
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Re: Re: Physics
It's obvious you have a misunderstanding both of how imaging, and these machines, work. We can play the "No, you're wrong!" game all day.
The simple fact of the matter is that the MMW arms do not swing around to the sides of the body, and the backscatter machines use ionizing radiation to "bounce" or backscatter back to create an image.
I know everyone is impressed by the 3-D image. It's a rendering, not what the machine sees. The machine assumes the shape, it doesn't capture it.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Getting through twice is enough to prove the point
The machines don't have to be 100% ineffective to be fatally flawed, and I think he's met the burden of proof to show that at least some models are fatally flawed.
And if you know the machines take images from multiple angles, I'd prefer a citation rather than an "I'm pretty sure".
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
1) Go to the security line with ticket and ID in hand, shoes untied, items collected, laptop ready to be removed, etc...
2) Tell security you're opting out of the scan
3) Let them pat you down, but while doing so remember to make all the proper statements, such as "Come to this airport often?", "You know I normally have to pay for this", etc...
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
It's not that people don't want airport security: we do!
The TSA is an exercise in compliance. I'm glad you figured out how to do it.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
That would be the TSA brass and others who make up this theater that you so willingly submit to at the airport. The fact that you think these processes protect you or anyone in a significant way is part of the problem.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Re:
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Almost ;)
The exploit I put out is different. The idea is that the scanner can't tell the difference between a metal object on your side and the wall of the scanner (or empty space). The body scanners are only able to detect metal when metal is against your body and contrasts with your body. Out on the side, there is no contrast, and they are invisible.
I'm certainly not claiming this is rocket science. But this *is* what happens when you try security through obscurity: the obvious exploits aren't necessarily detected until years and $1B later. The TSA is (and all of us are) lucky that they were forced to confront it now rather than by a terrorist who uses it to kill Americans.
--Jon
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Almost ;)
This is a valid point. Its easy for a team of scientists/engineers to come up with a system they can not beat. However it usually takes about 15 minutes in the real world before someone else finds a way around it.
Case in point would be the bored 15 year old Scandinavian who cracked DVD protection in an afternoon after the studios spent year and 10s of millions implementing it.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Almost ;)
I don't think the exploit is that different, and I'm not convinced that the exploit you explain really works as well as you suggest it does. You getting through twice is hardly proof.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Re: Almost ;)
Imaging does not work in the way you suggest.
Jon is correct. I work with imaging. An object on the side of the subject will not bounce the x-rays back to the reader in the way human flesh will. Any item on the side of a body is invisible to these machines.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Re: Almost ;)
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Still taking nakey images......
The only change is that they no longer display the actual image on the monitor that's out in the open. It's still captured, it's still stored, and if they've gotten what they asked for in the last request for production the new machines are capable of transmitting the actual (not gumby) image across the network to another location.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
PS The ATR (think that's right, automated target recognition, going by memory not search) in your example pic only works on the millimeter wave machines. And it certainly works by processing the original output, which would still suffer from the original contrast problems. A new way of presenting the results doesn't change how the machine works!
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
Do you travel? If you go through the scanners, you DON'T go through the metal detectors.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Re:
Perhaps not in all cases, but I have seen it done.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
.32 ACP isn't dangerous. Is it?
His wife was accosted for having a BMW key that flips out of the holder with a rounded edge.
I was almost arrested for trying to bring toothpaste with me. TOOTHPASTE!
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
As far as I'm concerned...
I think the lynch mob can continue... Just because this particular video is mostly hyperbole doesn't mean these shenanigans should continue.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
http://boingboing.net/2012/03/08/tsa-body-scanner-guy-says-tsa.html
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
http://www.popehat.com/2012/03/08/in-which-i-strongly-caution-the-tsa-to-snort-my-taint -and-probably-get-on-the-no-fly-list/
The blogger wrote to someone named as speaking to reporters on behalf of TSA. They did indeed work for TSA.
The response...
"Any guidance provided is to caution reporters not to generalize that our technology doesn't work or print something without all the facts, based on an inconclusive YouTube video."
Should the TSA be giving "guidance" to reporters?
Funny to hear someone from TSA talking about facts as they-
are lacking many of them about how their tech works
any dangers from it
how their staff behaves
how their staff steals
how their staff shakes down people for cash to jump the line
how their staff go after pretty girls
how their staff "searches" people outside of checkpoints
and several other incidents they have always claimed didn't happen or were isolated incidents... until it happened so many times they couldn't cover it up anymore.
I'm not sure this YouTube video is correct or not, but the fact TSA wants to hide behind the "we can't reveal anything, it would help the enemy" excuses is really worrying. They could have simply made a video duplicating the original setup and debunked it... it worries me they just want to say its wrong, we fixed it now, trust us.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
A well timed attack on scanners
Not exactly sure, are you? Corbett passed through two scanners at two different airports. The experiment was designed to foil the first - the backscatter scanner which everyone knows cannot scan the sides of the body.
The second was an L3 Millimeter Wave scanner which rotates around the body and uses Automatic Threat Detection software. It was in use instead of a traditional metal detector arch. The German transport police called the tech "useless" after trials which gave an 80% false alarm rate.
A metal detector arch would have detected the metal box in both cases.
The video is pertinent especially as, despite German trials, the TSA keeps on buying this charlatan machinery, the UK is continuing trials with it and Australia has just announced its intention to use the technology and even make it compulsory.
It seems Corbett was telling you what you already knew, but what the US, UK and Australian governments had already forgotten.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
He could have put a knife inside the box, which reflects x-rays. That's why he chose to smuggle a box through. Please use your brain before writing an article.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]